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Abstract 
 
An unprecedented number of Labour MPs was elected in rural areas in England in 
1997.  This study examines critically examines the making of rural policy and the 
implications for rural politics over the life-time of New Labour in power between 1997 
and 2010.  
The analysis begins by evaluating New Labour’s representative role in the 
countryside after the 1997 election and considering the basis for the party’s claim 
that it represented rural areas. It then provides a critical assessment of how the New 
Labour governments operated in relation to the countryside, setting out frames within 
which to analyse policies for the countryside and discussing programmes such as 
rural proofing. The study then critically evaluates whether New Labour was ever able 
to throw off the accusation of opponents that it was an urban construct which 
marginalised the rural, and discusses how events and crises such as the Foot and 
Mouth Disease outbreak impacted on the approach to rural areas.  
The body of the research analyses the approach to policy-making adopted by New 
Labour to investigate whether ‘externalisation’ and ‘decentralisation’ were important 
in how policy was made and the extent to which the wider New Labour mantra of 
modernisation affected the countryside. It also evaluates the extent to which 
temporal and spatial features played a part in how rural policy and politics evolved, 
and the extent to which this helped explain the course that the government pursued 
in the countryside. 
 
The research concludes by considering whether there was a ‘social democratic 
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moment’ that opened up possibilities for important policy intervention in the 
countryside, and if so whether this opportunity was taken or missed.  
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The New Labour Chronology 
This chronology highlights some of the main events that occurred during the period 1997 – 2010 and 
developments in policy and party matters.  The events chosen are not exhaustive but give an 
indication of the major issues and constraints that New Labour faced and some of the ways in which 
they responded to them, both in policy and political terms. 
Events                                                Dates     Policy issues and party development 
Election of Blair and start of New Labour 
 
General Election with New Labour winning clutch of 
rural seats rarely if ever held before 
 
Campaign of the Countryside Alliance intensifies 
against hunting ban 
Regional Development  Agencies Act 
 
Rural Audit report of the Rural Group published 
 
 
 
 
MAFF staff incorporated within Government Offices of 
the Regions 
 
 
 
The fuel protests 
Foot and Mouth outbreak 
General Election with New Labour losing very few 
rural seats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hunting Act passed 
Planning Act passed with impact upon rural housing 
provision 
 
 
General Election with more rural seats lost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brown replaces Blair as PM 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial crash 
 
 
 
 
 
General Election defeat                                           
1994 
 
1997 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
 
 
 
2004 
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
MAFF retained  
Backbench Group of Rural MPs set up 
 
Strategy for sustainable development for the UK 
 
Enhance to regionalism results 
 
Creation of the Countryside Agency 
PIU report ‘Rural Economies’ 
Rural White Paper launched 
Regional Development Agencies come into being 
 
Publication of Rural White Paper 
Final Report of the Burns Enquiry into hunting with dogs 
The CROW Act 
 
 
Defra created 
Defra Select Committee comes into existence 
Setting up of the independent Food Standards Agency 
 
 
The Curry Commission into Farming & Food reports 
 
Haskins Review 
Select Committee reports upon rural schools and broadband 
The reform of the CAP initiated for completion by 2005 
 
 
Defra Rural Strategy  launched 
Setting up of Regional Rural Development Frameworks 
alongside strengthened Rural Affairs Forums 
 
 
Social and economic rural development functions transferred 
from Countryside Agency to RDAs 
 
NERC Act passed – CRC and NE replace Countryside 
Agency 
Goodman report upon affordable rural housing 
Functions of Countryside Agency transferred to Natural 
England and CRC 
 
Planning for a Sustainable Future White Paper 
RDPE published 
Major problems with the RPA 
Treasury/Defra document Vision for the Common Agricultural 
Policy launched 
 
Taylor report upon affordable rural housing 
Select Committee report upon rural economy following 
intervention of the rural advocate 
New Planning Act passed 
The Potential of England’s Rural Economy debate 
 
New Labour loses Election 
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Chapter 1 – New Labour and rural policy - the purpose of the study 
1.1 The researcher’s role in New Labour and his position in relation to the 
study 
The New Labour government was elected in 1997 with 418 MPs, a majority of 179.  
Of those 418 MPs 180 of them purported to represent rural or semi-rural seats (see 
Appendix 1). This included MPs in constituencies such as The Forest of Dean, High 
Peak, Leicestershire North-West, Norfolk North-West and Stroud, where I was 
elected and remained as MP through successive Labour administrations until 
defeated in 2010, and I lost my seat (See Appendix 2 for the list of rural seats won in 
1997, and what happened to them subsequently).  Though the figure of 180 is now 
disputed (interview with Bradley)1, and very few of the seats that were captured were 
in the deepest rural category, defined as 80 per cent of their population living in 
remote rural areas (Bibby & Shepherd 2004), winning so many rural constituencies 
was still a major achievement. 
My interest in the issues tackled in this thesis resulted from a long-term involvement 
with rural matters as a Labour Party activist, as a Councillor and then as Stroud’s 
MP2.  I was somewhat unusual for a Labour MP in that my main areas of interest 
were agriculture and rural affairs.  During the 13 years I was in the House of 
Commons I was a member of the Select Committees for Agriculture, Fisheries and 
                                                          
1
 Peter Bradley set up and chaired the Rural Group of Labour MPs, which was created to provide a 
focal point for rural issues amongst Labour Backbenchers, and to capitalise on the presence of so 
many rural MPs, through publications, campaigning and Parliamentary activities. 
2
 I was elected as both a Labour and Cooperative MP.  The Cooperative Party is a sister party of the 
Labour Party and runs joint candidates, and elected upwards of 20 representatives during my time as 
MP.  The aim of the Cooperative Party is to protect and enhance cooperative values in the fields of 
production, distribution and consumption, which gave me a slightly different insight into rural politics 
compared to other Labour MPs. 
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Food, and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and was also an officer of 
Parliamentary Labour Party Committees concerned with rural matters.  From 2002 
onwards I chaired the Rural Group of Labour MPs, and made many speeches and 
wrote numerous articles on the subject of rural affairs both within and outside 
Parliament. 
Being so directly involved in rural issues meant that I had a unique opportunity to 
study at first hand the policy-making processes of New Labour, and how it attempted 
to deliver programmes in the countryside.  During that time I had access to ministers, 
special advisers, and colleagues, as well as a more indirect relationship with civil 
servants.  I was also able to meet and discuss rural matters with academics and 
practitioners who specialised in this field.  Though there was only one major Defra 
Select Committee enquiry into the countryside (2008), there were other relevant 
reports, and rural did feature widely as a contingent in issues such as the reform of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (2007), environmental concerns (2007), and the 
performance of subsidiary bodies, especially the Countryside Agency (2002). 
After I lost my seat I retained an active interest in the countryside, being a candidate 
and councillor for most of the 2010 – 2015 Parliament.  I also decided to turn my 
hand to writing up a narrative of my experiences, in the form of this thesis.  Losing an 
election can be a life-changing experience – Shaffir and Kleinknecht (2005) refer to it 
as a near-death episode, whilst Theakston et al (2007) describe the difficulties that 
former MPs have in trying to return to a normal life.  For myself, I decided to turn my 
knowledge and expertise to some benefit by exploring in an academic way an area 
where there is little primary research and few secondary sources which directly refer 
to the politics of rural affairs, and how New Labour made policy for the countryside. 
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This is in some ways an ethnographic but not an auto-ethnographic piece of work 
(Bryman 2012).  However there are strong elements of self-reflection and reflexivity 
contained throughout the text, particularly with regard to the collection of data 
through semi-structured interviews with key individuals (see Chapter Three).   
I was in the fortunate position of having ready access to major actors who were 
involved in the policy process at the time.  Many of these were known personally to 
me, having developed a relationship with them during my period as an MP.  
Therefore it was crucial that I sought to retain objectivity during the process of 
evidence-gathering.  Most interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2012 to 
optimise actors’ memory of events, and to contemporise the study by reinforcement 
of evidence by use of triangulation in parallel to my own recollection of events.   
I decided at the outset not to concentrate on the issues of the hunting ban, or the 
reform of agriculture.  Though these were of great importance, if not notoriety, over 
the thirteen years, they are comparatively well documented and analysed in detail 
elsewhere (Lowe & Ward 1998, Milbourne 2003a, Ward & Lowe 2004, Woods 
2008b). Instead this research focuses upon the politics and policies of the rest of the 
rural domain, which has been far less well investigated.   It also focuses on England 
only, for reasons of coherence and simplicity.  The study is principally interested in 
the actual period of New Labour government.  While reference is made occasionally 
to the period before 1997, and post-2010, the thrust of the study is about New 
Labour in power and how that impacted upon the countryside.   
1.2 The nature of New Labour 
There is an extensive academic literature on the genesis, values and operational 
activities of New Labour (Beech 2006, Bevir 2005, Driver & Martell 2006, Finlayson 
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2003) (See Chapter Two).  This concerns to what extent New Labour was able to 
mount an effective take-over of the Labour Party, how it was able to turn this into a 
very successful electoral strategy, and what means it used to capture and stay in 
office for 13 years.  Of particular interest is the degree to which New Labour 
represented a hegemonic shift in political, social and cultural relations and how it 
was then able to cultivate its use of power and influence to govern in the countryside 
as well as the city (Wickham-Jones 2003).   
There is widespread consensus amongst academics that New Labour appeared to 
be a fundamentally different force than its predecessor parties or administrations on 
the left.  Certainly the advocates of New Labour left nothing to chance in distancing 
themselves from Old Labour (Blair 1996, Giddens 1998, Gould 2011, Mandelson & 
Liddle 1996).  This mattered in the countryside, where Labour’s remit had 
traditionally been weak, and where its grasp on representation had been limited 
outside the years following the 1945 landslide.  
To appeal to rural voters, particularly those who embodied ‘Middle England’, required 
something quite different and exceptional (Hargreaves & Christie 1998).  That was 
why the Blair effect was so profound – it sought to govern for the many with no no-go 
areas, reaching out from Labour’s traditional heartlands to embrace voters who had 
never before voted Labour, or who had long deserted the Party.  Though rural voters 
were never crucial to New Labour winning power the success of the electoral 
operation was such that it captured so many rural constituencies and then had to 
take a much more proactive stance in relation to representing the countryside (See 
Chapter Four).  How it performed in response to this challenge provides the basis for 
this study. 
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New Labour’s rural characteristics cannot be easily disentangled from the rest of the 
Party’s schema.  It could not just wish away the constraints that had debilitated 
previous Labour administrations (McKibbin 1983, Shaw 2002a).  However there are 
some ways in which New Labour’s performance in the countryside was quite 
different.  To begin with, New Labour had no great aspiration for the countryside, 
which was not true of the 1945 government and that of Wilson after 1964.  Prior to 
1997, little campaigning had focused on rural seats – indeed very few rural 
constituencies were targets, and the 1997 manifesto was minimalist in its 
commitments to the countryside (Labour Party 1997) (See Appendix 3).  The size of 
the majority and the number of rural seats gained forced a major re-think to reflect 
the new-found mandate and support the successful representatives, now firmly 
ensconced in their seats.  They at the very least had the authority to speak for part of 
the countryside. 
The accomplishment of New Labour was in its pragmatism and its ability to react 
expeditiously to opportunities and events.  Thus it quickly saw the benefit of courting 
those rural voters who had placed their faith in the party.  Hamstrung initially by the 
moratorium on extra spending, as soon as this was over the government quickly 
prioritised getting a programme in place, initially through embracing the 
recommendations of the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) report on Rural 
Economies (1999), followed by the Rural White Paper (DETR/MAFF 2000).  This 
sudden warming to rural was partly a positive enjoinder to those now in positions of 
power in the countryside but also a riposte to those such as the Countryside 
Alliance, who accused New Labour of being the same old urbanist Labour Party, 
given the criticism it faced in the countryside over the handling of the ban on hunting 
and the Foot and Mouth (FMD) crisis (See Chapter Five). 
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There were other differences as well.  Whilst New Labour prided itself on the 
comprehensiveness of its message of modernisation and renewal, it was clear from 
the outset that reform in the countryside would be taken at a slower pace.  This was 
partly out of necessity – there were not the same opportunities for economies of 
scale in rural areas – nor did the authority of New Labour ever run as easily or 
smoothly in rural communities (see Chapter Seven). 
This had an effect on two themes which are studied extensively in this thesis.  First, 
the degree to which the tardiness with which reform occurred in the countryside was 
part of a deliberate bifurcation of policy from urban Britain.  Certainly between 1999 
and 2004, the nature of New Labour’s involvement in rural can best be described as 
social democratic interventionism, in marked contrast to the reliance upon neo-
liberalism in other places.  Admittedly this was only for a time, and was largely 
reversed after the Haskins’ Review (2003), but it is important to recognise the 
different temporal approaches. 
Second, how policy was delivered could also be differentiated.  Whereas from early 
days in office New Labour became a highly centralised and centralising operation, 
policy-making and delivery in the countryside was about externalising responsibility.  
Thus, the Countryside Agency was created to take on this function and ministers and 
civil servants operated mainly as delegators (Derounian 2006).  Again this changed 
after 2004 but the fact that there was a distinctly rural cutting edge to this process, is 
worthy of critical evaluation and explanation.  This divergence came about not just 
because MAFF/Defra chose to pursue this route but because of the relative 
marginality of rural and government’s prioritising of agriculture, environment and 
food.  Given that much of rural policy was decided by the main spending 
departments of health, education and social security anyway, the role of rural came 
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under scrutiny with specific regard to whether there should be a separate Rural 
Affairs Ministry  – something that in the end New Labour fudged with the formation of 
Defra (Ward 2000). 
Examining whether New Labour was able to make a convincing case for its rural 
credentials involves a study of the politics and policy-making framework alongside 
the role of actors and institutions, in defining the structure and agency that 
contextualised the New Labour operation in the countryside. 
1.3 Research aims and research questions 
This research has one central aim that is pursued through five research questions.  
The main aim is to provide a critical evaluation of New Labour’s approach to the 
politics and policy-framework in the English countryside.  As has already stated this 
is under-researched and therefore this study seeks to fill gaps in knowledge and 
provide a narrative for further examination of this subject-area. 
The research aim was to develop a hypothesis which explores a number of key 
themes, reflecting on the perspectives of actors involved with New Labour’s activity 
in the countryside, culminating in the idea that there was a social democratic 
moment, but that this passed by 2004. 
The original intention of this research was to pursue a case study approach, but it 
soon became clear that this did not provide sufficient rigour in critically evaluating the 
subject-matter or robustness in providing an overarching narrative.  The case study 
approach was therefore was replaced early on by a thematic study. 
The approach to the selection of research participants and interview subjects were 
chosen partly to reflect their knowledge of the subject area associated with certain 
20 
 
case histories.  However each interviewee was also questioned about more general 
issues concerning New Labour’s performance in the countryside. 
Five research questions were developed after careful consideration of the evidence 
that was accrued from the initial probing interviews (see Chapter Three), my own 
knowledge of the period, re-examination of some of the material I kept from my time 
as MP for Stroud, and extensive reading of the secondary source material from both 
politics and rural studies. 
These five research questions are: 
1. To what extent did New Labour’s success in the 1997 general election 
translate into a greater interest in rural policy and political development in the 
countryside? 
 
2. How did the reputation of New Labour as an urban construct affect its 
relationship with the countryside, and impact upon the government’s ability to 
undertake rural policy-making and delivery? 
 
3. In terms of New Labour’s strategic approach in what ways did the tension 
between (a) centralisation and decentralisation and (b) externalisation and 
internalisation of power impact upon policy-making and delivery in the 
countryside? 
 
4. In what ways did New Labour’s wider strategy of modernisation of the state 
have an impact on rural areas and how important were these themes in rural 
policy and political activity? 
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5. To what extent was New Labour’s approach to the countryside affected by 
both temporal events and spatial awareness, and how did this affect the 
manner of policy-making and delivery, and the political context within which it 
was operating? 
This thesis is a hybrid, covering both a study of both political science, and rural 
studies, and is a contemporary inquiry that also draws on literatures in the fields of 
economics, philosophy, social studies, cultural studies, geography, history and 
linguistics (see Chapter Two).  The approach is empirical and mainly relies upon an 
analysis that has been informed by techniques influenced by ethnography but with 
some reference to constructivism/interpretivism.  Whilst it is not principally aimed at 
greater theoretical understanding it does refer to the works of Gramsci, and his 
concept of hegemony (1971, Pearmain 2011) and Lukes and his dimensions of 
power, particularly the third dimension (2005).  Other concepts and their authors are 
referred to where appropriate (see Chapter Two).  This gives substance to the area 
of study whilst recognising that this examination is about contemporary themes, 
studied from the perspective of someone embedded at the time, and who had unique 
access to the main agents of change, then and since (Cruickshank 2003a&b). 
New Labour has been extensively studied from many perspectives.  However there 
are very few academic audits of New Labour’s performance in the countryside with 
the notable exception of Woods’ book (2008a).  Whilst the literature covers an 
interesting number of topic areas and provides a cogent analysis of the policy 
direction of New Labour, it does not evaluate the deeper political engagement of the 
government, nor does it try to disentangle the different political perspectives behind 
the New Labour Project, as it affected the countryside. 
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The central aim of this research is therefore to overcome this lacuna, and in so doing 
present the New Labour years in the countryside in a different and more compelling 
light.   
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis has eight chapters with the core chapters four, five, six and seven 
addressing the research questions in turn, except for the fifth research question, 
which is a cross-cutting theme referred to throughout the text but specifically covered 
in Chapter Eight.  After this introduction, Chapter Two provides a framework for the 
critical assessment of the politics of rural areas during the New Labour years.  It 
offers a critical review of the literature focusing upon the themes of hegemony, 
power and New Labour’s schema and frames for policy-making, making reference to 
the work of Gramsci and Lukes.  A number of specific themes are pursued during the 
chapter, including the relevance of New Labour, the third way, and other key 
‘philosophical’ traits associated with New Labour (Bevir 2000, Finlayson 1999).  
Rural schema play a major part in helping position New Labour in relation to these 
ideas, to draw out what were the cynosures that the government followed to try to 
maximise the advantages of being in office, and with what effect on the wider 
developments in the countryside.  Concepts that include the contested and the 
differentiated countryside are introduced to question what influence they had upon 
New Labour thinking, and how it then applied itself to governing in rural communities 
(Cloke 1997, Marsden et al 2005). 
Chapter Three presents the methodology of the study and reflects on the research 
methods used, principally ethnography and employing semi-structured interviews of 
elite witnesses.  The chapter considers whether this was the best way to elicit 
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information and looks carefully at the safeguards that were put in place to ensure 
objectivity, confidentiality and protecting the anonymity of the respondents as part of 
a discussion upon ethical issues.   
The fourth chapter critically evaluates the topic of New Labour’s representative role 
in the countryside, starting with an examination of whether the scale of the New 
Labour victory in the countryside gave the Party the legitimacy to believe that it could 
speak for the countryside.  The chapter then assesses how New Labour came to 
terms with its new-found authority including the role that backbenchers sought for 
themselves, how the government responded to that, and to the responsibility for 
governing in the countryside.  Account is taken of how to measure rurality including 
the attempts that the government made to develop expertise at data-collection 
techniques to drill down into how best to make policy and implement that policy in 
rural areas.  As a consequence it has been possible to better determine the true 
level of support New Labour had in rural areas.   
Chapter Five focuses on the extent to which Labour’s traditional urban bias meant 
that rural was neglected.  This embraces whether New Labour was genuinely 
different from Old Labour in its attitudes towards the countryside and if this was the 
case, how did this help form New Labour’s politics and its making and 
implementation of policy in the countryside.  It probes the nature of the policy-making 
process and how this was communicated to rural residents and to what effect.  The 
chapter therefore reflects on how New Labour was perceived in the countryside, 
particularly with regard to some of the big events of the day. 
Chapter Six assesses the policy-making process and seeks to find out what impact 
the externalisation of some policy-making had upon government, parliament, and 
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other actors.  In particular, it examines the relationship between the parent 
ministries, MAFF and then Defra, and its countryside non-governmental 
organisations, and how that changed over time.  It goes on to highlight the 
importance of the churning of people, institutions, structures and issues, and how 
this impacted upon the way in which New Labour performed and was perceived as 
performing.  The chapter concludes by reference to the wider centralism- 
decentralism debate that raged within New Labour circles to assess the extent to 
which the same results applied in the countryside as elsewhere.  Finally examination 
is made of the regional debate, and the impact of the EU, as they affected rural 
England to ascertain the extent to which this is of telling importance as to the policy 
debate. 
Chapter Seven, explores modernisation and how this key New Labour programmatic 
schema bore down on aspects of life in the countryside.  In this chapter there is a 
study of what elements of country living were subject to reform, how was this carried 
out, who was affected, and what were the consequences, both over the short and 
medium term.  Specific reference is made to the wider New Labour trope of the 
competition state to examine the extent to which these were concurrent themes 
along with other developing features that affected the British economy and society.  
This chapter concludes with an assessment of the relative success of this aspect of 
New Labour beliefs, behaviour, and performance. 
Chapter Eight provides a conclusion to the thesis by discussing the findings of the 
research.  It deliberates over whether the research questions posed at the outset are 
appropriate and whether the evidence backs up the suppositions made.  This 
chapter interrogates the importance of the temporal and spatial features of this 
study, examined as a cross-cutting theme in the other chapters, making direct 
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comment on the influence of events on how New Labour acted and reacted and the 
extent to which the government ever really came to terms with the different 
interpretations of how the countryside exists and functions.  Specific attention is paid 
to the importance of class, power, and elites, and the creation and re-creation of 
structure and agency in this regard (Parsons 2010).  Some proposals are made for 
the future direction for research alongside some personal reflections on the value of 
the research as a whole. 
The thesis is accompanied by a number of appendices which give a fuller description 
of how a rural constituency is defined, a description, in outline, of who was 
interviewed, and some additional material on New Labour. 
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Chapter 2 – Rural politics and the politics of the rural during the New Labour 
era 
2.1 Introduction: the context of New Labour and the countryside 
Drawing on Gramsci’s idea of hegemony and Lukes’ conception of power this 
chapter examines the academic literature on New Labour and the countryside in 
relation to the research aim and five research questions.  The chapter addresses 
how answering the research questions helps to explain the narrative behind New 
Labour’s actions and how this dictated how policy was made, who by, and to what 
effect, and what repercussions this had on the politics of rural areas.   
It juxtaposes how the importance of events created the environment in which New 
Labour’s performance can be judged against the changing structure and agency that 
came to symbolise the New Labour years in office.  In particular it confronts whether 
New Labour ever came to terms with the complexity and changing nature of the 
countryside and how its understanding of rural affected its ability to govern 
successfully there.  This chapter also critically examines the extent to which New 
Labour’s operation in the countryside was subject to temporal forces, including 
whether it sought out distinctive social democratic policies, and if these stood the test 
of time. 
The chapter then evaluates a critique of New Labour, and relates this critique to how 
it performed in the rural areas before examining the typologies that define the 
English countryside and how that relates to dimensions of power.  Each research 
question is then discussed from the perspective of what secondary source material 
says about each theme, and the chapter then synthesises the schema, frames and 
other notions that help explain and exemplify New Labour’s performance in the 
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countryside.  Within this thematic approach a number of issues appear that arise 
generally through the New Labour years such as regionalism, welfare reform and 
new forms of governance.  These are approached from the perspective of their 
impact on the countryside though it is difficult to extrapolate rural implications from 
the wider national scene in some cases. 
2.2 The influence of hegemony and power  
Wickham-Jones (2003) argues that New Labour was a hegemonic force that 
replaced Old Labour, and reconstituted British social democracy.  Responding to the 
attack of Przeworski (2001) that New Labour had morphed social democracy into a 
force for resignation and remedialism, Wickham-Jones preferred to describe New 
Labour’s social democratic instincts as reformist and revisionist.  His analysis begs 
the question of whether the notion of hegemony suitably defined New Labour’s 
relationship with the Labour Party; how much that explained the way in which New 
Labour prepared for office; saw its operation in government evolve; what impact that 
had on its regard for the countryside, and the manner it approached rural policy. 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony (1971), as part of a wider study of power in the 
countryside, has attracted interest from a number of academics (Shucksmith 2012, 
Varley & Curtin 2013).  This political concept defines and explains the manner by 
which social classes derive domination over other classes by a series of alliances 
and arrangements, as a result of mutually advantageous discourses and intellectual 
leadership.  These may be unstable and shift over time resulting in new power 
relationships evolving, as groups redesign their interests and cultural identity 
(Anderson 1976, Femia 1987, Joll 1977).  Hegemony has periodically been applied 
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to the English countryside to explain social relationships there and to seek to 
demonstrate class differentiation (Parker & Ravenscroft 2001, Pratt 1996).   
Gramsci’s derivation of hegemony and its relevance to the politics of New Labour is 
important for a number of philosophical, methodological and ideological reasons.  
First, Gramsci’s ideas had gained traction amongst the New Left in the latter-part of 
the twentieth century.  This influenced the Labour Party, and though it was not an 
antecedent of New Labour thinking, Gramsci’s legacy should not be dismissed 
(Maguire 2010).  Second, Gramsci’s version of Marxism, especially his historicism, 
realism, humanism, reference to civil society, and his extensive study of the state 
gave epistemological and ontological grounding to the New Labour project 
(Cruickshank  2003a&b, Gill 1993, Hall (Stuart) 1987, Hoffman 1984, Johnson 2007, 
Lewis 2003, Morera 1990, Ransome 1992, Simon 1982).  Third, Gramsci’s concept 
of an historic bloc, and the wars of manoeuvre and position gave meaning to the 
possibility that New Labour could capture the prevailing political discourse of the 
time, winning over converts that had previously been agnostic to Labour, or even 
antagonistic, and helping to marginalise opposition.  This was of direct relevance to 
the situation New Labour faced in the countryside where new opportunities 
presented themselves because of the wider appeal that New Labour had achieved 
(Holub 1992). 
The value of Gramsci’s ideas is that none of phenomena discussed are impermeable 
– indeed there is a great deal of overlap, mutual inclusiveness and cross-fertilisation 
of ideas, and none is sacrosanct – for improvements in the understanding of 
hegemony and how it relates to the study of power are continually being made.  The 
ideas of Lukes’ (1991, 2005 & 2006), is of relevance here.  The election of a New 
Labour government with such a dominant position nationally meant that it had a 
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freedom to act legislatively, policy-wise, and politically, unknown since the 1945 
Labour government, and in some respects New Labour had even fewer constraints 
upon it.  The question posed of New Labour was how far it was prepared to wield 
that power and to what effect.  Lukes’ in his book Power (2005) dwells on the 
differences between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’, and this was of importance to New 
Labour’s relationship with the countryside.  It clearly had the power to be an agenda-
setter, even in rural areas where its electoral strength remained weaker than in the 
cities.  The imposition of the hunting ban was indicative that it was prepared to exert 
‘power over’ to deliver on the manifesto promise.  However in other ways it was not 
even willing to use ‘power to’ rebalance the existing inequities and unfairness that 
existing in rural England.  This became particularly true after 2004. 
In his study of power in relation to political parties, Rye (2014) uses an account of 
Labour during the 1980s and 1990s to draw together ideas on how New Labour was 
formed and used the explicit exercise of power to build, retain and increase support 
both within the party and outside.  This community power debate has its antecedents 
in the Marxist discourse on structure and agency and the degree to which agents 
can evolve strategies independently of structures.  This is important in the context of 
New Labour and the countryside for it would determine what freedom the party had 
to manoeuvre, if it chose to try to change the prevailing power structures there.  The 
situation in rural England reflected Lukes’ third dimension of power whereby those 
rural working class and disadvantaged groups faced hidden power as their interests 
were suborned by those in authority.  New Labour could, if it wished, choose to do 
something about that rebalancing power relationships. 
Lukes’ analysis is not entirely accepted by all political scientists.  Hay (1997) 
criticises it in terms of his assumption that there is an easy distinction between real 
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and perceived interests, and accuses him of a value-laden approach.  In Lukes’ 
defence Doyle (1998), argues that there is merit in the idea of three-dimensional 
power for it has much to say on conflict, and the removal of conflict and this can be a 
useful analysis to apply in some situations.  New Labour’s relationship with the 
countryside would seem to be one such situation. 
The New Labour hegemony  
There are many books and articles that cover the ‘capture’ of the Labour Party by 
New Labour.  Central to this process were issues such as the responsibility of New 
Labour in the modernisation of the Labour Party as a response to four general 
election defeats; the role of Thatcherism in shaping New Labour; the re-emergence 
of economism, and the importance of globalisation to New Labour; the relevance of 
social democracy, and how that fared against neo-liberalism; and whether New 
Labour was a centralising or a decentralising force.  
Of specific interest is the book by Pearmain (2011) that investigates New Labour 
from a Gramscian perspective, identifying the key traits of New Labour’s origins as a 
response to the dominance of Thatcherism, a directional shift shared by some in the 
New Left (Bevir 2005, Finlayson 2003, Hall & Jacques 1989, Panitch & Leys 2001).   
There are four major critiques of New Labour from different political perspectives, as 
shown in Figure 2.1: 
 The socialist critique – which saw New Labour as purely a tool of neo-
liberalism and Blair’s route to power mainly as an accommodation with 
Thatcherism (Bewes & Gilbert 2000, Gilbert 2004, Hall 1979 & 2003, 
Heffernan 2000 & 2011, Panitch & Leys 2001, Pearmain 2011).   
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Figure 2.1 – The Four Critiques of New Labour 
Source: Author 
 The social democratic critique – that argued that New Labour lost its way in its 
pursuit of power, losing its soul and its commitment to social democracy along 
the way (Bevir 2000, 2005 & 2007, Driver & Martell 1999 & 2006, Fielding 
2003, Finlayson 2009,  Giddens 2010, Hattersley 2005, Hay 2002 & 2003, 
Shaw 2002, 2007, & 2012, Smith 2000, Wickham-Jones 2007)  
 The conservative/neo-liberal critique – that New Labour was merely an 
intermission to the continuation of Conservative Governments, increasingly 
market-focused and no matter how much New Labour aped governments of 
the Right, the New Labour project would end in failure (Atkins 2011, Evans 
2008, Kerr et al 2011, Seldon & Snowden  2005, Taylor-Gooby & Stoker 
2011) 
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 The academic/technical critique – which examined the manner of the New 
Labour takeover including the investigation of membership, representation 
and representatives, and party democracy (Beech 2006, Freeden 1999a&b, 
Russell 2005, Scott 2000, Seyd & Whiteley 2002 & 2004, Temple 2000, Wring 
2005). 
These critiques take radically different approaches to New Labour, its evolution and 
how it maintained its hold over the Labour Party, but it is possible to identify a 
number of key themes which relate directly to this thesis, specifically representation, 
urbanism, centralisation and modernisation (Lee 2000).  These themes are further 
examined in Section 2.3. 
Such was the scale of the New Labour victory in 1997 that there was a conjunctural 
moment in British political history.  Labour had never won so many seats, many of 
them in constituencies that it had not won before, or had only acquired in the 1945 
landslide.  The number of seats and vote share achieved by the Conservatives was 
also historically low.  The scale of New Labour’s success meant that it had many 
advantages that previous Labour administrations did not possess.  The incoming 
government had carefully constructed its vision for government (if not for the 
countryside), though not its detailed proposals, given the minimalist manifesto that it 
had produced.  Nevertheless its commitment to a small number of philosophical 
points of view and principles by which it would govern formed the backcloth to its 
operation. 
New Labour’s affinity to the third way (Driver & Martell 2000, Finlayson 1999, Temple 
2000, White S 1998 & 1999) and communitarianism (Driver & Martell 1997, Fyfe 
2005) was evident in the style of government, if not the purpose of all policies, 
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programmes and proposals it advanced.  Overall its policy style could be best 
described as eclectic (Bara & Budge 2001, Davies 2006, Gilbert 2004, Larsen et al 
2006, Wickham-Jones 2007).  Its approach would heavily trail schema incorporating 
economism, heightened reliance upon executive authority, an emphasis upon 
implementation as well as formulation of policy, incentivising the use of networks and 
markets in place of hierarchies, and a process of continual renewal of structures, 
institutions and people (Barber 2007, Bevir 2005, Burch & Holliday 2004, Elliott 
1993, Jessop 2003, Mandelson & Liddle 1996, Marsh & Smith 2000, Shaw & 
Eichbaum 2014). It also recognised implicitly that the hollowing-out of the state 
would continue, and that was bound to affect rural as well as urban areas (Edwards 
et al 2001, Rhodes 1994, Skelcher 2000). 
This backcloth of motivation would be ever-present throughout New Labour’s period 
in office though the emphasis placed on each would vary or change from time to time 
as political and electoral circumstances altered.  The most important aspect of New 
Labour’s instrumentality was the pragmatic nature of its approach, and the extent to 
which it was driven by personalities and events. 
Chapter Four explores the claim that New Labour represented the countryside after 
the 1997 general election, a situation that continued for the following two elections.  
There was disputation over numbers, definitions of rurality, reasons for the shift to 
voting Labour, and what justification New Labour MPs had in believing that they 
could speak on behalf of rural communities.  However the importance of possessing 
such a large number of MPs that represented rural and semi-rural constituencies did 
have a profound effect upon both New Labour and the balance of electoral power in 
the countryside (Denver et al 1998, Evans et al 1998, Fisher 2004, Johnston et al 
1998, Pattie et al 1997).  This presented both opportunities and challenges to the 
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government, but the presence of so many rural Labour MPs was not something it 
could ignore.  The creation of the Rural Group (see Chapter Four) was evidence of 
this. 
With the support that it was able to garner, New Labour could push ahead with its 
agenda, not only in its traditional heartlands, but also in the newly gained countryside 
territories.  Thus rural policy was empowered, with a programme that included 
modernisation of structures and procedures, decentralisation of powers, an 
emphasis upon new forms of governance, regular updating of institutions and 
people, as well as an enthusiasm for the delivery as well as creation of policy 
(Goodwin 2008, Lowe & Ward 2001, Pearce et al 2005, Ward 2006, 2008a&b, Ward 
& Lowe 2007b). 
2.3 New Labour and the dimensions of power in the countryside 
This section deals first, with the typologies that define the English countryside, and 
second, examines the major dimensions of power that contextualise the countryside, 
including who wields power, the nature of that power, and the changing 
circumstances around that power. 
The Labour Party was faced with considerable difficulties when trying to build 
support from key groups such as the rural poor, disadvantaged and those who 
worked in, and on, the countryside.  Until 1997 the hegemonic situation in rural areas 
considerably disadvantaged the Labour Party (with so many seats occupied by 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs), and the dimensions of power meant that 
Labour was unable to easily build a corpus of support.  Part of this was due to the 
perception that Labour was principally an urban party (see Chapter Five).  However 
other barriers were erected not just by Labour’s traditional opponents, but also by 
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those who might have been thought to have provided the bedrock of sustenance for 
Labour in country areas (Heley 2010, Hoggart 1997, Shucksmith 2012).  For 
instance support for hunting transcended class lines, and this placed the government 
in direct opposition to some who might have been supportive of New Labour in other 
ways (Cox & Winter 1997, Milbourne 2003a&b).  Likewise the inability to deliver 
affordable rural housing was the direct result of adversarial campaigns by those who 
wanted to protect rural space, crowding out the needs of others (Satsangi et al 2010, 
Sturzaker 2010). 
Nevertheless 1997 opened up possibilities that had not previously existed.  There 
was strong support amongst public sector workers and professionals in the 
countryside, who wanted to see the back of the Conservative government.  Lukes’ 
analysis of how power is distributed and the resulting relationships that develop is 
helpful in explaining how difficult it still was for New Labour to reach out to some in 
the rural electorate, and provides a useful backdrop for the thesis.   
There are three main typologies that have been developed to analyse the English 
countryside in academic literature.  They are; the contested countryside; the 
differentiated countryside; and England as a non-rural country.  These are now 
examined in turn. 
The Contested Countryside 
The notion that the countryside is contested is not a new one.  However it has 
received much more attention since the academics Macnaughten & Urry (1998) and 
Burchardt and Conford (2008) used it to postulate epistemological and ontological 
meanings to rurality and the evolution of human activity there.  Other writers have 
also entered into this debate including Cloke & Little 1997, Frouws 1998, Halfacree 
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1997, Marsden 1998, Olsen 2008, and Woods 2005.  Together this has provided a 
much clearer understanding of the concept and how this has shaped rural living 
(Burchardt 2008, Macnaughten & Urry 1998, Murdoch & Marsden 1994, Winter 
1996, Woods 2005 & 2011b). 
The gravamen of who contests the countryside, with what effect on the people living 
there, and how has this shaped spatiality remains crucial in comprehending the way 
in which rurality has evolved in England.  The situation remains complex, sometimes 
contradictory, and often obtuse (Cloke 2003, Kiley 2006, Murdoch 2006, Yarwood 
2005).  The features that underline this are location, including landscape and the 
cultures that arise from topography, social class, positionality or situatedness, 
functionality, and regulation.  To cover each of these in turn; 
‘Location’ concerns the arguments over who lives in the rural environment, who 
wants to live there, what are the landscape and resulting cultural implications, 
including what the relationship is to urban England.  The debate over location or 
place has been dominated by the issue of counter-urbanisation – the wish of those 
who live in the countryside to defend it from the intrusion of urban landscapes and 
consciousness (Champion & Hugo 2004, Newby 1986, Pennington 2000).  The 
debate was at its most acute when it is addressed in the liminal areas close to major 
urban centres, and through the role of market towns, with the perceived threat of 
increased urbanisation impinging on these territories (Powe et al 2013, Schoon 
2001).  In this respect the arguments were not necessarily about development itself, 
but the scale of that development and the fear of urban sprawl.  New Labour’s 
attitude towards the spread of urbanisation was complicated, if not contradictory.  On 
the one hand it did little to encourage development in the open countryside – indeed 
it made strides to further defend what it deemed vital landscapes such as the 
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National Parks (Defra 2004b&c, Thompson 2008, Woods 2006c).  On the other, its 
determination to build an additional 4.4million homes inevitably impinged on the 
urban-rural fringes, and the market towns.  Conflict over housing development 
became a constant theme of opponents seeking to make political capital against 
New Labour in the countryside (Local Government Chronicle 1998a&b, Satsangi et 
al 2010, Shucksmith 2013a&b, Sturzaker 2010, Sturzaker & Shucksmith 2011). 
Social class will be referred to in greater depth in the next Section.  However, whilst 
New Labour did valuable work in confronting some of the deep-seated problems 
faced by some rural areas, (especially homelessness, long-term unemployment, 
inaccessibility, service loss, and low incomes), there was little desire to reverse the 
underlying and greater unfairness in the class system, made worse by the previous 
Conservative government (Freeden 1999a, Lister 2001). 
Allied to class was the positionality or situatedness of individuals, groups, networks 
and communities.  New Labour was wary about taking on rural elites, preferring to 
seek consensus and mediation rather than conflict.  The reason was because New 
Labour was keen not to tarnish its reputation of speaking to and for middle England, 
much of which existed in the countryside (Halfacree 2007, Murdoch 2000, Ward & 
Jones 1999).  There were exceptions - the hunting ban and the right to roam were 
the completion of long-held Labour canonical commitments – but even here New 
Labour obfuscation and procrastination indicated a willingness to compromise with, 
rather than resist opponents (Reed 2008, Woods 2008b).   
New Labour acquired power at a time of unprecedented change in the English 
countryside with the prominence of issues such as post-productivism and the rise of 
the consumption economy; the acceleration of globalisation; modernisation; 
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regionalism; massive strides forward in technology, and the societal adjustment that 
the political, cultural and economic world demanded, alongside the new micro-
politics of rural development, to the fore (Evans et al 2002, Hamin & Marcucci 2008, 
Ilbery & Bowler 2014, Pearce et al 2005, Ward et al 2003, Woods 2006b & 2007).  
New Labour was keen to associate with, and advance these causes, integrating the 
countryside into appropriate strategies.  This raised hackles with traditional interests, 
especially some farming interests, but New Labour closely guarded and was keen to 
advance its modernist character. 
Regulation was not just about what control the state should exert over activities in 
rural areas, but about what role the state should play there (Hood et al 2000).  New 
Labour favoured the private sector as part of the competition state, but unlike in 
urban settings it was much less willing to impose this on rural communities (Goodwin 
et al 1995, Goodwin 1998, Marsden 1998 & 1999, Perkins 2006).  Rather it sought 
alternative scenarios whereby it could progress modernisation (see Chapter Seven), 
partly out of necessity – there were far fewer financial benefits that existed in the 
countryside – but also it chose a softly-softly approach, rather than confrontation 
(Cruickshank 2009).   
The Differentiated Countryside 
This typology is based on the idea that there is not one English countryside, but 
many, determined by topography, culture, land use, social class and perception of 
rurality, as shown in Figure 2.2.   
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Figure 2.2 - The Differentiated Countryside 
 
Source: Author 
Each feature encapsulates a different formulation of how power is captured, distilled 
and exerted (Halfacree 2006 & 2007, Heley & Jones 2012, Hodge & Monk 2004, 
Lowe et al 2005, Murdoch 2006).  That countryside is continually changing due to 
societal movement especially in-migration (Berry 2000, Champion et al 2009, 
Halfacree & Rivera 2012).  
New Labour struggled with the concept of differentiation, with its underlying power 
structures, and specifically how it could handle the idea policy-wise (Howkins 2003, 
Lowe et al 2005, Murdoch 2006, Taylor 1979).  Whilst it was willing to intervene 
where there was specific evidence of disadvantage, (including homelessness, 
unemployment, inaccessibility, and to protect service loss, where it would hit the 
vulnerable hardest), it largely failed to address economic disparity and did little to 
exploit new social, cultural and political opportunities (Anderson 2000, Bell & Jayne 
2010, Cloke 1997, Marsden & Sonnino 2008, Winter 2003).  Despite the 
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incorporation of the variable to bring lagging rural districts up towards the norm for 
economic activity in Public Sector Agreement 4 (PSA4) (See Chapter Four), this 
seemed to be of little consequence in terms of policy, even after the Haskins’ 
Review.  There was little grasp of how this objective could be accommodated within 
the drive for greater productivity, and few additional resources applied to make it a 
reality.  The inadequacy of the government’s response to this challenge was 
highlighted by the Defra Select Committee Report (2008).   
New Labour’s unwillingness to pursue a more aggressive line in developing the 
untapped economic potential of the countryside was due in part to latent disinterest, 
and also because of its unwillingness to defy existing centres of power.  This meant 
that the trend towards an older, richer, and less socially and economically diverse 
countryside, (which had begun post 1945), actually accelerated under New Labour 
(Phillips 2002a&b).  The government did little to combat this directly and rising house 
prices in villages exacerbated the plight of the poor and disadvantaged.  Instead 
attempts to intermediate through intervention in housing and planning policy were 
too little and too late (Evans & Hartwich 2005, Home 2009, Marsden et al 2005, 
Satsangi et al 2010). 
Some changes were made.  For example, the introduction of the area-based single 
farm payment scheme, (which assisted rich landowners at the expense of tenant 
farmers), and horsiculture (paying landowners to keep horses on paddocks, rather 
than farmers for farming), resulted in further negative social stratification.  This 
strengthened the grip of those who wanted to maintain the dream of the rural idyll 
and the protected and preserved conception of rurality (Marsden et al 2005).  New 
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Labour’s response was to put greater store by the governmentality3 of the hybrid 
neo-liberal market state and active communities, disregarding the potential downside 
of depoliticisation (Burnham 2001, Gardner 2008, Rao, 2005).  The emphasis also 
moved to greater payments for environmental measures (Evans et al 2002, 
Marinetto 2003a&b, Marsden & Sonnino 2008).  After the Haskins’ Review (2003) 
New Labour became even more driven by technological and efficiency concerns, 
and even less inclined to challenge the societal status quo.  Rather than the control 
of agriculture over the wider rural economy diminishing, the trend was reversed 
(Wakeford 2005).  
England as an Urban Country 
The OECD in its 2011 Rural Policy Review argued that England was essentially an 
urban country, the countryside having been marginalised to such an extent that it 
was totally reliant upon the urban (OECD 2011).  If that alone was one of the main 
legacies of New Labour’s time in power, then that is a sad reflection of how little the 
government achieved in policy terms.  Whilst this blunt assessment did not tell the 
whole story, it did indicate the scale of the problem that New Labour had faced in 
trying to shape rural policies and politics, let alone change existing structures of 
power. 
The observation of what is rural, and whether England can be considered as rural 
has long exercised academics.  Hoggart (1988 & 1990) provocatively postulated that 
where rural had the same characteristics as urban, they should not necessarily be 
separated.  Halfacree (2006) further added to the debate by arguing how difficult it 
                                                          
3
 Governmentality is a concept invented by Foucault to refer to the way in which the state exercises 
control over, or governs its people (Nadesan 2008). 
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was to define rural and identify rural space, the term suffering from structural 
incoherence and representative and representational lacunae.  In that sense the 
rural/urban debate is postmodernist and post-structural (Murdoch & Pratt 1993, Pratt 
1996).  Together this added to the sense that the countryside was a place of little 
importance in the wider economy, society and culture. 
Notwithstanding these discrete descriptions of rurality, the importance for New 
Labour was how it envisaged its relationship with the countryside, for this determined 
its willingness to contra-pose rural dimensions of power.  Being arguably a largely 
urban Party (see Chapter Five) did not prevent New Labour from making serious 
overtures to rural.  However it did mean that there was an undercurrent of urban 
distrust and denial of rural matters within New Labour ranks.  As much as there were 
many more rural Labour MPs, there were a large number of new urban MPs.  
Categorising the Rural Dimensions of Power 
There is no definitive list on how people in the countryside can be classified in 
relation to the distribution of power.  However there are some obvious headings that 
cover the major groupings as shown In Figure 2.3 below.  These are; in no order of 
importance; 
Figure 2.3 - The Rural Dimensions of Power 
Source: Author 
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Each of these is now considered: 
The position of social class 
New Labour was unwilling to demonstrably confront the issue of social class.  This 
was not a ‘new’ Labour position as the Party had traditionally shied away from the 
issue of highlighting the rural working class as it saw few votes to be gained in the 
countryside, and for fear of alienating farmers (Flynn 1989).  Moreover key to much 
of New Labour’s rationale was its classless appeal and its desire to reach out to 
Middle England, many of whom resided in the countryside (Heley 2010, Hoggart 
2007, Phillips 1998a&b & 2007, Urry 1995).  Some national policies such as the 
minimum wage were of great value in rural areas, and the government was not 
indifferent to the issues of disadvantage and poverty (Shucksmith 2003, 2004 & 
2012).  However it preferred to attack these via its social exclusion agenda, which it 
felt was more palatable and less adversarial.  Language and symbolism was 
deemed crucial to the New Labour presentational case (Geddes & Root, 2000 
MacLeavy 2008, Shucksmith & Chapman 1998).   
The downside of such a subliminal message was that those who stood to gain most 
from the government’s intervention were often oblivious to the benefits of the policies 
targeted at them.  For instance, the SureStart programme in rural areas was more 
keenly exploited by middle class rather than working class parents, which defeated 
some of the covert social engineering that the scheme intended (Asthana et al 2009, 
Fahmy et al 2004, Garbers et al 2006, Tipping 2007, Willan 2007, Wilson 2006).  
The excuse that the better quality of life in the countryside made up for the 
inadequacies working-class populations encountered was scant consolation 
(Glendinning et al 2003). 
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The role of Elites 
Rural elites took different overlapping forms – the traditional landed estates; 
producers, especially those represented by the National Farmers Union (NFU); the 
new monied class that came into the countryside from business; hunting classes; 
professional classes who chose to live in the countryside and work elsewhere, or 
who retired to the countryside; and counter-urbanists who moved to the countryside 
because of their disdain for the city.  Power and influence was wielded by these 
groupings in different ways and at different times (Budge 2006, Hoggart et al 2014, 
Hoggart & Buller 2015, Howkins 2003, Woods 1998).  New Labour was not 
anathema to all of them – indeed it is probable some individuals from groupings 
represented here must have voted New Labour in 1997, and subsequently, because 
of the number of rural seats won by New Labour (See Chapter Four).   
New Labour’s approach to rural elites was to largely sidestep them to avoid 
antagonising them (Little 1999).  There were exceptions – hunting and the right to 
roam brought them into conflict with landed estates, the hunters and their followers.  
However, with the housing Nimbys, found mainly amongst the counter-urbanists, 
New Labour signed an early retreat notice as it failed to build anything like the 
number of houses that it predicted it would in the countryside (Heley 2010, Mitchell 
2004, Phillips 2010).   
In taking this approach New Labour failed to make anything other than a cursory 
glance at the covert submission of the rural working-class and disadvantaged.  
Admittedly some policies, such as greater labour market protection, when they bore 
fruit over the longer-term, would benefit lower income groups socially and financially, 
but there was little regard for the idea that the hegemony of rural elites was 
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challengeable.  New Labour was therefore complicit in its accommodation with rural 
elites.  This situation demonstrated Lukes’ third dimension of power with working 
class and disadvantaged groups continuing to face discriminative manipulation of 
their livelihoods as rural elites continued to exploit their position of ‘power over’ them.  
Sectoral/territorial breakdowns 
Under New Labour the shift from traditional forms of agriculture continued, though 
the extent can be exaggerated.  The BSE scandal, followed by the FMD debacle, 
had a searing effect upon how New Labour viewed farming and farmers.  New 
Labour commissioned not just the Haskins’ Review but also the report by Don Curry 
(2002) which encouraged farmers to seek out new food-chain possibilities and 
become more business-orientated. These changes were reflected in the UK 
government’s contribution towards the reform of the CAP.  The presence of the 
Treasury in these developments cannot be underestimated as evinced by its role in 
the document ‘A Vision for the Common Agricultural Policy’ jointly authored with 
Defra but as the Select Committee discovered, largely written by Treasury officials 
(Defra Select Committee 2007b).  This was indicative of a move back towards rural 
as a subset of farming, tied in with New Labour’s care not to antagonise farming 
organisations.  The CLA and the NFU were privy to information throughout all the 
discussions that led to the area-based payment system – a controversial move which 
had a mixed response from the wider farming community – but both organisations 
were largely supportive at the outset (interview with Practitioner 25, Greer 2008).   
FMD showed how dependent the countryside was on non-farming activities when 
many parts of it were closed during the outbreak.  However it was noticeable how 
much compensation was paid to farmers (of the £6bn total cost) in recompense, 
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again indicative of how cautious New Labour was to go against the power that 
farming communities still possessed (Donaldson et al 2006, Haskins 2001, Scott et 
al 2004, Ward & Ward 2001).  Whilst post-productivism led to a greater appreciation 
of territorial taxonomies of the countryside, the balance of power still remained with 
productivist approaches.  Nevertheless New Labour embraced new developments 
on alternative uses for the countryside and boosting rural policy provision was one 
such. However in failing to clearly discriminate between territorial divisions and the 
new identity politics, New Labour unnecessarily upset some in the countryside, (for 
instance it lumped together many who disagreed with aspects of policy as hunt 
supporters when that simply was not the case), and gave credence to the point of 
view that the government didn’t really understand rural issues (Muir 2007, Woods 
2008e).   
Thus the opportunity to encourage the distinctive development of market towns as 
part of the economic and social development of the countryside was missed as New 
Labour struggled to come to terms with these new regimes of rural politics (Caffyn 
2004, Morris 2012).  This could have led to a much stronger identification of New 
Labour with trends that would have benefitted the wider rural community.  The 
government not only failed to recognise this but was lax in how it communicated its 
message.  Therefore it was criticised for territorial shortcomings – particularly over 
the house-building debate, inadequately explaining why more homes were needed in 
the countryside – whilst not spelling out the advantages of investing in the future of 
market towns and their rural hinterlands. 
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Situatedness 
Outside of those rural constituencies that had been captured by New Labour in 1997, 
the government possessed few advantages that would allow it to gain traction in the 
wider rural community.  This was the paradox of New Labour.  Though it talked in 
terms of One Nation, its remit outside of either traditional rural Labour strongholds or 
the newly gained seats remained relatively weak.  Isolated pockets of Labour 
representation such as in Cornwall and Shropshire suffered because of the 
impotence of New Labour not only on the ground but in wider forums such as local 
authorities and enterprise bodies (Phillips 2000).  This demonstrated that New 
Labour’s hegemonic influence only went so far in the countryside as it was incapable 
of building a wider historic bloc, even though from 1999 to 2004 it did receive 
widespread support from many associated with the countryside.  This did not 
transcend into more remote rural areas however. 
This resulted in there being very little shift in the real balance of power despite the 
immediate ramifications of the landslide (See Chapter Four) and culminated in New 
Labour losing credibility and influence, even when national policies were of benefit to 
many of those based in rural communities (an obvious example would be the 
attempts to improve rural transport).  Those MPs who were elected were in the 
unfortunate position of often being the sole representative of government present in 
the locality and therefore took the full weight of criticism by opponents.  Whilst some 
targeted assistance was nearly always given, this did not prevent the feeling of 
abandonment and powerlessness (Faucher-King & Le Gales 2010, Stoker 2004a, 
Teles & Landy, 2001). 
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Modern versus traditional centres of power 
New Labour was elected as a modernising and modernist force.  In taking this 
stance it inevitably ran into opposition from more traditional elements operating in the 
countryside.  This not only included the usual sources of displeasure at the prospect 
of a Labour government – landed estates, hunters, the farming community – but also 
those antipathetic to aspects of New Labour’s reform programme.  Over time it 
became clear that the introduction of many of these proposals were obstructed in the 
countryside (house building being the most obvious, even though many village 
communities stressed the requirement of a pocket of affordable houses in their 
Parish Plans to keep their community vibrant) .  This was both a consequence of the 
powerlessness of New Labour against local elites and rural power-brokers but a 
mixture of lack of perseverance and guile in how it exercised its approach to making 
change (Mawson & Hall 2000, Ward 2008a&b, Woods 2003).   
There are numerous examples in housing, transport and economic development of 
how commitments were left unfulfilled or policies unimplemented as New Labour 
could not get the grip it needed to effect real change and modernise rural 
communities.  Therefore the reform programme in rural England was greatly behind 
that of its urban counterparts.  Whilst marketisation was less prominent in a rural 
setting, this was at the cost of resource allocation, which left the disadvantaged parts 
of rural society even more out on a limb (Clarke 2005, Gardner 2008, Oakley 2006, 
Whitfield 2006).  In this respect New Labour neither challenged the extant power in 
rural areas, nor was willing to heavily invest in those areas to effect a dramatic 
improvement in services and so show those communities what was possible under a 
New Labour government.  This situation deteriorated further after 2004 (Milbourne 
2008, Shucksmith 2012). 
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2.4 The New Labour operation in the countryside 
New Labour’s representative role in the countryside 
Research question One critically examines New Labour’s representative role after 
1997 and evaluates the claim that after the landslide victory it had become the party 
of the countryside.  Chapter Four adduces evidence for greater New Labour 
involvement taking different forms, including the setting up of the Rural Group, the 
spike in rural policy after 1999, the attempts to better define rural, and the formal 
recognition of rural in the creation of Defra, all of which is explored fully in Chapter 
Four (Bibby & Shepherd 2000 & 2004, Huby et al 2007, Woods 2009).  
Notwithstanding the political vicissitudes that affected New Labour over the thirteen 
years in power, it was significant that it did retain significant representation in rural 
England up until 2010 (Ward 2008c, Woods 2008d). 
At the core of this analysis is the counterfactual that if New Labour was different from 
earlier Labour administrations because of additional rural representation, how did 
this affect the government’s attitude towards the countryside, and how did this work 
through in terms of policy and politics there? 
Throwing off the shackles of urbanism? 
The second research question directly confronts the issue of whether New Labour 
was really different from its predecessors and had managed to transcend the 
characterisation that it was still an urban construct. Admittedly there were very 
limited expectations about what New Labour wanted to do for the countryside when 
elected in 1997, so low was the bar that it had set itself in the manifesto and in its 
campaigning (Labour Party 1997) (See Appendix 3).  Whilst New Labour was a 
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different party to Old Labour, in one respect there was still a similarity – that Labour 
governments governed largely for its supporters in urban areas – and that was 
where its emphasis would lie (Lowe & Ward 1998 & 2001, Newman 2001, Ward 
2002, Woods 2003). 
Yet after two years in power, as soon as the moratorium on public expenditure had 
been lifted, New Labour executed a dramatic shift in policy which demonstrated that 
whilst not ‘born-again ruralists’, a message of intent in the countryside had been 
delivered.  The reason for this change of heart was partly the reactive requirement of 
responding to the travails of the period 1999 – 2004, (which was at the height of the 
campaign against the ban on hunting, and the FMD outbreak), and partly because of 
New Labour’s new-found authority in the countryside, with so many rural MPs 
elected.  However it was also the result of a calculated attempt to extend its reach 
into rural areas because of the opportunity afforded by 1997.  That this period of 
intense interest in the countryside largely disappeared after 2004 begs the question 
of why New Labour took this path, and how much was it able to offset the traditional 
image of Labour governments as being principally urban-inclined (Ward 2002). 
There were a number of themes that New Labour pursued in order to demonstrate 
its rural credentials.  Ideas such as Vital Villages, which centred upon revitalising 
village life through community development, had been around for some time.  What 
the government did was to fund and encourage these initiatives through the conduit 
of the Countryside Agency. 
Ward and Lowe (2007a&b) describe how New Labour’s modernising zeal found the 
countryside not an unhelpful test-bed for experimentation.  Admittedly most initiatives 
had been fully trialled in urban settings first, but there was evidence of some 
51 
 
sensitivity being shown to the needs of rural areas in policy-formulation and 
implementation (Martin & Sanderson 1999).  After 2004, at what Ward and Lowe 
(2007a&b) saw as the destructive Haskins’ Review the ‘grand project’ of 
modernisation was replaced by ‘technocratic managerialism’.  In this regard it is 
possible to see the New Labour operation as novel, counter-intuitive, well-meaning, 
and radical, albeit eventually failing.  That it fitted one of the core objectives of New 
Labour – to reform and update the British state as part of national renewal was both 
resonant with, and a compelling reason for, the rationale behind New Labour’s 
involvement in the countryside (Ward 2008c). 
How much this performance in rural areas was substantive rather than superficial 
depends on the stance taken towards the wider modus operandi of the government.  
The Rural White Paper (2000), and the provision of an additional £1bn alongside a 
much more interventionist stance largely carried out by the Countryside Agency, 
marked a significant watershed (Derounian 2006).  However matters went into 
reverse after 2004, which left a great sense of unfulfillment and the belief that the 
opportunity for rural to reassert itself in relation to the rest of the country had been 
tossed away, with urbanism again in the ascendency (Columb 2007, Grant 2006, 
Raco & Imrie, 2003 Ward 2008c Wilson & Hughes, 2011, Woods 2008e). 
How far was New Labour dependent upon decentralisation and the externalisation of 
rural policy? 
In the third research question the idea is posed that much of New Labour’s approach 
to the countryside was dependent upon a decentralised approach with an emphasis 
upon externalised decision-making.  Generally New Labour policy-making was 
complicated, often contradictory, and multi-dimensional, targeting different audiences 
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at the same time (Driver & Martell 2006, Newman 2001, Savage & Atkinson 2001, 
Shaw 2002b).  This was very true of the rural domain. 
From the outset New Labour was determined not to be captured by producer 
interests and to encourage competition wherever possible, whilst centring on new 
forms of governance through active citizenship and participation, prioritising markets 
and networks over more traditional hierarchies in modes of decision-making.  In rural 
areas the position was even more complex, with many more actors, agents, and 
labyrinthine structures (Curry 2009b & 2012b, Stone 1989). 
When ‘rural’ was fully absorbed within ‘agriculture’, (which it was for most of the 
twentieth century), decision-making could easily be described as command and 
control (Cox et al 1986, Flynn et al 1996, Self & Storing 1962).  New Labour broke 
radically from that position, at least for a time, having given much of the authority for 
policy-making and delivery to the Countryside Agency.  Though ministers oversaw 
the general strategy, most of the initiation for new policies, programmes and projects 
came directly from the Agency (Countryside Agency 2006, Derounian 2006, 
Warburton 2004).  It was this that Haskins’ was so critical of, believing it to be an 
inefficient and ineffective mode of operation, which was excessively costly and 
provided poor value for money.  Haskins’ cleavage of policy-making from 
implementation (which was clearly demonstrated in his evidence to the Defra Select 
Committee Enquiry (2003c)) and the abolition of the Countryside Agency pulled what 
was left of the government’s programmes back within Defra.  In so doing what 
happened to rural matched the re-centring of government policy-making in order to 
focus on fewer targets and to get control over delivery mechanisms (Barber 2007, 
Lodge & Muir 2010, Richards & Smith 2006). 
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The issue of the externalisation of policy-making could not be isolated from the 
decentralisation/devolution debate which was at the heart of New Labour’s reforms 
of the state.  This mattered because much of the administration of programmes and 
projects passed from the Countryside Agency to the Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs).  In theory this placed rural issues closer to the decision-makers 
but in reality rural communities actually felt increasingly distant from those in power 
(Deas & Ward 2000, Ethier 1998, Hewitt 2011a, Lynch 1999, Mawson 1998, 
Tomaney 2000 & 2002, Tomaney & Ward 2000, Webb & Collis 2000). 
Much of the academic material on the subject of New Labour’s externalisation of 
policy in the countryside focuses upon individual case studies based around the 
major topic areas of government.  There is little analysis or evaluation of the New 
Labour measures in practice – more about the discrete areas of policy-making, the 
role of regulation, and the impact of participative models on both producers and 
consumers.  This was against a scenario of rapid change in the countryside, a 
constant backcloth, and a major determinant of what happened to the rural over this 
period (Askins 2006, Greer 2005, Marsden et al 2000, Yarwood 2005, Woods 
2008d).   
The political instrument that New Labour employed most to enable this activity was 
evidence-based policy-making – ‘what is best is what works’.  This pragmatic 
(though some would argue it was more ideological) desideratum was referred to as 
an act of faith, and crucial to what it portrayed as its non-ideological dependence 
upon the third way.  However it was also a practical guide as to how ministers, 
special advisers, civil servants, and others who advised government, should dovetail 
their efforts to provide practical solutions to often wicked problems, and 
communicate the mantra that this was different and better than what had gone 
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before (Nutley & Davies 2000, Nutley & Webb 2000, Shortall 2013, Southern 2001, 
Wilkinson 2007).  The problems arose when the evidence was unclear, incomplete 
or fallacious which led to policy churn and a somewhat chaotic agency/structure 
arrangement.  There was no better example of this than the fate of the Countryside 
Agency (see Chapters Five and Six) (Gallent & Andersson 2007, Ward 2008b, 
Woods 2009). 
The mantra of modernisation 
Research question Four emphasises the importance of modernisation to the New 
Labour project.  Though the 1997 manifesto was light on commitments, details and 
vision on the countryside, the document as a whole implied that New Labour’s 
modernising zeal would extend country-wide, including in rural areas.  This meant 
updating the system of agricultural support, reforming and improving public services, 
and making broadband available to rural as well as urban Britain (Davies & Crabtree 
2004, Moseley & Owen 2008).  Though ruralities stood to gain from national 
measures – the minimum wage, the welfare to work programme, extra spending on 
health and education, and the roll-out of infrastructure investment - modernisation of 
the rural economy, society and culture, appeared as secondary to the drive to 
improve the cities (see Chapters Five and Seven).   
Subsequent manifestos became more explicit on how the modernisation of rural 
areas was catered for in the government’s agenda, with a greater stress upon 
choice, economic renewal, including modifying the food chain, and guaranteeing the 
quality of life through a rural services standard (see Appendix 3).  These were 
highlighted in the 2000 Rural White Paper and in rural manifestos.  For example the 
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2010 manifesto was explicit on the building of 10,000 new homes in the countryside 
by 2011.  
In rural areas there was a tension between New Labour’s preference for the 
competition state and how it might deliver this in the countryside.  The mechanisms 
of marketising, outsourcing and tendering of services, alongside the vehicle of New 
Public Management was rarely available in rural areas, unless it was part of a much 
larger regional or sub-regional arrangement (Christensen & Laegreid 2006a, Gains 
2003, Pollitt 2009).  Rural areas were rarely situated in action zones or 
neighbourhood renewal areas and struggled to obtain the larger sums of money 
allocated for major service change.  Therefore the schools’ academy movement was 
much slower to take hold in rural communities and even in health, where the 
government had a more radical modernising agenda, the pace of change was 
nothing like that in urban England (Asthana et al 2202, 2003 & 2009, Asthana & 
Gibson 2008, Power et al 2004, Power & Whitty 1999, Whitty 2008 & 2009).  Instead 
counterproductively the consequence of modernisation elsewhere in the country, 
was usually the closure and loss of services in rural areas, victims of the drive 
towards more efficiency (Curry & Moseley 2011, Farrington & Farrington, 2005, 
Higgs & White, 1997, Marsden et al 2005, Mungall 2005, Paddison & Calderwood 
2007).  This was in marked contrast to what was promised in the Rural White Paper 
where service standards were guaranteed. 
Other New Labour modernising ideas were less controversial and more widely 
welcomed, especially its interest in governance.  The idea of joined-up government, 
cross-cutting procedures and networking aimed to drive up participation and favour 
the citizen and consumer over the producer (Clarence & Painter 1998, Needham 
2007).  Much of this chimed with rural communities as it worked with the grain of 
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self-sustenance, voluntarism and bespokeness, rather than one-size fits-all statism 
(Coulson, 2004, Stoker, 2004a, Taylor 2007).  Additionally there were many 
segments of village life that were in need of reform – although not accepted by all 
parts of those communities – but there was a large element of consensus over the 
requirement to deal with the shortcomings of local councils, the funding of voluntary 
organisations, and the way some services were delivered - or not - to rural localities 
(Pratchett 2004).   
The government’s involvement was welcomed by ruralities for three reasons.  First, 
the recognition that rural mattered and was now receiving attention was seen as long 
overdue, and compared favourably to the Thatcher/Major period.  Second, from the 
early 2000s reform was accompanied by the provision of real resources.  Third, the 
countryside itself had changed – large parts had voted New Labour, and the growing 
bond with New Labour MPs was exploited to good purpose.  At least some in New 
Labour recognised that and capitalised on this providential moment (Ward 2002). 
The means by which this was achieved was by a mixture of clever positioning as the 
propagators of change, communication, exhortation, incentivising opportunities, and 
soft threatening of recalcitrant elements who would not agree or compromise.  
However it was the resource issue that was most prominent – which made it all the 
more difficult for the government after the reductions in expenditure from 2004 
onwards, especially after 2008, as the financial crisis began to bite (Ahmad & 
Broussine 2003, Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones 2000, Satsangi et al 2010 Ward & 
Lowe 2007a, Woods 2003 & 2008c). 
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The effect of temporal and spatial features on New Labour in the countryside 
The fifth and final research question refers to how events and geographical factors 
affected New Labour’s performance.  From the outset New Labour struggled to come 
to terms with legacy issues especially BSE and the collapse in farm-gate prices (see 
Chapter Four).  Though the decision to push on with the hunting ban was popular 
with most Labour MPs and party members the time it took to see through the ban 
was unhelpful to the government’s wider programme in the countryside.  This, with 
the right to roam brought to a crescendo its focus on the countryside, but one that 
divided countryside opinion (Milbourne 2003a&b, Wallwork & Dixon 2004, Williams 
2001). 
Then there was the recognition that the problems of the countryside were deep-
seated and complicated, brought home to the government by the foot and mouth 
outbreak of 2001.  This was an event both of huge temporal and spatial implications 
– delaying an election, and changing the face of much of the countryside for the 
short-term (Anderson 2007, Houghie & Dickinson 2000, Ward & Lowe, 2007b).   
Between1999 and 2004 New Labour became expert at systematically and 
symbolically identifying and targeting social ills in the countryside – homelessness, 
joblessness, inaccessibility, and service decline.  Its approach was marked by its 
willingness to pursue an overtly social democratic agenda.  However policy 
interventions were usually short-term, ad hoc and superficial, especially after it lost 
focus after 2004.  This left the spatial and cultural dimensions of life in the 
countryside largely untouched, resulting in growing inequality, worsening housing 
disparity, and a poorer quality of living for lower income individuals, families and 
communities (Cloke 2003 & 2006, Shucksmith 2003 & 2012, Woods 2008c&d). 
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An increased concentration on economic and business solutions to the countryside’s 
shortcomings from 2004 onwards led to a skew away from the societal issues that a 
more traditional Labour government might have grappled with, and was scant 
consolation for rural communities.  The sense of a policy vacuum was all too obvious 
after 2004 (Webber et al 2009). 
2.5 Schema, frames and other notions to explain New Labour’s countryside 
policies and modes of delivery 
The New Labour approach nationally prioritised modernisation, economism, 
electoralism, devolution of power within a one-nation state, strong executive 
decision-making, alongside effective modes of delivery, and encouragement to the 
concept of competition state tied up with its Europeanism and support of 
globalisation (Diamond & Radice 2010 & 2011, Finlayson 2003, Watson & Hay 
2003).  Where the opportunities in the countryside fitted these objectives the belief 
was that rural areas should share in the pursuance of these objectives, though not 
necessarily at the same time, or in the same way.  Therefore the schema, frames 
and notions of New Labour’s operation in the countryside were derived largely from 
the party’s overall perspective on government, but there were some important 
differences and variability in how those objectives were applied. 
New Labour’s schema or the organised pattern of thought and behaviour associated 
with that thought was sometimes difficult to disentangle.  Hay (1999) argues that 
much of New Labour’s underlying philosophy was associated with how it tried to 
come to terms with the post-Keynesian world and class de-alignment (Evans & Tilley 
2012).  Whilst not wholly neoliberal in outlook, the tools of analysis had more in 
common with Thatcherism than with previous Labour governments (Driver & Martell 
59 
 
1999, MacLeavy 2007).  As such, though New Labour still described itself as social 
democratic, socialism was social-ism or social liberalism (Buckler & Dolowitz 
2000a&b, Freeden 1999a&b, Hale 2006, White 2001).   
Fairclough’s (2001 & 2010) examination of New Labour through discourse analysis, 
text and metaphor confirmed how far New Labour had departed from traditional 
modes of operation, a view confirmed by others (Benwell & Stokoe 2006, Hewitt 
2009, Reisigl 2008). Together these debates were at the crux of whether New 
Labour had become entirely accommodationist with Thatcherism or at least had the 
pretense of being a social democrat party or something quite else (Chilton 2006, Hall 
(Stephen) 2003, Joseph 2006, Leggett 2007, Mair 2000). 
This mattered to New Labour’s modus operandi in the countryside as it strongly 
influenced not only its approach to policy-making and politics there, but also 
contextualised how New Labour was perceived by others.  Thus the framing of New 
Labour’s case determined its agency, how it responded to existing structures and 
institutions, and indicated its robustness in seeking change.  This framing was 
measured against a backcloth of attempting to retain the support of Middle England, 
effective crisis-management, the application of evidence-based policy-making, and 
pursuing the main New Labour governmental themes.  Where the countryside 
figured in terms of the ongoing debate between neo-liberalism and social democracy 
was a constant feature of how these frames should be understood and how New 
Labour used language as part of its hegemonic project (Atkins 2011, Fairclough 
2001, Lister 2003, Matthes 2011, Newman 2001). 
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2.6 Summarising New Labour’s approach to the countryside after 1997 – the 
relevance of Gramsci and Lukes’ 
This chapter has considered the academic literature on New Labour in relation to the 
aims and research questions with an emphasis on the extent to which the 
government came to terms with its rural responsibilities.  Overall this research 
critically evaluates and reflects upon the role of agency in the countryside and how 
that affected structures, institutions, processes and procedures.   
The thesis is not a theoretical study, but it has reflected on the ideas of Gramsci and 
Lukes which will be referred to later in this Section.  It has also made reference 
where appropriate to the social construction that gives meaning and reality to the 
performance and behaviour of people and institutions when challenged by the 
confluence of events and spatial features that contextualised New Labour’s time in 
office, and how that impacted upon developments in rural policy and politics.  
Chapter Four discusses the opportunities that increased representation brought to 
New Labour.  This came in the form of being able to use its parliamentary numbers 
as a riposte to those who argued that Labour had no legitimacy in rural areas and 
largely misunderstood rural issues.  Given the heightened interest in the countryside 
because of the hunting and right to roam debates New Labour was able to point to 
its electoral success as a reminder to those who used those issues to attack the 
government that they did not have a monopoly of support. 
As important was the practical benefit of having representatives who were willing to 
go out and argue New Labour’s case.  This was why the Rural Group was so 
influential, at least for a period, because it gave a symbolic and substantive meaning 
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to what New Labour could stand for in the countryside (see Chapter Four).  Woods’ 
(2008) book goes some way to exploring this; the thesis builds on that knowledge. 
What the Rural Group did was to open up a dialogue with countryside organisations 
and campaigners, which was a useful conduit for government to exploit.  Coming as 
it did in parallel with other contributory developments – the PIU report, the Rural 
White Paper and the setting up of the Countryside Agency – New Labour found itself 
in the fortuitous position of being seen by some from 1999 onwards as a positive 
force for good in the countryside and actively courted.   
In this sense New Labour was able to build on the hegemonic position in the 
countryside that it found itself in after 1997.  This hegemony had not come about 
through anything other than chance, though the conjunctural antecedent of the social 
and economic circumstances of the time allied to the political and electoral collapse 
of Conservativism must not be underestimated (Atkins 2011).  New Labour had no 
great ambitions for the countryside prior to 1997.  Yet it now had captured many 
more rural seats than it had anticipated and had a strong reason to want to be seen 
to be doing something in the countryside.   
Two problems arose.  First, it had little experience on how to govern in rural areas – 
this at least explains why it was willing to externalise so much of the rural operation 
to the Countryside Agency.  Second, its focus on the countryside was very much 
events-led.  As soon as the controversy around the hunting debate in particular died 
down, so New Labour’s interest in the countryside waned.  Other features 
compounded that loss of interest – the decline in importance of the Rural Group; the 
government’s concentration upon delivery, focusing on its main public service areas; 
the decision of Defra to marginalise rural; the cuts in budget; the growth of 
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regionalism and the limited role given to rural – all meant that rural after 2004 
became far less important in the eyes of ministers and civil servants and that was the 
perception that was communicated to the countryside. 
Counterfactually New Labour could have done much more to use its hegemonic 
position.  Certainly in terms of Lukes’ analysis of dimensions of power New Labour 
had the chance to use its agenda-setting power to continue to make in-roads into the 
rural economy, society and culture.  Though it did not haemorrhage rural seats until 
2010, when it lost the general election, it could have done much more to support 
rural Labour MPs if it had continued with the programmes it had put in place from 
1999 until 2004.  That it chose not to do so signalled that it had regressed to become 
much more urban-focused after 2004 and displayed how tenuous its relationship with 
the countryside was. 
The greatest disappointment in this was that New Labour betrayed the very people 
that it could have done so much to help if it had carried on with its social democratic 
intervention between 1999 and 2004.  This meant trying to rebalance power in the 
countryside in lieu of supporting those who faced suppression (consistent with 
Lukes’ third dimension of power) – the working class and disadvantaged – their 
problems were at least equal to those of their urban counterparts.  This required New 
Labour taking on the rural elites and those with power in rural areas.  However this 
was something that had not really occurred to ministers, was seen as too difficult to 
encompass, or had undesirable consequences, such as heightened attacks by the 
Countryside Alliance.  This was a serious weakness of New Labour’s approach to 
the countryside.  Yet the essence of what the Countryside Agency had provided 
through its programmes and activities during its short existence was just such a 
radical departure.  However these improvements largely disappeared when the 
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Agency was abolished.  So did New Labour’s social democratic intentions in the 
countryside.  Also it lost the goodwill and support that it had built up in the academic 
and practitioner community – its own historic bloc.  That this was sacrificed did not 
seem to unduly concern the government – it dallied with the idea of not needing a 
replacement for the Countryside Agency before settling for the much reduced CRC.  
This summed up New Labour’s lack of chagrin as it turned away from rural.  The 
tragedy was that having promised so much (through the very encouraging Rural 
White Paper), and put in motion a decent policy-mix and effective programmes for 
delivery on the ground, this was cast aside for little good reason other than the cost 
overruns (that did admittedly damage the reputation of the Countryside Agency).  It 
is surprising that there has been so little investigation into the role of the Countryside 
Agency apart from a review of the Agency by Derounian (2006). 
The short-sightedness of this approach not only confirmed in the eyes of critics that 
New Labour was really an urban construct and also impaired the government’s 
ability to deliver its wider programme in the countryside.  Thus modernisation 
appeared to be far less successful in rural areas than in the cities.  This might have 
prevented the wholesale marketisation and privatisation of services, but it also led to 
lower investment into key provision such as health, child care and 
telecommunications.  Rural areas lost out two-fold.  First, the gap with urban centres 
grew in a number of fields, especially in the more remote parts of the countryside.  
Second, rural areas faced a disproportionate loss of services, as the modernising 
tendencies of government sought closures of inefficient rural services to compensate 
for increased investment elsewhere.  The demise of many rural post offices is an 
exemplar of this and a further manifestation of the hollowing-out of the state in rural 
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communities.  For this Labour MPs in rural seats would get all the blame and little 
credit for what had been accomplished by the government. 
That was the legacy of New Labour in the countryside.  The disappointment was that 
what had been achieved between 1999 and 2004 was not only a lost opportunity, but 
had proved that a very different legacy could have been left if New Labour had 
persevered with what it had started at the end of the twentieth century. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology and methods  
3.1 The methodological standpoint  
Ethnography has been of growing importance as a methodology in both political 
science and rural studies.  In terms of political research, ethnography has added to 
the diversity of the study of politics, even if still understudied and is now accepted as 
a valid way of eliciting information from actors, which can then be interpreted, and 
conceptually analysed (Anyero 2006, Baiocchi & Connor 2008, Brewer 2000, 
Burnham et al 2008, Johnson & Reynolds 2003, Schatz 2009, Schram & Caterino 
2006, Silverman 2007).  For the investigation of rural, ethnography has been a 
vehicle for the development of the cultural turn as an alternative to the positivist 
epistemology, which the subject-matter used to be prescribed by (Cloke 1994 & 
1997, Hughes et al 2000, Milbourne 2002, Previte et al 2007).   
Ethnography, with its links to participant observation, was the methodology of choice 
for me as the researcher.  I was fortunate in that I had direct experience of the field 
and events and had access to individuals that others might have been precluded 
from (Lewis & Russell 2011, McGinty & Salokangas 2014, Murchinson 2010).  This 
also brought challenges in that as an insider I could find it difficult to detach from my 
own prejudices, and as some of those interviewed were friends, this could cause its 
own difficulties over objectivity (Grills 1998, Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, 
Handwerker 2001, Owton & Allen-Collinson 2014).  This unique positionality, if used 
carefully, can still be highly advantageous, permitting the researcher to reach places 
and people that would otherwise remain unstudied.  The ontological relationship 
between researcher and respondent can add considerably to the shared episteme to 
allow a richness of evidence to be forthcoming.  Provided this is validated, it can 
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provide a compelling narrative on the temporal and spatial elements at question in 
the research, and a robust empirical defence of what is discovered (Creswell & Miller 
2000, Denzin 2004, Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). 
The building-block of ethnography is that it is a study of agency, within the context of 
the evolution of events that can then be conceptualised and interpreted, to look for 
causation and consequences (Patterson & Monroe 1998).  In the case of this 
research most of those interviewed were elite actors, active in the public realm and 
with positions to defend (Harrison 2001, Hughes A & Cormode 1998, Odendahl & 
Shaw 2002, Smith 2006, Woods 1998).  As Chapter Two has intimated it is not just a 
question of collecting data and creating a narrative, but also then interpreting what 
has been said.  Actors are subject to social constructions, based on their past 
experiences, prejudices, and the parameters of the milieu in which they are 
operating.  This study strongly confirmed that state of affairs (Burr 2015, Parsons 
2010). 
The centrality of ethnography in this research places the enquiry within the 
hermeneutic strand of discovery whereby emphasis is put on the need to understand 
the meanings people attach to social behaviour (Bevir & Rhodes 2003, Furlong & 
Marsh 2010).  The study is largely concerned with what Geertz (1973) refers to as 
‘thick description’, whereby a narrative arises through the application of ethnographic 
techniques deriving social constructions to actions and influences.  In this way the 
research can attain both objectivity and realism.  
My approach throughout has been to be overt, and to be clear on any ethical caveats 
– to explain exactly why I was undertaking the research - and to limit my report to 
textual exposition, not referring to my opinions on the interviewee, what they said, 
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and to the semiotics of the interview.  I made the occasional note of what was said 
outside of the formal interview, in passing, but as participants were guaranteed 
anonymity and confidentiality, unless explicitly asked otherwise, this was never 
misused (Bryman 2012, Christians 2011, Denzin 2009, Farrimond 2013, McAreavey 
2013, McNabb 2004).  That is why the research is not auto-ethnographic, for 
although interviews were dialogic, as there was not the power imbalance that might 
have been faced by an outsider who had not been immersed in the field, and 
reflexivity, self-reflection and symbolic interactionism4 were key elements in my 
learning, the focus was on the unfolding story, and narrative, rather than analysing 
feelings, emotions, and values in the interrelationships (Alvesson & Skoldberg 2009, 
Anderson 2006, Atkinson 2006, Chang 2008, Holliday 2002, Lewis & Russell 2011, 
Vryan 2006). 
Using ethnography as a single source of investigation has had its critics 
(Hammersley 2013).  There is always a danger of bias, in who is chosen as 
respondents, the partiality of their knowledge and discourse, and the manner of the 
textual analysis (Halperin & Heath 2012, Peters 1998).  This is why I was keen to 
validate by use of archive materials, secondary evidence, and triangulate, by cross 
referencing between the different interview sessions to draw out points of common 
agreement (Ball 2003, Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, Davies 2001).  Eventually, however, 
ethnography can be distilled down to the trustfulness of the individuals involved and 
the authenticity of the evidence.  I was pleased by how frank those who I interviewed 
were, but surprised that even when being told something in confidence, more often 
than not the point at issue was already in the public domain.  To have details 
                                                          
4
 Symbolic interactionism is defined as a theoretical perspective in sociology and social psychology 
that views social interaction in terms of the meanings actors attach to action and things (Bryman 
2012). 
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confirmed is nevertheless important, and can enhance epistemological 
comprehension (Pennings et al 2006). 
What the use of ethnography crystallised in terms of this study, was the benefits of a 
thematic approach over case studies, and specifically the importance of the 
diachronic shift from social democracy in the countryside after 2004, following the 
seminal Haskins’ Review (2003).  The responses of participants also highlighted the 
differential between politicians and others interviewed.  Whereas practitioners, 
academics and to some extent civil servants could specialise and stay with the rural 
for some time, politicians rarely had that luxury, as other issues intervened, and new 
responsibilities beckoned.  This was not helped by ministerial churn and institutional 
change (see Chapter Six).    
Interviews also highlighted the changing structure and agency in the countryside with 
hierarchies being replaced by networks, and to a lesser extent markets.  The value 
of ethnographic enquiry remains that the researcher can extract these ideas to help 
form the research hypothesis, linking the evolving narrative to the dialectical process 
of interpretivist analysis (Bryman 2012, Heyl 2001).  The ultimate test is whether this 
methodology can be an improvement against other forms of enquiry.  However the 
very fact that voice has been given to those who previously have been ignored, and 
that this can be epistemologically, and ontologically justified, suggests that 
ethnography will grow in importance in the future in both political science and rural 
studies, and will further elucidate the study of power and how policy is created in the 
countryside (Weeden 2010). 
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3.2 The methods: primary, secondary and academic sources 
The thesis has employed a mixed-methods approach.  Whilst relying principally upon 
evidence from semi-structured interviews, recourse was made to archive material, as 
well as my own memory of people and events.  Together this allowed me to 
triangulate, in order to get the fullest confirmation possible of accuracy, validity and 
relevance. 
Semi-structured interviews 
The principal method involved the application of semi-structured interviewing of elite 
actors.  This evidence was entirely primary and five categories of research 
participant were chosen.  In total 139 interviews took place.  The numbers for each 
category are given below: 
 Ministers and special advisers (8 +2) 
 Members of Parliament; Lords; Councillors; and Labour activists (11; 4; 3; 5) 
 Civil Servants (10) 
 Academics (10) 
 Practitioners (a) National 47; (b) Local 39. 
The rationale for choosing these categories is explained in Section 3.3.  However 
these people were the key players in making and delivering rural policy, and major 
actors in the wider rural political scene.  The numbers for each category and an 
explanation of the different categories is to be found in Appendix 4. 
Semi-structured interviews gave the advantage of flexibility in questioning, permitting 
respondents to range over issues they wished to talk about, as well as answering 
prompted questions.  The first set of interviews – the scoping interviews - aimed to 
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confirm that the research study was one worthy of investigation, that individuals 
contacted would be willing to participate, and that it would be possible to devise an 
interview schedule that would yield good evidence.  At this stage I interviewed a 
couple of MPs, one of which was Bradley, and three practitioners, all of whom were 
well known to me.   
The rationale was less about detailed consideration of the issues, and more about a 
conversation to establish whether they thought this was a worthwhile project, and 
how I might best go about obtaining appropriate information, and from whom.  
Already I was trying to establish a suitable narrative, and interpret what we had 
discussed. 
From that first set of scoping interviews, a substantive interview but bespoke 
schedule was arrived at and logistical planning put in place (though this sometimes 
meant pulling it all together on the train journey before the interview).  For these 
major interviews, I would have to be less conversational, and more structured, and 
organised in how I approached them.  However throughout the process, the 
emphasis was upon open questioning exercised in a dialogic manner.  Every attempt 
was made to pursue biographical stories to permit a narrative to arise, through the 
cross-referencing of ideas, issues, events and personalities, to develop the theories 
and concepts in order to further the research aims.  Over time the sequence of 
questions asked took on greater significance, becoming more definitive, including 
elements of counterfactual prompts, about how things might have transpired 
differently if alternative scenarios had been progressed (Ritchie & Spencer 2002, 
Wengraf 2001). 
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The intensity of undertaking detailed open-ended questioning meant that though I 
chose the boundaries of the research, within that respondents were able to range 
quite widely over the terrain of their experiences.  In this they acted as explainers, 
defenders, problematisers, postulates, truth-seekers, sharers and deniers (Manheim 
and Rich 1981, Johnson and Reynolds 2003).  Most sessions lasted for an hour – a 
time frame I thought was appropriate (for both parties), and was occasionally 
followed up by email or phone, to check on details.  Interestingly a number of 
meetings concluded by participants expressing how pleased they were to be asked 
questions about their experiences, and how much they enjoyed being cross-
examined, as they had never been debriefed on leaving office.  Only on two 
occasions did the interview turn into an excursus of justification, which had to be 
brought to an end by myself due to saturation (interview with Minister 1 & Practitioner 
1, Mason 2010).  Otherwise the emphasis was on adding to knowledge, sharing 
experiences and devising appropriate understanding of this period in history.  In that, 
there was the distinct advantage that the research study ended in 2010, so anyone 
continuing in office could be more open about what they had to say (Berg 2009, Heyl 
2007). 
Crucial to the exercise from the scoping interviews was the use of the technique of 
triangulation5, to validate the data collected, and help the interpretation of that data, 
by cross-checking the material accrued from the different sessions (Baiocchi & 
Connor 2008, Denzin 2009, Kubik 2009, Peters 1998).  This material was later 
compared and complemented with evidence from documentary sources (Peters 
1998, Bryman 2012).  As the number of people interviewed increased and the 
                                                          
5
 Triangulation is the method by which you draw together at least three pieces of empirical evidence in 
order to be able to construct moderately complex theoretical concepts (Denzin 1970). 
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evidence snowballed, and more people came recommended to me as being useful 
participants, it became possible to identify specific themes (Berg 2009).  These 
themes were subsequently confirmed, edited or discounted, to allow other lines of 
enquiry, and to recalibrate the research process, including further finessing the 
interview schedule.   
To summarise, the interview process was divided into three phases: 
First, were the scoping interviews, which gave structure to the process and created 
enquiry boundaries (Robertson et al 2012).  Second, came the substantive 
interviews, which detailed who, what, when, how and where people were interviewed 
and evidence accrued.  These occurred from 2010 to 2012.  This phase continued 
over a couple of years, though the bulk of the interviews were completed by 2011.  
The third phase was a follow-up stage, when a small number of people were re-
interviewed, sometimes over the phone, or by email, and details were checked out 
by recourse to correspondence.  Given the number of interviews undertaken, some 
139 overall, gave confidence to me that there was sufficient data from which to draw 
conclusions, and to minimise the risk of subjectivity (Grills 1998, Hammersley 2006, 
Kvale 1996). 
Documentary Sources, including personal papers 
Government, its agencies, parliament and the media provide plentiful written 
accounts delivering an abundance of contemporary material made freely available to 
the researcher.  It is a moot point whether this evidence is primary or secondary – 
particularly as I was a participant in some of the proceedings.  In terms of the 
approach taken to the research, an early effort was made to capture, use and apply 
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material from parliamentary debates, questions, and reports that fitted the subject-
matter of rural affairs (Ihalainen & Palonen 2009, Scott 1990).   
In addition, I retained a small number of personal papers, which were helpful in 
reminding me of events I was involved with, and assisted in the contextualisation of 
the narrative. 
Participant observation 
This research could not utilise the method of participant observation as such, 
because the topic-area was historical.  However, it was important not to discount the 
knowledge-base of the researcher, having been an active player in many of the 
events described, and having personal recollections of the actors involved, and the 
decisions that they took (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). 
In particular, the involvement with the Backbench Group, where the author was a 
committee member throughout, and latterly the chair, alongside long-time 
membership of the most relevant select committees, was of assistance in helping 
contextualise the study.  In this sense, the research made limited use of auto-
ethnography.6 
 
                                                          
6
 Autoethnography is a form of qualitative research, studied from a critical realist perspective, 
combining interpretivist epistemology, and constructionist ontology (McNabb, 2004, Bryman, 2008).  
Autoethnographic enquiry is unusual in that it can be both a method of research in itself, but also the 
written product of that research (Atkinson 1990, Bryman 2008).  It links directly to discourse analysis, 
and fits what is called the hermeneutic circle which reinforces verstehen, or understanding, through 
dialogic reasoning (McNabb 2004, Caterino 2006).  Overall autoethnography permits researchers to 
indulge in highly individualistic empirical investigation, referring back to some personally derived 
research hypotheses, which the mode of research can aim to substantiate through the gathering of 
evidence.  It cannot prove that the research hypotheses are correct according to Popperian 
falsification theory, or even establish causation (Denscombe 2002). 
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Academic sources 
The research work is dualistic in combining two fields of enquiry, political science 
and rural studies.  Both areas have an extensive research base, but there is only 
very limited overlap.  This lacunae helped inform the gathering of primary material 
and set the parameters for secondary resource investigation. 
For political science there is an abundance of texts which explain what are the 
appropriate research methods in politics, political science and policy-making, and 
how best to apply these.  Initially this meant that it was necessary to undertake a 
broad review.  The most helpful starting point was Marsh and Stoker (2010), though 
others were studied, from the perspective of general methods (Burnham et al 2008, 
Harrison 2001, McNabb 2004), empirical analysis (Manheim and Rich 1981) and 
comparative studies (Pennings et al 2006, Peters 1998).  As part of this investigation 
into research methods, the necessity for specific lines of enquiry became evident, 
such as in Chapter Four, which examines how a rural constituency is defined. 
For rural research methods, it was necessary to seek out a more eclectic mix of 
sources, which explain how rural studies has been influenced by the cultural turn, 
driven by new methodologies, particularly ethnography.  Two key texts are; Cloke 
(1997) and Hughes et al (2000) which these synthesise this alongside economic, 
sociological, cultural, linguistic and geographical features.   
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3.3 The nature, form and structure of the interviews 
The interview process with elite actors 
This section considers the detailed rationale behind the interviews that took place, 
and how this both shaped the interview process itself, and the wider research study. 
The five categories identified in Section 3.2 were chosen for a couple of 
straightforward reasons.  First, the number of different categories gave breadth to 
the enquiry, giving balance and robustness to the evidence-gathering.  Second, 
research participants were mainly known to me, which gave the advantage that I 
came to the interview with some common ground and experiences already 
established.  Most were elite actors, though some had a local, rather than a national 
persona (Cochrane 1998).7 Only the civil servants were strangers to me, though 
even here our paths had sometimes crossed at select committee hearings, seeing 
them in the box8 and at meetings with ministers.  The large number of practitioners 
that I chose to interview resulted from my belief that it was important to investigate 
the implications of government policy amongst those who were empowered to 
deliver those policies.  This explains why local as well as national practitioners were 
cross examined so that the impact on the ground was explored.  There was also a 
limit on how many politicians, civil servants and academics available who could 
usefully add to the research, so practitioner participation was vital. 
                                                          
7
 Practitioners consisted of those people working in local government, in professions, in the third 
sector and pressure groups, and a good many had achieved high status within the local rather than 
the national field of expertise and experience. 
8
 At question-time and in debates civil servants sit in a row at the back of the of the chamber in the 
House of Commons, so that they can be there to pass notes to ministers, to advise on answers made 
and to help clarify the government’s agenda.  This is known colloquially as ‘The Box’. 
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The numbers involved meant I had a valid sample that overcame the threat of bias, 
given that the list was hand-picked (Handwerker 2001).  Anonymity and 
confidentiality was assured except in two cases, Bradley and Haskins, where 
because of the importance of the content, I asked the individuals to go on the record.  
Subsequently as a result of the work I undertook on defining rural constituencies, 
Bibby also agreed to be mentioned by name. 
Notwithstanding the issue of how elite is defined, many in the list were obvious 
choices because of their roles over the thirteen years of New Labour’s rural 
responsibilities (Odendahl & Shaw 2002).   
Deciding to include a number of actors from the ‘local’ scene widened and deepened 
the research effort, and gave reinforcement to the process of triangulation. 
(Cochrane 1998, Hughes & Cormode 1998, Richards 1996). 
Interviewing elite actors can lead to special problems, some practical, some 
methodological.  Practical considerations include persuading individuals to give 
interviews and them finding the time to participate.  Methodologically there is the 
danger that interviewees are more concerned with defending their own position, 
rather than adding to the sum total of knowledge (Delaney 2007). 
Such concerns come to a head in the form of power relationships, and the danger of 
bias, as both interviewer and respondent can attempt to manipulate the process to 
their own benefit.  This was something I became acutely aware of (Barniskis 2013, 
Leech 2002b, Lewis & Russell 2011, McGinty & Salokangas 2014, Smith 2006).  My 
experience is that the many advantages of ethnography outweigh these difficulties. 
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All initial interviews including the scoping interviews were conducted according to 
Chatham House Rules (CHR)9, the research agreement that best befitted my 
relationship with the individuals in question. Given the issue of how individuals would 
be described to maintain their anonymity I checked the nomenclature to ensure that 
they were happy with this, which was a slight deviation from the 2002 CHR 
clarification on affiliation.  Later interviews, when I was formally enrolled for the 
doctorate involved informed consent forms, to be fully compliant with university 
research procedures.  Venues were nearly always chosen by the respondent, though 
some meetings occurred on ‘neutral’ territory.  Usually the interview was undertaken 
in their office, though in the case of politicians the hospitality rooms of the Palace of 
Westminster were often preferred.  Only one person could not be interviewed – 
through diary difficulties rather than non-acceptance.  I had the distinct advantage 
that in many cases the interviewee dealt directly with me, rather than through a 
gatekeeper (Goldstein 2002).  This meant that I was able to negotiate directly the 
terms of our meeting, and prepare some of the groundwork first-hand rather than it 
being passed on by a third party.  Over time because I dealt directly with 
                                                          
9
 My choice of CHR was a consequence of my own experiences as a Parliamentarian in meetings and 
being interviewed, recognising that politicians tend to respect this approach as one where the trust 
and integrity of the relationship is such that there is greater respect for the use of material, and any 
outcome than ensues. 
CHR are clear and explicit: 
‘The Chatham House Rule is a system for holding debates and discussion panels on controversial 
issues….At a meeting held under the Chatham House Rule, anyone who comes to the meeting is free 
to use information from the discussion, but is not allowed to reveal who made any comment.  It is 
designed to increase openness of discussion. 
The rule which was further defined in 2002 now states: 
When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use 
the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any 
other participant, may be revealed’ (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2014). 
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participants, I was able to prompt them for suggestions on which other individuals I 
might interview, so an element of snowballing occurred (Christopoulos 2009). 
A small number of interviews were conducted by phone or email (Shuy 2003).  
Largely I decided that it was preferable to meet interviewees in person though I did 
follow up by more indirect means, to check on details, or to pursue a specific point 
that did not arise in the meeting.  From time to time the interviews involved more 
than one respondent.  This was always at the instigation of the chosen interviewee, 
who requested that someone else (who was interested in my project) be present in 
order to add their own views to the discussion.  This added to the richness of the 
interview (Davies 2001, Frey & Fontana 1991).  I have only counted this as one 
interview, so in reality I interviewed more than the 139 subjects stated. 
From the outset, I chose to take field notes rather than to record interviews.  This 
was for a number of reasons.  First, it was a personal decision, given that I have 
been interviewed on many occasions, including by research students, and I felt that 
the presence of a tape recorder somewhat changed the dynamics of the interviewer-
interviewee interface.  Second, the venues chosen were not always conducive to the 
application of recording technology.  This was especially true when in a 
parliamentary setting.  Third, given who was being interviewed, I believed that those 
individuals would be happier to talk more freely if I did not have a recording of what 
they had said (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007).  This required careful listening, 
accurate field notes, and the evolution of a codified system that could later be 
analysed and interpreted (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, Berry 2002, Rubin & Rubin 
2012).   
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The large number of quotes in the text came from me checking assiduously exactly 
what the respondent said – even if that meant interrupting the flow of the interview 
for a short time.  I also, as a matter of course, typed up the interviews immediately 
afterwards, always allowing time for this.  Given the number of train journeys I 
undertook this was a useful opportunity to keep to this rule.  Very occasionally I went 
back to the individual to check a detail, especially the accuracy of a quote.   
I had two further advantages.  First, the language, terminology or idiolect was not 
alien to me, being well versed in government and parliamentary procedures 
(Wengraf 2001).  Second, power relations were somewhat different to the usual 
researcher-interviewee relationship, as I tended to be treated as an equal in 
recognition of my previous role (Harrison 2001, Leech 2002a, Smith 2006).   
The ethnographic methodology identified that there were as many differences within 
groupings as there were between them.  One example of this was the split between 
Old and New Labour MPs10, who took a somewhat different approach to the role of 
government in rural areas.  I also included a small number of councillors, 
parliamentary candidates and political activists in the process.  This was partly to 
give a different perspective but also to get a grounded view of New Labour’s 
achievements or otherwise from those who had direct experience of policies in action 
(see Chapter Five). 
At the outset it was my intention to pursue a case study approach.  However this 
soon proved to be unsatisfactory and was replaced by a thematic analysis.  This did 
                                                          
10
 The nomenclature of Old and New Labour is not easy to define.  Perhaps it was better to refer to 
those who were more Blairite in persuasion, though the conflict with Brownite supporters added 
certain piquancy to who was interviewed and why. 
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not invalidate all the earlier interview material as much of the material was still of 
interest (Pennings et al 2006).  
Ethical issues 
Given the close personal relationships that existed with some of the interviewees, 
ethical issues were bound to arise.  There was never any attempt by me to hide this 
fact and I would not in any way dissimulate, or expect anyone to participate, other 
than as a willing volunteer, and in the knowledge of what they were taking part in 
(Grills 1998, McNabb 2004).  Research ethics were never sacrificed because of 
friendship and the position of the interviewee was reinforced by the additional 
provision of informed consent, after the early use of Chatham House Rules (Ayres & 
Pearce 2004, Manheim & Rich 1981, Pettigrew et al 2004, Rothman et al 2009).  I 
became aware of the threat of the ‘Rosenthal effect’11 and moved to mitigate that. 
Hammersley (2013) and Potter and Hepburn (2005) have pointed out some of the 
pitfalls that ethnographic accounts can fall into from the ethical perspective.  First, 
that the interviewee is less inclined to give an objective account of their role in the 
historical process, but more likely to try to position themselves in a favourable light.  
This is defective psychology in people’s experiences, which is socially-culturally 
constituted.  This is why triangulation is so important – to try to minimise the impact 
of excursus. 
                                                          
11
Given the familiarity of the researcher to the interviewees the issue of bias was a real one.  That 
again was a reason for choosing so many different people, to minimise this risk, so that as objective 
an account as was reasonably feasible could be achieved.  Academics refer to this as the ‘Rosenthal 
effect’ (Halperin & Heath 2012), or more simply described as the danger that the researcher can 
influence or bias the results, because of their proximity to interviewees (Denscombe 2003, Farrimond 
2013, Owton & Allen-Collinson 2014, Peters 1998, Yin 2009).  The intention would be to try to be 
dispassionate in all interview situations, making sure that I did not intervene into narratives, other than 
to push the respondent for more detail or further explanation.   
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Second, there is always a danger that the researcher/interviewer nexus will dominate 
from ‘a conversational analytic and discursive psychological perspective’ (Potter and 
Hepburn 2005: 291) setting the framework in such a way that the evidence is 
interpreted or construed to fit the research aims of the ethnography (Atkinson 1990, 
Atkinson & Silverman 1997, Cannella & Lincoln 2011, Silverman 2007).  To 
overcome this I made sure that there were always some set questions to the 
interview (Hopf 2004). 
Trust remained vital throughout the process including over how that material was 
subsequently interpreted, the subject of Section 3.4. 
3.4 Towards a Thematic Approach 
The original conception of this research involved taking a case study approach.  As a 
starting point I would still argue that case studies have merits.  They can be an 
invaluable method for extracting material to help create a theoretical framework, and 
give direction for further empirical evidence-seeking.  Despite the paradoxes of 
misunderstandings that sometimes constrain the case study approach (Flyvbjerb 
2006 & 2011), case studies remain an invaluable research tool being both pragmatic, 
and flexible, and very applicable to ethnographic investigation (Denscombe 2003, 
McNabb 2004, Peters 1998, Yin 2009).  Though this approach was to be 
abandoned, the material accrued from the interviews and research enquiries, has 
still proven to be extremely helpful in contextualising the research methods, and the 
hypotheses to be tested, giving the thesis a strong comparative dynamic with plenty 
of material which is still ripe for application.   
However as Section 3.3 identified case studies proved unsatisfactory failing to give 
sufficient robustness to the research and after due consideration and extensive 
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discussions with supervisors it was decided that the case study approach did not 
offer suitable research questions, and would not make the best use of the research 
evidence. 
Nevertheless the topics that were initially chosen for the case studies; the decline of 
the rural post office; the right to roam; parish governance; affordable rural housing; 
and public service reform in the countryside, were invaluable as prompts to 
participants, who were able to recall their role, responsibilities, knowledge and 
experiences on these topic areas. 
There were three major reasons for changing to a thematic approach. 
First, this was not a dramatic paradigm shift in the research approach, rather an 
evolution to something more appropriate.  The shift was underwritten by a process of 
iteration, which gave some clear lines of enquiry to follow, and more flexibility in how 
the research might develop.  In so doing, it clarified the relationship between the 
research questions, the epistemological and ontological standpoints, and the 
methodology to be applied.  Using a thematic approach does not exclude the 
application of case study evidence but permits it to be incorporated as part of a more 
solid conceptual model, which tries to capture the underlying features affecting those 
topics.  It also built on the nexus with ethnography and exploitation of documentary 
sources identified in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1 - Towards a Thematic Study 
 
 
Source: Author 
Indeed, there is a long history in rural studies of using case studies to exemplify 
thematic and theoretical understanding.  For example Cloke and Milbourne (2000) 
have used enquiries into homelessness to highlight the clashes between social 
classes in the countryside.  Lowe and Ward (2009) have vested considerable time in 
drawing out the distinctions between ‘rural’ and ‘agriculture’ by employing specific 
case study evidence around the themes of Europeanisation and regionalism. 
Second, the thematic approach made it easier to integrate some complex lines of 
enquiry, which did not make for easy comparison, or for straightforward interpretation 
of the data.  An example of this include the extent to which New Labour’s embracing 
of modernisation merely masked greater marketisation of public services, or if there 
was genuinely a third way between public and private sectors (see Chapter Seven).  
Thematic studies have the advantage of seeking out emergent ideas, which can then 
Thematic 
Study  
Case Study 
Approach 
Ethnography 
Documentary 
Sources 
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be fully analysed and evaluated.  In turn, this allows the data to be indexed, 
according to criteria, which are, systematic, contextual, diagnostic, evaluative and 
strategic (Ritchie & Spencer 2002).   
Third, it is possible to develop typologies around the different themes that transcend 
the normal case study approach, operating diachronically over longer time scales 
than is the norm, in spaces that would otherwise be prohibited, capturing empirical 
data that might, using other methods, go untapped.  Wengraf (2001) explains how it 
is possible to go beyond the contingencies found through the interview texts to 
provide more general phenomena by interpretation that can then be developed into 
typologies.  This links with the grounded theories of Glaser and Strauss (1967) - a 
technique I have employed before - reinforcing understanding of what really matters 
in rural policy and politics, and how government may help or hinder the development 
of those ideas.   
This can encapsulate why actors matter, institutions develop, and how they influence 
the relationship between structure and agency, getting the researcher closer to 
identifying important features and making assertions, which can help validate 
whether the hypotheses are sustainable (Burnham et al 2008, Creswell & Miller 
2000).  The in-depth interviews permitted the exploration of the meaning behind 
different typologies such as social class, locational isolation, and the role of elites, 
grounding through a series of ideas, questions, and conclusions which linked to the 
investigation of archive materials, and created the core rationale for the research. 
An evolution and refinement of the thematic approach recognised that qualitative 
research was less about trying to trace patterns of causation, but more concerned 
with cross-case analysis, to draw out both similarities and differences among cases, 
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where the outcome or process studied allowed inferences to develop clearer 
explanations and help create better hypotheses (Rihoux & Ragin 2009). 
Adopting a thematic approach required reworking the interview schedules.  However, 
the key themes of representation, urbanisation, externalisation and modernisation 
had already been identified as key ideas, even under a case study emphasis. 
Grounded theory was constitutive throughout the research, and gave me the 
confidence to feel that the themes identified were valid, and helped in the evaluation 
of the ethnographic life histories.  Discussion of the themes widened and deepened 
the epistemological and ontological rationale for the enquiry, placing it within the 
context of the temporal, spatial, territorial and institutional tropes of that period (Berg 
2009). 
3.5 Summary: How the methods chosen are appropriate for addressing the 
research objectives 
To recap the research relies principally upon the employment of ethnography as the 
methodology, and open-ended semi-structured interviews as the main method.  The 
reason for this approach is that this makes best use of the researcher’s special 
position as an embedded insider with unique access to the number and range of 
respondents.  Given the novelty of this research area, and the relative lack of source 
materials, both primary and secondary, it was vital that the research methodology 
and the methods chosen mediated the importance of the interrelationships at work to 
permit self-reflection, reflexivity and symbolic interaction. 
The use of semi-structured interviews encouraged the fullest evidence base to be 
compiled.  In the collection of data it was possible to differentiate not only between 
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classified categories, but also within each category to demonstrate that despite the 
complexities present in the research, it was possible to gather evidence that 
approximated to the thematic themes identified in the research questions (Cladie 
1999).  Interview material was supplemented by personal recollections and papers, 
with use, where necessary, of secondary source material, much of it from 
Parliament.  This justifies the argument for choosing a thematic approach that 
defines an analytical framework, a compelling narrative, and appropriate 
interpretation of the evidence. 
The reliance upon semi-structured interviews as the dominant technique for primary 
data collection can be criticised.  However such is the breadth and depth of this 
research enquiry, that it is possible to justify this concentration on one method as the 
best way of eliciting information that otherwise would be ignored.  Though highly 
personalised the discourse has been substantiated by use of techniques such as 
triangulation, to arrive at an account that now adds considerably to the subject-
matter.  Great care has been taken to keep the study as objective and ethically 
sound as possible.    
This investigation of government policy-making and politics fits directly with a wish to 
capture more from an inside knowledge of the inner workings of the political process, 
by making greater use of embedded research.  Combining this with a contemporary 
political study of the countryside adds to the store of knowledge in a neglected area.   
Using these ethnographic tools the thesis will now examine the four thematic factors, 
representation, urbanism, externalisation and modernisation, to highlight how this 
caused New Labour’s operation in the countryside to evolve. 
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Chapter 4 – New Labour’s representative role in the countryside after 1997 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter, on representation, is the first of the four thematic chapters, and as such 
provides a bridge through to the subsequent chapters on urbanism, externalisation 
and modernisation. 
This chapter critically examines the repercussions of the New Labour landslide in 
1997, with many more rural and semi-rural constituencies won by Labour MPs.  It is 
centred on research question One, evaluating the extent to which the presence of a 
large number of Labour rural MPs impacted upon the approach of the New Labour 
government towards the countryside, helping determine policy and politics.  
First, it investigates how rural constituencies are defined, and considers why the 
government spent time and resource on improving the understanding of rural, using 
evidence-based policy-making as the mechanism for achieving this.   
Whether New Labour was able to claim that it did represent the countryside after 
1997 is analysed, and with what effect on the formulation of policy, and evolution of 
political activity in Section 4.3.   
The Chapter then examines more directly the actual process of policy-making, 
critically evaluating whether the increased representation of Labour MPs made a 
tangible difference to the development of individual policies and the overall policy 
remit of New Labour for the countryside.  The section also probes the effect of the 
Haskins’ Review (2003) on New Labour policy-making and implementation, and so 
provides findings in relation to research question Five on the temporality and 
spatiality of the government’s performance in the countryside. 
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4.2 What is a rural constituency? 
When New Labour came to power there was no definitive measure of what a rural 
constituency was.  Whilst there will always be differing opinions on what constitutes 
a rural constituency, providing a better understanding of the classification of different 
types of parliamentary seats is not a pointless activity.  Rather, the process of 
defining rurality helped expand electoral comprehension, and gave a better micro-
analysis of how individual constituencies behaved. 
New Labour was determined to use evidence-based policy-making (EBPM) as the 
cornerstone to its modus operandi (Parsons 2002, Sanderson 2002a, Wells 2007).  
Therefore setting about gathering and interpreting rural data became a key element 
in helping develop policy in the countryside and was something in which Defra took 
particular pride (interview with Civil Servant 8).   
The positive critique of EBPM was that when policies were introduced, those policies 
could be better justified if the substantive evidence backed them up (Burton 2006, 
Davies et al 2000, Solesbury 2001, Sanderson 2002a &b, Shortall 2013).  Problems 
arose sometimes in the manner EBPM was exploited.  Any piece of evidence was 
subject to interpretation and possible misuse.  EBPM could never be an alternative 
to political decision-making, and would not be applicable for use in all cases.  EBPM 
might also add significantly to the complexity of the policy-making process, which 
made decisions more difficult to take (Parsons 2002).   
Establishing that New Labour was a Party of the countryside was contingent upon its 
ability to gain and sustain rural representation, and that could be achieved only by 
demonstrating a commitment to those rural areas, through research, data collection, 
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application of knowledge, effective targeting of resources – all necessary to help 
devise and implement well thought-through policies.   
British parliamentary history points to the fact that many constituencies have deep 
roots, some keeping the same name, and a similar geographical area, over 
centuries, despite the electoral map of the UK forever changing12.  This is caused by 
population movement reflected in the periodic reviews of the Boundary 
Commission13. 
There are two traditional ways of clarifying the description of constituencies (1 & 2), 
and two modern interpretations (3 & 4).  These are:  
1. Geographical or functional representation of the type of seat. 
2. Parliamentary division of seats into borough or county constituencies. 
3. Geodemographic segmentation of the electorate. 
4. Output Area Classification/Local Authority Districts. 
Each of these typologies is described fully in Appendix 5.  Defra invested heavily in 
typology 4, in order to provide better distinctions not just between urban and rural 
areas, but also within the categorisation of urban and rural.  This was seen as a 
crucial bench-mark for a better understanding of the needs of different types of area, 
which would help in the better targeting of resources (Bibby & Shepherd 2004).  
                                                          
12
 Amongst those that still have the same name from the 1832 Great Reform Act include Ashton-
under-Lyne, Cambridge, Cheltenham and Gloucester, though some of these had more than one MP 
for part of their early history (Cheffins et al 1998). 
13
 The Boundary Commission has overall responsibility for defining the status, make-up and number 
of voters allocated to each constituency.  It works in parallel with the Electoral Commission and is an 
independent legal entity. 
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Subsequently Defra’s data collection and handling processes was a crucial reason 
for winning funding and other support from the Treasury (Elton 2011). 
The importance of Defra as a centre of excellence in the field of data collection, 
handling, and interpretation was that ministers and civil servants were now much 
better equipped to be able to definitively argue the case for rural, and what mattered 
in rural areas.  This was instrumental in being able to make a stronger case with 
other government departments for additional resources for rural, and also meant that 
Defra was better able to deflect criticism from organisations such as the Countryside 
Alliance that New Labour had no interest in the countryside (interview with civil 
servant 8). 
4.3 The 1997 General Election result and the impact of New Labour’s greater 
representation in the countryside 
The sheer scale of the 1997 landslide with 418 MPs elected on 43 per cent of the 
popular vote, a majority of 179, and a 10 per cent swing from Conservative to New 
Labour meant that there were now Labour MPs representing parts of the country that 
previously had never had a Labour MP, except possibly in the landslide of 1945.   
In England, this included many rural constituencies and dramatically changed the 
electoral map (see Maps 1 & 2).  Even an area like the South-West that had 
traditionally been alien territory for Labour now had significant splashes of red (see 
Map 3).  Though Labour had a tradition of representing rural areas in Scotland, 
Wales and the North, it was rare for the party to win seats in the countryside in the 
Midlands and the South of England.  Such was the scale of the 1997 victory that 
among constituencies captured was Stroud, The Wrekin, Falmouth and Camborne, 
North-East Somerset, Waveney and Wyre Forest.  Some of these rural seats stayed 
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with Labour until 2010, indicative that New Labour had traction that previous Labour 
governments lacked (Norris 1997, Pattie et al 1997, Ward 2002).  Importantly New 
Labour had done little to target many of these seats as winnable. 
The Party listed just over 100 seats as part of its Key Seat list, which it needed to win 
in order to be sure of a majority. These were decided purely by relative marginality.   
Other features including the strength of the local party membership did not matter 
(Seyd & Whiteley 2002).  Most of the seats on this list were urban, or suburban and 
little campaigning was undertaken in rural constituencies.  Maps 1 and 2 
demonstrate the dramatic increase in red due to the scale of Labour’s victory. 
Such was the scale of the landslide that many more rural constituencies were 
captured (Denver et al 1998, Denver & Hands 2004, Evans et al 1998, Fisher et al 
2011, Whiteley & Seyd 1994).  Appendix 2 identifies the non-traditional rural seats 
held by New Labour MPs in 1997, and what happened to those seats in subsequent 
general elections.  Figures 4.1 & 4.2 taken from Woods (2008e) highlight the limited 
reaction against the New Labour government in rural seats in 2001 and 2005 
elections. 
The presence of so many Labour MPs in rural these seats had two major 
repercussions.  First, territorial ownership of rural England constituted a three-way 
battle between Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.  Second, there 
was now a cohort of Labour rural MPs keen to display their credentials as effective 
rural representatives, and to make their mark in Parliament, in the wider Labour 
Party and in their constituencies.   
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Map 1 – The 1992 Election for the 3 main Parties (reproduced 
from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki.File.UK_General_Election,_1992.svg) License CC BY-SA 4.0. By 
permission of Mirrorme22. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
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Map 2 – The 1997 Election for the 3 main Parties (reproduced from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_general_election,_#media/File_General_ 
Election,_1997.svg) License CC BY-SA 4.0 By permission of Mirrorme22. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ 
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Figure 4.1 - Labour vote in selcted rural constituencies at the 2001 general 
election 
Constituency type (number of seats) Labour 
vote 
2001 
Change 
1997 - 
2001 
Swing 
Lab - 
Con 
Labour 
seats 
2001 
Change 
on 1997 
Hunt kennels in seat (159) 30.5% -1.6 +2.1  48   -3 
Three of more hunt kennels in seat (34) 23.3% -2.4 +3.1   6   -1 
Top 20 farming seats (20) 21.4% -2.3 +2.8   2   -1 
One or more cases of FMD in seat (93) 36.2% -2.5 +2.5  46   = 
20 or more cases of FMD in seat (19) 30.6% -3.3 +3.7   7   = 
High car ownership and low population 
density (19) 
25.5% -1.8 +2.9   5   -2 
Partially rural seats on ACORN classification 
(76) 
25.5% -1.2 +2.3  15   = 
All GB constituencies excluding Northern 
Ireland (641) 
42.0% -2.2 +1.8  412   -6 
 
Figure 4.2 - Labour vote in selected rural constituencies at the 2005 general 
election 
Constituency type (number of seats) Labour 
vote 2005 
Change 
2001 - 05 
Swing 
Lab - 
Con 
Labour 
seats 
2005 
Change 
on 2001 
Hunt kennels in seat (159) 26.3% -4.2 +2.4  40   -8 
Three or more hunt kennels in seat (34) 20.4% -2.9 +2.1   2   -4 
Top 20 farming seats (20) 20.2% -1.2 +0.7   2   = 
Partially rural seats on ACORN 
classification – England and Wales only 
(60) 
22.1% -3.6 +1.8   5   -5 
All GB constituencies exluding Northern 
Ireland ( 628) 
36.2% -5.8 +3.2  356  -56 
 
Source: Woods (2008e) pages 265 and 266, reproduced by kind permission of 
Professor Mike Woods 
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Map3 - The 1997 Election in the South-West – reproduced from 
www.ukelect.co.uk by kind permission of Tim Bickerstaff 
The optimistic mood amongst rural Labour MPs led to one of their number, Peter 
Bradley, the MP for the Wrekin, to set up the Rural Group of Labour MPs, early in 
the 1997 Parliament (Woods 2008d).  The Group sought to lobby government for 
positive changes to countryside policies and the creation of new ones, to help 
organise campaigning activities - within and outside of the Party - and to mobilise 
opposition , when Labour was under attack from other parties for being out of touch 
with countryside issues.14  
                                                          
14
 There were frequent debates called by both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats during the 
first two New Labour administrations.  A snapshot of these debates taken from Hansard comprised; 
‘Rural Life’ – 4th November 1997 Vol 300, cols 176 – 200; ‘Rural Economy’ – 10
th
 December 1997 Vol 
302 cols 927 – 47; ‘Agriculture’ – 4
th
 November 1998 Vol 318 cols 934 – 84; ‘Rural policing’ – 16
th
 
January 2001 Vol 361 cols 1 – 15WH; ‘Rural broadband services’ – 25
th
 March 2003 Vol 402 cols 31 
– 56WH. 
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In his foreword to the Rural Audit (1999), the inchoate publication that signalled the 
Group’s existence, Bradley claimed a potential membership for the Group of 180 
Labour MPs of which 97 actually joined the Group.  The Group was able to point to 
various successes.  Amongst these were; pressed the demand for a Rural White 
Paper, achieved in 2000 (DETR/MAFF); brought forward a Ministry that at least in 
part was a focus for rural issues with the creation of Defra in 2001; and got the 
Labour Party to embrace the idea that rural mattered, evident through the holding of 
rural conferences, more focused campaigning in rural areas, and the production of 
specific rural manifestos from 2001 onwards (Lowe & Ward 2001).  As Bradley 
commented to me as part of this research;  
I was determined that rural would mean more than just farming and fox-
hunting.  It was about persuading the media that life existed beyond the M25.  
That’s why the publications and conferences mattered so much. It was about 
drawing a distinction between urban and rural – even if the same issues 
applied, and getting fair funding in rural areas (interview with Bradley). 
The inception of the Rural Group was not without its problems.  There was 
opposition to its formation from within the Parliamentary Labour Party, and initially 
ministers were somewhat wary of giving outright support.  For instance Bob 
Ainsworth, the Deputy Chief Whip tried to persuade putative members of the Rural 
Group, that the PLP Agriculture Committee would be a sufficient vehicle for rural 
MPs to raise their concerns.  Others, despite representing rural seats, did not see 
the point of belonging to a separate Group.  A personal anecdote was that I was 
assigned to try to encourage Dennis Skinner to join the Group.  I was told in the most 
unparliamentary of language that he was a mining MP and not a rural one, despite 
Bolsover being categorised as rural, according to any of the different classifications 
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(See Appendix 5).  Likewise some rural MPs preferred to associate with city politics, 
their seats being contiguous with urban areas. As a colleague commented for this 
research; 
We were both active members of SIGOMA.  We rarely discussed rural.   We 
were members of SIGOMA to get a fair deal for our area and felt that this 
body was the best way to achieve this even it was largely a metropolitan 
construct.  Rural would rarely carry the same weight (interview with MP 2)15. 
Interestingly the bulk of the Group was not immersed in rural politics prior to election.  
Bradley, for example, had made his reputation as a Westminster Councillor, the 
scourge of Dame Shirley Porter16.  Most truly rural activists were based in 
unwinnable constituencies, but the strength of the embryonic Rural Group was to 
give confidence to the wider Labour Movement.  As one MP noted; 
We quickly learned the benefit of campaigning in our own rural areas, and 
then to spread out into other non-Labour constituencies.  We wrote materials 
that spoke to the rural electorate rather than the usual urban-inspired 
newsletters that the wider Party splurged out.  The hope was that if we helped 
other constituencies their activists would return the favour and come back to 
help us at the next general election (interview with MP1). 
Despite the barriers it faced the Group proved adept at publicity and the wider party 
began to turn to it for advice and leadership on rural issues.  One such instance was 
                                                          
15
 SIGOMA stood for Special Interest Group of Metropolitan Authorities, made up of Labour MPs, and 
councillors based in and around the great cities of the north.  SIGOMA became a very effective 
lobbying organisation influencing New Labour on issues such as city regions. 
16
 Porter was pursued for surcharge due to maladministration as Council Leader.  She later fled to 
Israel. 
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when the Group was consulted over whether to postpone the 2001 general election 
because of the ongoing foot and mouth outbreak – advice that proved crucial in the 
election being delayed.   Over time the Group lost both members and influence as 
the number of rural seats fell in successive general elections, and the focus of Group 
members drifted to other interests.  Key to this was the defeat of Bradley in the 2005 
election, his driving-force never being successfully replaced.   
Even though the Rural Group never regained the ascendency it had up to 2004, 
overall its role was symbolic of how the Party had undergone a positive 
transformation in relation to the countryside, and how it had exploited the new-found 
electoral legitimacy.  As Woods has commented; 
The Rural Group of Labour MPs established following the 1997 election has 
been active in highlighting a (wider) range of issues including poverty, social 
exclusion, services, transport and crime – an agenda which was incorporated 
into the Rural White Paper for England in November 2000.  In this way, 
Labour has attempted to forge a non-Conservative coalition in rural Britain 
that should in theory enable it to retain as significant proportion of rural 
constituencies for the foreseeable future (2002; p 226). 
It certainly gave New Labour something upon which to build its rural reputation, from 
the low base of the disinterest shown before 1997, culminating in the minimalist 
manifesto commitments where rural was concerned.  This paid dividends, for 
although 1997 was the high water mark for Labour’s rural representation, there was 
a remarkably small swing against the governing parties in the countryside in 2001 
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and 2005 (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2) (Ward 2002)17.  For Bradley this was due to the 
hard work put in by rural MPs, reaching parts of rural constituencies that their 
Conservative predecessors had never bothered with (interview). 
This did not mean that rural Labour MPs were immune from criticism.  They were 
targeted by political foes, especially those opposed to the hunting ban.  The fiercest 
adverse reaction came from the Countryside Alliance, the organisation established to 
lead opposition to the ban.  This drew in broader support by pursuing a much wider 
agenda of rural grievances against the government such as higher fuel prices, the 
farming crisis, and the threat to rural services.  Of these the collapse in farm prices 
presented the greatest ongoing threat to New Labour, (though the antecedents 
predated the arrival of the Blair government), the legacy of falling world prices, the 
rise in the value of the pound, and the embargo on British beef exports, because of 
the BSE/beef on the bone scandal.  Figure 4.3 shows that prices had not recovered 
even by 2015 and were again heading in the wrong direction.  The picture is made 
more complicated by the reduction in the level of support payments to farmers. 
The acme of this were three massive demonstrations, alongside major publicity 
operations against the government, and the ongoing harrying of individual Labour 
MPs (Anderson A 2006, Lusoli & Ward 2006, Marsh et al 2009, Reed 2008, Woods 
2008c,d&e).  New Labour responded to this criticism by pointing to its new-found 
strength in rural England.  For instance Angela Eagle, a junior DETR minister 
replying on behalf of the government to a debate on Rural Life, referred directly to 
the number of Labour rural MPs and how New Labour was now the true 
representatives of rural areas. 
                                                          
17
 Using the RERC research criteria seat descriptors from OA/LAD New Labour retained 67 rural 
seats in 2001, and 55 in 2005 (Shepherd 2006). 
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The rump that the Tory Party parades as an outdated caricature of town 
versus country can only do damage to the countryside, while Labour in the 
one nation party (Hansard 4th November 1997 col 210). 
Figure 4.3 - Total Income from Farming 1995 - 2015 
 
Source: Defra - from Farming National Statistics 28th April 2016 (First estimate 
– taken from p2) by kind permission of Defra. 
Attacks by opponents cemented the sense of solidarity amongst rural MPs 
(interviews with MPs 6 & 7), and gave them greater credibility in the eyes of 
ministers.  This was one strong reason for the positive response by the government 
to the request for a Rural White Paper to coincide with that planned for urban 
England (interview with Civil Servant 6, and Practitioner 1; Hewitt 2011a).  The 
protection of the new-found rural base also became a useful argument for ensuring 
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that service loss in the countryside was minimised, resulting in policy changes 
including the network subsidy for rural post offices, an embargo on shutting rural 
primary schools, and monies to help preserve shops and pubs (interview with MP 9, 
Moseley & Owen 2008, PIU 2000, Woods 2006c). 
The Rural Group was also useful in that it developed good links with many 
countryside organisations, some of whom were persuaded to put their name to the 
Rural Audit (1999), the inaugural publication of the Group.  This relationship 
burgeoned over time and served as a helpful conduit for government (interview with 
Bradley).  This influence was also felt over issues such as whether there should be a 
stand-alone rural ministry following the FMD debacle.  Though opinions were divided 
in the Group on the viability of and reasons for such a move, there was agreement 
that MAFF had to be replaced (interview with Bradley & Minister 6, Farmers’ Weekly, 
1998).  Defra was the compromise arrived at, even though this broke the 
commitment made in the 2001 manifesto for a fully-fledged Department of Rural 
Affairs (Labour Party 2001 – See Appendix 3 and Defra Select Committee Report on 
The Role of Defra 2002b).  The aim and objectives of Defra (See Appendix 6) 
already highlighted that rural would be more marginal to the new set up than some 
had hoped for. 
Activities outside of the Group, but spear-headed by Group members gave rural 
matters a higher standing in Parliament, Party, and outside.  The Defra Select 
Committee also undertook major enquiries into rural schools, and access to 
broadband in the countryside (2003a&b). 
There was additionally the presence of the Countryside Agency which began to build 
itself into a very powerful lobbying, policy-initiating and delivery body in rural 
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communities (interview with Practitioners 1, 26 & 27).  Much of the evidence-base for 
the Rural White Paper was collected by, and reinterpreted by, members of the 
Agency, who produced most of the copy material (interview with Civil Servant 6 and 
Practitioners 1 & 27).  It was important that the government had set up the Agency in 
1999 and given it so much power as an externalised voice alongside (but often in 
place of) that of government.  Likewise it was manifestation of the growing 
prioritisation of rural that one of the first Performance and Innovation Unit reports 
was into Rural Economies (1999; interview with Academic 1).  Taken together all 
these developments represented a dramatic shift in how New Labour treated rural.  
However, this situation was not to last.   
Following the Haskins’ Review (2003), and the Rural Strategy (Defra 2004a) which 
followed from that Review, and accepted virtually all of the Review’s 
recommendations, there was a marked change in the government’s emphasis.  
These are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.  Instead of the social democratic, 
proactive, interventionist approach that had become the byword of New Labour’s 
rural regime, there was a reversal in policy and political activity after 2004.  Ward 
and Lowe (2007a&b) saw this as the destruction of New Labour’s rural grand project, 
and blamed Haskins for something Ward later described as vandalism (Ward 
2008b).   
Four reasons have been advanced for this apparent volte-face.  First, the pressure of 
events associated with the countryside had begun to recede.  The hunting ban was 
seen as a fait accompli (Milbourne 2003a&b, Ward 1999, Woods 2008b); the 
memory of FMD had started to fade, partly helped by the generous compensation 
payments given to those affected (interview with Academic 2; Convery et al 2005, 
103 
 
Haskins 2001); other problems such as the debacle of the Rural Payments Agency18 
impacted upon a much more limited audience (Defra Select Committee 2007c, Ward 
2006, Ward & Lowe 2004).  Second, the influence of the Backbench Group waned  – 
Bradley was appointed as Alun Michael’s19 Parliamentary Private Secretary, and 
resigned as Chair – and the Group as a whole became less effective and focused.  
As one leading Labour rural councillor told me for this research; 
I was disappointed at the failures of the backbench group.  The conferences 
were useful but the notion of Labour as a rural party never quite took hold.  
This came on the back of ineffective rural ministers after Alun Michael, who 
was very good.  There were many warm words, but little of substance came 
as a result (interview with Labour Rural Councillor 1). 
Third, the Countryside Agency came under heavy attack for poor leadership, 
excessive expenditure, and unnecessary bureaucratic interference in the countryside 
(Derounian 2006).  Removing initially its authority, and eventually its very existence, 
was a vital explanandum for Haskins’ (interview with Haskins).  It was only after it 
had been abolished that the organisation’s value was truly appreciated (Ward & 
Lowe 2007a&b). 
Fourth, the government was in political retreat in the countryside, a mixture of 
perceived electoral weaknesses there, and the greater attention it paid to urban 
issues from the second period of government onwards.  This was partly a reversion 
                                                          
18
 The Defra Select Committee investigation (2007c) identified that the RPA had failed as much due to 
poor implementation and lack of accountability as the wrong original concept.  The Agency was 
bedevilled by inadequate management, IT failings, and major cost overruns, which led to a loss of 
confidence from farmers.  It took an inordinate amount of ministerial time to try to fix these problems, 
a legacy that continues through to the current time (King & Crewe 2014). 
19
 Michael became Rural Affairs Minister in the new Defra Ministry after 2001.  He was also tasked 
with taking the Hunting Bill through Parliament. 
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to type, but also was due to its concentration prioritising delivery of the key policy 
areas in health, education, law and order, and transport, and militated against rural 
(Barber 2007).  The financial crash post 2008 deepened this schism. 
In terms of New Labour’s reputation over rural matters this undid most of the good 
that had been achieved from 1999 – 2004.  Whether the peradventure of the Rural 
Group, together with the fortuitous circumstances that presented themselves in those 
years had really changed Labour from being mainly an urban construct is discussed 
in Chapter Five.  What remained problematic in terms of New Labour’s history in the 
countryside were the antinomies of the way in which New Labour had approached 
the countryside before and after 2004. 
4.4 How did New Labour’s greater representation in the countryside influence 
government, its policy-making and delivery, and the prevailing political 
situation? 
1997 heralded a new era for Labour in government, and that was as true for the 
English countryside as for the rest of the country.  Juxtaposed with the government’s 
apparent new enthusiasm for an entrée into rural matters to assuage its own 
representatives was the requirement that it had to be seen to be responding to the 
needs of rural communities, reacting to events, and devising a clear strategy.  This 
was achieved by effective policy development and careful implementation of those 
policies.  Initially this responsibility was mainly arrogated to the Countryside Agency.  
However after Haskins’ Review Defra took back the authority for making policy as it 
was felt that more direct control was required (interview with Minister 3 and 
Practitioner 1). 
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In this respect New Labour’s relationship with the countryside can be divided into 
three distinct periods.  1997 – 1999; a period of disinterest in the countryside, with 
little preparation having been made to cope with rural issues.  1999 – 2004; 
maximum involvement in countryside matters, with the Party reverting to a social 
democratic agenda, to deal with a raft of problems that it was faced with.  2004 
onwards; after which there was a steep decline of interest in rural matters.  A case 
can be made out for a further period after Brown’s ascendency to the premiership 
after 2007, when there was a more precipitous fall off in interest, heightened by the 
financial crisis and greater cuts in public spending. 
New Labour’s discovery of rural policy, the forms that it took, and the repercussions: 
1999 - 2004 
New Labour, as the previous section adumbrated, entered government with few 
plans for the countryside.  The 1997 manifesto commitments involved tinkering 
rather than radical reform (see Appendix 3).  In the run-up to the election New 
Labour took little interest in rural areas, and Blair made few visits to the countryside 
as part of campaigning activities (interview with MP 7, Labour Rural Councillor 2).   
This made it all the more surprising that after two years of government, as the 
moratorium on additional expenditure came to an end, New Labour began to look 
seriously at rural policy.  Admittedly a serious investigation of change in the 
countryside chimed directly with the Blairite themes of modernisation, and the politics 
of the ‘third way’ (See Chapter Seven), but nevertheless the government went further 
than might have been expected of it, beyond what was needed to keep rural Labour 
backbenchers happy, and Countryside campaigners at bay.   
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The measures that were introduced over the period 1999 – 2004 were a mixture of 
policy and programme initiatives, with institutional and structural change.  Policies 
were formal courses of action undertaken by the government, whilst programmes 
tended to be more ad hoc, decided upon in a more participative manner of operation, 
and usually time-limited.  Chief amongst those measures were: 
 Presumption against closing village schools 1998 
 New bus and community transport provision 1998 
 Creation of the Countryside Agency 1999 
 The Performance and Innovation Unit Report on Rural Economies 1999 
 Protection of rural post office branches 1999 
 Introduction of a sparsity factor initially into school funding, and then policing, 
1999 & 2000 
 The Rural White Paper 2000 
 The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 
 The creation of Defra 2001 
 Beginning the Mid-Term Review of the CAP 2002 
 The Quality Parish Council Scheme 2003 
Taken together these measures gave a signal that the government was willing to 
intervene to protect and enhance services in rural England, and provide more 
equitable distribution of services with urban England, bear down on rural 
disadvantage, and encourage new forms of governance and decision-making using 
networks, partnerships and collaborations (Ward 2008c, Woods 2008e).  This sought 
to tackle at least some of the divisions that existed between the physical and human 
environment, economic and social ruralities, farming and non-farming activities, and 
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between the protectors of the countryside, and those who wanted development there 
(interviews with Practitioner 23 and Minister 3, DTI 1999, Flynn et al 1996, Local 
Government Chronicle 1998a&b, Moser 2004). 
Of particular importance were the PIU report (1999), and the Rural White Paper 
(2000) that quickly followed it, because this put in place a new rural regime with clear 
commitments laid down by government on how it would support, fund and oversee 
rural communities (interviews with Practitioners 1 & 27 and Civil Servant 7).  As one 
civil servant remarked about the White Paper; 
There was a Cornish backlash against what was seen as excessive urban 
influence upon the government.  John Prescott came to Cornwall on holiday 
each year and so we organised, when I was working there prior to entering 
the civil service, to invite him out for the day to experience real rural life with 
all its problems.  After that day Prescott appeared to become absorbed with 
issues involving rurality and I believe it was this that persuaded him to 
become an enthusiastic supporter of the need for the Rural White Paper 
(interview with civil servant 6). 
Whatever the reasons behind the genesis of the White Paper, the impact upon New 
Labour was dramatic.  Major programmes were launched in transport, housing, 
education, health, the rural environment, and parish governance – largely under the 
instigation of the Countryside Agency.  Key to this was the additional funding of 
£1bn.  Much of this was new money allocated from the Treasury, but some came 
from within DETR, at the insistence of the Deputy Prime Minister, a decision not 
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welcomed by all in his Department (interview with Minister 3)20.  However there were 
other crucial developments which arose from the White Paper, principally the 
beginning of rural proofing of policy across government and its agencies.  This is 
covered in detail in Chapter Seven – suffice to say that this was a symbolic 
representation of modernism in action, ensuring that rural was bound into wider 
changes (interview with Bradley). 
The Rural Group were keen advocates of the need for a White Paper to sit alongside 
what was proposed for urban England.  This stimulated other activity.  The 
successful lobbying of Charles Clarke to introduce a sparsity factor into block grants, 
- initially at education, and then at police - ran in tandem with the issue of the White 
Paper (interview with Bradley).  The Treasury was a surprising ally in this, and 
helped to broker deals on a number of occasions (interview with Practitioner 27).  
Together with Defra ministers, and their special advisers, a rural demarche was 
launched.  This met with a positive response from at least some in the rural 
academic and practitioner community, who were excited by the new possibilities 
(interviews with Practitioners 5, 9, 12, & 19, and Academic 7).  As one prominent 
academic said to me; 
Labour made some real progress up to 2001 with its rural policy because of 
its substantially increased representation, and despite the presence of the 
Countryside Alliance who were always trying to attack the government’s 
legitimacy in the countryside.  However the FMD outbreak did at least partly 
undermine this (interview with Academic 1). 
                                                          
20
 Nick Raynsford the Housing Minister was reported as livid at the cuts he was asked to make to the 
housing budget as a result (interview with Minister 3). 
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Though there was a degree of cynicism that the government was merely responding 
to events there was willingness by some to look beyond this superficiality.  Without 
doubt this enthused and encouraged ministers to think and act more about rural 
matters and they began to realise the advantages of the changed electoral 
circumstances and different political and cultural environments then present in the 
countryside (interviews with Practitioners 2, 4 & 7, Minister 4).  This period is still 
regarded with fondness by some; 
I was proud of what New Labour achieved and in particular what the 
Commission for Rural Communities (and previously the Countryside Agency) 
did for rural communities.  It put rural poverty on the agenda, recognising that 
poverty did not just occur in urban England.  What New Labour did was to pay 
attention to alternative models of decentralisation responding to local needs 
and priorities (interview with Practitioner 9).  
Notwithstanding what occurred after 2004, New Labour succeeded in establishing its 
credentials as a party that took rural policy seriously and its pragmatic approach in 
trying to come to terms with the English countryside in the twenty-first century found 
some surprising admirers (interviews with MPs 3, 6 & 7; Goodwin 2008).  Even the 
Countryside Alliance complimented some of the agenda, provided the topic of 
hunting was side-stepped, as was said to me by their operatives on numerous 
occasions.  Woods concurs with this point of view (2008d pp 264 – 66). 
Post 2004 – The decline in rural activity 
By the early years of the new century New Labour had produced a framework for a 
social democratically-based rural policy, and had begun to focus on the fields which 
needed attention, as set out in the Rural White Paper.  In more deprived ruralities, 
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communities became eligible for funds that stimulated neighbourhood renewal, as 
part of national programmes.  There was also help for pre-school provision through 
SureStart and targeted support for education and health (Ward 2008a&b). 
Particular programmes that were widely praised included Vital Villages – which 
enabled rural communities to undertake aspects of community development and 
renewal.  Also important are: 
 Parish Transport Grants – that encouraged parish councils and local groups 
to seek out innovative solutions to their accessibility needs 
 Quality Parish Councils – permitting those councils who wanted to, to 
professionalise themselves and streamline decision-making 
 Affordable Rural Housing – putting facilitators such as rural housing enablers 
onto a sounder financial footing to drive up the numbers of houses 
 The Market Towns Initiative – which emphasised the importance of market 
towns to their rural hinterlands, and funded their development 
 Food chain initiatives – following the Don Curry Commission (2002) grants 
were put in place to improve links from ‘plough to plate’ and this gave rural 
businesses an incentive to be part of this (interviews with Practitioners 20 & 
29, Academics 3 & 7): 
Having accomplished so much in a relatively short period of time, it was all the more 
unexpected that New Labour’s rural policy went into first abeyance, and then 
reverse, after 2004.  Yet that was exactly what happened, and the research evidence 
gathered from the interviews supports this proposition.  Some of the reasons for this 
have already been explored above but central to the explanation was the 
government’s unhappiness with the outcomes from the FMD debacle, especially the 
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massively over-budget recovery costs of £6bn.  To learn from these mistakes, once it 
had overcome the immediate aftermath of FMD, government commissioned three 
separate pieces of work with an aim of preventing such a reoccurrence.21  It also 
turned its attention to an overhaul of rural policy with three other initiatives – the 
review of the Rural White Paper (Defra 2004b); a rural data study from Birkbeck 
College (Rural Evidence Research Centre 2004); and the Haskins’ Review (2003). 
Each of these were major pieces of work, and together they entailed a dramatic shift 
in Defra’s direction of travel away from social democratic interventionism towards a 
more neo-liberal, business-orientated approach.  The White Paper Review stressed 
the need for Defra to focus upon sustainable development, regionalism and the 
redesign of the food chain.  The rural data study likewise, as this chapter has already 
pinpointed, focused Defra’s efforts upon data collection, handling and interpretation. 
Of the reviews however the most prescient was undoubtedly Haskins’ - though this 
did parallel much of the critique in Defra’s own investigation - demanding a shake-up 
in the structural and institutional make-up of rural affairs.  This highlighted the 
difficulties caused by the lack of quantification of data, poor integration between 
policy objectives, and between layers of government, and the fact that some of the 
White Paper was aspirational rather than deliverable (Defra 2004b).  Haskins’ 
primary proposal was the separation of policy-making from delivery, the former to be 
clearly located within Defra itself.  Given that Haskins was given a free hand by Blair 
(interview with Minister 2), he was able to put an unchallengeable imprint on the 
                                                          
21
 There were three reports that covered the aftermath of the FMD outbreak.  They were the Don 
Curry Commission (2002) on ‘Farming & Food: A sustainable future’; the Ian Anderson Report (2002) 
‘Foot and Mouth Disease: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report’; and the Royal Society Inquiry 
(2002) chaired by Sir Brian Follett. 
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direction he thought rural policy-making and delivery should go.  As such he 
produced a comprehensive, if controversial blueprint for the future of the countryside, 
which was heavily biased towards business, and economic performance and took as 
its lead, a private-sector approach to rural matters (Elton 2011).  It also clipped the 
wings and expenditure of Defra’s agencies with the abolition of the Countryside 
Agency, to be replaced by an integrated agency that was to become Natural 
England.  In addition it promoted a regional agenda.  Haskins himself was adamant 
that part of his argument was misunderstood, or misinterpreted by government so 
that the emphasis he put on devolution and decentralisation was less prominent in 
the government’s response than he had hoped for.  As he commented in interview to 
me; 
It wasn’t a brilliant report.  I had intended that ministers and the civil service 
would have got the message for more decentralisation.  They found it difficult 
to let go (interview with Haskins). 
Others were far less charitable (Ward & Lowe 2007a&b).  Nevertheless the 
government’s response was to accept nearly all of his recommendations, and the 
review formed the basis of its new Rural Strategy (2004a) which supplanted the 
Rural White Paper.  Haskins’ therefore marked a turning point in New Labour’s rural 
policy ambitions, after which rural policy was much more narrowly focussed, far less 
ambitious, and the social democratic edge had all but disappeared.   
The aim of the resulting Strategy (Defra 2004a) was to move towards a sustainable 
countryside built on; economic prosperity distilled into strong communities; 
equitability, facing up to social disadvantage; and protection of the countryside.  The 
stress was firmly upon the economic, with greater reliance placed upon business and 
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the private sector (Haskins before the Defra Select Committee 2003c, and interviews 
with Ministers 2 & 3, Academics, 1 & 7).  The problem with the change in direction 
was that it was accompanied by major cuts in spending as Figure 4.4 clearly 
demonstrates, a situation that was predicted to continue through the remainder of 
the government’s life.   
Figure 4.4 – Rural policy spending 
 
Source: Defra Departmental Report 2007 p 196 by kind permission of Defra 
The government dovetailed this approach with its review of CAP expenditure.  In line 
with the Commission it supported a speeding up of a move away from direct 
payments by bolstering Pillar 2 of the CAP which incorporated rural matters, but 
sought to do so much more quickly than other EU member states.  This did not 
necessarily provide more help for rural communities however.  Though supposedly 
more money was going to be allocated through to rural initiatives via the Rural 
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Development Programme for England (RDPE), as England had traditionally 
underfunded rural through this mechanism, and as the basis for the new 
arrangements was historic, the situation of underfunding rural was set to continue 
(Elton 2011). 
The new Strategy abandoned most of the policy initiatives outlined earlier, as the 
money dried up, and there was no strong advocate to protect those schemes (with 
the demise of the Countryside Agency).  Just as damaging was the backtracking 
over the protection of rural services.  The subsidy for rural post office branches was 
curtailed, followed by two programmes of substantial closures, which adversely 
affected those MPs representing rural seats (interviews with MPs 2 & 3).  One MP 
said in interview; 
Post offices were a bloody nightmare.  The issue was very difficult to handle 
with people campaigning to keep them open, but then not using them.  Lots of 
post offices were going to close anyway. I tried hard to save some but this 
was against the odds.  The government just didn’t get it in terms of the 
reputational damage done to rural Labour MPs (interview with MP 6). 
In parallel were other threats to rural services, particularly health, where community 
hospitals came under attack, alongside small maternity units and village GP 
practices.  This was because of an insensitive national medical model that 
emphasised the benefits of size and specialisms, through ideas such as polyclinics, 
that were simply not practicable in a rural setting (interviews with MP 2 and 
Academic 4, Pollitt 2007).  As a result government came under attack and this 
caused rural Labour MPs to be put on the defensive in their constituencies, on a 
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topic that should have been one of Labour’s strongest because of the extra 
resources being invested into the NHS (interview with Practitioner 30).  
Evidence of the government’s harder-edged economistic approach, with an 
emphasis upon business, enterprise and improving productivity was the growing 
reliance upon Public Service Agreements.  Public Service Agreement PSA 4, the 
main objective Defra was given by the Treasury, required the Department to: 
reduce the gap in productivity between the least well performing quartile of 
rural areas and the English median by 2008, demonstrating progress by 2006, 
and improve the accessibility of services for people in rural areas (Defra 
2004c).  
Though PSAs were only a passing phase in New Labour’s increased obsession with 
target-driven culture and top-down directed reforms (Bevir 2005, Faucher-King & Le 
Gales 2010, Miller et al 2006), they did give a clear indication of the government’s 
intentions and this directional shift strengthened over time. PSAs also featured at 
local as well as national level (Entwistle & Enticott 2007).  It also indicated the 
greater traction that the Treasury were exerting over Defra, evinced by the reform 
proposal for the CAP, The UK Government's Vision for the Common Agricultural 
Policy, which was largely written by the Treasury (Defra Select Committee 2007b).  
Elton refers to this as the Treasury becoming a meta-governor, acting as an 
overseer of Defra policy, including its relationship with the EU (2011). 
Defra seemed especially ill at ease with this process and admitted its slowness in 
moving towards these targets, the gap in productivity scarcely altering (Agarwal et al 
2009, Annibal & Boyle 2007, Curry 2009a & 2012a, Defra 2007, Huggins & Clifton, 
2011 Lowe & Ward, 2007 Rizov & Walsh 2011, Webber et al 2009, Curry & Webber 
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2012).  As the Defra Select Committee remarked, targets remained unattainable 
when the Department had so few levers to pull (2008).  The prize of exploiting the 
untapped potential of between £236bn - £347bn in the rural economy as highlighted 
by the Rural Advocate’s report (CRC 2008), was barely recognised by Defra, as the 
Select Committee reported (2008).  Others were less charitable and described the 
PSA and the productivity issue as a ‘dog’s breakfast’ (interview with Practitioner 3), 
merely exacerbating the opinion that Defra had hardly any influence over the wider 
policy-making agenda of government and little involvement in its own right over rural 
policy.  This negative view strangely was even the stated view of the government 
itself in its own internal investigations of the performance of Defra (Office of 
Government Commerce 2007).   
The increased emphasis upon the regional level seemed to further complicate 
matters and add to the sense of disconnection from rural areas (interview with 
Practitioner 8; Bosworth & Venhorst 2015, High & Nemes 2007, Terluin 2003, 
Thompson & Ward 2005, Ward 2012).  Geographical problems were made worse by 
the increased complication in decision-making (Curry 2009b & 2012b, Woods 
2011a).  This is examined in more detail in Chapter Six. 
It was not as though Defra was short on advice on possible remedies for these 
difficulties, for it commissioned work to study and make recommendations on what to 
do (Agarwal 2009, Dey-Chowdhury & Gibson 2008, Gibson et al 2009, SQW 2006).  
Unfortunately, it did not seem to take much notice of this advice, and largely adopted 
a position of resignation (Defra 2005b).  This put Defra at odds with other parts of 
government which now centred on the five drivers to improve productivity identified 
by government as a priority – skills, enterprise, innovation, investment and 
competition – which did not easily transcend into a rural setting (interviews with 
117 
 
Bradley & MP 2; Porter & Ketels 2003).  Neither did it appear to embrace the 
advantages of bottom-up endogenous development, outside of programmes it was 
committed to deliver through the EU, especially the LEADER programme (Defra 
2007, Ray 2000, Shucksmith 2000).  So it failed to exploit the new rural paradigm 
trumpeted by the OECD amongst others, preferring to pursue its own direction of 
travel (Bryden 2000, Dwyer et al 2010, Fraser et al 2006, OECD 2006). 
Where there were new initiatives after 2004, the outcomes were often unclear and 
contradictory.  For instance there were two major enquiries into why it was so difficult 
to deliver affordable rural housing.  The Goodman (2006) and Taylor (Matthew) 
(2008) reports came up with many practical ideas and solutions to this difficult issue 
but neither were properly implemented (interviews with Practioners 43 & 44, and 
Bradley).  The Rural Pathfinder programme which empowered rural communties to 
set their own priorities and targeted resources on a decentralised basis ran from 
2005 onwards, but this only affected a relatively small number of communities (Local 
Government Chronicle 2004).  Rural proofing continued and was supplemented by 
mainstreaming rural, but neither scheme got much traction over the wider public 
sector (Atterton 2008, Connelly et al 2006, Curry & Owen 2009, High & Nemes 2007, 
Marsden 2009 Marsden et al, 2005 Shucksmith 2010).  The views of Bibby were 
shared by many other interviewees; 
I persuaded Alun Michael of the value of the spatial analysis approach.  For a 
time he took a very active part in encouraging other ministries to buy into this 
idea, but when he departed Defra went back to being a rural backwater, and 
this was seen as purely an academic exercise (interview with Bibby).  
This situation deteriorated further after 2007.  As one colleague said in despair; 
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We tried for ages to get Gordon (Brown) to put some boots on, and for him to 
go into the countryside.  The boots were always at the ready.  Sadly he said 
he was too busy and could not be prevailed upon to at least make this gesture 
of being mildly interested in rural (interview with Minister 4). 
Why this happened and how New Labour’s rural legacy became symbolically 
associated with this growth of disinterest and eventual the loss of rural seats is the 
subject of the final section. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has critically evaluated the first research question in terms of how far 
the increase in New Labour representation accounted for a heightened level of 
interest by the government into rural policy-making and politics.  This was measured 
not only in terms of greater policy and political engagement, but also by a much 
better understanding of what rural constituted, through collection and interpretation 
of data.  It has also covered the temporal and spatial features identified in the fifth 
research question, based around the synchronic period 1999 – 2004, and what 
occurred after that time.   
In Section 4.3 four reasons were identified for New Labour’s turn away from rural: 
that rural events were no longer a pressing problem to the government; the decline 
in importance of the Rural Group; the abolition of the Countryside Agency as a 
symbolic gesture that the government would be less inclined to intervene in rural; 
and the arguments why New Labour focused its attention away from rural, with a 
subsequent massive reduction in budget, to focus on the core areas of health, 
education, transport and law and order; and to target urban as the most appropriate 
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location, until the financial crash meant that all areas had to make financial 
sacrifices. 
The research evidence points to why these reasons, though individually important, 
were collectively compelling, explaining why the progress made after 1999 was not 
maintained.  Though individuals stressed different emphases for why this was the 
case, the overall impression of the discreteness of the post 2004 era was clear. 
Bradley in his interviews adduced that it was increasingly difficult to promote the rural 
case after 2004, as rural issues just did not have the same traction and there was 
not the same opportunity to voice rural opinions, his tangible disappointment 
crystallised around the loss of his own seat22.  Defra ministers and civil servants 
referred to the problem that the Department faced, with a Secretary of State who 
prioritised the environment and agricultural reform, with rural being marginalised 
(interview with Ministers 2 & 5, Civil Servant 7; Kay 2003, Ward & Lowe 2004 & 
2007b).  This sense of desuetude was picked up on by many of the practitioners 
talked to, whose sense of regret over the decline in interest and activity after 2004 
was palpable.  As one said in interview: 
The loss of the Vital Villages scheme did immense harm, not just in terms of 
the immediate loss of activity in those villages which had engaged with it, but 
in the sense that rural was once again being side-lined in policy innovation 
terms (interview with Practitioner 29). 
                                                          
22
 Bradley put his defeat at the 2005 General Election at least partly down to the antics of Vote OK a 
hunting-front organisation intent on punishing pro-ban MPs, and the lack of support and protection he 
received from the wider Labour Party (Kite 2005, and in interviews with Bradley). 
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Brown’s premiership and the financial crash worsened this sense of depression at 
what had been achieved, and then lost (interview with Minister 4 and Civil Servant 
5).   
Chapter Two made reference to the literature search in this diverse subject-area and 
Chapter Four has more fully developed this in terms of the importance of 
representation to explain why its new-found representational strength triggered its 
greater involvement in rural policy and politics.  Together these chapters underline 
why New Labour was able to demonstrate that it was different in the way in which it 
treated rural matters, but that standpoint did not remain extant beyond 2004.  This 
directly questions whether New Labour was able to provide a distinctive rural 
approach, or whether it was drawn back towards its urban strength, which is now 
considered in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter 5 – Urban governance and the neglect of rural?  
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five critically evaluates the extent to which New Labour marked a 
disjuncture from Old Labour in so far as it had a legitimate claim that it represented 
the countryside and was not solely dependent upon urban Britain (and specifically 
urban England) for support.   
It explores the second research question as to the extent to which New Labour was 
able to escape from the perceived urbanist dominance of the Labour Party and 
governments (Johnston & Pattie 1989).  In this chapter recourse also is made to the 
underlying importance of temporal and spatial features as they affected New 
Labour’s performance in the countryside. 
Section 5.2 considers the counterfactual proposition that New Labour was still really 
an urban party, and did little to weaken the domination of urban elements within it.  
Section 5.3 then investigates the relationship between Old and New Labour, to 
examine the extent to which that rural and urban they can be differentiated, and if 
this influenced how the government approached the countryside. 
The chapter then critically examines in Section 5.4 the policy-making apparatus, to 
probe the extent to which this was different under New Labour, and if so, how; and 
then, in Section 5.5 explores the role of communication, to highlight how the 
government tried to get its message across, what language it used, and at whom 
was its message aimed at? 
The penultimate section, Section 5.6, seeks an understanding about events and 
crises as they affected the direction New Labour took in relation to the countryside 
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and how that changed its attitude, behaviour, performance and status in respect of 
the countryside.  The chapter concludes by re-examining the main proposition to 
assess the extent to which the urban-rural juxtaposition had been addressed by New 
Labour. 
5.2 To what extent was New Labour after 1997 just an urban government? 
In Chapter One it was noted that New Labour had not prepared to govern with 
anything other than cursory regard to the countryside.  Whilst New Labour was 
strong on the rhetoric of ‘One Nation Britain’ which would include rural England 
(Campbell 2007, Mandelson & Liddle 1996, Newman 2001), the countryside was not 
going to be a priority of the government.  As one MP said to me; 
We didn’t expect to have so many Labour MPs elected in rural areas.  The 
outside perception of Labour as an urban Party was shared by many within.  
Tony Blair didn’t think much about rural as I witnessed as a member of the 
Parliamentary Committee.23  Issues such as affordable housing in rural areas 
were just never raised (interview with MP 9). 
The obverse of this was that New Labour negotiated the 1997 election with a central 
belief that its very purpose and being was to regenerate urban Britain.  This was 
seen as crucial to the country’s economic and social recovery (Colomb 2007, 
Pearson 2012, Regan 2000, Rogers R 1999).  Sometimes its use of language and its 
general disposition made it prey to opponents’ attacks that it was principally 
interested in an urban affairs (Fairclough 2000, Ward 2002, Woods 2008b).  As one 
Labour activist with a background in rural campaigning put to me; 
                                                          
23
 This is the body part elected by the PLP that holds the leadership to account in parliament.  It 
meets on a weekly basis when parliament is sitting.  I was a member for a short period during the 
Brown administration. 
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The Party always appeared unwilling to campaign and put resources into rural 
areas since the 1980s.  A few lone voices highlighted the needs of rural areas 
but they were drowned out by the many more urban ones (interview with 
Labour activist 2). 
The view reinforced the notion that the divide between urban and rural England was 
so great that nothing could easily bridge that gap politically, socially, geographically, 
culturally and economically (Benton 2007, Wiener 2004, Williams 1973). 
One advantage that New Labour possessed was that it had no great reputation to 
live up to in the countryside.   The conviction that Labourism had been built on urban 
values meant that few would have given much thought to producing a 
comprehensive programme for the countryside, other than as part of national 
priorities.  Certainly that was the New Labour view up to the 1997 election, borne out 
by the very limited commitments made to rural areas prior to the election.  This was 
a view shared by those selected as candidates in rural and semi-rural seats as one 
colleague explained; 
There was just an unwillingness of the Party to campaign in rural areas.  
Admittedly it was hard work to win over the villages, but it could be done.  
Sadly there were no high profile rural champions and we couldn’t get the 
scale of the operation in the countryside right (Labour activist and PPC in a 
rural seat). 
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New Labour’s antecedents in the countryside 
To what extent had Labour and particularly New Labour become urban-dominated?  
There is no straightforward answer to this, and this remains an area of under-
researched academic enquiry.   
From its earliest days, Labour had always taken an interest in the countryside 
through its core beliefs in trying to protect working people, eradicating poverty, and 
supporting the most vulnerable (Pelling 1965 & 1983).  Even Labour’s first 
administration, the 1924 government, identified rural accessibility as a major issue, 
alongside the urban dimension24.  This was because Labour always drew some 
support in the countryside from groups such as farm labourers, public service 
workers, miners and some in manufacturing.  It was able to achieve support if not a 
breakthrough on the back of this.  Whilst its pockets of rural support were 
concentrated largely outside England Labour did consistently win seats in the north, 
and occasionally where a rural hinterland surrounded an urban setting, such as the 
Kent coastal ports.25 
Some of the dramatic changes to the rural landscape in the twentieth century were 
the result of Labour governments, especially the 1945 administration, which laid 
down the structure of agriculture for thirty years26 until the UK’s accession to the 
Common Market in 1973 (Self & Storing 1962).  This set in stone the separation 
                                                          
24
 The Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1924, was the centre point of the first Labour government’s 
achievements, and made particular reference to help rural areas, short of housing. 
25
 An example of this was the Faversham Labour Party which succeeded in obtaining a Labour MP for 
every election between1945 – 66 (Black 1998). 
26
 The 1947 Agriculture Act pioneered by the Labour Minister, Tom Williams, put in place the 
deficiency payments funding system, which subsidised British farmers to increase production, whilst 
keeping prices low.  
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between the human and physical environment of the countryside, a situation that 
remained extant until New Labour re-integrated the two, with its institutional changes 
in 1999 (Rogers A 1999).  As one interviewee said to me; 
The ’45 Labour government created the structure of the modern British 
countryside.  In dividing the countryside into human and physical aspects, 
manifest through the creation of two separate rural organisations, the 
Countryside, and the Rural Development Commissions we had 50 years of 
discrete policy-making.  It was somewhat ironic therefore, that it was the Blair 
administration that re-integrated them through the setting up of the 
Countryside Agency (interview with Practitioner 14).   
It was not as though countryside issues didn’t pervade Labour’s being for four key 
dilemmas dominated much of the inter-war and post war period. These were, hunting 
with dogs; land reform, including whether to nationalise; the resolution of the tied 
cottage issue (as a marker of support for agricultural labourers); and the protection of 
the countryside from unwanted development (Flynn 1989, Tichelar 2002 2003a&b, 
2004 & 2006).  Labour’s relationship with the countryside was seared by its attitude 
towards farming, farmers, and those who worked on the land, and was 
contextualised by relationships of conflict.  Whilst it was always difficult for Labour to 
get much traction where farmers were concerned (Johnston 1987, MacKintosh 1970, 
Self & Storing 1962 pp 193 – 211), it was also not unknown for disagreements to 
arise with farm labourers and their representatives, who did not necessarily see the 
Labour Party as natural bedfellows (Griffiths 2007, Johnston 1972, Judge 2013, 
Mansfield 2006).  This was counteracted by the fact that farmers were not seen as 
quite the lost cause that might have been anticipated because of the notion that 
developed in the inter-war years that farming could be classed as a public service.  
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This was a reason why Labour thought it ill-advised to neglect farmers and their 
voting power in the countryside and took measures to avoid falling into this trap 
(Griffiths 2006)27.  Regionally Labour was constrained.  For instance the south-west 
was seen as very inhospitable territory for the Party, with the preponderance of rural 
voters there (Thorpe 2005), and there remained in popular culture at least, the view 
that the countryside was a no-go area for Labour.28  Howkins (2008) argues that 
Labour from the 1920s onwards made more progress in rural areas than was 
sometimes appreciated.  However it still had many barriers to cross before it could 
be seen as an effective party in the countryside. 
With Blair’s accession to the leadership in 1994, Labour had much to gain and little 
to lose in terms of reputational damage, if it chose to seek a rapprochement with the 
countryside.  There were reasons why this happened, albeit after an uncertain start.  
The background to this has much to do with where New Labour placed itself in 
relation to Labour’s history.  Blair’s New Labour was keen to present itself as new 
and different and willing to take on difficult challenges in hostile territory (Mandelson 
& Liddle 1996).  However this oversimplifies the juncture of history, traditions and 
nostalgic linkages between the Old and the New.  For New Labour was only too 
willing to represent itself as a successor to some strains of Labourism, and found it 
impossible to escape from other elements.  As Griffiths (2011) has written: 
                                                          
27
 I am always reminded of the story told to me by Ian Cawsey, (the former Labour MP for Brigg and 
Goole), about an old farmer he knew who claimed that farmers would enter the polling booth and vote 
Tory to a man, but then came outside would hold their coat collar and pray to God that Labour won 
(on the understanding that they always got a better deal under Labour governments).  
28
 In two Radio 4 programmes commissioned to celebrate the 60
th
 anniversary of The Archers, entitled 
the Politics of Ambridge, no mention was made of any Labour politicians in the popular series (Dobbs 
2011). 
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Against a disputed heritage of talismanic policy commitments, leaders’ 
betrayals, and the perennial dilemmas of reconciling values, pragmatism, 
interests and ideology, the Party’s sense of its own history has served as one 
means of defining and justifying Labour’s existence as an enduring political 
formation (p283). 
Therefore New Labour’s entrée into the countryside was not the disjuncture it might 
have first appeared and had something to do with its own dependency on traditional, 
heritage and nostalgia (Drucker 1979, Hay 2003, Jobson 2012, Robinson 2013). 
What caused New Labour’s interest to arise was the intercession of events which 
required government intervention in the countryside.  Consequently New Labour 
soon grasped that its programme for government could help the party to make 
further inroads into rural areas beyond the immediate electoral success.  It had the 
advantage that as there was little expectation of New Labour involvement in the 
countryside so any potential presence there could be perceived positively. 
There are three elements to this.  First, the incoming government had quickly to 
realise that its programme - focused on the hunting ban, the right to roam, the 
protection of some village services, and the reform of the CAP - would cause tension 
in the countryside.  On top of this, the fuel crisis of 2000 and the foot and mouth 
outbreak 2001 would require substantive government responses (Greer 2003, 
Woods 2008d). 
Second, the creation of the Rural Group encouraged the government to adopt 
policies to placate these members.  So a decision was taken, after some hesitation, 
to welcome and assist the Group, and to use the presence, expertise and 
enthusiasm of Group members to help devise an effective rural programme. 
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Third, much of the government’s agenda could be adapted to operate equally well in 
rural settings.  National policies which included SureStart, the regeneration of local 
communities, and public service reform applied to ruralities, just as much as it did to 
the rest of the country.  On the back of the Rural White Paper (DETR/MAFF 2000) 
ministers began to comprehend that rural areas required specific assistance.  The 
idea of rural proofing was born to prove that government cognisance of rural would 
become an essential ingredient of policy-making.  The Countryside Agency defined 
this as; 
…thinking about whether a policy will have any significant differential impacts 
in rural areas.  It aims to encourage government departments and others to 
‘think rural’ by talking account of the characteristics and needs of the 
countryside when making and implementing policies (2005a). 
By 1999, after the fallow first two years of the Blair administration, which affected 
most aspects of government other than health and education due to the self-imposed 
embargo on additional expenditure, New Labour introduced a raft of institutional, 
structural, policy and programmatic measures which sought to appeal to the 
countryside.  The logic was to try to neutralise the negative perceptions of urban 
bias, and the realisation that the government’s authority and reach, could deliver 
rewards in rural England. 
This took many different forms, but was galvanised by the comprehensive Rural 
White Paper (DETR/MAFF 2000) which sought active rural communities and strong 
local economies (Lowe & Ward 2001).  The White Paper received many plaudits.  
One academic interviewee referred to the White Paper in the following way; 
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The White Paper was an excellent piece of work, coming on the back of other 
initiatives which gave good value for money.  During this time New Labour 
was in the ascendency in rural areas dealing with the issues that really 
mattered.  More than anything rural communities had access to real resources 
rather than the promised monies – that usually failed to materialise – a 
situation they had become accustomed to (interview with Academic 3). 
A Defra civil servant interviewee added; 
It is important not to underestimate the importance of the White Paper.  The 
Rural Services Division became a key player and rural proofing was to stand 
the test of time.  Civil servants, who worked on this, were buoyed up by it, and 
felt good to be part of something positive (interview with Civil Servant 7). 
By the early part of the new century New Labour had made great strides to modify its 
relationship to the countryside.  Though it had not won over all – the hunting ban 
meant that there was still the entrenched opposition of some – many rural 
communities had seen the benefits of the government’s willingness to engage with 
those communities.  Amongst the tangible improvements made available were 
funded schemes to boost rural transport, incentives to develop village housing, 
parish plans, alongside empowered local councils. 
One practitioner said in interview; 
1997 marked a sea-change as far as parish councils were concerned, and the 
White Paper consolidated and further stimulated the opportunities that 
councils could now seek out to update themselves, make governing more 
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democratic, more professional, and much more a functioning layer of 
government (interview with Practitioner 12). 
Other opponents, such as those who alleged that New Labour wanted to abolish 
Parish Councils, found the opposite to be true (Bevan 1999, Howard 2002). 
The inroads that New Labour had achieved in the countryside made it all the more 
surprising that there was a volte-face after 2004 following the Haskins’ Review.  This 
led to a sense of disappointment, if not betrayal. One interviewee described this as; 
There was a real loss of impetus from the earlier White Paper of 2000 and the 
government completely lost the plot after the 2004 Rural Strategy.  There 
were problems with a disempowered civil service, ministers went off on their 
own, and the CRC had little authority over the rural agenda (interview with 
Practitioner 21). 
The positives of the five year period were almost completely negated by a 
government that wanted to return to trend, rediscovering its indifference to the 
countryside.  Whether this was just the consequence of the changing events of the 
time or whether this was a return to a more traditional Labour stance is open to 
question.  However the most disappointing repercussion was the cynicism this 
engendered (interview with Practitioner 1), reinforcing the pessimistic view that at 
least parts of the countryside were destined for continued decline (Bell et al 2010, 
Howkins 2003), a situation that New Labour had for a time at least, appeared to have 
forestalled. 
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5.3 The Old Labour/New Labour Schism and did this make New Labour a 
different party in rural areas? 
Chapter Four established that New Labour’s triumph in 1997 gave it the mandate to 
govern in the countryside as well as the town.  Though its overall majority meant that 
it faced few direct challenges in Parliament, the additional representation in rural 
constituencies gave New Labour the confidence to develop a rural strategy, with 
bespoke policies.  In theory at least, unlike previous Labour administrations, New 
Labour could govern in rural areas with few inhibitions, at least at the start of its 
period in office.  Even with the emergence of difficult issues, New Labour had reason 
to believe that it could count on the support of large parts of the countryside which 
had chosen to vote New Labour in unprecedented numbers.  With the benefit of 
hindsight this political reach was exaggerated but it was still true that New Labour 
could justify its political appeal to the countryside by reference to this new found 
representative authority. 
New Labour – a different sort of Party? 
Events interceded to make New Labour realise that it had to adopt a different tenor 
in its relationship with the countryside.  There were three principal reasons why this 
challenge fitted the Blairite agenda more easily than predecessor administrations. 
First, though New Labour was committed to urban regeneration, a traditional Labour 
mind-set (Theakston and Gouge 2004), and embraced the findings of the Rogers 
Urban Task Force (1999), urban renaissance was also relevant to parts of rural 
England (CRC 2008).  Second, much of the government’s third way agenda 
(Giddens 1998, Gould 1998, Mandelson & Liddle 1996), and emphasis upon 
community, neighbourhood renewal, and active citizenship, found resonance in rural 
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communities, keen to find a new start, via bottom-up development (Clarke 2005, 
Davies 2012, Levitas 2000, Marinetto 2003b, Tiesdell & Allmendinger 2001).  This 
chimed with the strong neo-endogenous direction EU and OECD rural policy was 
moving in (OECD 2006).   
Third, New Labour was eager to pursue policies that would bear down on poverty, 
disadvantage and social immobility.  The rural domain gave plenty of opportunities 
for policy evolution to match what was planned for the cities.  Together, these ideas 
encapsulated New Labour’s leitmotif, of modernism and one-nationism, wrapped 
within a caring persona (Imrie & Raco 2003).   
New Labour was helped in its new found identification with the countryside by two 
other factors.  First, the Rural Group changed the dynamics of the politics of the 
countryside, at least for a time, as it became adept at skilfully using its authority both 
within parliament and outside (see Chapter Four).   
The second factor was the changing nature of rural areas themselves.  Much has 
been written about how rural England had altered due to in-migration, the decline of 
the predominance of agriculture, and the increased squeeze put on the countryside 
by urbanisation, and the counter-urbanisation reaction.  Bell et al (2010) refer to the 
material, symbolic and relational practices of the rural, and how this defines rural 
power structures.  By the changed class complexions of the British countryside 
(Phillips 2007, Woods 2006a) New Labour gained by being able to appeal to non-
traditional Labour voters, who were both tired of the Conservatives and seduced by 
the Blair effect.   
As Bradley commented to me; 
133 
 
Rural voters had the same concerns as the urban electorate.  They worried 
about jobs, housing and their kids’ education.  Fox hunting was only a minority 
pastime, enjoyed by the rich few.  New Labour and Blair in particular, 
captured their imagination (interview with Bradley). 
Part of New Labour’s dilemma in how it could best communicate with the countryside 
was made more difficult because of the very unequal regional distribution of 
Population (see Figure 5.1). Rural Labour MPs struggled against blocks of their 
urban colleagues in parts of the country such as the North-East. 
The problem was that this support proved to be electorally fickle after 2005, as rural 
voters increasingly turned against New Labour (Cutts et al 2012, Johnston & Pattie 
2011), particularly as the government ran into difficulty over public service reforms 
(Asthana et al 2009, Gray et al 2006, Henderson & Taylor 2003, Parr et al 2004, 
Shucksmith & Chapman 1998).  This damaged New Labour more than the rural 
protest movement, even though the latter got most attention at the time (Reed 2004).  
Other negative issues included the commitment to build an extra 4.4m homes, which 
impinged badly on the countryside, and did untold damage to the government’s 
reputation, for it neither delivered anything like the promised number of houses, nor 
was able to mitigate the perception that this was just an imposition by an urban 
government (Gallent 2008). 
In this sense New Labour was not the same party as Old Labour.  It took a different 
view to traditional Labour governments on how it should approach the countryside 
and with what purpose.  This was due to a mixture of opportunism and circumstance, 
which led it to a position whereby it was more open to building relationships with  
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Figure 5.1 – Regional Distribution of Population 2001 
Source: OECD Rural Policy Review of England (2011, p52) by reproduced by 
kind permission of OECD.  
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rural communities.  Whether this stance stood the test of time, will be examined in 
the rest of this chapter. 
5.4 Rural policy making and delivery? 
New Labour’s period in office in relation to the countryside can be divided into three 
distinct time frames, 1997 – 99; 1999 – 2004; and 2004 – 2010. 
Policy-making and implementation was radically different between the three periods, 
demonstrable by an analysis of actors, institutions, structures, processes, and 
events.  Much of the operational context to New Labour’s performance in the arena 
of policy is covered in Chapter Six, but in this Chapter it is important to understand 
how the rural-urban dynamic affected the nature of policy, the institutional context, 
and how actors performed in relation to the roles and responsibilities assigned them.  
The first period was of no real consequence because of the moratorium on public 
expenditure which meant that there were no funds available to enhance rural policy.  
The one exception to this was the creation of the Countryside Agency which though 
it was officially formed in 1999 much of the work to amalgamate the different 
contributing organisations predates that.  That is why 1999 marks the paradigm shift. 
1999 – 2004, and the dominance of the Countryside Agency 
In 1999 New Labour fastened onto rural policy both from a position of strength, but 
also weakness.  It was strong in that the election of so many Labour MPs in rural 
constituencies gave it the authority to speak directly to rural communities.  It was 
weak with regard to its defensiveness in the face of the pressure it was placed under 
by its opponents in the countryside, principally in relation to hunting.  The response 
of the government was usually to attempt to head off opposition by taking on-board 
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the complaint, seeking out the brightest and the best to find solutions, revising policy 
accordingly, and then do all it could to get rapid introduction of the changes 
necessary.   This was classic Blair ‘big tent’ strategising (Kavanagh 2007, Mulgan 
2005c). 
A classic example is the initiative to launch Quality Parish Councils.  Under attack 
from those who argued that New Labour wanted to abolish Parish Councils (Pickles 
2003), the government chose to bolster and encourage their existence in an attempt 
to wrong-foot the sceptics.  To achieve this it worked closely with the National 
Association of Local Councils, the representative body and a useful bulwark against 
its critics, and a new front through which to engage with rural communities (interview 
with Practitioner 12; Pearce & Ellwood 2002, Poole 2010, Skelcher 2003).  This not 
only answered those critics who argued that Labour had no right to interfere with 
Parish Councils but was useful in that it provided a building-block for the later Lyons 
Review on Local Government, which specifically recommended an enhanced role for 
them (2007). 
The government’s pragmatism when it had a fight on its hands proved remarkably 
successful and won people over to its side.  One practitioner in interview 
commented; 
New Labour showed some deft touches in rural policy-making for which it 
didn’t really receive the praise it deserved.  Sadly it seemed to believe its own 
propaganda that it was an urban party, when it achieved much in rural areas.  
Sadly it could have achieved a lot more, if it had pushed on with reforms such 
as the removal of the dreadful Right to Buy (interview with Practitioner 14).  
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This pragmatism was displayed elsewhere in fields as diverse as housing, planning, 
transport, education and health.  Not all areas were successfully navigated however, 
and the ongoing dispute over hunting did show the limits of this strategy.  Blair did try 
to rebuild fences with those so offended by the ban, but this failed29.  Overall the 
dispute over hunting was seen by some as highly deleterious to relationships in the 
countryside and undid many of the positive measures that the government had 
accomplished (interview with Practitioner 31). 
During most of this period the government effectively delegated policy-making and 
delivery to the Countryside Agency (see Chapters Four and Six).  The Agency was 
given the role of overseeing aspects of rural proofing policy (2001c), from the Rural 
White Paper (2000).   The move towards rural proofing was a significant departure 
from what might have been expected of an urban government with the potential to 
make the most difference on the ground (Caffyn & Dahlstom 2005, Lowe & Ward 
2007, Pearce et al 2005, Woods 2006a). 
Rural proofing was not a new idea.  It derived from the Canadian Rural Lens 
procedure (Bollman 2005, Bradford 2008, Partridge & Olfert 2008, Sandwell 1994, 
Williams & Kulig 2012).  However the manner of its introduction and the 
comprehensive nature of its application made it a significant contribution towards 
valorising rural alongside other aspects of government policy.  The process of rural 
proofing involved a number of elements, which impacted on people, organisations 
and businesses.   
                                                          
29
 In his memoirs Blair (2010) made clear that he was never personally in favour of the ban, but felt he 
could not thwart the PLP, and most Labour MPs who strongly supported it. 
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First, policies in the countryside would be more coordinated, with the aim of listening 
to the concerns of rural communities, bringing in local people, and rurally-inclined 
professionals, for their knowledge and skills, especially in relation to the NHS 
(Asthana et al 2003, Baird & Wright 2006, BMA 2005, Swindlehurst et al 2005).  This 
included an annual report by the Countryside Agency on the rural aspects of policy, 
a rural ‘check-list’ to be filled in by government departments, better regional co-
ordination through government regional offices, integrating MAFF staff into those 
teams, and the establishment of national and regional sounding boards.  The Rural 
Advocate - a post filled by an appointee of Number 10 - was tasked to listen to rural 
communities and argue their case within and outside of government30.  Training of 
those required to carry out those functions was given to raise awareness of rural, 
and improve the skills set of those handed this responsibility.  Second, the activity of 
rural proofing was carefully laid down and administered at each level of government 
to ensure proper reporting and scrutiny of decisions.  This incorporated the English 
Rural Development Programme, which was signed off by the EU Commission.  
These measures were overseen by a Cabinet Committee.  Third, and crucially, 
budgets were co-ordinated to promote rural proofing alongside the enhancement of 
the economic, social and environmental well-being of local areas and communities.  
The presumption was that this would help the move towards more sustainable rural 
economies (Lowe & Ward 2007). 
As a concept rural proofing had considerable merit.  It raised the profile of rural, 
getting many more parts of government to take the issue seriously.  It certainly, in 
theory, rebalanced rural against urban.  The extra resources inculcated the notion 
                                                          
30
 Initially it was Ewan Cameron, the Chair of the Countryside Agency, and he was succeeded by Stuart Burgess, 
Chair of the CRC. 
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that rural mattered, and no policy, programme or project proceeded, without in theory 
being fully evaluated for the effect upon the countryside (Anderson et al 2005, Eales 
et al 2005).   
The problem came in the practical application of rural proofing.  The procedures for 
operation were seen as bureaucratic, time-consuming and difficult to scrutinise 
(Atterton 2008, Curry & Owen 2009, Munday 2008, Pugh et al 2007, Shucksmith 
2012).  Too many parts of government paid lip-service to the demand that they 
completed the process of rural proofing in advance of making a decision, which 
usually meant that the obligation was fulfilled only retrospectively, by which time it 
was too late to adjust.  Regionalism further complicated the mechanism, and led to 
greater circumvention (Jeffrey & Mawson 2002, Ward et al 2003).  As one civil 
servant commented in interview; 
The Rural White Paper committed the government to rural proofing all policy.  
The problem was that it was introduced against a background of rationalising 
resources.  It really became part of Defra’s cross-cutting initiatives but there 
were always tensions with other departments on how much notice should be 
taken of it.  Mainstreaming rural futher strained relationships – it was all seen 
to be too complicated and bureaucratic (interview with Civil Servant 3). 
As rural became less prominent overall following the 2004 turn, so did the 
importance of rural proofing, to such an extent that by the middle of the decade, 
government moved on to the idea of ‘mainstreaming’ rural policy (see Chapter Six).  
This did not replace rural proofing but gave a new twist to the place rural occupied in 
the derivation of policy.  Rather than see the inclusion of rural as being part of a 
bureaucratic overlay, in theory rural was positioned at the centre of how policy was 
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made, and policy-makers would be expected to specify the rural dynamic in policy 
formulation (Connelly et al 2006, Lowe & Phillipson 2006, Tomaney 2002).  Practice 
was something else altogether however. 
Not every aspect of rural policy-making was abdicated to the Countryside Agency 
and government kept hold of funding, especially those departments outside of the 
rural domain who guarded their wider empire closely.  Thus changes in schools, post 
offices, police and health funding which affected ruralities were driven by the parent 
department and not by MAFF/Defra, or one of its agencies.  Nevertheless, much of 
the rural prerogative for direct intervention in the countryside was externalised to 
specialist rural providers, especially the Countryside Agency, which became an 
effective bulwark against the notion that only urban mattered.  This resulted in there 
being a cogent rural voice, but not always an uncontroversial one (Derounian 2006).   
2004 – 10: The demise of rural policy 
By 2004, New Labour had established a novel, highly interventionist, and radical 
rural policy, which had accomplished a number of key objectives.  First, it had diluted 
the impact of campaigns by its opponents by being able to demonstrate its rural 
credentials through active policy-making and delivery.  Second, it had continued to 
keep many of its new found supporters in rural England on board, so there was no 
major rural backlash in the 2001, or even in the 2005, general elections (Woods 
2002, Worcester et al 2005 pp 257 - 8).  This caused some rural MPs to hang on to 
their seats when they might have been expected to lose.  Third, it had made 
progress in delivering wider government policy aspirations in rural, as well as urban 
England. 
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Having played such a strong hand in rural policy, this made what transpired after the 
Haskins Review of 2004 all the more surprising.  More unusual still, rural now had its 
own parent ministry (Defra) to bat on its behalf. 
Yet part of the answer for the about-turn in the policy approach lay with the decision 
to set up Defra, formed out of the remnants of MAFF.  Having presided over both the 
BSE and FMD scandals, MAFF was deemed not fit for purpose by New Labour.  As 
Alastair Campbell stated in his diaries, there was little alternative but to replace it 
(2011, pp 558 – 567).  The problem was with what?  The 2001 manifesto committed 
New Labour to a new Rural Affairs Ministry, but that did not come to pass.  Jack 
Straw’s refusal to move a revamped DETR, and Margaret Beckett’s insistence that 
she would only accept the Food responsibility if Environment was added, saw to that 
(interview with Minister 2). There was opposition to the idea of a standalone rural 
ministry anyway (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4).   
In the event the new department treated rural as a theme that did not compare in 
importance to its responsibilities for environment, food policy, climate change and 
reform of the CAP.  As a personal reflection, whilst a member of the Defra Select 
Committee I struggled to get rural onto the future business itinerary.  In the nine 
years under New Labour, the Select Committee only conducted one substantive 
enquiry into rural matters, the investigation into the potential of England’s rural 
economy (2008).  What made matters worse, was that the rearrangement of the 
department and its main agencies was badly botched, with pay issues, uncertainty 
over where individuals would be placed, and budget cuts, dominating the early 
months of its existence (Heppell 2011).  Whilst these were short-term maladies there 
was a much bigger question-mark over the government’s commitment to rural 
matters.   
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Both Blair, and later Brown, had no real interest in rural (interview with Minister 6).  
What compounded this disinterest was that Beckett as Secretary of State shared 
their disdain.  As one Minister said to me; 
I would only ever see Margaret very infrequently, and she never engaged with 
rural. There was not a lot of ministerial sharing of ideas on rural within Defra.  
This meant that I had to look outside of Defra for support.  This required me 
going to the territorial administrations to try to form a bulwark against English 
ministers and ministries where rural was concerned.  This confirmed my 
prejudices that the urban-rural split was very real (interview with Minister 5). 
This was in marked contrast to the team that oversaw the last years of MAFF.  The 
then Secretary of State (Cunningham) had become a strong advocate of a Ministry 
of Rural Affairs to replace MAFF.  He was thwarted in his ambitions by others in 
government (interview with Academic 7). 
The context to this is important, for it explains the background to the Haskins’ 
Review, and why he was allowed to take a cleaver to much of the government’s work 
in rural areas.  It explains why he was given such a free hand and why government 
readily responded to his recommendations, a mixture of deregulation, resetting of 
rural institutions, a business-favoured approach, and some degree of 
decentralisation, masked by his insistence on a greater role for the RDAs in rural 
areas (interview with Minister 2).  Figure 5.2 gives an indication to the theoretical 
model behind Defra from its formation in that decision-making was supposed to flow 
outwards from the parent ministry.  Haskins’ argued that this was not the case in 
practice. 
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The trend, from the formation of Defra through to Haskins’ and the Rural Strategy 
followed a route that led to the diminution rather than the strengthening of rural within 
government.  This negated the promise of the Rural White Paper, and undermined 
the government’s previous commitments.  That might have been ascribed just to the 
easing of the pressure of events, to be seen to be doing something in rural England 
to take attention away from the hunting debate and FMD, but the stance of those 
involved went further than that, and marked a definite turn away from rural. 
In this regard the post 2004 period was a reassertion of Labour as a mainly urban-
focussed party.  This situation consolidated because Defra itself was a weakened 
ministry, and rural played only a small part within that ministry.  This limited the 
capability of Defra to command support from rural communities disillusioned by the 
forthcoming cuts in services and the lack of sensitivity shown towards them.  As one 
civil servant commented in interview; 
Rural was just tagged on the end of Defra.  We had some clear aims, such as 
the need to improve land use planning and introduce a proper food policy, but 
lack of money was always a problem.  The Rural Services Division started as 
a key player, especially under Alun Michael, who continually stressed his 
belief in social justice.  However after he went, we were faced by reduced 
funding, disruptive reform, and everything apparently being in a state of flux.  
The Department became hamstrung between those who wanted to stress 
rural as an arm of business development, and the supporters of the CRC 
approach, who viewed rural residents as victims.  The RDAs were never 
supportive of rural, and we had to rely upon local authorities as the main  
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Figure 5.2 – Defra’s model of operation from 2001 - 2004 
Source: Author 
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Some of the additional complexity is demonstrated in Figure 5.3 below.  Internal 
tensions exacerbated matters.  There was a troubled relationship with the 
Countryside Agency from the perspective of both civil servants and Ministers 
(interview with Practitioner 1).   
Figure 5.3 – Defra and its relationships post 2004 
 
Source: Author 
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industry and the economy, and therefore most attributes were buried deep within the 
texts of detailed documents and therefore inaccessible to all but the very committed 
member (Labour Party rural activist 3 interview).   
The approach to rural policy from the end of 2004 onwards was to move resources 
from social support to economic regeneration, relying upon a reduced pool of advice 
– the CRC that replaced the Countryside Agency employed less than one tenth of 
the staff – and had to externalise funding allocations to the RDAs and the EU, where 
appropriate.  In all but a small number of cases this marked a retreat from rural 
policy, rather than a revision. 
In this regard New Labour’s retreat from the countryside helps to illustrate Lukes’ 
third dimension of power.  The government’s acquiescence to the status quo and 
unwillingness to contest the power that elites exerted over other groups particularly 
the rural working class was indicative of both a failure to understand the dynamics of 
the countryside, and an acceptance that its priorities lay elsewhere in the urban 
domain.  This was marked by the rapid decline in expenditure on rural matters, 
connected to the removal of the Countryside Agency, and a loss of focus on issues 
such as homelessness, joblessness, and protecting service provision. 
5.5 How did New Labour communicate its message to the countryside? Was 
this ever successful? Was it ever heard? 
How did New Labour try to get its message across to rural communities? 
New Labour prided itself on its ability to communicate directly with the electorate.  
The problem that it faced in rural areas was that it had no history of doing this, and 
no vehicle to carry it out, given that the media in the countryside had never been that 
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accessible to Labour.  The New Labour operation used a mixture of public relations, 
branding and news reinterpretation – commonly referred to as ‘spin’ (Egan 1999, 
McNair 2004, Price 2010, White & de Chernatony 2002).  Given New Labour’s 
disinterest in rural matters prior to the 1997 general election, few Party-orientated 
stories were focussed upon the countryside, other than those of a defensive nature 
needed to parry some of the attacks on its hunting policy.   
This situation altered after 1999 as the government chose a more active relationship 
with rural communities.  The regional and local press were particular targets of New 
Labour’s search for helpful media outlets, (though during FMD regional broadcasters 
were seen as very important), to try to allay some of the worst scare stories of the 
national media (Campbell 2011).   
Most of the communication the government had with rural areas and electors 
happened through third parties.  The most important of these was the Countryside 
Agency, and its replacement, the CRC.  Later Natural England took on this mantle.  
This was because these bodies were able to reach rural communities more directly 
than either MAFF or Defra.   
MAFF only really retained links with farmers and farming organisations such as the 
NFU.  Whilst Defra did attempt to widen its communication beyond farming this was 
not an easy task because of the lack of media outlets, and the restricted nature of 
the information they aimed to deliver.  One demonstration of how limited the 
government’s ability to access rural communities were came as a result of the 
publication of the Rural White Paper (DETR/MAFF 2000).  Prompted by the Rural 
Group that it would be good if individual parish and town councils were sent a copy, 
the Group was informed that this would be difficult because the civil service had no 
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addresses of local councils, even though they were the first tier of British 
government.  This hardly bode well for any government which wanted to have an 
active communication strategy with ruralities. 
The loss of the Countryside Agency dealt a blow to the government’s capability in 
terms of its communication strategy.  Whilst there was conflict over the Agency’s 
mode of operation (interview with Practitioner 1), the regular flow of reports, 
newsletters and bulletins on the countryside (as well as many issue-based 
conferences) did at least reach a wide audience.  This was never to be replicated by 
the CRC, with the small budget it had.  This loss was felt hardest by those in the 
voluntary sector who had regularly received information from the Agency to help 
them progress projects and access funding.  Alternative arrangements, which 
included using local authorities and RDAs, proved to be scant consolation (interview 
with Practitioner 27). 
After 2004, and particularly after the loss of the Countryside Agency, government 
found it more difficult to direct its message to rural communities, partly because it 
had less to say, and partly because it had lost the ear of those who had previously 
been willing to listen.  This was compounded by the reduction of the number of rural 
MPs and the decline in relevance of the Rural Group (interview with Bradley). 
Was the New Labour rural message heard? 
During 1999 – 2004 when the government operated a vibrant rural policy the 
message began to sink in, (in some rural communities at least), that New Labour 
was different, and had an interest in rural issues.  This message was not easy to 
deliver, and New Labour never received the credit it deserved for undertaking the 
activities it did.  As one academic interviewee said; 
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It was difficult to tell why New Labour didn’t do better in rural areas.  After the 
(Rural) White Paper it was a very exciting time for those of us interested in the 
countryside.  There was plenty going on and some very good influencers of 
opinion, such as the Backbench Group.  However it was difficult to overcome 
the perception that Labour was centrist and urban.  Quite simply the 
government did not get what it deserved, and post Haskins’ the progressive 
message to the countryside disappeared again (interview with Academic 7).   
One story that came from another academic interviewee summed up how difficult it 
was for the government to get a fair hearing in villages. 
On the back of foot and mouth recovery monies, my village, which had been 
hit hard by the disease outbreak, was able to rebuild its community centre.  Of 
the funding received nearly 70% came directly from government, via the FMD 
recovery fund; the rest from the county council, local council, grants, and 
community fund-raising.  Come the day of the grand re-opening everyone was 
there to speak, and be formally thanked by the community – except Defra, or 
its representatives.  Thus the biggest funder was totally ignored.  This showed 
how difficult it was for government – any government, but particularly a 
Labour government to get praise and thanks from rural communities 
(interview with Academic 2). 
Others interviewed were more critical of the government’s performance, arguing that 
it made little effort to communicate policy aims, or explain the politics behind 
decisions (interview with Labour Councillor 5).  Even former ministers shared this 
condemnation of the communication strategy believing that New Labour failed to 
reach out to its target audience in rural areas (interview with Minister 5).   
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One example here is the roll-out of the SureStart pre-school initiative into rural areas.  
Whilst the programmes and additional funding was largely welcomed by those 
involved with nursery education in the countryside, the nature of the programmes, 
and the language used to communicate how they would be introduced, was merely 
lifted from what was already underway in the cities.  Much of it was not suitable for a 
rural setting, and practitioners had to work incredibly hard to make them bespoke 
(interview with Practitioner 8). 
To further complicate matters, government was in competition for media coverage in 
rural areas with the Countryside Alliance.  To maximise its appeal across the 
countryside and beyond its core hunting supporters, the Alliance sought through its 
media strategy to capture anyone who lived in rural England who had a grouse with 
the government including farmers, hauliers, those against housing developments, 
and people who campaigned against the loss of rural services (Anderson A 2006, 
Stoker 2002).  This meant getting the New Labour message to possible positive 
recipients, was made that much more difficult (interviews with Ministers 2 & 3).   
New Labour’s communication strategy was not helped by its use of language.  As 
Fairclough (2001 & 2010) has explored extensively, the use of New Labour rhetoric 
which repeated the mantras of modernisation, the opportunity society, and active 
citizenship, was not attuned to a rural audience.  The slickness of the message did 
not compensate for the shallowness of content, and the inappropriateness of the 
words used.  The discourse chosen was often ill-equipped to engage and persuade 
those who might otherwise have been interested in what was on offer (Fairclough 
2010; Chapter 14).  For instance New Labour continued to produce campaigning 
materials that were clearly written with urban settings in mind oblivious to the 
scepticism this encountered in the rural milieu.  Where communication was written 
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directly for rural audiences, and the information was relevant to their lives, the result 
was more successful.  Unfortunately this was not something that New Labour 
frequently took on board.  As one special adviser noted; 
There was so much in terms of good ideas that we could have communicated 
but unfortunately the New Labour democratic chemistry wasn’t applied 
appropriately to rural England.  You have to be counterintuitive in how you 
develop and nurture partnerships in the countryside.  Our communication 
strategies lacked capacity and understanding (interview with Special Adviser 
1). 
Interestingly it was not just what New Labour said to rural communities – but what it 
did not.  Largely through the mediated output of the Countryside Agency, difficult 
topics such as rural homelessness, the role of ethnic minorities, and others such as 
travellers were discussed and there was a willingness to embrace debates with rural 
communities themselves on how to progress policies to try to overcome these 
problems.  However this only went so far.  The issue of social class was rarely 
mentioned in documents, reports or statements, and having backed away from any 
confrontation for fear of the consequences, change in attitudes was not easy to 
achieve.  As one academic interviewee bemoaned: 
New Labour was so timid in many respects.  People in rural areas have rights, 
just the same as those in the city.  Take health – why should rural dwellers 
expect a worse service?  Yet the government wouldn’t take on these issues 
for fear of upsetting someone, somewhere.  The rural poor and disadvantaged 
have the right to expect to be treated fairly, recognised, and listened to.  Yet 
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New Labour’s communication seemed indifferent to them and what they had 
to say (interview with Academic 4). 
New Labour also had a tendency to undersell its success.  Meacher’s introductory 
comments to the second reading of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act (2000) 
was a mastery of compromise and diplomacy – on a measure that Labour had 
campaigned on for over 70 years (House of Commons Hansard March 20th 2000, 
Col 720 - 731), and which many saw as a pivotal piece of legislation (Clark 2008, 
Mayfield 2010, Parker & Ravenscroft 2001, Parker 2008, Whitby & Falconer 1999).  
This underselling of the measure continued through into implementation, as there 
was little publicity to promote the extension of access in the countryside.  So there 
was no real attempt to capitalise on greater opportunities for urban dwellers to 
migrate into the countryside on trips in line with Hoggart’s charabanc excursions 
(1957). 
New Labour had an opportunity to build better relationships with rural communities.  
For a time, between 1999 and 2004, it realised this and sought to communicate its 
message and reach out to the countryside.  That it failed was not entirely its fault.  
However after 2004 it appeared to give up trying, and the consequences of this was 
that any message it delivered would never satisfy those who it wanted to hear it 
(interview with Academic 1). 
5.6 Events, crises and rural politics during the New Labour years 
The latter part of Blair’s time as Prime Minister was overtaken by the issue of Iraq, 
and Brown’s by the financial crash.  This meant that rural affairs inevitably lost out.  
Funding cuts and further changes in strategy followed. 
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The lower profile of rural was due also to the waning importance of the two crises 
that had engulfed New Labour, the repercussions of the hunting ban, and the foot 
and mouth outbreak.  The hunting ban had taken far too long to introduce and the 
longer the delay, the more strained relationships with some in the countryside 
became (Woods 2008b).  As one Practitioner interviewee argued; 
Hunting was very unhelpful to trying to build positive relationships between 
the government and the countryside.  It marred the other achievements of 
New Labour such as the creation of two new National Parks.  It meant that 
other more important rural concerns such as housing went untackled and put 
those of us who were supportive of the government on the defensive, as we 
then came under attack from the Countryside Alliance (interview with 
Practitioner 34). 
Foot and mouth was different.  It was a spontaneous, exogenous event which would 
have tested any government.  The difficulty for New Labour was that it came on its 
watch (interview with Minister 8).  FMD did enormous damage to the government’s 
reputation for competence, and the cost of £6bn, (including the recovery funding), 
left an undesirable legacy (Donaldson et al 2006).  Even though the political harm 
had been muted the ongoing hangover of this crisis would stay with Defra for the 
remainder of the New Labour administration (Greer 2003, Woods 2002). 
These two major issues fuelled the claim by some that New Labour was really an 
urban construct with little feel for the countryside.  The response by New Labour 
which predated but was heightened by its reaction to the FMD outbreak was to 
become actively involved in the countryside.  This took many different forms, but can 
be summed up as reliance upon classic social democratic interventionism.  The 
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question that has to be asked, is why this ended so peremptorily, and with what 
outcome? 
The impact of the Haskins’ Review 
Section 5.4 explained the background to the creation of Defra, the Haskins’ Review 
which radically pruned rural policy-making and delivery, and the resultant Rural 
Strategy.  Rural policy was drastically curtailed because of this, and the level of 
activity greatly reduced.  However these changes did not exist in isolation for there 
were other departures in government strategy which also compounded this situation. 
Defra’s diversion back to agriculturally-based rural, and the turn to regionalism 
As much as the Haskins’ Review was the dominant factor in the revision of rural 
policy, the importance of the enquiry conducted by Sir Don Curry (2002) must not be 
underestimated.  This demanded a major transformation of British agriculture, with 
an attempt to get the farmer closer to the consumer, more willing to innovate and 
look for new market possibilities (interviews with Practitioners 25 & 35).  Together 
these two reports, with the active encouragement of the Treasury, caused Defra to 
re-order its priorities back towards an emphasis upon agriculture and food production 
(interview with Minister 2). 
Haskins’ argued for a return to the primacy of land-based solutions to the ills of rural 
areas, on which farming was placed at the centre and this chimed directly with the 
views of Curry.  The Treasury/Defra document published in 2005 defined its vision 
for agriculture for the following fifteen years, and had four key objectives based on 
competition, market-orientation, sustainability and environmental sensitivity, and high 
animal welfare standards.  This signalled two developments.  First, that Defra would 
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again subsume rural within agriculture and that the dominant concern of Defra would 
be CAP reform, which at best would crowd out other aspects of rural.  Second, what 
was left of the reduced budget that rural areas expected, would be increasingly 
funnelled through EU monies, pitting against other priorities within the CAP regime 
(interview with Academic 1).   
Most of this funding would be available through pillar two of the CAP on rural 
development, which was to be bolstered, partly to help rural regeneration (Lowe & 
Ward 1998, Ward & Lowe 2004).  Though many rural areas had some experience of 
the LEADER and other similar programmes they had limited knowledge of all the 
ramifications involved in applying for EU support (interview with Practitioner 7).  The 
situation was complicated by the unwillingness of the UK government to allocate 
sufficient matched funding to open-up opportunities for rural communities (Lowe et al 
2002).  Together this compounded rural communities’ strength of feeling that the 
ground rules for funding schemes had been altered to their disadvantage (interview 
with Academic 7).  Administrative problems that Defra encountered when it made the 
dramatic shift to an area-based payments scheme for the Single Farm Payment 
aggravated everything.  The resultant turmoil in the Rural Payments Agency cost the 
government heavily in lost prestige and ministerial time, as Chapter Four explains 
(Defra Select Committee 2007c). 
The extra barriers put in the way of rural communities, allied to a sense of drift where 
rural policy was now positioned, added to a sense of frustration amongst many rural 
practitioners (Lowe & Ward 1998).  As Chapter Four suggests, part of the new 
direction was due to New Labour reverting to an economistic approach, dependent 
upon business becoming the main instigator of change, especially to overcome the 
difficulties faced by lagging rural areas.  Defra could not escape from further criticism 
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however.  The skills-based emphasis did not seem to include some of the key 
players, which should have been tasked to carry out the transformation.  As one 
practitioner interviewee said; 
I just couldn’t get LANTRA (the main rural skills training body) up the political 
agenda.  The government talked about the importance of skills, training and 
improved productivity, but didn’t put the words into practice (interview with 
Practitioner 10). 
The suborning of rural was affected by a further major factor - the encouragement of 
regional development through the expansion of the RDAs.  Despite the set-back of 
the lost referendum for a regional assembly in the north-east in 2004, the 
government’s stated aim was to pursue a regional agenda, albeit not one 
underpinned by a direct democratic mandate.  RDAs were central to that agenda, 
and Haskins’ appointment to the Rural Delivery Review, signalled that rural policy 
would be increasingly integrated into the regional dimension.   
Hewitt (2011a) refers to four Foucauldian discourses where regionalism is 
concerned.  These are participatory development, administrative regionalism, 
participatory regionalism and regional autonomy.  In terms of New Labour’s 
approach it tried to move from the first two towards the latter two but was thwarted 
by a mixture of distrust of the government’s political motivation and a lack of a clear 
agenda, which resulted in a vacuum which could only be overcome if grass roots 
pressure for change occurred.  The reference to Foucault is apposite because this 
brings in the two concepts of governmentality and disciplinary power.  
Governmentality (see page 41) is a helpful concept in that it in posits the underlying 
reasons behind how people are governed, and the notion behind how power 
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constructs the relationships that are constitutive as a result of that (Foucault 1986, 
Foucault et al 1991, Lemke 2002).  Disciplinary power explains how people become 
subject to regimes of control sometimes overt, often covert, and the way in which this 
affects outcomes (Foucault 1986).   
Regionalism was not popular with some rural advocates who saw it as a front for 
urbanism, and disliked the more complicated funding procedures which RDAs were 
keen to impose (Defra Select Committee 2005, Hewitt 2011a).  However regionalism 
was a long-term objective of the Labour Party and so there should have been no 
surprise that this was still a priority of New Labour (Hobsbawn 1968 p253).  RDAs’ 
performance was viewed as patchy and complacent with regard to rural support 
(interview with Practitioner 5).  This was despite each RDA Board being told to 
appoint a rural specialist.  The Defra Select Committee investigation identified the 
variable performance in rural delivery between different RDAs (Defra Select 
Committee, 2008).  Chapter Six covers this in more detail. 
The implications of the drive to regionalism confirmed the prejudices of some, that 
this was a cover for greater urbanism, and could only further weaken the case for 
rural.  Coming on the back of the changes announced by Haskins’, and the Rural 
Strategy, the increased role and funding for RDAs was perceived as being bad news 
for rural communities (interview with Practitioner 5).  With the other moves that the 
government had made, and with the signals that came from Defra that rural was only 
a small part of its responsibilities, the feeling that government had lost its way and 
had now retrenched both in policy and political terms, had grown steadily.  The later 
actions, or inactions, of the Brown government merely validated that viewpoint. 
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5.7 Conclusion: To what extent did New Labour focus on urban areas to the 
neglect of the countryside? 
This chapter has explored the extent to which New Labour was really an urban-
inclined party that had more in keeping with traditional Labour, and so there was no 
clear disjuncture with the past.  It therefore addressed research question Two and 
also has examined the underlining temporal and spatial features as they affected 
New Labour’s performance in the countryside, in line with research question Five. 
The research evidence points to a mixed picture for though New Labour’s locus was 
not in the countryside there were sufficient grounds to argue that for a time New 
Labour was willing to invest heavily in rural policy and politics.  Admittedly New 
Labour had the great advantage that it had little to live up to, reputation-wise, in the 
countryside.  Previous Labour administrations had, somewhat unfairly, been tarred 
with the epithet of marginalising rural.  However New Labour itself had no great 
ambitions for governing in the countryside as evinced by its limited commitments in 
the 1997 manifesto, and paltry efforts to campaign in, and win rural seats (interview 
with MP 2). 
That the government performed a sharp about-turn as rural issues gained 
prominence early on in Blair’s administration, was a credit to the pragmatic nature of 
New Labour and how it exploited opportunities that arose.  It was also a tribute to the 
influence of rural backbenchers, particularly those who formed the Rural Group, to 
create a body of opinion in parliament and outside that rural mattered and that the 
government should respond positively to the needs of the countryside (interview with 
Bradley). 
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Between 1999 and 2004 the government adopted principles, policies and 
programmes that captured the imagination of those who believed in social 
democratic intervention in the countryside.  Plaudits came from academics, 
practitioners, and those more directly involved in the political process.  New Labour 
was acting counter-intuitively, aiming to prove wrong those who accused it of only 
being interested in urban areas, issues and voters. 
Much that was novel and good was attempted during this period.  Not all initiatives 
worked - some failed for reasons outside of the government’s control.  Nevertheless, 
by 2004 a strong agenda had been put in place and there was much that the 
government could point to in opposition to the urban jibe continually railed against it. 
The reasons for the first shift were not purely positive.  Attack was the best form of 
defence against the Countryside Alliance and it was easier to assuage nervous rural 
backbenchers than merely expect them to follow meekly behind the urban banner.  
Yet much of what the government instigated was different – it responded to the 
needs and demands of rural communities in crucial areas requiring policy uplift in 
such areas as transport, education, housing, the protection of rural services, and the 
enhancement of enterprise.  Whilst rural communities doubted the sincerity of some 
parts of the government offer – parish councils, for example were unsure whether 
the measures sought undue influence over their mode of governance (interview with 
Labour rural activists) – the extra monies alone were a sign that New Labour had 
begun to take rural policy more seriously than either the Thatcher/Major 
governments or predecessor Labour administrations (Ellwood et al 2000, Jones 
2007). 
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From the end of 2004 however, there was a major reversal of these policy and 
political objectives, and New Labour retrenched back to type, as an urban construct 
in which rural matters were marginalised.  
The analysis has evaluated why these two phases happened.  In the first, the 
analysis brings forward evidence to show that New Labour was indeed different and 
more importantly came to be perceived by at least some in rural communities, as 
different.  In this respect the government was able to throw off some of the epithets 
of being purely urban, and was not the same Old Labour centrally-driven, 
conurbation-dependent Party, as had traditionally been the case.  Unfortunately it did 
not receive the kudos it deserved for making such a radical transformation (interview 
with Academic 7).  However there was a caveat and this became all the more 
prevalent in the second phase.  One minister in interview summed it up as follows; 
There was a problem being a representative of a rural constituency on the 
edge of a big city.  When my urban colleagues wanted support over an issue 
which affected their area they were only too willing to call upon my help and I 
dutifully trooped along to talk to ministers on their behalf.  However when I 
needed them to intervene for me, on a rurally-inclined matter, there was 
silence.  Therefore the process was just one-way.  Until Labour realises that it 
has to reach out to rural representatives and the communities they represent, 
we will always be seen as an urban party regardless of what good work the 
then government is undertaking in the countryside (interview with Minister 7). 
That symbolised the failure of New Labour in rural areas.  It might have started to 
grapple for a time with the intricacies of rural life during the period 1999 – 2004 but 
those efforts were not sustained.  The retrenchment that followed from 2004 
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onwards, combined with the loss of political and electoral significance in the 
countryside after the 2005 general election, did immense damage.  This not only 
undermined what had gone before, but also confirmed the prejudices of those that 
felt that Labour would always be biased in favour of urban peoples. 
There was not only a temporal shortcoming, but a spatial one as well.  Chapters Six 
and Seven will further elaborate on this.  However in terms of Labour’s orientation 
towards urban, too often the government failed to grasp the importance of how long 
it took to effect change in the countryside.  Too often policies were hand-me-downs 
from urban, and failed to be embedded or embodied in the proper rural sense, and 
therefore were far less successful there.  Health changes clearly exemplified this.  
Too often the models applied in the countryside were merely adaptations of what 
was happening in the major conurbations, and lacked the sensitivity and precision, to 
work effectively in ruralities.  There was also the downside that investment in urban 
resulted in closures of facilities in rural areas (Asthana & Holliday 2004).  Affordable 
rural housing was another policy area where New Labour just failed to get a grip in 
the countryside (Satsangi et al 2010).  In this, it mirrored a wider policy failing of the 
New Labour government, but this did not make it any easier to accept (Toynbee & 
Walker 2001, 2005 & 2010). 
In this way New Labour was unwilling, and increasingly incapable of addressing the 
basic inequity and lack of social justice that existed in rural England, preferring to fall 
back on its urban comfort-zones. 
 
  
162 
 
Chapter 6 – Tensions between (a) decentralisation/centralisation and (b) 
externalisation/internalisation in the making of rural policy 
Chapter Five argues that at least for a time New Labour broke free from the clutches 
of Old Labour’s urbanist past, and had departed along a route that would take it into 
novel and interesting rural policy and rural political fields.  This chapter explores the 
dualisms of centralisation/decentralisation and externalisation/internalisation of the 
policy-making and implementation framework and how that affected the New Labour 
performance in the countryside.  The chapter therefore covers research question 
Three critically to evaluate the implications of the policy-making process.  It also 
relates to research question Five, to investigate the temporal and spatial features 
that contextualised the making and delivery of policy. 
Section 6.1 begins with a scoping exercise of how New Labour approached policy-
making vis-a-vis the countryside, and how this symbolised the New Labour 
performance.  This is followed in Section 6.2, by an inquest into the degree to which 
New Labour externalised responsibility for policy-making and implementation to 
other bodies both within government, and outside, and how this played with other 
departments and parts of government who were tasked with delivering public 
services in the countryside. 
The chapter then addresses in Section 6.3 the important factor of change, to 
interrogate the extent to which this had an impact upon how policy was made, and if 
the consistency of approach mattered.  Section 6.4 evaluates why New Labour 
preferred externalised decision-making to internalised processes and the extent to 
which this was a temporary or a permanent feature.  Finally in Section 5.5, the 
chapter concludes with a re-examination of the extent to which the different ways of 
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making policy helped or hindered New Labour in its relations with the countryside 
and in particular how this arrangement worked with regard to other functioning 
bodies active in the countryside, including those in the voluntary sector. 
6.1 Organisationally where did New Labour make policy and how did this 
symbolise the operation of government in rural areas? 
In his book on the Labour Left, Seyd makes the observation that, “The Left needed a 
coherent programme yet it displayed ideological uncertainty, programmatic 
weaknesses, and strategic myopia” (1987, p175).  This epithet could equally be 
applied to New Labour in rural England, for New Labour was dogged throughout 
most of the 13 years in government by a feeling of insecurity over the designation, 
direction, and locus of rural policy-making and delivery.   
This was partly explained by the perception that it was driven by events, and not in 
control of policy, having apparently abdicated responsibility to outside agencies.  The 
situation was complicated by the fact that notionally, the parent ministry for rural 
(initially MAFF, and then after 2001, Defra) was unable to gain much traction over 
many aspects of rural policy, as the entrustment for policy was vested elsewhere in 
government.  This was a perennial problem for both rural ministers and civil servants 
(interview with Minister 5).  This fracture was lessened only if the minister who had 
the rural affairs brief worked very hard to engage with those other Departments and 
governmental bodies.  As a civil servant commented in interview; 
Alun Michael, when the minister, worked incredibly hard at keeping other 
Departments informed about Defra’s intentions.  This was particularly true 
around the issue of rural proofing.  Take one example – there was a spat with 
DWP, a Department that would just not recognise rural, even though it had 
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launched a very interesting programme called Village Agents, which gave 
advice and help to older residents living in rural areas.  This was only resolved 
by Alun (Michael) going directly to Patricia Hollis, the DWP minister, and 
getting some assurances that Defra would not be excluded from deliberations 
DWP were making that affected the countryside.  This was typical of the role 
that the Rural Affairs brief involved.  Unfortunately successor ministers were 
not as diligent as Alun, and so Defra often failed to get its own way (interview 
with Civil Servant 8). 
The same individual went on to say that such was the impact of the loss of Alun 
Michael that New Labour’s rural policy never recovered from it and was a signal to 
what would happen after 2004; 
The loss of Michael was crucial.  The only replacement who half measured up 
to him was Jim Knight and he was reshuffled as soon as he got to grips with 
things.  The targets which Alun Michael had set became meaningless after he 
left and we got stuck with an undeliverable PSA.  This mattered as it affected 
our funding through the CSR.  We had a brief upturn when (David) Miliband 
arrived, but largely it was downhill once Michael had gone (interview with Civil 
Servant 8). 
New Labour’s rural policy 1999 – 2004 and the delegation of policy making and 
implementation to the Countryside Agency 
The moratorium on no increased expenditure outside of health and education 
entered into by New Labour in advance of the general election gave scarcely any 
room for manoeuvre until 1999.  This restricted MAFF on what it might have liked to 
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have done to update rural policy which was certainly the wish of the Departmental 
Team (interview with Minister 6). 
In truth rural policy had altered little since the post war Attlee government which put 
in place the institutional arrangements, and the policy agenda and processes, which 
existed for the next fifty years (Manton 2006, Thompson 2008, Winter 1996).  This 
dictated the split between the human and physical environment which had a marked 
effect on the way in which countryside programmes were administered (interview 
with Practitioners 14 & 23).  Despite the Conservatives’ Rural White Paper in 1995 
(Department of the Environment), the view was generally shared that rural policy 
was a neglected policy area with agriculture given the emphasis (Blake 1996, Bullen 
1995, Lowe & Ward 1998, Lowe et al 1995, Murdoch 1997). 
If New Labour was to make any impact on rural policy-making and delivery it had to 
consider investing more resource, encouraging institutional change, and breaking 
rural away from agriculture, by a new policy-making approach. 
New Labour’s initial move was to create the Countryside Agency, an amalgam of the 
previous Rural Development and Countryside Commissions, but with enhanced 
powers, a wider brief, and considerably more resources (Derounian 2006, Murdoch 
2006, Ward & Lowe 2007a&b).  Though largely welcomed, the Countryside Agency 
was not without its critics (interview with Practitioner 23 and Minister 1).   
I had unease with the Countryside Agency and its leadership.  I regularly had 
to intervene to hold others back from direct criticism of its performance.  It was 
too establishment-led, too close to landowners, and too self-satisfied.  I was 
happy to support Chris Haskins, and his radical agenda for reform, including 
the abolition of the Countryside Agency (interview with Minister 1). 
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Another Practitioner in interview was also critical about the Agency’s role; 
Much of the Agency’s work was not new in the sense that similar ideas have 
run for years in France and in the Walloons region in Belgium.  The problem 
the Agency caused was it duplicated activity already underway in the 
countryside at excessive cost and kept interfering, often with little result.  Take 
the special status of the Forest of Dean - it spent a £1m on this and after three 
years had got absolutely nowhere (interview with Practitioner 7).   
A more measured account, but nevertheless still voicing criticism came in an 
interview with another Minister; 
It was acknowledged that the Countryside Agency was a useful vehicle for 
change.  However sometimes it ran ahead of itself and those at the top almost 
seemed contemptuous of ministers which meant when it came to its survival, 
there was no one to fight its corner (interview with Minister 2). 
Supporters spoke to its strengths, as an interview with a practitioner suggested; 
The Countryside Agency was a far-sighted vehicle, amalgamating the search 
for rural prosperity with protecting the beauty of the countryside.  It pushed 
sustainable development forward.  Richard Wakeford (the Chief Executive), 
was a visionary, cutting through the bureaucracy associated with rural issues 
(interview with Practitioner 26).   
One example of the enhanced opportunities that the newly empowered Agency 
presented came in the planning field.  Though village appraisals, which allowed 
small communities to future-scope their community’s requirements, pre-dated New 
Labour, the improved mechanism for taking forward neighbourhood participation was 
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demonstrated by the evolution of village design statements, which later morphed into 
parish plans.  Bottom-up forms of planning intended that rural communities take 
responsibility for change, to seek to overcome the excesses of nimbyism, to strive for 
sustainability, and to extend the accountability of local decision-making (Davies 
1998, Moseley 1997 & 2002, Moseley et al 1996, Osborne & Tricker 1998, Osborne 
et al 2004, Owen 1998 & 2002).  The Countryside Agency inherited many of the 
existing programmes of its predecessor organisations, but because of the additional 
resources it was given - £100m annual budget and 600 staff in total – it grew and 
expanded those programmes.  Its specific responsibilities extended to overseeing 
the management of the National Parks and it led on the introduction of the right to 
roam (Derounian 2006)31. 
Endogenous development was encouraged, overseen, and largely funded by the 
Countryside Agency, and there was widespread acknowledgement and support for 
the Agency in this aspect of its work, being seen as stimulating compared to 
previous stultifying processes.  It was also a symbolic representation of counter-
urbanisation and promoted issues including tackling social exclusion (interview with 
Practitioner 1; Bosworth & Willett 2011, Lowe et al 2005, Shucksmith 2000). 
A problem arose however.  Despite parish plans later being included within the 
statutory guidance of District or Unitary Development Plans, the disconnection with 
strategic planning procedures, practices, and outcomes was a recognised shortfall in 
                                                          
31
 At the same time what the Countryside Agency became expert at the promotion of issues that 
hadn’t tended to feature widely beforehand.  This included the re-localisation of food (2001a), the 
protection of common land (2001b), diversity of peoples (2002), future trends for outdoor recreation 
(2005b), and linking landscape and biodiversity to aspects of human geography (2005c).   
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their operation (Owen et al 2007).  This led to frustration on the ground.  I led a 
deputation to talk to the then Planning Minister, Lord Falconer, to alert him to this 
lacunae, at the request of academics who had raised the issue, but little was done to 
avert the consequences with the two systems staying in conflict (interview with 
Practitioner 28).  This salutary lesson was a blunt reminder of how weak the 
bargaining power of rural usually was, when it came up against intransigence from 
other parts of government.  As one academic interviewee said to me; 
You just couldn’t get the civil service to recognise the problem of this 
dislocation in the planning process.  This was immensely disappointing for 
those working to resolve this conflict between bottom-up planning and the 
strategic planning process.  You realised that the whole system was 
unaccountable, particularly to rural interests.  The legislative framework for 
planning was at the heart of government, and no amount of lobbying seemed 
to make any difference to getting ministers and civil servants to see sense 
and make some minor modifications to procedures (interview with Academic 
6).   
The 2004 Planning Act did at least emphasise the value of bottom-up approaches to 
planning, and underwrote the importance of the Countryside Agency’s involvement – 
though this was to be time-limited because of the intervention of Haskins’.  Later 
planning legislation was more top-down and sadly undid much of the good intention 
in the 2004 Act (interview with Practitioner 37).   
Alongside the Countryside Agency the government created the post of Rural 
Advocate, to be an independent voice representing the countryside and able to 
speak directly to Ministers, including the Prime Minister.  Whilst a useful conduit to 
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outside organisations, the direct contact with ministers and civil servants seemed to 
get less the longer New Labour was in office. 
Figure 6.1 – The delivery of policy 
Source: Author 
 What marked out the relationship between government and the Countryside Agency 
was the degree of freedom that the Agency was permitted in initiating policy, 
developing programmes of activity and delivering them (see Figure 6.1).  Effectively 
rural policy had been delegated to the Agency, and although the change was not 
perceptible until after the Rural White Paper of 2000 was published, when 
substantially more resources were made available, the externalisation of policy had 
already been put in place. 
 
 
Government 
• Externalised policy-making to Countryside Agency 
• Very limited responsibility for delivery of policy 
Countryside 
Agency 
• Initiation of policy  
• Delivery of policy working with organisations such as RCCs 
Rural 
Communities 
• Mainly recipients of policies introduced by Countryside Agency 
• Some endogenous development through both government and EU 
schemes 
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The Haskins’ Review and the consolidation of policy-making within Defra 
The creation of Defra signified a departure over where rural policy was to originate.  
Though not immediately apparent, for Defra took some years to establish itself, 
encumbered as it was with the legacy of FMD, internal staffing issues32, and the 
clear disinterest of the Secretary of State (Beckett) in anything rural (interview with 
Minister 5), a start had been made.  Defra’s mode of operation was also criticised.  A 
practitioner said to me in interview; 
I was against the idea of earned autonomy33 and the increased top-down 
decision-making that Defra seemed intent on installing.  What was worse was 
that there was indecision on what was meant by regional – city regions would 
have been a much better idea than the huge centralised regions that were set 
up.  Rural always seemed to lose out because of urban pressures (interview 
with Practitioner 9).   
From the beginning Defra had a tortuous relationship with the many agencies that 
reported to it, as well as other parts of government and outside countryside bodies 
(see Figure 6.2) exemplifying the action and output functions associated with Defra.  
This included those listed in the diagram alongside other major organisations such 
as the Environment Agency, English Nature (after the NERC Act 2006, to become 
Natural England), Ofwat, the Forestry Commission and the Rural Payments Agency.  
                                                          
32
 The DETR staff which came over to Defra as part of the Environment directorate were substantially 
better paid than their equivalents within MAFF.  This led to a bitter dispute, which I was made aware 
of by PCS representatives.  This got the new Department off to a bad start (interview with Civil 
Servant 5). 
33
 Earned autonomy was a concept that evolved out of the public management reform agenda.  The 
idea was that government would take a more nuanced and proportionate approach to bodies, both 
those inside of government, or those contracted or commissioned by it, so that those organisations 
could develop a greater degree of freedom of operation, provided they met performance targets 
(Flinders 2005). 
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Besides these, Defra was the parent body and regulating authority for parts of 
government as diverse as overseeing waste, including nuclear waste, the 
propagation of food policy, pursuing nature conservation, GMO policy, national 
parks, and veterinary support.   
Figure 6.2 – Rural relationships 
 
Source: OECD Rural Policy Review on England using information provided by 
Defra (2011, p122) reproduced by kind permission of OECD. 
In the rural field, the Countryside Agency, and its successor body, the Commission 
for Rural Communities, were the main countryside organisations, though they were 
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low down Defra’s hierarchy of importance.  How this worked out in practice is 
demonstrated diagrammatically in Figure 6.2.  This prescribed the operation of the 
Department given how much it was subject to externalised decision-making, testing 
the patience and ingenuity of civil servants and ministers (interview with Minister 6).  
As one civil servant recalled in interview;  
There were so many NDPBs (Non-Departmental Public Bodies) that the 
Department was responsible for.  This took a huge effort to get funding 
streams sorted, and to work out how each would report and to whom.  Some 
of these bodies were completely a law unto themselves…for example the 
Environment Agency under Barbara Young was untouchable.  Even Chris 
Haskins could go no-where near her empire (interview with Civil Servant 7). 
To a great extent the setting-up, and rationale behind Haskins’ Review, was a 
reaction by Defra to its own powerlessness.  Though Haskins was appointed at the 
instigation of the Prime Minister (interview with Minister 2) he was given total support 
by Defra to completely re-jig the rural policy-making process (interview with Minister 
5).  The result of Haskins’ was the centralisation of functions within Defra but with 
reduced funding and staffing overall (interview with Civil Servant 7).  The residue 
would be passed on to a much-reduced countryside organisation (the CRC), Natural 
England, the RDAs, and some went into the EU budget for rural. 
Haskins had two primary aims in his review.  First, to make Defra itself, the body 
responsible for policy-making.   As Haskins said to the Defra Select Committee; 
…Defra should be a policy-making Department, full stop, and it has a pretty 
ambitious policy-making remit covering these four strands – agriculture, 
environment, the rural economy and rural affairs – that is what it should be 
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about and it should be concentrating on that (Haskins in evidence to the Defra 
Select Committee 2003c).   
Second, to boost the power of the RDAs (Haskins was himself a member of Northern 
First RDA).  The second of these propositions was at least questionable.  As one 
Minister said in interview; 
Passing the responsibility and funding over to the RDAs further marginalised 
the role of rural within Defra.  Defra had hardly any control over the RDAs – I 
believe that RDAs could have unlocked some of the problems the countryside 
faced, but money for rural was frequently left unspent.  The RDAs were 
immune to any pressure from Defra.  What was galling was the fact that we 
could have used that money to kick-start an affordable rural housing 
programme, for instance, but instead it was lost into a black hole (interview 
with Minister 7).   
A civil servant in interview was even blunter in his assessment of RDAs; 
RDAs were often ambivalent towards rural.  I was distrustful of them, to the 
extent that I held back part of the enterprise monies that I should have 
reallocated as I did not think that they would spend it on rural provision 
(interview with Civil Servant 7).   
The issue over whether regions helped or a hindered rural development was to be a 
perennial dilemma throughout the New Labour period (Deas & Ward 2000, Hamin & 
Marcucci 2008, Hewitt 2011b, Lowe & Ward 1998 & 2007, Pearce et al 2005, Ward 
et al 2003, Ward & Brown 2009, Woods & Goodwin 2003).  This was highlighted by 
the Defra Select Committee enquiry which demonstrated the variability of 
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performance including the differential access granted to rural organisations (2008).  
Much depended upon the capability of individual RDAs to demonstrate their 
commitment to rural (as Chapter Five) argues and not just provide another layer of 
bureaucracy with which rural areas had to contend (interview with Minister 4).  
Question-marks remained over the legitimacy of RDAs, once democratic 
accountability was eliminated as an aim following the failure of the north-east 
referendum on a directly elected assembly and the lack of pressure for greater 
regionalism (Hewitt 2011a).  Interestingly Bristol University commissioned by the 
South-West RDA to write its epitaph gave only cursory mention to that RDA’s 
support for rural, even though it was one of the most rural English regions (2011). 
In parallel with the devolution of rural delivery to the RDAs was a re-visitation of rural 
funding streams.  Rural had long been a recipient of EU funding – as part of the 
CAP, but this route was to become even more important after 2004, for the domestic 
budget was about to be slashed and rural re-assimilated back into agriculture 
(interviews with MP1, and Academic 7).  The link to the EU dovetailed with the 
thinking of the Secretary of State (Beckett) who pursued a strong line on CAP 
reform, including enhanced pillar two monies, largely to help rural communities 
through the LEADER programmes (interview with Minister 5).  However there was a 
lack of clarity in the exact relationship between agricultural support and rural funding.  
Marsh and Smith’s (2000) advocated the idea of a closed policy community (with the 
NFU being a useful ally to that), as against Knudsen’s (2009) more open-ended 
description of government’s approach, with the emphasis being upon social welfare 
and rural values in original policy design.  This mattered in terms of potential 
outcomes in what resulted from the reforms of the CAP, and how that impacted upon 
rural matters (Elton 2011). 
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The increased ambivalence of the government to rural provision in England after 
2004 added to the sense of drift and disillusion, manifested in the worsening 
relations with rural communities (interview with Bradley).  Though the nature of these 
schemes was predicated upon networks, bottom-up development and endogenous 
development, the lack of funds and the limited accessibility to project managers 
undid much of the good that had been achieved through the Countryside Agency 
(interview with MP 6; High & Nemes 2007, Lowe et al 2002, Murdoch 2000, Ray 
2000 & 2006, Valve 2002, Ward & Lowe 2004, Ward & McNicholas 1998). 
The direction the government took after 2004 was to veer away from bespoke and 
specialised provision to alternative off-the-shelf arrangements (Ward & Lowe 
2007a&b).  That this was accompanied by a cooling of the relationship between 
government and the countryside only added to the suspicion that New Labour was 
becoming less interested in rural development.  Defra post 2004 looked more like 
MAFF Mark II, with funding streams emphasising farming, rather than as a vibrant 
advocate for rural affairs (interview with Practitioner 23).  Although decision-making 
was still, in the field of rural issues, principally external to Defra, now it had been 
delegated to the RDAs and the EU, rather than the Countryside Agency.  Just as 
with its existence the demise of the Countryside Agency divided opinion.  As one 
academic commented in interview; 
There was a lot that was disappointing about the move from the Countryside 
Agency to the Commission for Rural Communities following the Modernising 
Rural Delivery Review.  Elsewhere I have called it the vandalism of 
modernising rural delivery (interview with Academic 1). 
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What was absent from 2004 onwards was a specific agency tasked to focus 
principally upon rural matters acting as an arms-length, semi-autonomous body in 
the role of critical friend (to government).  The integrated agency, Natural England 
which took its place, was never able to replicate the work of the Countryside Agency, 
nor did it have the budget to even try.  Figure 6.3 indicates the direction of travel for 
policy-making and delivery with the separation of roles.. 
Figure 6.3 – The changes in policy-making and delivery after 2004 
 
Source: Author 
6.2 The role, responsibilities and performance of the most important 
countryside organisations and strategic bodies under New Labour and their 
relationship to Defra 
Section 6.1 identifies the organisational framework of policy-making and 
implementation under New Labour in the countryside.  This section builds on the 
assertion that policy-making and delivery was largely externalised, particularly from 
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1999 - 2004, but that there were always tensions with both ministers and civil 
servants keen to re-centre aspects of the policy-making agenda back with 
themselves as largely occurred after 2004. 
The PIU report and the formulation of a rural strategy 
The significance of the Performance and Innovation Unit Report, Rural Economies 
(1999), was two-fold.  First, although it was produced at the same time as the 
Countryside Agency came into existence, and received little publicity, the prescience 
of the Report in persuading the Prime Minister to devise a rural strategy should not 
be underestimated (interview with Minister 3).  Second, it was symptomatic of New 
Labour that the report was mainly authored by an outside academic, Neil Ward, from 
the University of Newcastle, rather than being the responsibility of MAFF, or another 
part of government.  In this, it replicated much of New Labour’s raison d’etre, that it 
would go to the brightest and the best, to undertake such research (Clark 2002, 
Flinders 2002, Gains 2003, Lowe & Ward 2001, Ward 2008a).  This corresponded 
with Blairite pragmatism, paralleled the desire to promote evidence-based policy-
making and advanced the idea of the ‘big tent’ approach to policy development 
(Wilkinson 2011).  The topic was chosen with an aim of deflecting attention away 
from the hunting debate but was a far-reaching document in its own right (interview 
with Academic 1).  Without the PIU Report it is highly unlikely that the Rural White 
Paper would have been produced at the same time as the Urban White Paper (Ward 
2008a).  It also dovetailed successfully with the creation of the Countryside Agency. 
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The Commission for Rural Communities and Natural England 
Haskins’ originally recommended that the replacement Integrated Agency should 
acquire all those responsibilities not delegated to the RDAs and he saw no need for 
any continuing rural advocacy role (2003).  However, such was the worry about a 
backlash from the countryside and rural organisations that Margaret Beckett relented 
and agreed to the setting up of the CRC.  As one Minister said; 
There was a dawning in government that may be the Haskins’ Review had 
gone too far, and though there was a need to get the balance of institutions 
right, it might not have been such a good idea just to abolish the Countryside 
Agency.  There was a worry that Natural England would not be able to cope 
with the workload – given that it had to endure heavy budget cuts as it came 
into being.  The NERC Bill was full of holes institution-wise.  That was why 
Margaret Beckett, under pressure from Alun Michael, changed her mind, and 
cobbled together the idea of the CRC – to at least assuage some countryside 
opinion (interview with Minister 2).   
The CRC was a rump compared to its predecessor.  It had a core staff of about 50, 
hardly anyone out in the field, and had much reduced budget and functions.  With 
such a small workforce CRC was left to fulminate about aspects of rural life – usually 
issues related to disadvantage.  This became a constant theme of its publications, 
and lobbying, to such an extent that civil servants reacted negatively to its portrayal 
of the countryside.  As one civil servant argued; 
The Rural Development Commission perpetuated the myth of the deprived 
countryside.  The CRC merely replicated this, portraying the countryside as a 
victim.  However the statistics do not bear this out – the countryside is 
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integrated with the city, and though it may suffer from similar problems, those 
problems are not of the same intensity.  The CRC banging on about 
disadvantage did not help its cause (interview with Civil Servant 8). 
Given this accusation it was surprising that the CRC’s most important contribution 
was the Rural Advocate’s Report on the potential of the English rural economy (CRC 
2008).  This stressed the opportunities that government missed by failing to pay 
sufficient attention to the rural economy and the inability to discriminate between 
those areas that were doing relatively well, and possessed even more potential for 
development, and those that lagged behind. 
Haskins desire as part of his review to overcome what he saw as unnecessary 
duplication by creating one integrated rural agency was largely achieved with the 
creation of Natural England.  This encompassed rural development, environmental 
protection, and biodiversity.  Haskins argued that this would be a cost-effective and 
politically beneficial arrangement that would overcome the deficiencies of the 
Countryside Agency (interview with Haskins).  Natural England came into existence 
after the NERC Bill was enacted in 2006 consisting of what was previously English 
Nature, the Rural Development Service34 and parts of the Countryside Agency.   
What Haskins had not envisaged on the human-centred side of the countryside was 
that there were four distinct difficulties Natural England (NE) encountered.  First, 
Natural England’s expertise was largely in the field of biodiversity, conservation 
management and landscape protection (interview with Practitioner 26).  With the 
                                                          
34
 The Rural Development Service was created in 2001 and was made up of people who worked on 
practical schemes which assisted with rural development.  The RDS was originally placed with Defra 
but most people transferred to NE, although some moved to the State Veterinary Service and others 
to RDAs. 
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abolition of the Countryside Agency many of the government’s putative experts in the 
field of economic and social development of the countryside left or were reassigned 
(interview with Practitioner 32).  Second, on inception the new organisation was 
faced with steep budget cuts, to an extent that it could no longer run many of the 
previous English Nature projects.  This included a number of the contracts it had with 
Rural Community Councils, further antagonising that important sector within the 
countryside (interview with Practitioner 21). 
Third, NE was bogged down with the practicalities of introducing the government’s 
right to roam legislation, specifically the mapping exercise (interview with Practitioner 
15).  This proved both a technical and administrative nightmare to complete and 
eventually undermined the Agency’s effectiveness.  As one practitioner stated in 
interview;  
Being given the responsibility for introducing the right to roam overwhelmed 
the Agency.  The level of resource demanded and the time it took to manage 
this exercise, precluded other valuable work from going ahead, and meant 
that for a time, we were just focused on the implementation of the legislation 
(interview with Practitioner 32).   
Fourth, Haskins’ desire to strip policy-making away from delivery, leaving agencies 
only as deliverers, led to significant shortcomings and frustration as operatives found 
that they had little control over implementation, which practitioners struggled to 
resolve (interview with Practitioner 36). 
What resulted was an inadequate solution to a problem that had existed only in the 
minds of some within government.  Policy-making was now centred within Defra but 
little attempt was made to close the disconnection between Defra’s attempts at 
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policy-making and the agencies’ capability of delivering those policies.  In fact the 
confusion, which already existed, became that much worse as a new regional level 
was incorporated (Defra 2004d).  One Labour Party political activist who had inside 
knowledge of the operation of a RDA said to me in interview; 
My experience was one of total confusion over policy-making and 
implementation.  Take the Market Towns Initiative, a key programme.  This 
was set up and originally administered by the Countryside Agency – however 
after Haskins’ it passed to the RDAs.  Whereas we could have learned from 
the Countryside Agency, we had to virtually start the programme again.  
RDAs and Government Offices had a real credibility and accountability 
problem, and RDAs struggled with the rural brief.  There was a lack of 
strategy and policy coming down from government – evinced by the muddle 
over the FMD recovery monies.  As time went on this got worse, not better 
(interview with Rural Political Activist 4).    
The prevailing situation was exacerbated by the fact that Defra was by this time 
greatly weakened as a department.  The rural team had been drastically cut in size 
within a department that was about to suffer further body blows, especially the 
removal of the climate change portfolio to DECC35, and the onset of further crises 
over CAP funding and flooding (interview with Civil Servant 7).  Defra was 
increasingly marginalised as government activity after 2004 was concentrated upon 
the key departments of the Home Office, Health, Education and Transport (Barber 
                                                          
35
 Given the importance of landscape mitigation measures and the impact of animal farming upon 
climate change, rural had been seen as a vital cog in climate change measures.  However once the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change was created this nexus was largely lost.  Defra did retain 
responsibility for adaptation but the division of responsibilities made little sense, and budget cuts 
further damaged the effectiveness of this vital aspect of policy. 
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2007, Clark 2002, Perri 6 et al 2002, Richards & Smith 2006).  After 2004, rather 
than streamlining the decision-making process, if anything, it had become more 
complicated.  Defra was now notionally at least responsible for policy-making.  Yet 
much of the authority had really been syphoned off to the RDAs and the EU.  Defra 
taking back control was a blunt instrument.  It was not just the number and diversity 
of policies that mattered, let alone from whence they came, but their quality.  With 
such a small departmental team, and limited access to special advisers (interview 
with Special Adviser 1), Defra ministers suffered from the new onus placed on them.  
As was said to me by one interviewee; 
Though I represented a rural constituency I was not an expert in rural affairs.  
Yet I was expected to decide on really important issues, under pressure and 
with limited time frames.  This was alongside all the other responsibilities I 
had to account for as part of my portfolio.  Given that rural was already 
marginalised within the department, my involvement would make little or no 
difference (interview with Minister 7).  
Splitting policy-making from implementation sounded feasible to operate in theory 
but was much more difficult in practice.  What remained of the management of 
countryside organisations after 2004 suffered from a lack of clarity on what they 
should have been doing, and more than anything, from insufficient resource.  In this 
respect what damaged rural policy was just not returning to more centralised top-
down decision-making reminiscent of the MAFF days but the savage budget cuts 
that accompanied the organisational restructuring. 
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6.3 Did the churning of ministers, advisers, institutions, policies and 
implementation vehicles make a difference to where, and how policies were 
made, and by whom? 
The derivation of rural policy underwent two substantial transformations during the 
New Labour era.  Much of this was due to the government’s pragmatic and reactive 
approach to events, but part was down to the government’s insistent belief that 
change was synonymous with improvement – the modernising agenda (See Chapter 
Seven).  The state of continual flux of people, structures, policies and institutions 
inevitably determined how New Labour operated in rural areas.  However just 
examining the architecture of New Labour’s rural policy fails fully to comprehend the 
groundings of policies, and implementation strategies.  This Section critically 
examines the impact of change on Defra, key actors within the department, and on 
the institutional and structural frameworks.  
Ministers 
MAFF had two Ministers for Agriculture, Jack Cunningham and Nick Brown from 
1997 – 2001.  The successor department, Defra, had three Secretaries of State 
under New Labour, Margaret Beckett, David Miliband and Hilary Benn, and 
numerous other ministers who had some responsibility for rural affairs, usually as 
part of a wider role with farming and food (see Appendix 7 for the full list of 
Ministers).  Only Elliot Morley was a minister in MAFF/Defra for any length of time 
though Michael Meacher was Environment Secretary for the first six years of the 
government and he oversaw the implementation of the right to roam legislation 
(interview with Minister 3).  Cleary and Reeves (2009) identify the numerous 
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problems that the churning of ministers causes, and Defra’s plight was symptomatic 
of that. 
Defra may have come about only by happenstance (Heppell 2011), but rural affairs 
did at least now have its own departmental home, and clearer delineation of 
responsibilities. 
Chris Mullin captures the futility of much of the work of junior ministers, with the the 
memorable analogy of ‘moving the deckchairs around’, with very limited influence 
over policy-making (2009 & 2011).  Ministers, in interview, frequently bore out this 
frustration (interview with Minister 5).  Much depended on the relationship with, and 
ideas of, the Secretary of State (Theakston et al 2014).    
Whilst Haskins’ did try to centre policy-making within Defra, with limited success, as 
part of what some academics refer to as institutionalised path dependency 
(Kavanagh & Richards 2001, Marsh et al 2000), there were always counter 
challenges.  Defra suffered from its lack of traction over so much of rural policy 
because other Departments held the purse strings and the responsibility for delivery.  
As was said to me in interview; 
Defra was seen as a less important ministry.  David Miliband did lift the profile 
for a while but he was mainly interested in climate change and so rural got 
further side-lined.  Too often policy areas we needed control over such as 
rural bus transport grants were beyond us.  I came to think towards the end of 
my time there that rural would have been better situated within CLG where 
ministers seemed to enjoy more authority (interview with Civil Servant 4). 
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Additionally Defra inherited MAFFs tendency to be subjected to immense pressure 
from external lobbyists, especially the NFU, and this curtailed its freedom for 
manoeuvre (interview with Civil Servant 8).  So Haskins’ may have been a pyrrhic 
victory for those who wished totally to subsume rural policy-making within the 
department – in reality this aim was never achievable.  
Advisers 
New Labour substantially increased the number of special advisers (SPADs) whilst 
in office, and relied heavily on this conduit for the formulation and delivery of policy 
(Elcock 2002, Gay 2000, Shaw & Eichbaum 2014, Yong & Hazell 2014).   
Why SPADs mattered in terms of the policy-evolution process was that they were the 
bridge between ministers, their civil servants, officials in NDPBs, other SPADs (and 
therefore other ministers), the wider Party, including MPs, and interest/pressure 
groups.  SPADs played a crucial role in the fetching and carrying of ideas and 
oversaw policy creation, implementation, and the monitoring of performance (Kelly 
2001). 
Defra suffered from three distinct disadvantages which hampered access to good 
quality advice.  Firstly, there were very few sympathetic individuals who had the right 
skills match to provide the rural affairs team with appropriate support (interview with 
Bradley).  Secondly, few SPADs stayed for a any length of time, which meant that 
there was little continuity in decision-making.  Nevertheless some SPADs such as 
Sheila Watson36 built up a formidable reputation as a political operator (interview with 
Special Adviser 1).  SPADs were both part of the internal departmental structure – 
                                                          
36
 Watson was Margaret Beckett’s SPAD, and was for all intended purposes the political eyes and 
ears of the Department always standing in when Beckett was not available.  However she, like her 
master, had little interest in rural. 
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but they also dealt extensively with external agencies.  In fact one of their 
weaknesses was that they came heavily under the influence of pressure groups 
(interview with Bradley).  Thirdly given that the total number of SPADs available to 
government at any one time was limited, it was usual for Defra to have only a couple 
of SPADs, which severely limited its overall performance, and meant that it suffered 
in relation to other departments37.  
Institutions 
New Labour was influenced by the ideas behind new institutionalism which helped 
frame its underlying political ideology (Bevir 2003 & 2005, Chhotray & Stoker 2009, 
Hay 1999, Lowndes 2010, McAnulla 2007, March & Olsen 2005).  This gave New 
Labour the flexibility to draw on the delimits of the market and rationality, advocating 
the advantage of networks over hierarchies, alongside dynamic change, with new 
embedded normative rule-making approaches, integrative in style, rather than the 
traditional institutional stasis associated with British public office.  Though largely 
drawing upon the economic and political theories of the New Right, there were 
elements of social democratic thinking applied in an eclectic manner, strongly 
evident from 1999 until 2004. 
The new institutionalism and the principal-agent relationship neatly described Defra’s 
delegation of policy-making, initially to the Countryside Agency, and then other rural 
organisations in the community and voluntary sectors, commensurate with self-
governing models, and new forms of diverse leadership (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 
Pollitt 2009).  However with the unease that grew over cost and effectiveness of 
                                                          
37
 SPADS were only available to the Secretary of State and Ministers of State.  Given that it was rare 
for Defra to have more than one Minister of State this was a constraint.   
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policy delivery, and the dramatic intervention of Haskins’, it helped explain why 
policy-making was brought back into the ministry as a rational response to those 
concerns (Brousine 2009, Burch & Holliday 2000, Newman 2001, Peters 1999, 
Room 2011).  
Even after the paradigm shift of 2004, Defra did not preclude experimentation to try 
to find new ways to expedite service delivery.  Local government was potentially a 
useful ally in this.  In the Rural Delivery Pathfinders initiative it attempted to create 
newly-integrated models of service delivery.  A major part of this was the rolling out 
of local area agreements, part of the Rural Strategy, and a practical demonstration of 
how rural proofing and mainstreaming rural could be of mutual benefit.  Unfortunately  
the Pathfinders’ recommendations got little attention in wider government, displaying 
the limitations of the Department’s reach (Defra 2008).   
The shifting of institutional structures added to a sense of disorganisation and 
depoliticisation which New Labour was regularly accused of (Burnham 2001, 
Flinders and Buller 2006).  Certainly a number of the institutional reforms did not 
seem to be well formulated, or were given insufficient time to work through properly.  
An example of this was the planning changes which whilst in theory being 
sympathetic to bottom-up rural development, contradicted this in legislative-terms.  
This meant that reform seemed superficial, if not counterproductive. 
As one civil servant memorably commented to me in interview;. 
Civil servants like to hear nothing more than when a new minister says he 
wants to reform the institutional arrangements of the department.  We know 
that this means more money for us, new roles, and new nameplates on the 
doors.  In a year they will be gone; reshuffled or demoted.  And then his or her 
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successor, can start the process of reorganisation all over again - plus ca 
change (interview with Civil Servant 7). 
Policies, strategies and their implementation 
New Labour had no shortage of rural policies.  It developed its own strategy (2004c) 
on the back of the Rural White Paper (2000).  Implementation of these policies may 
have been a problem, but that was something that the whole government perceived 
as a perennial weakness, which was why Blair was so keen to address this (Barber 
2007). 
The main policies, reports and programmes are listed in the timeline on pages 12 
and 13.  Overall it was an impressive collection.  In addition, rural was the recipient 
of policies that were nationally formed and directed, though not all national 
programmes necessarily reached the countryside, or were sufficiently tailored for it. 
Institutional churn made an enormous difference to where policy was made, who by, 
and how those policies were then communicated to the countryside.  The future of 
the rural post office branch network was one such example (See Chapters Four and 
Seven).  The protection of village post offices was one of the few commitments in the 
1997 manifesto, and the Rural White Paper (2000) gave explicit support to the idea 
of subsidising the network, with a presumption against the closure of individual 
branches, at a cost of £400m per annum (Midgley 2005). The policy was part of the 
government’s financial inclusion strategy, alongside the provision of basic bank 
accounts, and the post office card account (Edmonds 2011).  
Yet within a short period of time, rural communities saw this policy completely 
overturned as successive programmes of closure, Network Reinvention and Network 
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Change shut hundreds of rural post offices.  This did great damage to the credibility 
of individual rural Labour MPs.  As one MP interviewee stated; 
Under Network Change three post offices were identified for closure in my 
rural constituency.  I managed this process reasonably successfully.  But after 
a post office was saved in the constituency of Castleford and Pontefract - the 
seat of Yvette Cooper - the Post Office, operating under the zero sum 
principle, came after another one here.  Having originally sidelined my 
opponents they now came after me with glee.  So we sacrificed one in a 
highly marginal constituency to save another in a rock solid Labour seat – just 
to assuage a minister.  I went to see the Post Office Minister over this.  He 
was just oblivious to the electoral consequences (interview with MP 2). 
This story was replicated a number of times, as other MPs described to me the 
discomfort they experienced under the closure programmes.  Lessons were hardly 
learned as Lord Mandelson38, when back at the DTI, brought forward the part 
privatisation of the Royal Mail (Hooper 2008).  Though eventually dropped, again the 
electoral repercussions for Labour rural MPs appeared dire as the proposals seemed 
like a killer-blow to the rural network (interviews with MPs, 3 & 6; Cowley & Stuart 
2014, Parker 2013 & 2014). 
These policy and strategy cleavages grew in the latter years under Blair, and 
worsened under Brown, and were taken as evidence of New Labour’s growing 
disenchantment with the countryside.  The post office example, was just one – which 
could easily have been replicated by others such as affordable rural housing, 
                                                          
38
 Lord Mandelson as Secretary of State at DTI commissioned the Hooper Review which 
recommended part privatisation of the Royal Mail.  Most Labour MPs vehemently objected to this 
proposal, and opposition was at its strongest in the Rural Group. 
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transport or employment all of which demonstrated a mixture of frequently changing 
policies – but with little beneficial outcome for rural areas.  This seriously questioned 
Defra’s capability, or even willingness, to intercede when rural interests were 
involved, a situation that was borne out by the critical comments of MPs about their 
ministerial colleagues.  As one MP lamented to me; 
The turnover of ministers and policies was counterproductive, as New Labour 
became more centralising – we went back to rural being synonymous with 
farming, and it just got marginalised.  Civil servants seemed disengaged in the 
last few years of New Labour and Defra had no real authority within wider 
government, being overturned on a regular basis.  This was disappointing as 
new initiatives such as Total Place (2010)39 and the Quirk Review (2007)40, 
could have given rural a role again (interview with MP 1). 
Chapter Five examined rural proofing policies as an antidote to urbanism.  Yet this 
was given little opportunity to bed down in practice because of Defra’s inability to 
enforce this across government.  It was a similar state of affairs with mainstreaming 
rural (interview with Practitioner 4; Courouble 2011).  By 2009, Defra in its annual 
departmental review failed to specify any Departmental Strategic Objectives which 
related to rural, and preferred to concentrate upon rural as part of the cross-cutting 
work of the Department (Defra, 2009d).  Whilst the second Rural Development 
Programme for England 2007 – 2013 (2007) made great play of continuing activity, 
                                                          
39
 Total Place was a Treasury/CLG Joint Paper which brought forward the idea of ‘a whole area 
approach to public services’ encouraging the better integrated allocation of resources, with citizen 
empowerment being at the centre of the decision-making process. 
40
 The Quirk Review looked at how to make increased and better use of public and community assets, 
work carried out on behalf of CLG. 
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in reality this was a much more limited operational framework than had been the 
case in the first programme. 
Together with the cuts in funding and the lack of an ambitious programme this 
Section has illustrated the impact of the institutional turmoil which surrounded Defra 
and its constituent parts from 2004 onwards.  This is not to dismiss the importance of 
where policy was made, who by, and how it was implemented, but that was of 
secondary concern compared to the reduction in resources, and the growing 
disinterest in the rural domain. 
6.4 Why did New Labour have such little faith in internalised methods of policy 
formulation? 
Rural policy-making in England was unusual in that it was at least partly outside of 
the traditional civil service – minister arrangement for policy-making.  This derived 
from MAFF, the parent ministry already being so reliant upon EU monies.  However 
it was also true that MAFF remained one of the few command and control 
departments where central direction of policy was still in force (interview with 
Academic 8).  This led to a confused picture – but with so much rural policy being the 
responsibility of external agencies there was an interesting dynamic at work on the 
internalisation – externalisation continuum of where policy was made.  What further 
complicated this picture was that New Labour, whilst it spoke the language of 
decentralisation from 2001 onwards, was intent on taking greater executive control in 
order to speed delivery of policies.  This reached a head in rural areas after 2004.   
The debate over whether this was a shift in strategy or a longer-term tendency that 
had just been dormant in New Labour, has been the subject of significant academic 
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interest (Bevir & Rhodes 2006, Burch & Holliday 2000, Davies 2000, Judge 2006, 
Lee 2000, Meredith & Catney 2007). 
Labour’s traditional distrust of the civil service 
Many in the Labour Party had long distrusted elements in the civil service.  This 
doubt in the civil service’s objectivity grew after Labour had tasted office, and 
remained an ever-present belief amongst many in the Party through to the 1997 
election and beyond.  Both the Crossman (1979) and Benn (1996) diaries make 
much of this believing that the civil service tried to block radical manifesto 
commitments.  There were countless reasons for this antagonism, and this has been 
written about extensively (Gamble 1996, Theakston and Gouge 2004).  There was a 
strong sense of foreboding of what New Labour should expect of the civil service, 
from the leadership through to the grass roots, in the belief that Thatcher had 
politicised the civil service and put her own own placemen there (Theakston 1990).  
Blair himself was more concerned about inertia rather than outright opposition from 
the leadership of the civil service (Blair 2010), but that view was not widely shared by 
colleagues (Sinclair 2007). 
So New Labour came to power generally sceptical about what support it would 
receive from the civil service.  Given its radical agenda of public service reform, 
joined up government, and devolution and decentralisation, some element of 
preparedness would require strategems of how to confront this, to work around it, or 
to find alternative methods of policy-making and implementation.  New Labour chose 
all three approaches.  Despite these concerns, in its White Paper ‘Modernising 
Government’ (Cabinet Office 1999) New Labour set itself testing targets; more 
joined-up and strategic policy-making; a consumer-orientated focus; and high quality 
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and efficient public services relying upon evidence-based policy-making (Gray and 
Jenkins 1999, Rhodes 2000).  This viewpoint pervaded rural policy-making, as it did 
the rest of the government. 
This initially pushed New Labour towards externalisation of policy-making and 
delivery in rural policy to accommodate the modernisation discourse, alongside 
some recourse to managerialism, marketisation, agentification, a regulated polity, 
and decentralisation (See Chapter Seven). 
New Labour also sought to encourage earned autonomy from its own agencies,and 
employed  think tanks, community and voluntary sector organisations and external 
consultants to generate ideas (Schlesinger 2009, Taylor 2003).  The creation of the 
Countryside Agency and funding third sector bodies such as the Rural Community 
Councils was the embodiment of this in practice (interview with Practitioner 4).  
Special advisers similarly acted as a counterweight to the civil service (Yong & 
Hazell 2014). 
As a footnote to this narrative, somewhat in contradiction to the perceived wisdom, it 
was striking that all the Defra civil servants interviewed spoke about how much they 
had welcomed the New Labour government into office, after the increasingly sterile 
period under the Conservatives.  This was true of Defra itself, where the focus upon 
rural up to 2004 was seen as an enlightening experience, the first time in their 
working lives that rural had been given the prominance that they believed it 
deserved.  This made disappointment all the greater when New Labour’s rural 
interest waned (interviews with Civil Servants 3 & 6).   
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The changing scene – the EU and globalisation 
New Labour’s period in office, was marked by major changes in the globalisation 
discourse, indicative of the new challenges that all governments faced at the turn of 
the millennium.  A historicist appreciation of events at that time indicated that New 
Labour believed that it had to be seen to be taking a modernist approach as part of 
its break with Old Labour.  New Labour did not just acknowledge the influence of the 
new global forces at work, it positively welcomed and argued the benefits of 
globalisation.  At one level this was an esoteric and philosophical discourse, as 
evidenced by the speeches of ministers, and the texts of documents (L'Hote 2010).  
This centred around the inevitability of  globalisation as:  
a non-negotiable economic constraint in order to render contingent policy 
choices ‘necessary’ in the interests of economic rejuventation (Watson and 
Hay 2003, p289). 
Yet this debate had particular reverberations for the rural economy and society 
because the reform of agriculture, land use, and the food chain would be major 
planks in the government’s ambitions.  To New Labour this could occur only if the UK 
was fully bound into the EU – and the Party’s European ambitions, were a crucial 
element in the recognition of the inevitability of globalisation (Holden 2002).  This is 
why it embraced the post-productivist future of the rural landscape, whilst moving 
farming towards niche markets and multifunctionality (Curry 2002, Evans et al 2002, 
Ilbery & Bowler 2014, Lowe et al 2002, Marsden 2009, Marsden & Sonnino 2008, 
van der Ploeg & Roep 2003). 
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Juxtaposed with the shift away from a nationally-determined rural policy towards 
global and supranational structures, there was a counter movement to encourage 
neo-endogenous development at a local level (Ray 2006, Shucksmith 2010).  In the 
EU this was partly encapsulated in LEADER programmes (Dwyer et al 2007, High & 
Nemes 2007, Marsden & Sonnino 2008, Ward & McNicholas 1998).  Across the 
OECD countries it was referred to as the new rural paradigm (Horlings & Marsden 
2012, OECD 2006, Sabel 2001).  English rural policy was supposed to follow this 
directional shift, though the evidence was that England lagged behind other parts of 
the EU in terms of developing appropriate policies, the result of insufficient funds and 
lack of prioritisation amongst those tasked to deliver New Labour’s agenda.  This, 
rather than who by, or where the policy was made, was a major reason for 
unsatisfactory progress in rural development (Hoggart et al 2014, Moseley 2003). 
New Labour’s wider agenda – externalisation versus centralisation? 
Rural policy-formulation did not exist in a vacuum.  Defra, its agencies, and those 
Labour representatives who were interested in rural, were equally affected by the 
directional swings  of Blair’s government.  Over the 13 years, whilst there were 
unpredictable movements in how New Labour approached policy-making, the 
direction of travel was towards greater executive authority, as the government 
attempted to streamline both policy-making and in particular policy-delivery (Barber 
2007, Mulgan 2005a &b, Temple 2000). 
In tune with its philosophical commitment to the politics of the Third Way the Blair 
government refused to be bounded by traditional Labour constraints, whether that be 
by giving preference to the private sector over the public one - when that was 
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thought appropriate and expeditious - or taking advice from as wide a cross-section 
or people, within government or outside (Blair 1998, Giddens 1998, Latham 2001). 
Besides its emphasis upon pragmatism and open-mindedness New Labour had 
another reason why it came to rely so much on outside counsel in the rural policy-
making field.  Quite simply it did not have the internal expertise and experience to be 
able to fall back upon.  The Rural Group did partly act as a counterweight to this 
(interview with Bradley).  Defra did come to realise that with the abolition of the 
Countryside Agency it needed to develop much greater knowledge of data collection.  
This explained the foray into the Bibby/Shepherd research area (See Chapter Four).  
As one civil servant admitted in interview; 
We needed to do something dramatic to separate the myths of rural life from 
the realities.  So we decided for Defra to specialise in data collection and 
interpretation.  We became second to none in this – and we were often able to 
get the better of other departments because our evidence base was so solidly 
worked through.  For the first time we could define rural, and know what rural 
areas were really like – generally with high levels of satisfaction for those 
living there, but with specific problems that required targeted help (interview 
with Civil Servant 8). 
So as a reaction to its previous reliance upon the research, data and interpretation of 
those external to the department, Defra responded by developing its own means of 
justifying its modus operandi.  To Defra it was not just a simple case of centralisation 
and internationalisation versus decentralisation and externalisation – New Labour 
used the tools appropriate for the time and the policy in question.  This might have 
added to the complexity of policy-formulation, and confused those not privy to what 
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was going on – indeed one of the shortcomings of the Bibby/Shepherd work was the 
lack of communication of the results (interview with Bibby).  This did not necessarily 
mean that that all the research was valuable, or came though into policy, let alone 
implemented (interview with Academic 1).   
6.5 Conclusion: To what extent did the focus upon external sources for policy-
making and delivery help, hinder or make little difference to New Labour’s 
operation in the countryside? 
This chapter has critically examined the case that New Labour abdicated rural policy-
making and delivery to external agencies.  The evidence points to this being the 
situation – but this only tells some of the story, and only refers to part of new 
Labour’s time in power.  In exploring research question Three what is clear is that on 
the axes of internalisation – externalisation, centralisation-decentralisation New 
Labour’s performance in the countryside was confusing, contradictory and somewhat 
self-defeating.  This did little to help Defra’s reputation, and eventually was one 
reason why it led to rural policy being of diminished importance after 2004 and why 
the legacy of New Labour in rural areas is one of lost opportunities. 
Such a state of affairs was not entirely of the government’s own making.  Certainly 
its response to the growing crisis in the countryside from the late 1990s onwards was 
commendable in terms of its pragmatism and positive reactivity.  This was the 
apogee of New Labour’s rural demarche.  That it coincided with the period when the 
newly-formed Countryside Agency was at its greatest prowess possessing of a 
considerable budget was not accidental.  Government ceded power, influence and 
authority to that body and in so doing unleashed an upsurge of activity, initiative and 
intervention.  Given the social-democratic nature of this involvement it was easy to 
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portray this as a typical Labour response to a given set of problems.  However it was 
much more than that, for New Labour transcended traditional boundaries to exploit 
possibilities in rural England that predecessor administrators could have only dreamt 
about.  
It is a moot point whether agencies operate inside or external to government 
(Christensen & Laegreid 2006b, Talbot 2004).  In its operation and performance the 
Countryside Agency gave the impression of playing it both ways.  From the 
interviews, former staff made it clear that they thought that the authority of the 
Agency came as a result of its ability to portray itself as a wing of government.  
However they also felt it vital that they maintained their objectivity and semi-
independence.  As one interview practitioner said; 
We valued our role in the Countryside Agency as being an independent voice 
within government.  It was good that we could go directly to ministers and give 
them our advice, but this never weakened our resolve to be first and foremost 
the advocates of the countryside, telling the government what needed saying, 
no matter how unpalatable the message (interview with Practitioner 27). 
Government agencies work to a policy and resources framework set-out by 
government.  This was the Countryside Agency experience.  Though it did have the 
power to make and launch policy this was only in conjuction with government.  
Policy-making was therefore a two-way process, rather than an agency making 
decisions in isolation.  Where agencies do veer away from government is the time 
when problems tend to arise.  The history of the Rural Payments Agency was a case 
in point – though the degree to which government was able to absolve itself from 
responsibility from the debacle of mismanagement and overspending was never 
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widely accepted given its support for the radically different approach to the Single 
Farm Payment (Defra Select Committee Enquiry 2007c).  In this respect whether 
government delegated policy-making and implementation to an agency, or a third 
party, did not mean that government was not ultimately responsible for those 
policies. 
This was the crux of the Haskins’ Review.  In demanding the separation of policy-
making from delivery Haskins’ view was that it must be the duty of a government 
department to dictate the policies – his criticism of what had happened under 
MAFF/Defra was that too much autonomy had been given to the Countryside 
Agency.  In this he reaffirmed his support for the view of the Thatcher administration 
towards a ‘next steps’ approach (Gains 1999, Haskins 2003).  Whether his 
recommendations would have been quite so stark if the Agency had been perceived 
to be better managed, and the rural subject-milieu less inclined to crisis, would have 
been an interesting, if hypothetical argument (Greer 2003, Lowe & Phillipson 2006, 
Taylor 2003, Ward & Lowe 2007a, Ward et al 2004).   
Given that the period after 2004, was one of policy-making famine, it is possible to 
speculate that government by internalising the policy-formulation process weakened, 
rather than strengthened, its involvement with the countryside.  However as has 
been argued there were factors that made the reduction in rural intevention 
inevitable anyway given the major budget reductions.  
New Labour did not come to take on the rural mantle with any preceptions on how it 
might operate so limited was its expectations both in representative and policy terms.  
However this did not mean it could start from a blank sheet of paper.  As with any 
government it acquired policy from its predecessor regime.  From this there was a 
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longstanding understanding that much of rural policy-making was already 
externalised.  Government, in general, had therefore tended to have an arms-length 
relationship with rural policy-making (Phillips 1993, Rogers A 1999).  It took a bold 
move in setting up the Countryside Agency but this also indicative from an early 
stage that New Labour had no confidence in MAFF (interviews with Academic 7 and 
Practitioner 23).  This also recognised that policy and delivery were largely outside of 
the remit of MAFF, and even after the creation of Defra, this stayed the situation.  As 
one practitioner interviewee stated; 
There was a a great deal of ‘policy wind’ within Defra – and even CLG, but to 
get anything done in the countryside you needed the great offices of state, the 
Treasury, Health, Education, the Home Office and DWP on board (interview 
with Practitioner 9).  
In this respect rural policy development had to a large extent always to be 
consensual, externalised, and the lead department always looking to work jointly with 
others.  Defra had neither the influence within government to make things happen, 
let alone the resource to undertake the bigger initiatives (interview with Civil Servant 
4; Defra Select Committee 2008).   
The limited leverage Defra possessed, was illustrated by the struggle it had to get 
other departments to meet their obligations under rural proofing.  This was a fine 
rhetorical device to demonstrate how important rural was to the government but 
devilishly difficult to get other departments and agencies to engage with.   
It was the very powerlessness of Defra that led it to side with Haskins over the 
abolition of the Countryside Agency.  In this regard, it was trying to assert some 
control over policy-making, given so much had been ceded externally, both to the 
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agencies and to the outside world.  That this coincided with a drastic decline in the 
government’s involvement with the countryside reflected the dangers of just 
internalising policy-making, without the means to carry it out effectively.  For all the 
criticism advanced by ministers and others over the performance of the Countryside 
Agency, its replacement by a rural organisation shorn of  power and influence, an 
integrated agency that was biased in favour of landscape conservation, and a 
Department which had neither the means nor the inclination to provide a resonance 
with the countryside, was hardly a great success.   
In this way it appeared that it was less important where policy was made, rather it 
was a question of what resource had been given to pursue those policies, and the 
status afforded to those in charge of delivering it.  As one civil servant interviewee 
concluded; 
The problem was that the abolition of the Countryside Agency coincided with 
cuts to the Defra rural team and budget.  Alun Michael, who had started as a 
centraliser, had learned that you got more done by delegating responsibility 
and monies.  His difficulty was that he was saddled with handling the hunting 
brief alongside rural, so couldn’t spend as much time on the countryside as he 
would have liked .  By the time he was moved, we had a ‘bugger’s muddle’ of 
a directorate, with a great deal of bickering with the RDAs.  The government’s 
strategy, let alone its tactics were wrong, not helped by the crises which 
always seemed to follow this part of government around.  Too much time was 
spent on institutional changes and senseless initiatives.  New Labour missed 
a golden opportunity to do something big on rural (interview with Civil Servant 
6). 
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It was therefore the withdrawal of resources from rural that did more than anything 
else to harm New Labour’s reputation in the countryside and as the analysis of 
research question Five highlights, the temporal and spatial limitations on how New 
Labour performed confirmed that what had started so brightly, deteriorated into 
something with no legacy worth defending. 
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Chapter 7 – Modernisation in rural policy 
New Labour was created to demonstrate that the Labour Party had changed and 
was now a ‘modern’, forward-looking organisation that would be a modernising 
influence on politics, government, society and even internationally.  From the outset 
of his leadership, Blair skilfully employed the language, textuality, metaphor and 
terminology of modernisation in his speeches, policy documents, and media 
appearances (Blair 1996).  The 1997 manifesto referred to the word ‘modern’ 25 
times (Labour Party 1997) and was replete with a narrative that was dominated by 
the management of change in the context of a fast-altering world demonstrating how 
far the Party had departed from the traditional stance of Labour (Savola 2006, Shaw 
2009).   
This chapter critically evaluates the role modernisation played in determining New 
Labour’s rural policy and how temporal and spatial events helped shaped those 
policies and politics in the context of the modernisation discourse.  The chapter 
explores research questions Four, and Five, to assess how influential the mantra of 
modernisation was in the context of the countryside, and how this was affected by 
time and events over the thirteen years of government.  It also probes whether 
modernisation in the countryside had a particular flavour, which was different from 
elsewhere, and if this modified the way in which policy was made and implemented. 
The analysis starts in Section 7.1 with a discussion of why the New Labour Project 
was so bound up with the notion of modernisation and how this impacted upon the 
governance of rural areas, especially on the remaining role for the state there.  
Section 7.2 then investigates whether the pursuit of modernisation by New Labour 
changed the dynamics associated with conflict in rural communities.  The following 
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section then critically evaluates the successes and failures of New Labour’s 
modernisation in the countryside and Section 7.4 synthesises the arguments to 
ascertain how important modernisation was to the operation and performance of 
New Labour in rural areas.  It addresses whether the changes made contributed 
much to the wider agenda that the government was progressing and also reflects 
upon the underlying philosophy of New Labour to explore where the reforms sat in 
relation to the social democratic – neoliberal continuum. 
7.1 The antecedents of New Labour’s interest in modernisation, and how did 
this affect the government’s approach to rural areas? 
New Labour’s approach to modernisation 
Blairism required the portrayal of New Labour as being new, exciting and distinct 
from Old Labour.  This required New Labour to use metaphor and symbolism to 
make this shift, evinced by the removal of clause IV and reform of the Labour Party 
(Bevir 2005, Brivati & Heffernan 2000, Fielding 1997, Hay 1999, Panitch & Leys 
2001, Shaw 2002a & 2009, Wring 1998).  In parallel with this came a recognition that 
New Labour had to build confidence that it had changed in terms of economic 
responsibility.   Therefore the Party came to accept economic constraints, such as 
the self-imposed two year moratorium on additional spending and keeping to the 
Major government’s financial commitments (Glyn & Wood 2001, Hay 2004a&b).  
Modernisation in relation to rural policy under New Labour was conspicuous by its 
absence.  There was a marked reluctance to say anything about the countryside, 
and an unwillingness to engage with rural politics both with Blair and his 
predecessors (Gilg 2003).  In comparison to previous Labour administrations, New 
Labour’s proposals for the countryside, other than the hunting issue and the right to 
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roam, were mild and unambitious (Griffiths 2007, Pearlman & Pearlman 1996, Shoad 
1987, Tichelar 2002, 2003a&b).  This did not mean that passionate views were not 
held on particular issues.  As one practitioner informed me in interview; 
When the Right to Roam Bill was eventually enacted Barbara Castle threw a 
large party in the House of Lords.  This was to remind everyone how integral 
access to the countryside was to the wider Labour Movement and in memory 
of the Kinder Scout mass trespass in 1932 (interview with Practitioner 39). 
What faced New Labour in 1997, and how did this shape the government’s 
modernising agenda in the countryside? 
With such an overwhelming majority and such strong support across the country 
including rural areas, New Labour had every reason to want to extend its 
modernising agenda into the countryside, despite its previous ambivalence (interview 
with Academic 7; Woods 2006c & 2008a). 
The political construction of rural Britain in 1997 has been described by Woods as; a 
space of resource, dominated by agriculture - even though the country was in a post-
productivist phase; a romantic rural idyll; and a place of inequality and oppression 
(Woods 2008c).  Dealing with these conflicting identidies would inevitably be difficult 
as the rural terrain was contested and differentiated (Cloke 2003, Halfacree 2006, 
Marsden 1995 &1998, Woods 2005 & 2006).  There was the added lacuna that 
much of the narrative and discourse about the countryside was stylised if not 
mythologised (Cloke 1997 & 2003, Hodge & Monk 2004, Yarwood 2005).   
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What changed New Labour’s attitude of indifference and gave it a hunger for reform 
of rural policy?   
The research evidence points to four discernable features.  First, New Labour had no 
alternative but to replace the discredited MAFF, a demise that was accelerated by 
that ministry’s disastrous handling of the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak of 2001 
(interviews with Minister 1 and Civil Servant 7; Aldous 2000, Gerodimos 2004, Scott 
et al 2004, Thompson et al 2002, Ward et al 2004)41.  Second, there was an ongoing 
review of the CAP and this gave New Labour the opportunity to progress new 
funding arrangements for rural through the EU conduit (Shucksmith 2000, interview 
with Academic 1).  Third, Labour had triggered institutional change through its 
regionalist approach, specifically the evolution of Regional Development Agencies 
(Hamin & Marcucci 2008, Ward & Lowe 2002, Willett & Giovannini 2014).  
Dovetailing this with a newly established Countryside Agency would give an 
important signal that rural England was also a site for institutional change and policy 
development (interview with Practitioner 1; Defra Select Committee 2002a).  Fourth, 
paying attention to rural themes would act as a counterweight to the critics of 
modernisation.  Hopefully it would also help bolster the credentials of those 
backbench Labour MPs elected in rural areas (Ward & Lowe 2007b, Ward 2008c) 
and re-inforce New Labour’s one nation drive for public service reform, and 
redefinition of the state (Newman 2001, Parsons 2002, Tomaney 2000). 
The potential for reform and modernisation in the countryside took different forms.  In 
broad terms there were four typologies.  These typologies then framed the policy 
debate; 
                                                          
41
 Ministers and civil servants interviewed who had experience of MAFF were clear that New Labour was 
moving towards replacing MAFF with some form of Rural Ministry. 
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 Modernising service delivery 
 Developing human and social capital 
 Reaching out to disadvantaged groups 
 Invigorating the rural economy 
Modernising service delivery 
Evidence suggests that the provision of public services in rural areas suffered from 
issues associated with accessibility, additional costs through the loss of economies 
of scale, lack of technology, and social and cultural barriers to change (Cloke 1985 & 
2003, Edwards & Woods 2004, Shucksmith & Chapman 1998, Warren 2007, Wiener 
2004).  Though many myths existed about the ability to deliver services to rural 
areas (interview with Academics 6 & 9; Hodge & Monk 2004), there was a general 
presumption that living and working in rural England would involve some sacrifices, 
compared to conurbations.  There was compensation in that some services were 
perceived as better in rural England.  For example the quality of GPs in rural areas 
was regarded as better than in the cities (Asthana & Halliday 2004, Watts et al 
1994). 
New Labour was determined to harness the advantages that information technology 
and the internet permitted, so a programme of fast roll-out of broadband was an 
early priority.  This included rural areas, though the nature and complexities of the 
programmes tended to mean that the countryside lagged behind, further 
accentuating the disparity from urban locations (interview with Practitioners 2 & 25; 
Galloway 2007, Rogers R 1999, Skerratt & Warren 2003, Warren 2007). 
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The invaluable advantage of the application of information technology was in being 
able to update services that had suffered from long-term decline.  The introduction of 
the Horizon system into the postal service offered one such opportunity.  This was 
later combined with the General Government Practitioner initiative42 which notionally 
gave rural areas enhanced access to government services (interview with MP 11). 
Modernisation transcended the public sector to give additional assistance to 
struggling village services such as the shop or the pub.  New Labour by working with 
Virsa, and later the Plunkett Foundation, was able to input additional resources and 
also generate new ways of working, encouraging mutual and social enterprise 
solutions (interview with Practitioners 20 & 40, Moseley 2000, Moseley & Owen 
2008).   
The drive for modernisation also occurred through New Labour’s attempts to update 
parish councils – the Quality Parish Council launch.  This protected New Labour from 
the accusation that it had an agenda to abolish local councils, and in addition gave a 
route into helping modernise planning, housing and transport in rural areas (Gardner 
2008, Gray et al 2006, Lowe & Ward 2001, Rao 2000, Satsangi et al 2010).  As one 
practitioner commented in interview; 
1997 did represent a sea change in the attitude towards parish councils.  The 
government recognised early on that local councils could be a valuable asset 
to help energise local democracy and was keen to work with the National 
Association of Local Councils (NALC - the representative body).  This meant 
real monies coming into the sector, and a desire to delegate powers and 
                                                          
42
 This initiative ran for a number of years in Leicestershire.  It was discontinued and not rolled out 
nationally because of excessive cost and limited take-up. 
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responsibilities…..The government was keen to experiment as part of its 
modernising agenda, especially with regard to the introduction of Quality 
Parish Councils, and it possessed strong advocates for the sector in Michael 
Meacher, Alun Michael, David Miliband and Hazel Blears (interview with 
Practitioner 12). 
As Chapters Five and Six have already described, New Labour’s approach to the 
countryside was contextualised by both temporal and spatial developments.  This 
was especially true of the government’s modernising agenda.  The factors which 
mainly influenced this were Defra’s approach to policy-making, contextualised by its 
relationship with its constituent organisations, the impact of events, the government’s 
wider agenda, and the role of the EU.  Of particular significance was the 
development of the concept of mainstreaming rural.  Figure 7.1 defines how this was 
applied in practice and to what effect.  
Figure 7.1 – Mainstreaming rural defined 
Source: OECD Rural Policy Reviews on England (2011, p111) by kind 
permission of OECD. 
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There were distinct periods when modernising was about expanding the role and 
responsibility of government, and times when it was not.  Between 1999 and 2004 
there was a definite tilt towards a social democratic stance, which characterised the 
uniqueness of this period with the introduction of measures from the Rural White 
Paper, especially rural proofing (See Chapter Five).  Mainstreaming rural, which ran 
in parallel to it, whilst never being as convincing in policy-terms, did still represent an 
attempt to encompass rural within the wider government agenda, including reform of 
public services (Glendinning et al 2003).  The problem was that it was never backed 
with the same resources (interview with Practitioner 29).  The OECD report on 
England pointed to the uniqueness of mainstreaming rural, no other Member State 
having such a policy (2011).  This pointed to the weakness of England in this regard, 
having no embedded history of promoting a strong rural policy.  It spoke to the 
mantra of modernisation rather than the substance, implying inclusiveness and 
collegiality, but in reality making very little difference on the ground in the way that 
rural was perceived (Elton 2011). 
The optimism of 1999 - 2004 was blunted by the Haskins’ Review.  Despite the 
keynote purpose of Haskins’ being to modernise and rationalise the delivery of public 
services in rural England, Modernising Rural Delivery changed the focus of 
modernisation, with greater emphasis being placed upon the market and enterprise.  
Together with the Don Curry Commission (2002), which recommended a radically 
different approach to farming and food chains, government sought to dramatically 
alter the nature of its commitment to rural areas (interview with Practitioner 5; Ward 
& Lowe 2007a).  Figure 7.2 shows the integral relationship between the influences 
on service delivery – these were increasingly centrifugal after 2004.   
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One further element was that key facilities were increasingly centred on the cities or 
large towns and this further deprived villages of development opportunities that were 
needed (Bovaird 2007, Diamond et al 2010, Ward & Brown 2009).   
Figure 7.2 – Modernising Service Delivery 
 
Source: Author 
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Developing human and social capital 
New Labour came into power as disciples of two prevailing philosophies, the third 
way and the stakeholder economy (Giddens 1998, 2000 & 2002, Hutton 1995 & 
1997), and communitarianism (Bevir 2005, Driver & Martell 1997, Etzioni 1993 & 
1998, Hale 2006, Levitas 2000).  Of these, the belief in strong communities and 
vibrant neighbourhoods advanced by Etzioni’s version of communitarianism was 
particularly relevant to rural communities, where the sense of community remained a 
vital part of the fabric of village life (interview with Academic 7; Fyfe 2005, Rose 
2000).  Though New Labour’s overt commitment to both the third way and 
communitarianism waned after the first term, the core philosophies were in evidence 
in many of its policy initiatives (Jordan 2010, Mouzelis 2001). 
Ruralities stood to gain where they tapped into this ideology, utilising the 
opportunities to enhance community development and energise actor participation, 
through careful asset deployment.  Examples in action could be seen through the 
evolution of the parish planning process (interview with Practitioners 2 & 21; Bishop 
2010, Owen 2002, Owen & Moseley 2003), taking responsibility for transport and 
housing initiatives within villages (Clark et al 2007, Gardner 2008, Lowe & Ward 
2001, Satsangi et al 2010), as well as more discrete occurrences such as Millennium 
Greens (Curry 2000 & 2001).  Rural communities also took advantage of the national 
roll-out of programmes to completely modernise facilities – an example would be 
SureStart which aimed to revolutionise pre-school activities across rural as well as 
urban England (interview with Practitioner 8; Barnes 2007, Garbers et al 2006, 
Gustafsson & Driver 2005).  Likewise rural communities were able to get the benefit 
of major capital spending programmes – the Decent Homes Standards which was 
committed to renovating and modernising existing council housing stocks was 
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illustrative of this, a far cry from the previous Conservative government’s attitude 
(interview with Practitioner 46; Hills 2007).  As was commented to me by one 
interviewee; 
The Labour government was potentially a boon for local authority housing, 
and there were also plenty of grants for councils to work with social landlords 
to boost the level and quality of social housing for rent. The problem was that 
this still just touched the surface as there was a huge backlog and we were 
never able to satisfy demand (interview with Practitioner 46). 
In addition the Rural White Paper (2000) catalysed community involvement with 
extra resources being targeted to the countryside, especially poorer communities.  
This was made manifest by the work of the Countryside Agency, and later the 
Commission for Rural Communities, which were given a steer by government to 
intervene through initiatives like Vital Villages and Rural Renaissance (interview with 
Practitioners 26 & 29, Academic 7; Allmendinger 2011, Caffyn 2004, Clark et al 
2007, Lowe & Ward 2007, Pearce et al 2005).  This spawned numerous examples of 
exciting opportunities for rural communities, and encouraged those villages to think 
laterally about future development.  As one practitioner stated in interview; 
Vital Villages was a really good story – how to empower rural 
communities.....This linked service renewal to appropriate housing 
developments, to parish planning – to get ruralities to plan their own future.  If 
done properly it put value into the use of space and local home provision.  
Village appraisals, parish mapping, village design statements and parish 
plans were moved onto a more strategic level.  The money that government 
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donated to kick-start this process was real value for money (interview with 
Practitioner 29). 
Even the National Lottery was suborned, making available monies for the renovation 
of village halls, and other key community features.  The Quirk Report (2007) gave a 
fillip for the reuse of community assets, and started the interest in asset-based 
community-development (interview with MP 1).  There was also a place for rural 
communities within the Local Agenda 21 and Transition Towns process, which 
sought to link community empowerment with environmental and climate change 
requirements (Defra Select Committee 2007a, Hopkins 2010, Marsden 2009, 
Seyfang & Haxeltine 2012, Wild & Marshall 1999).  Figure 7.3 exemplifies this. 
Figure 7.3 – Developing human and social capital 
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Crucial to the prioritising of community development initiatives was the ability to 
substantiate this by the application of an evidence-base.  In terms of the justification 
for the employment of community development models, a wealth of evidence was 
collected, interpreted, and utilised in various service sectors and used with 
categories such as infrastructure development, competition and collaboration, job 
creation and education and training.  The pursuit of good practice which could be 
mirrored elsewhere was a consistent aim of the work of both the Countryside 
Agency, and government directly (Derounian 2006).  As one practitioner said in 
interview; 
All the evidence points to the successful implementation of initiatives being 
the result of voluntary effort being underpinned by state support – the 
arguments of Philip Blond – to do this required a good evidence base.  1997 
was a huge paradigm shift in terms of active citizenship/community 
engagement. The government realised that you couldn’t just leave it to the 
locals – there was a need for outside help (interview with Practitioner 2)43. 
Reaching out to Disadvantaged Groups 
The Labour Party was created to fight for social justice, fairness and equality.  The 
Party’s very being consisted of a willingness to intervene on behalf of disadvantaged 
individuals and groups, and successive Labour governments sought to meet those 
objectives (Shaw 2002a).   
New Labour was different to Old Labour in being more attuned to market solutions to 
problems, which demoted traditional social, if not the socialist aims of the Labour 
                                                          
43
 Philip Blond wrote the book ‘Red Tory: How left and right have broken Britain and how we can fix it’ 
(2010). 
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Party.  Notwithstanding this change in emphasis, New Labour did support extensive 
programmes of support for less well-off individuals, families and groups.  National 
programmes and legislative reform were as important in rural areas as in the rest of 
the country and substantial benefit was obtained by the introduction of the national 
minimum wage, tax credits and higher public spending on education and health in 
Figure 7.4 – Reaching out to Disadvantaged Groups 
Source: Author 
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particular (interview with Academic 7, MPs 3 & 4; Cartmel & Furlong 2000, Dolton et 
al 2010, Glasmeier et al 2008, Haynes & Gale 2000, Hills & Stewart 2005). 
Targeted assistance also had an impact upon the countryside.  Help to overcome 
homelessness, long-term unemployment, and poor housing was made available to 
individuals in rural England, as it was elsewhere.  This included financial aid to rural 
foyers44 (Beer et al 2005, Bevan 2000, Lovatt et al 2006), help-to-work schemes 
such as Project Jumpstart45 (Shucksmith 2004, Storey & Brannen 2000), and making 
rural social housing eligible for grants to improve the stock under the Decent Homes 
Standard.  This is categorised in Figure 7.4 above. 
New Labour also chose to protect vulnerable groups – particularly between 1999 and 
2004.  For instance the embargo on the closing of village schools was introduced 
directly at the instigation of the Rural Group to help deal with the accusation that the 
government was more interested in closing public services than protecting them.  
This rarely received much prominence, and when it did the credit was as likely to go 
to the local council, even though it was the government that had promoted this 
policy. 
As one minister said to me; 
On schools and health we got very little recognition; for example the embargo 
on not closing village facilities.  This seemed to spook the government, and 
meant that we couldn’t get the minimum standards debate across to even our 
                                                          
44
 This was an idea adapted from France whereby homeless young people could be housed 
communally and given support, advice and protection.  Foyers were a working and educational 
environment as well as a place to live to upskill individuals and bring their qualifications up to an 
acceptable standard. 
45
 Project Jumpstart allowed unemployed young people who lived in remote rural areas to borrow a 
moped to get to work or training opportunities. 
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own supporters in rural communities.  Therefore we experimented less and 
failed to develop ideas such as hub and spokes, which would have 
encouraged greater cooperation and mutual self-help.  Altogether very, 
disappointing and it made a rural advocate like myself incapable of really 
getting the rural message into the heart of government (interview with Minister 
4). 
In this way New Labour acted social democratically with direct government 
intervention, recognising the state’s responsibilities.  The majority of these schemes 
reached their apogee during the years 1999 – 2004, under the watchful eye of the 
Countryside Agency, after which resources became scarcer and involvement 
declined.  Whilst not fulfilling any real transfer of power New Labour did embark upon 
a campaign for greater intervention to face down social ills through increased public 
expenditure in rural communities.   
As one interested practitioner recalled to me; 
Project Jumpstart was a brilliant idea.  It was lateral thinking recognising two 
of the great problems facing young people in remote rural areas – access to 
transport and work.  By offering this help these people were given a chance.  
The only downside was the temporary nature of the schemes, as the 
managers had regularly to reapply for the monies (interview with Practitioner 
7). 
Invigorating the rural economy 
Given that the PIU Report was entitled ‘Rural Economies’ (1999) and that economic 
regeneration featured widely in both the Rural White Paper (2000) and the Rural 
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Strategy (2004a) this aspect of the reform agenda would seem to be paramount.  Yet 
as Chapters Five and Six have argued the economic standpoint was always of 
secondary importance until 2004, after which the government became less 
interested in social democratic intervention, and more inclined towards market-based 
solutions to rural issues. Key features of the economic approach were upskilling the 
rural workforce, improving rural productivity, and growing the numbers of jobs and 
businesses.  There was recognition that some parts of the rural economy lagged 
behind, highlighted in PSA4 (Defra Rural Division 2007). The contributing factors are 
highlighted in Figure 7.5.  They were tackling the supply-side features, looking for 
innovation and targeted help, overcoming the specific difficulties faced by ruralities, 
and facing up to the productivity problem, particularly in lagging districts (CURDS 
2003). 
Central to the economic dimension was the role of market towns, developed as 
service hubs, as locations for housing development, and as resource-centres for the 
rural hinterlands around, becoming the springboard for enterprise and innovation.  
Accordingly there were many initiatives which were focused upon market towns, and 
money became available to stimulate growth.  The overall aim, as the Taylor 
Commission (2008) identified, was to maintain employment in rural towns and 
villages, to give incentives for appropriate housing and jobs, and to help create 
vibrant communities by ensuring that infrastructure and facilities were installed as 
part of wider economic improvements.   
New Labour therefore followed in the footsteps of previous administrations, including 
Labour ones (interview with Practitioner 27 and Minister 2), which had invested 
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heavily in programmes such as CoSIRA46, which re-located businesses and jobs to 
rural settlements, and tried to re-balance the overall economy by making sure that 
remote locations did not lose out (Rogers A 1999).   
Figure 7.5 – Invigorating the Rural Economy 
Source: Author 
What marked the New Labour era out as being somewhat different from predecessor 
administrations was the scale of the changes planned in the economic field, the 
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 CoSIRA originated through the Development Commission (merged to form the RDC) and had the aim of 
encouraging the development of small scale industrial estates in rural areas to reduce unemployment there. 
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reliance upon advances in technology, and the particular focus upon productivity.  
This was the basis of New Labour’s economic modernisation. 
Structural and methodological reform of the state and public services in rural areas 
New Labour was committed to modernising the British state and had very clear ideas 
on how this should be completed.  Already advocates of New Public Management by 
the time it reached office, the government wished to widen and deepen its 
application (Driver & Martell 2006, Flynn 2001, Lane 2000, Newman 2000 & 2001).  
This led to an increase, rather than a diminution, in the amount of privatisation, 
externalisation, outsourcing, contractualisation, and flexibilisation of public service 
provision.  Combining national service standards with whatever methodology best 
delivered efficient allocation of resources and maximised consumer satisfaction, New 
Labour put in motion policy frameworks that were different from that which might 
have been expected from a more traditional Labour administration (Cutler & Waine 
2000, Foley & Martin 2000, Newman 2001).   
Rural England was much less subjected to this agenda and the impact of 
marketisation and managerialism was often difficult to discern.  Where it was present 
there was often heavy criticism of the manner of its operation and its unsuitability for 
rural areas (interviews with Academics 4 & 7, Practitioners 18 & 19; Ackroyd et al 
2007, Broadbent & Laughlin 2001, Kilkauer 2013).  The greatest impact upon rural 
areas usually occurred when a part of the countryside, contiguous with an urban 
centre, was included within an action zone or neighbourhood renewal area.  Rarely 
was any attempt made to differentiate the elements of rural from the wider 
programmes and ideas such as new public management were seen as helpful in 
dealing with the perceived problems of the countryside (Ahmed & Broussine 2003, 
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Fergusson, 2000, Foley & Martin 2000, Perkins et al 2010, Pollitt, 2007 Power & 
Gewirtz 2001, Tunstall & Lupton 2003).   
The only real benefit for rural areas came in the enhanced opportunities for the 
voluntary sector as an alternative to state-centred models (Clark et al 2007, Foley & 
Martin 2000, Osborne & McLaughlin 2004).  Partnership working, something that 
became a tenet of the New Labour operation in the countryside meant that additional 
resources were pumped into voluntary sector organisations and this became a vital 
tool for the delivery of policy (Clark 2004, Edwards et al 2000 & 2001, Shucksmith 
2010).  As one practitioner highlighted in an interview with reference to the 
introduction of the right to roam legislation: 
Partnership working became a crucial way in which we were able to 
implement this major piece of complicated legislation on the ground.  This 
allowed us to draw in expertise, which we simply did not have in the Rights of 
Way Department of the County Council, and meant that we could play divide 
and rule with those opposed to its inception (interview with Practitioner 41). 
More important to rural areas than structural changes were methodological ones.  
New Labour looked a much more participative form of democracy emphasising 
partnerships and networks rather than imposed solutions and hierarchies (Newman, 
2001).  This was sometimes fiercely contradicted by the drive towards greater 
concentration of decision-making to encourage better delivery (interviews with 
Practitioners 7, 10 & 12; Clark et al 2007, Jones 2000, Ray 2006, Smith 2002).  
However the reliance upon consensus frequently resulted in dispute and delay in the 
implementation of programmes (Curry 2009). Community-centred affordable rural 
housing developments often fell victim to this (Satsangi et al 2010). 
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Double devolution47, pioneered by David Miliband when he was both at CLG and 
Defra gave a boost to this direction of travel, specifically through its appliance to rural 
(interview with Academic 7; Davies 2008, Hilder 2006, Jones & Stewart, 2006 
Miliband 2006, Pearce et al 2005).  Sadly neither Miliband nor these ideas stood the 
test of time, and there were other challenges that negated these ideas. 
7.2 The contesting of New Labour’s application of modernisation to the 
countryside – who by and to what effect? 
The notion of the contested countryside was discussed at length in Chapter Two.  
That analysis allows a proper understanding of the differentiated nature of rural 
areas, highlighting the conflict over geography, physical and human boundaries, 
culture, social class, environmental concerns, and attitudes towards urbanisation. It 
also explains why 1997 was such a paradigm shift, more so than even 1945, as New 
Labour now had a substantial stake in rural constituencies (Ward 2002, Woods 2002 
& 2008a) and dominance of the public sphere (Johnson 2007, MacLeavy 2007, 
Marinetto 2003a). 
Winning rural seats was not the same thing as being able to represent and govern in 
those areas successfully.  Much depended on the policies, activities, programmes 
and initiatives that New Labour proposed for the countryside.  From the research 
evidence those who confronted New Labour had three different characteristics.  
They were: 
 Traditional opponents of Labour, both political enemies and those in social 
movements such as supporters of hunting 
                                                          
47
 Double devolution was based upon the notion of central government devolving to local government, 
which in turn would give more resources, power and authority to communities. 
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 Those who were against New Labour on one specific issue, though that 
opposition could become more general – for example those opposed to 
house-building in the countryside 
 Those who had been generally supportive of New Labour, and may even 
have voted for its candidates, but who turned against the party because of 
policy or political changes, or different economic circumstances.   
These groups are shown in the Figure 7.6 below. 
Figure 7.6 – Opponents of New Labour in the Countryside 
 
Source: Author 
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the task that faced New Labour was heightened, as over the closure of village post 
offices and the proposed privatisation of the Royal Mail (Langford & Higgs 2010, 
O’Reilly & Webber 2007). 
Traditional opponents 
New Labour was under no illusion during its time in power that it would face outright 
opposition from some who lived, worked and played in the countryside.  Despite New 
Labour winning so many rural seats, Conservatives were still in the ascendency in 
most parts of rural England, particularly the more remote and agriculturally-inclined 
countryside (Dewdney 1997a&b – see Appendix 1). 
Unsurprisingly the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats, 
mounted attacks on the government on the basis that it was dominated by urban 
interests with little regard for the rural way of life.  During the first two administrations 
there were frequent debates called by the Opposition on farming and rural life which 
aimed to destabilise the work of the government and undermine the credentials of 
rural Labour MPs.  This was to be expected and was largely dealt with easily by the 
government (Woods 2008b).   
More pressing and difficult to handle was the impact of the various social movements 
centred around the hunting ban and how those different groups, who vehemently 
opposed new Labour, were able to coalesce around certain issues and shared 
values (Anderson A 2006, George 1999, Lusoli & Ward 2006, Milbourne 2003a, 
Reed 2004, Wallwork & Dixon 2004, Woods 2003, 2004, 2008b & 2010). 
For those opposed to New Labour the modernising agenda was symbolically and 
symptomatically contrived as an attack on all those values traditionalists stood for 
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and, more importantly, was seen as undermining the very fabric of English rural life.  
Both in terms of New Labour’s language and its actions the threat of what the 
government planned for the countryside was ascribed to motives such as revenge, 
complete misunderstanding of rural life, and contempt for all those who were outside 
of urban centres.  Woods (2008b) in his chapter on whether the hunting ban was a 
success points to these lines of attack.  Therefore the very idea of modernisation 
became associated with all that was wrong with an urban Labour Party, New Labour 
or otherwise.  As well as collective action, attention was also focused on individual 
Labour MPs representing rural areas that led to attempts to unseat those MPs, 
though this met with mixed success.48 
Eventually the hunt ban was implemented, though this process had been greatly 
delayed and taken many hours of Parliamentary time to enact.  More than one 
minister and MP ruefully commented that this time could have been better spent.  As 
one minister said to me; 
The hunting ban did enormous damage to Defra’s credibility in the countryside.  
The Home Office dumped this responsibility on Defra, and Alun Michael in 
particular.  This should not have happened – the ban should have been 
introduced more quickly and earlier.  We let opposition build when we should 
have grasped the nettle.  The problem was that Defra then lost its slot for other 
changes that needed legislative time – all very counterproductive (interview with 
Minister 2). 
                                                          
48
 Bradley attributed a strong reason for his defeat in 2005, to the work of Vote OK, and hunt 
supporters, because of his strong stance on the hunting issue (interview). 
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The modernising agenda would never appeal to countryside traditionalists and 
forthright opposition to New Labour was to be expected.  However the government 
did not handle the hunting ban well and its tactics allowed opponents to spin out the 
legislative process, and gain traction, which might have been prevented if a more 
speedy resolution had occurred (Woods 2008b).  Much of this was due to Blair’s own 
equivocation (2010, interview with MP 7).  This stymied other attempts to modernise 
the countryside and side-lined rural matters.   
Issue-based opposition 
New Labour’s skeletal programme for the countryside in 1997 was given more flesh 
as time passed.  However as that programme developed and the countryside 
became worthy of greater government attention so did the possibility of conflict over 
certain policies and their delivery. 
One of the most contentious policy areas was housing in rural areas and especially 
the drive substantially to raise the number of houses built.  Prescott’s plan to push 
for an additional 4.4m homes over two decades energised counter-urbanisation 
elements in the countryside (Balchin & Rhoden 2002, Lund 2002, Mullins & Murie 
2006, Satsangi et al 2010, Simpkins 2005).  Rural Labour MPs found this a very 
difficult issue to deal with (interview with MP 2).  On the one hand there was a strong 
argument for more affordable homes in the countryside, but finding locations led to 
conflict (Best & Shucksmith 2006, Goodman 2006, Taylor 2008).  As one MP said in 
interview; 
Housing ended up as a poor issue for us.  I was a big campaigner for park homes 
reform but the government did not want to listen.  I could persuade people and 
groups of the need for more housing – especially affordable housing – in parts of 
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the constituency, and the need for housing repair in the rented sector was 
paramount.  People were being driven out of their own villages.  However there 
was little joined-up government policy, and we seemed to seek out unnecessary 
confrontation (interview with MP 6).   
Similar conflicts arose over other issues such the right to roam where the 
government got stuck between those who wanted much more land to walk on, 
and landowners who wishes to limit access (Curry 2005, Parker & Ravenscroft 
2001).  This did result in considerable delay in the introduction of the coastal path 
access (Defra 2009c).   
Modernising public services in rural areas played for high stakes.  Whilst rarely at 
the front end of reform, changes to education, health, and employment support in 
the countryside often caused a dramatic reaction.  Many MPs and ministers 
interviewed referred to having to face down large protests over reforms to 
schooling, hospitals, and even loss of job centres.  The problem was that unlike 
in urban settings MPs in rural areas often had to stand alone against these 
protests, or seek to accommodate the wishes of protestors and then run counter 
to government policy.  Neither made for an easy life and often was damaging 
electorally as issues became toxic (interviews with MPs 2 & 10, Practitioner 42;  
Allen 2009, Brown 2003, Hall 2003, Mays & Dixon 2011, Mays & Tan 2012, 
Newman 2002, Paton 2008, Ritchie L & Robinson 1998).  As one practitioner 
interviewee argued; 
Health brought out the insensitivity of New Labour to rural needs.  There was 
little understanding of the value of community hospitals and what they meant 
to those communities.  At least I was able, with others, to stop the onset of 
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Polyclinics in the countryside, after talking to Lord Darzi.  This would have led 
to a raft of further closures of those hospitals, with little benefit to rural areas 
(interview with Practitioner 9). 
Policy U-turns, mistakes and opposition groups 
The third grouping which grew disenchanted with New Labour arose because of 
disagreement with a policy or opposition to arguments over the performance of New 
Labour in rural communities as shown in Figure 7.7.  Inevitably all governments 
make mistakes and policies can go awry, partly self-inflicted, but also due to the 
natural turn of events.  Such was the plight of New Labour in the countryside.   
The confrontations over maintaining the rural postal network has demonstrated that.  
Allied to unpopular closure programmes the lack of progress on devising a viable 
business model for rural post offices encouraging them to take on greater financial 
responsibilities reflected doubts about the network as a whole (interviews with 
Practitioners 17 & 43; Midgley 2005, Pollitt 2002, Shucksmith 2003, Wilson 2006).  
However it also demonstrated an unwillingness to confront other financial players, 
especially the banks.  As one practitioner in interview argued; 
The loss of Post Offices in rural areas meant that the community hub idea was 
stillborn.  Sadly this showed a lack of concern by ministers – when there was 
evidence of demand for services and a willingness of the Post Office nationally to 
spearhead this as a way of modernising the role of post offices.  It displayed the 
timidity of New Labour when faced with the intransigence of the banks who didn’t 
want post offices as competitors, even though many of the customers concerned 
did not, would not, or could not, be catered for by banks (interview with 
Practitioner 31). 
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Figure 7.7 – Groups which turned against New Labour on Specific Issues 
Source: Author 
The removal of resources for the many and varied initiatives that the Countryside 
Agency pioneered led to annoyance, distrust and dismay (Lowe & Ward 2007, Ward 
2012).  Councils, who had used the funding to invest in minibuses and other 
community vehicles, were left high and dry when the revenue support was 
withdrawn.  Service users felt similarly let down.  In Stroud, the Village Link project 
(which was an interactive bus service whereby rural residents could pre-book a place 
on a community service vehicle which would take them to a mainline bus route) was 
peremptorily withdrawn, with resultant anger being totally explicable.  Such tales 
were commonplace amongst MPs and trying to defend the policy vacuum that 
followed was impossible. 
The Quality Parish Council scheme previously mentioned was evidence of a 
modernising brush that swept in new attitudes and opportunities.  Whilst supported 
at national level by NALC and the Society of Local Council Clerks, this manifestation 
did not always translate to the grass roots of parish councils (Lowe & Ward 2001, 
Pearce & Ellwood 2002, Pratchett 1999, Skelcher 2003).  The main reason was that 
Housing - campaigners opposed building in the countryside 
Service loss - opposition to any closure of village services 
Fear of dicatatorship from the centre - reform of Parish Councils 
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the bar set for councils to achieve quality status was too high in terms of training, 
auditing, and democratic49 requirements, which was beyond many councils’ 
capability and seen as an imposition.  A later move to compel councils to introduce a 
statutory code of conduct before local councillors could take office compounded the 
sense that New Labour did not understand the voluntary nature of such bodies and 
used modernisation as a fig leaf for greater control of councils. 
The common theme in this category of opposition to New Labour’s modernisation 
was its pragmatic rather than ideological nature.  Much of it resulted from 
expectations being dashed, policies being peremptorily altered, or funding 
withdrawn. The consequence may not have mattered in the individual case but 
collectively it led to the accusation of an uncaring government out of touch with the 
countryside and possessing of dubious competence (interview with Labour Activists 
3).  
7.3 The successes and failures of New Labour’s modernisation, in rural areas 
What were New Labour’s successes? 
New Labour’s rural agenda was not easily presentable as a modernising one.  
Nevertheless within the interstices of the various programmes, policies and projects 
it was possible to interpret two clear achievements of New Labour’s rural demarche.  
These were the benefits of novelty in how New Labour approached rural policy-
making, and political activity, and secondly, the advantages of having created a new 
basis for structure and agency in the countryside. 
                                                          
49
 The aim was for Parish Councils to be made up fully of elected representatives rather than through 
co-opting when vacancies arose.  However getting people to stand for office was a perennial problem 
and a costly one for the Councils themselves. 
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The benefits of novelty  
New Labour came to power with few ideas on how to approach rural policy, and little 
apparent interest in the countryside.  The government’s programme was predicated 
upon the premise that it was elected to modernise the British state (Driver & Martell 
2006, Finlayson 2003, Hindmoor 2004).  Alongside the recognition of the value of the 
market to catalyse change in the public sector, New Labour was prepared to 
experiment with management styles which encouraged different attitudes towards 
government.  Rather than devise its own methodological practices, New Labour saw 
the advantage of new styles of public management (Boyne et al 2001, Cutler & 
Waine 2000, Ferlie et al 1996, Lane 2000, Siltala 2013)  
After the two year moratorium on increased public spending lapsed New Labour was 
able to develop an interest in rural policy with fewer inhibitions.  Driven by events, 
principally the need for a response to the opposition exploitation of the hunting ban, 
and the incipient crises that regularly seemed to afflict the countryside, (first BSE, 
then, FMD), New Labour had to set about a comprehensive reform of rural policy 
through the Rural White Paper (Donaldson et al 2006, Greer 2003, Jasonoff 1997). 
First and foremost, for the period 1999 – 2004 New Labour seemed only too willing 
to act as a traditional social democratic government in the countryside.  The answer 
to the identified problems was intervention through government and increased public 
spending.  This included invigorating the welfare state in rural areas, albeit in tandem 
with a modernisation of public services (Lavalette & Mooney 1999, Lister 2001, 
Mooney & Law 2007).  Yet the background to New Labour’s new-found enthusiasm 
for the rural was more nuanced and novel than was initially recognised. 
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For instance the creation of the Countryside Agency not only acted as the stimulus 
for a raft of initiatives in the field of social engagement but also triggered interest in 
landscape, biodiversity, and protection of the natural environment.  The height of 
these endeavours was the designation of the two new National Parks.   
The government’s willingness to take on unpopular causes such as rural 
homelessness and poverty during this period reinforced the view that New Labour 
had found a purpose – one that it was happy to pursue in parallel with its urban 
programme.  Its support of reforms to councils, to new forms of governance, and 
new ways of working, further accelerated the notion that New Labour was genuinely 
going to govern for the whole country including the countryside, even if this meant 
taking on opponents (Faucher-King & Le Gales 2010).  It was also about 
consolidating the position of rural Labour MPs, who found themselves in the novel 
situation of being welcomed rather than shunned by rural communities – especially 
on the back of agreed improvements to countryside facilities.  As Bradley said to me; 
The 2001 general election proved two things.  That the countryside was not off-
limits to Labour MPs and that those MPs were in touch with their rural 
communities after years of being ignored by other Parties (interview with 
Bradley). 
New Structure and Agency 
The countryside had long been associated with hierarchical systems of operation.  
MAFF, which notionally at least was the rural ministry, functioned as a command and 
control organisation since its inception in the late nineteenth century (interview with 
Academic 8; Self & Storing 1962).  Other facets of rural, diffused as they were 
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amongst many ministries, and other parts of government, tended to have policy and 
its implementation dictated to it. 
With the formation of the Countryside Agency there was an attempt made radically to 
reform traditional structures and look to bring in new agents in order to facilitate 
different modes of performance.  The idea was to create new networks, similar to 
what was being tried in urban settings, to encourage greater participation and active 
citizenship (Barnes et al 2004, Bevir 2005, Clarence & Painter 1998, Marsden & 
Murdoch 1998, Murdoch 2000).  In this way popular themes of community, 
governance and neighbourhood were tied together by networks, and this 
transcended into rural regeneration (Osborne et al 2004).  Localism, rather than 
being at odds with globalisation, could exist alongside it (Cerny & Evans 2004, 
L’Hote 2010, Watson & Hay 2003). 
What was different about rural was that many networks already existed, albeit 
informally using the vehicle of voluntarism rather than reliance upon market-
solutions.  This built upon the idea of developing partnerships, both within and 
across sectors, and put a heavy emphasis on externalised policy-making, (outside of 
government directly), to maintain New Labour’s partiality for decentralised ways of 
working and joined-up government (Bevir 2005, Clark 2002, Newman 2001).  The 
government’s essential discourse was post-modernist having recognised the discrete 
nature of much of the rural world and the inevitability of lateral decision-making that 
accompanied that, if not challenging centres of power and influence (Ollman 2001). 
In this regard New Labour acted counter-intuitively negating the view of the OECD 
(2011) and others that England was just an urban country.   Instead it sought to use 
new institutions like the Countryside Agency to engender change through a rural lens 
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that pictured a modernised rural economy and society as part of a vibrant modern 
countryside and a competition state (interview with Civil Servant 3; Cerny 1997, 
Cerny & Evans 2000, Hay 2004a). 
The capture of the voluntary sector was crucial to this and became a compact in 
name and purpose (interview with Minister 1; Fyfe 2005, Haugh & Kitson 2007, 
Lewis 2005, Morison 2000, Osborne & McLaughlin 2004, Ross & Osborne 1999).  
This was largely because the government wanted to tread gently so as not to raise 
unnecessary hackles and thus ruled-out wholesale marketisation, but also realpolitik, 
in that there would never be the same market opportunities in the countryside.  This 
appealed, at least to some prominent in the rural voluntary sector.  As one 
practitioner interviewee reflected; 
Recognising the role of Rural Community Councils was brilliant.  It brought the 
voluntary sector right into the middle of rural policy-making, empowering Parish 
Councils and giving volunteers a real boost, making them realise that they could 
run and be responsible for vital rural assets such as the village hall.  The 
difference from what previously existed was that funding possibilities now existed 
(interview with Practitioner 16). 
What were the failings? 
As much as there were some obvious plus points to New Labour’s modernising 
crusade in the countryside, there were, somewhat inevitably and certainly over time, 
a number of critical failures.  These were three fundamental fissures that developed 
as the government’s tenure in office became shakier.  Three were; inconsistencies 
and confusion in policy; rural gradually became a subset of urban-led developments; 
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and pragmatism subsumed by reactive submission to outside influences shown in 
the Figure 7.8 below.   
Figure 7.8 – Three Failings of New Labour’s Rural Policy
Source: Author 
Inconsistencies and confusion in policy 
Much of New Labour’s modernising agenda in rural England suffered from short-
termism, policy about-turns, language enigmas, and inadequacies in commissioning 
and implementation (Pollitt 2007).  The distinct time periods which contextualised the 
New Labour operation in the countryside – were played out against this backcloth. 
From 1999-2004 when there was an impetus behind policy development, the 
Countryside Agency was prominent, and rural had exercised a degree of wider 
traction over government.  Under this guise rural was integrationist, involved active 
advocacy, was better defined, reached out more, and was better governed (Woods 
2008e).  After that, many of the exciting initiatives that had earmarked the 
government’s willingness to engage with rural were truncated and little was put in 
their place.  However, government inconsistencies surfaced even during the 
intensive period of rural involvement.  Of particular importance was the degree to 
Inconsistencies and 
conflusion in policy 
Rural as a subset of 
urban-led development 
Pragmatism subsumed 
by reactive submission 
to outside influences 
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which New Labour was genuinely a decentralising influence or whether there was 
always a tendency to revert to a centralising approach (see Chapter Six: 
Cruickshank 2009, DTLR 2001, Powell 2004, Pratchett 2004, Stoker 2004a&b).  This 
was exemplified by health, postal services and employment policies, which were 
subject to regular alteration by central diktat, a situation made worse by occasional 
over-selling of the true value of what had been accomplished (interview with 
Practitioner 5; Seldon 2007).  New Labour’s tortuous use of language in the missives 
it sent out to rural local authorities often exacerbated these difficulties, being 
unsympathetic to the nature of rural communities. 
Too often those commissioned to oversee and manage change were given 
insufficient support, and not allowed enough time to carry through their duties before 
resources were cut.  This situation caused resentment amongst rural communities 
and a loss of confidence in New Labour’s motives, performance and true 
understanding of the countryside.  It was the illusion rather than the reality of change 
and improvement (interview with Civil Servant 3; Ellison & Ellison 2006, Fenwick & 
Elcock 2004, Geddes et al 2007) 
Ministers were regularly accused of a lack of leadership – not helped by regular 
reshuffling and institutional flux, especially the abolition of the Countryside Agency.  
This consolidated the feeling in the minds of rural communities that the government’s 
grip was failing and its interest waning (interview with Practitioner 2).  This lack of 
leadership was clearly demonstrated in the government’s unwillingness to face up to 
the relevance of social class in the countryside, and the continuing power of rural 
elites (Abram 1998, Hoggart 2007, Phillips 2007, Shucksmith 2012, Woods 1998). 
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Rural modernisation – a subset of urban models 
The second failing was that rural modernisation was too often the result of urban-
inspired thinking rather than being self-standing and self-originated.  The exception 
to this was the social democratic period, but after that and even towards the end of 
2003/4 it became obvious that rural had again become subservient to urban.  This 
meant that policies and strategies were not sufficiently sensitive to rural needs 
(Greener 2004).  As one practitioner associated with a rural SureStart Centre said to 
me; 
We were the only rural centre in phase one in this county.  This meant that the 
bulk of the effort went into the urban areas.  Much of the advice, and the back-up 
materials were written to comply with urban standards, and only partly adapted 
for a rural scenario.  Often we were on our own, and we had to break the back of 
the project work – as there was no one with the knowledge and skills for rolling 
out pre-school provision in the countryside.  This was a pity as SureStart was still 
a brilliant initiative, and with greater planning could have been as important in 
rural as urban areas in time (interview with Practitioner 8). 
This undermined the early benefit obtained from the PIU enquiry ‘Rural Economies’ 
(1999) when rural seemed to have achieved a status under New Labour.  However, 
it was symbolic that the Policy Action Teams, and the Social Exclusion Unit that 
followed the PIU, took almost an entirely urban-focus to their work50 (Johnson & 
Osborne 2003).  What recommendations that did carry across rarely had the feel of 
being rural initiated.  Additionally only a small number of rural communities were able 
                                                          
50
 There were 18 PATs, none of which related to rural.  In terms of membership there was only one 
civil servant from MAFF in the totality of the membership of all the PATs. 
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to gain direct benefit from the modernising penumbra associated with being in an 
action zone or neighbourhood renewal area (Barnes et al 2004, Clarence & Painter 
1998, Foley & Martin 2000, Lister 2001, Painter & Clarence 2001).  Despite rural 
proofing and mainstreaming rural, policy-development was heavily skewed towards 
the cities and conurbations (interview with Academic 5; Atterton 2008, Fahmy et al, 
2004 Lowe & Ward 1998, Rewhorn 2014).  If anything regionalism cemented the 
view that rural reform was dependent upon what happened in urban settings and 
rural was an afterthought.  As one academic in interview lamented; 
Regionalism rather than encouraging decentralism seemed to do the opposite – 
New Labour used it as an opportunity to reassert its control from the centre.  And 
rural became even further from the levers of power (interview with Academic 2). 
From 2004 onwards with the centre having grown in the ascendency, the 
predicament of rural was further aggravated by the loss of confidence in new 
thinking.  Double devolution came and went, and with that ideas which excited those 
who wanted to update and improve rural governance seemed to go too.  Proposals 
that involved social enterprise, mutuality and cooperation which appeared ideally 
suited to parts of rural England were ignored or dispensed with (interview with 
Practitioner 18).  The mood for experimentation had passed and so had the time for 
radical modernisation.  Brown replacing Blair merely heightened the feeling of policy 
and strategy desuetude, and rural communities became more disengaged.  What 
change that did occur gave a greater role to the market and a lesser one to the state.  
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Pragmatism and reactiveness to outside influence 
New Labour prided itself on careful political positioning in order not to alienate itself 
from other centres of power.  Therefore it jealously guarded its relationship with 
business as well as trade unions, individuals and communities.  Likewise it felt it 
could represent an aspirant middle class as well as be the Party for the less well off.  
In this it kept its predilection for the Third Way (see pages 32 – 33). 
What it was not good at was withstanding pressure from organised lobbying, 
particularly by business interests.  This was nothing new – most predecessor 
governments’ agriculture policies had been heavily influenced by the effective 
intercession by the NFU.  What transpired was modernisation that was strongly 
influenced by the activities of certain organisations, and influential individuals (Ball & 
Exley 2010, Schlesinger 2009).  For instance the decision to move to shut small 
cottage hospitals was heavily influenced by lobbying from large urban-centred 
Hospital Trusts.  It was a similar case with the move to an area-based Single Farm 
Payments Scheme, the result of intervention by the Country Landowners and 
Business Association (CLA).  Some interviewees suggested that this was Blair 
acquiescing as a quid pro quo for the upset caused by the hunting ban and the 
introduction of the right to roam (interviews with Ministers 2 & 4 & Practitioner 15; 
Rowe 1998, The Economist 2001 & 2004).  The problem was that the impact that it 
had on rural was either not factored in, or discounted, further marginalising it. 
There was a similar feeling about housing development with a strong opinion 
amongst those rural communities threatened by predatory housing developers that 
the government had bowed to the developer wishes (interview with Labour Activist 
3).  That modernisation required large housing developments was evident, though 
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housing needs in rural areas required more affordable and social housing, rather 
than just more market-driven homes.  Where there was not the same force of lobby, 
over an issue such as rural deprivation, the government was far less forthcoming in 
taking a robust stand. 
The for and against checklist 
There is no easy way of off-setting the accomplishments of New Labour’s reform 
agenda against the failures that occurred.  However, it is possible to recognise that 
modernisation in the countryside was contextualised by both time and spatial 
pressures, that this had a substantial influence on what transpired, and how New 
Labour’s performance was accordingly constrained.  Many of these obstacles 
predated New Labour.  What made the New Labour era that much more difficult to 
assess was the fact that modernisation was seen as synonymous with the purpose 
behind New Labour’s existence and therefore by the end of its time in power there 
should have been tangible signs of what it had achieved in this respect in the 
countryside.   
If this was to be the only yardstick, then New Labour’s period of office in the 
countryside was one of failure.  However this is to deny the successes, minor in the 
main, but nevertheless to the government’s credit, in the fields of child care 
provision, new and better forms of rural governance, and a whole series of initiatives 
in villages and small towns.  The disappointment was that many of those initiatives 
were not sustained or built upon. 
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7.4 To what extent did modernisation have a key part to play in New Labour’s 
approach to policy-making and politics in rural areas and how important was it 
to the government’s bigger picture? 
Modernisation of the rural economy and society was never as important to New 
Labour as in its urban programme, and what changes that occurred were mainly 
concentrated within the period 1999 – 2004.  This was partly because of the different 
priorities of the countryside but also because the government’s modernisation of the 
countryside derived from very disparate motivations.  This was evinced by the limited 
emphases placed upon forging change in rural areas in manifestos, policies, 
programmes and delivery mechanisms and by the suspicion that New Labour 
calculated that it had only to respond to the pressures brought about by hunting and 
FMD, and that once it had seen them off it could re-locate countryside issues into the 
low priority order box (Larsen et al 2006).   
In exploring research question Four the findings suggests that modernisation was a 
far less important as a theme in the countryside than in the country as a whole.  
However, to make this stark assessment is to deny what happened between 1999 
and 2004 when modernisation of the countryside was a live topic and New Labour 
did make considerable inroads into changing the countryside in a direction that it felt 
was appropriate.  The 2000 White Paper and the activities of the Countryside 
Agency at that time highlight what was possible for New Labour to achieve had it the 
will.  That it failed to do so was the result of temporal and spatial circumstances 
bound up in research question Five. 
The problem came from 2004 onwards when New Labour saw little purpose in 
persevering with its interest in the countryside, let alone prioritising a reform agenda 
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there (interview with Academic 1; Ward & Lowe 2007a&b).  To explain why this was 
so says a great deal about New Labour, its objectives, and how it carried them 
through.  In some respects, given that New Labour had chanced upon its interest in 
the rural its turn away from it was not a surprise. 
However this again is to misunderstand what New Labour had achieved and why the 
disappointment of those interested in rural affairs was all the greater.  Having 
believed that new Labour was different, going a long way towards the modernisation 
of the countryside would have been a considerable legacy to leave behind. 
Much of the quandary about why rural was different from the rest of the country, and 
why the period 1999 – 2004 stood out, was that New Labour’s response during that 
period was really social democratic.  The response to the attacks on the government 
due to the unpopularity it faced in parts of the countryside was to be avowedly 
interventionist.  This involved spending money on programmes and projects, working 
with the grain of community empowerment using the rural voluntary sector as 
partners and making adjustments to policy areas such as housing, health, transport, 
governance and service provision that would generate support and enthusiasm for 
its efforts. 
Arguably New Labour’s countryside policy was radical during that period – it was just 
that it did not compare with what was happening elsewhere in the country with the 
rush towards the competition state and the indifference to the further hollowing out of 
the state (Cerny et al 2005, Holliday 2000, Rhodes1994 & 1997, Skelcher 2000).  It 
was unashamedly populist and unlike in urban England the modernism it pursued in 
the countryside was community-driven rather than market-driven (Clarke & Newman 
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2007, Gilbert 2004, Hall (Stephen) 2003).  This did not make it any less novel or 
exciting. 
The problem was that this approach was transitory.  Once Haskins’ had reported and 
Defra had acquired its own dominance over policy-formulation in the newly designed 
Rural Strategy (2004a), then rural policy was subjected to the dominance of urban-
centred solutions, and novelty was abandoned in place of safety-first, cost-effective 
and risk averse schema. 
Other factors combined to make rural less important.  Rather than encouraging a 
greater focus on rural the growth of regionalism and the role of the RDAs made it 
appear as even more marginal in terms of the government’s outcomes (interview 
with Practitioners 1 & 31).  This damaged the potential for experimentation as 
budgets were further squeezed, and there was little enthusiasm for making 
modernising rural areas a key plank in most RDAs’ priorities.  This negated one of 
the central arguments of Haskins’ who had advocated that rural should be an 
important responsibility of RDAs, which he even later admitted was a failing of the 
outcome of his Review (interview with Haskins). 
Therefore it was not just rural policy that took a backward step after 2004, but the 
crucial part that modernising policy in the countryside could play in energising and 
enthusing rural communities.  The direction of travel with the greater emphasis upon 
economic renewal and market-centred solutions was just no substitute for what had 
been sacrificed in drawing back from the period of social democratic intervention.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion – New Labour and its approach to the countryside - 
Was a social democratic moment achieved and foregone? 
8.1 Assessment of the research questions 
This thesis has one core aim that has been explored through five research 
questions.  The aim has been critically to evaluate New Labour’s approach to politics 
and the policy framework in the countryside during its years in power by examination 
of the role of key actors around a hypothesis that investigated some specific themes.  
The thesis has pursued an analysis that there was a social democratic moment 
during the New Labour era and sought to discover why this occurred and why this 
was only a temporary phenomenon.  To re-iterate the five research questions, they 
are; 
1. To what extent did New Labour’s success in the 1997 general election 
translate into a greater interest in rural policy and political development in the 
countryside? 
 
2. How did the reputation of New Labour as an urban construct affect its 
relationship with the countryside, and impact upon the government’s ability to 
undertake rural policy-making and delivery? 
 
3. In terms of New Labour’s strategic approach in what ways did the tension 
between (a) centralisation and decentralisation and (b) externalisation and 
internalisation of power impact upon policy-making and delivery in the 
countryside? 
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4. In what ways did New Labour’s wider strategy of modernisation of the state 
have an impact on rural areas and how important were these themes in rural 
policy and political activity? 
 
5. To what extent was New Labour’s approach to the countryside affected by 
both temporal events and spatial awareness, and how did this affect the 
manner of policy-making and delivery, and the political context within which it 
was operating? 
Section 8.1 summarises the findings about these research questions before 
examining the extent to which those questions have helped explain how New Labour 
functioned in the countryside.  Section 8.2 examines the extent to which the study 
objectives have been met.  The penultimate section, Section 8.3, critically evaluates 
the role of the researcher, given the nature of my embedded position during this 
period of history, and finally, Section 8.4, makes some recommendations of future 
areas for research, which will amplify the understanding of New Labour, its 
relationship to the countryside, and how this links with possible enquiries into 
progressive politics in the context of rural areas. 
Research Question One – To what extent did New Labour’s success in the 1997 
general election translate into a greater interest in rural policy and political 
development in the countryside? 
The research evidence for this question is clear.  New Labour won a great many 
rural seats in 1997, only to lose virtually all of them by 2010, mainly to the 
Conservatives.  The only seats they retained were traditional Labour rural seats, 
such as Bassetlaw, Bishop Auckland, Bolsover, North West Durham and West 
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Lancashire, (largely former mining communities), or some rural-suburban seats such 
as Gedling, or more industrialised rural areas like Chorley.   
This thesis has argued that New Labour had no rural programme worth talking about 
in 1997, and left office in 2010 having left little lasting footprint in rural areas. 
As was commented upon by an MP, and a Labour Activist, in interviews; 
I was a so-called key seat in 1997, as I was in 1992 when I lost.  Though I 
was a rural key seat, you might have thought that this gave me some 
particular characteristics.  The fact was I was treated like every other key 
seat, throughout my candidacies, with no special targeting because I was in a 
rural area (interview with MP 7). 
I was involved in a publication called ‘Reforming Labour’ published in 2001, as 
part of the Labour Reform pressure group.  Part of our rationale was that 
Labour could win in rural seats, if more effort was made, and policies tweaked 
to appeal to rural voters.  Rural areas have the same problems as urban 
Britain, and certainly have its areas of deprivation.  Rural Labour Parties felt 
undervalued and activists were always being told to go and work in the 
nearest key seat.  Because of this our constituency could never build up 
membership, undertake campaigning activities and get representatives 
elected, which was so disappointing.  When we lost office in 2010 we were no 
further forward than we had been in the 1990s.  This was a total lost 
opportunity demonstrating that the national leadership just didn’t get rural 
(interview with Labour Rural Activist 3). 
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Yet this does not tell the whole story of the impact made by New Labour’s increased 
representation, and how that impacted upon rural policy and politics, especially 
between 1999 – 2004. 
In a sense New Labour’s victory in 1997 led accidently to a rural hegemony, such 
was the scale of the landslide in the countryside as elsewhere.  Chapter Four has 
suggested that the number of seats won was exaggerated – indeed Bradley’s claim 
that there were 180 rural seats is now disavowed by Bradley himself – but the 
implications of that rural representation cannot easily be dismissed (interview with 
Bradley).   
Much academic opinion substantiates the importance of the change in rural matters, 
psychologically and culturally, as well as politically and socially (Ward 2008c, Ward & 
Lowe 2007a&b, Woods 2008e).  The wealth of evidence from so many of the 
practitioner respondents that there was a new mood afoot in rural areas even before 
1999 points to the potential paradigm shift that was underway. 
New Labour’s rural policy has been divided up into three distinct periods.  From 1997 
until 1999 when little happened, largely because of the moratorium on increased 
expenditure, from 1999 until 2004, when rural policy was at its height, and from 2004 
onwards when there was a rapid decline. 
Chapter Four identifies two major reasons for New Labour’s volte-face in 1999 from 
comparative disinterest in the countryside to one of active involvement.  First, the 
response was the epitome of a pragmatic reaction to the events of the time, with first 
the hunting debate and then FMD dominating not just the countryside, but national 
politics.  To intervene in the countryside was both a clever way to build opinion and 
hegemony against opponents but also a strategy by government to fill the vacuum 
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left by the demise of the Conservatives.  In addition it was classic Blairism – if a 
problem arose, fix it before it escalated into a full-blown crisis.  Thus Campbell’s 
diaries are replete with descriptions of how New Labour tried to deal with the FMD 
outbreak by throwing resources at it, first, for the containment of the outbreak, and 
second, to overcome the aftermath, by offering (over-generous) compensation 
packages to those affected (Campbell 2011).   
The second reason was that the increased number of Labour backbenchers was 
both a symbolic and practical way in which New Labour could demonstrate its new-
found authority in the countryside.  Chapter Four argues that this was a significant 
departure from Old Labour and though it proved to be transient, for some years it 
was a powerful influence on how New Labour governed in the countryside. 
This influence took a number of different forms: the evolution of legislative, 
institutional, funding and system changes; acting as conduit for dialogue between the 
government and all manner of rural organisations;51 and developing a discourse on 
rural matters in Parliament through debates, questions and committee activity, and 
outside, as a channel for Party opinion on rural.  These links were referred to 
regularly by interviewees as being a major contributor to better mutual 
understanding, and an effective way in which ideas could be progressed.  As one 
practitioner in interview said to me: 
                                                          
51
 This dialogue took on some surprising twists and turns.  Organisations as diverse as the National 
Association of Small Schools, ACRE, for Rural Community Councils, the f40 campaign for the poorest 
funded Education Authorities, all found in rural areas, and the Rural Services Network all had strong 
links with Rural Group Of Labour MPs.  Even more bizarre the Countryside Alliance kept the door 
open to the Rural Group, an arrangement helped by the fact that the majority of members of the 
Alliance’s executive were card-carrying members of the Labour Party, including the Chairman John 
Jackson, and the CEO Richard Burge for most of the early years of the Alliance’s existence. 
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What Labour backbenchers did was to get issues that were so far off the 
beaten track into the government’s agenda, whether that was biodiversity, 
conservation, rural regeneration or countryside planning.  This may not have 
affected the big picture of government but at local level it was of vital 
significance and for the first time asked questions of agri-environmental 
schemes, and the public benefit of the countryside.  This was as much about 
politics as hunting ever was and those who expedited this process should be 
properly credited (interview with Practitioner 32).   
New Labour also did much to develop better understanding of what was meant by 
the term ‘rural’.  Commissioning the research work by Bibby and Shepherd (2004) 
was an important indication of intent that the government would use an evidence-
based approach having first researched the data in order to get a better 
understanding of the rural milieu, to permit drilling-down into what really happened in 
the countryside.  This made the Countryside Agency, and then Defra, a repository for 
detailed knowledge of the rural landscape and gave a comparative advantage when 
it came to dealing with other Departments or third parties. 
The fact that this stage in the development of rural policy was transitory as social 
democratic moment faded after 2004, should not underestimate what was achieved.  
As Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven demonstrate, the nature of policies, the way 
in which they were carried out, and the praise they received in at least part of the 
countryside was an important legacy.  This made it all the more disappointing that 
the turn against ‘rural’ was as dramatic as the original turn itself.  Much criticism has 
been placed at the door of Haskins and his review (Ward 2008a&b), though there 
were other doubts highlighted by interviewees about whether the upswing in rural 
enthusiasm would last.   
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The loss of key proponents for rural matters within government (Michael, Meacher, 
Tipping), and within the Rural Group (Bradley, Kidney, Mountford and Pickthall) all 
contributed to help downgrade rural.  After Alun Michael had been moved there was 
less support for rural than there had been in the dark days of MAFF, where at least 
Cunningham, Rooker and Morley were keen exponents of the need for a proper rural 
strategy (interview with Minister 4).  Of these, the loss of the drive of Michael from 
the post of Rural Affairs Minister was the most damaging development and from his 
departure onwards there was no dominant voice for rural in government (interview 
with Civil Servant 7). 
As much as personalities, structures and institutional change played their part.  It 
was also true that the government just ran out of steam where rural policy was 
concerned and increasingly had less presence to be able to make much difference 
on the ground.  This was partly the nature of what vicissitudes in the countryside 
involved – longer-term consistent policy-making was required when most of New 
Labour’s efforts were initiatives, projects or time-limited experiments.  
Representation could go only part way to covering the cracks in the lack of holistic 
approach and the partial take-up of programmes in places.  This was particularly 
because the monies grew much tighter after 2004, and New Labour had done little to 
really challenge the fundamentals of the countryside.  This was no more clearly 
evinced than by the failures over affordable housing and accessible transport 
(interviews with Practitioners 5, 44 & 45 & interview with Civil Servant 4).  The good-
will created by the activities of Labour backbenchers soon dissipated as a result.    
It was the combination of these factors of lack of clear strategy, declining funding 
streams and fall in activity, allied to the loss of representation, that undermined and 
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eventually defeated the case for intervention in the countryside and left New Labour 
just as hamstrung as previous administrations. 
Research Question Two – How did the reputation of New Labour as an urban 
construct affect its relationship with the countryside, and impact upon the 
government’s ability to undertake rural policy-making and delivery? 
New Labour came into power with little history of interest in rural matters.  More 
particularly its new-found legitimacy in the countryside came on the back of 
politicians who rarely had a background in rural affairs, and whose experiences were 
largely derived from urban experiences as councillors, trade unionists, political 
advisers or community activists.  Even the Rural Group, and especially its 
leadership, was made up of individuals who had cut their political teeth outside of 
rural areas (interview with Bradley).    
Therefore the government had no great rural expertise to call upon, and no pressing 
desire to involve itself with the countryside other than as the recipient of nationally-
driven policies.  Some of these had enormous positive repercussions for the 
countryside, the national minimum wage for example, and the residue for some 
changes that might prove of specific benefit to rural areas, such as the protection of 
the village branch post office network. 
This lack of ambition identified in the 1997 manifesto (See Appendix 3) was partly 
the result of a disconnect with the countryside, and an insouciance about whether 
the countryside really mattered to New Labour, and a much greater expectation of its 
performance in urban centres, let alone the pressures of keeping an urban-
dominated Party on board.  One Parliamentary Candidate said to me; 
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Labour didn’t set out to appeal to rural voters because it saw itself as an 
urban-inclined Party.  Therefore the messages, materials and campaigns 
don’t resonate with rural voters.  The only way to overcome this is both to talk 
and act about issues that really matter in the countryside - affordable housing, 
better transport and green technology bespoke to the countryside (interview 
with Rural Activist 5 who was also a Parliamentary Candidate in rural 
constituencies 2005 & 2010). 
What changed New Labour’s attitude to rural areas was the confluence of events, 
and the realisation of unique opportunities presented to it.  However there was a 
gradual comprehension that urban and rural were not necessarily opposite ends of a 
continuum, but locations that needed, and flourished, from each other.  This was 
explained in the seminal work of Schoon (2001) which encapsulated how the urban-
rural interface was mutually beneficial and has been widely explored by other 
academics (Allen 2003, Cloke 2006, Gallent & Andersson 2007, Harper 1987, 
Masuda & Garvin 2008, McCarthy 2007, Soini et al 2012, Tacoli 1998, Woods 2009).  
It became apposite because of New Labour’s structural reforms including the drive 
towards regionalism (Hall & Stern 2009, Hamin & Marcucci 2008, Horlings & 
Marsden 2014). 
Between 1999 and 2004 the transformation that occurred was both an example of 
New Labour reacting to events and pursuing a pragmatic line on rural issues.  
However the nature of the policy-mix and the evidence from interviewees 
demonstrates that New Labour went much further than might have been expected, if 
this was purely a cynical attempt to fool opponents and build temporary alliances. 
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New Labour, as Chapter Five critically explains, embarked upon a fundamental shift 
in orientation from being driven mainly by urban characteristics to one where rural 
mattered and derived its own field of activity.  This combined institutional radicalism 
in the creation of the Countryside Agency accompanied other institutional and 
service reform in rural areas.  The Rural White Paper (2000) instigated the 
introduction of policies including far-sighted ones such as rural proofing. 
This forced a major reassessment of New Labour from some countryside 
campaigners who had traditionally only seen the Party as bolting on rural to urban.  
As one practitioner averred in conversation with me; 
There was so much that was good that came from the early period following 
the creation of the Countryside Agency.  So many bright ideas were 
encapsulated in the thinking of the time, and the Agency was given an annual 
budget of £100m and many more staff to operate with.  People really wanted 
rural to work, and work in an integrated manner with localised decision-
making and transferable models of good practice.  Being around this was very 
exciting and we seemed to have everyone from the PM downwards on our 
side (interview with Practitioner 31). 
The willingness of the government, Countryside Agency, and others in the employ of 
the state to delve into fields of rural disadvantage including homelessness, 
worklessness, and the difficulties caused by remoteness, was laudable.  Though this 
paralleled what was going on in the urban sphere, most of the work was bespoke 
and drew up different schedules of activity than that prepared for the cities (Bambra 
& Popham 2010, Cloke et al 2001 & 2002, Dwyer & Hardill 2011, Green et al 2013, 
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Milbourne & Cloke 2006, Townsend et al 2013, Webster 2006, Wiggins & Proctor 
2001). 
However rural largely remained a subset of national policies and most rural policies 
were decided not by MAFF/Defra or the Countryside Agency, but by the great 
ministries of state.  Even if there was an element of rural proofing or a specifically 
rural initiative in the form of the Village Agents, rural still had very little traction over 
what was put in place (See Chapter Six). 
This situation worsened considerably after the Haskins’ Review and the introduction 
of the Rural Strategy.  Though Haskins denied that the downgrading of rural was 
ever his intention that was what government read into his report and responded 
accordingly (interview with Haskins).  After Haskins’, social policy lost out to 
economic priorities, the market and business dominated other organisational forms, 
and reform was heavily constrained by financial limitations (Ward & Lowe 2007a&b).  
There was never a discrete change by which urban again subsumed rural, but there 
was a noticeable lack of interest in rural affairs from 2004 onwards with the loss of 
many specifically rural programmes and the ending of tailored-policies from the 
national to the local which took proper account of the rural element. 
Defra, which Haskins’ insisted should be the appropriate policy-making agency 
marginalised rural rather than supported it.  Beckett (Secretary of State for Defra) 
displayed no interest in rural matters, a situation that frustrated her own team, and 
gave a negative signal to civil servants who could hardly advocate the case for rural 
when their own ministry belittled it (interview with Minister 5).  As one person 
disappointedly admitted to me; 
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Whilst it may be wrong to be overly critical of Haskins himself – he was after 
all given a job to do though it was highly questionable whether the problems 
he identified needing fixing in the first place - the result was that rural had by 
2004 run out of time, money and policy-wind.  The Rural Strategy that 
followed was less clear than what had gone before and the diversion of funds 
to the RDAs was just plain wrong.  Local authorities just couldn’t fill the gap 
that was left with the demise of the Countryside Agency, and we were all left 
feeling that we had reached the end of the line (interview with Civil Servant 7). 
Cuts to the civil service rural team that exacerbated the impact of the abolition of the 
Countryside Agency just added to a sense of drift, and the feeling that rural was no 
longer a good place to be (interview with Civil Servant 4).  Any sense of excitement 
about the rural agenda had all but disappeared, and ministers who fulfilled the rural 
affairs responsibility as part of their brief were given little encouragement (interview 
with Bradley). 
At the same time urbanism was reasserting itself as the primary concern of New 
Labour after 2004.  Changes to planning, housing, and infrastructure development 
were heavily weighted in favour of urban.  This took the form of legislative and other 
reforms which heavily skewed government policy in that direction. Also  New Labour 
had become increasingly obsessed with delivery as well as the creation of policy and 
concentrated its efforts on four main areas; crime reduction, improving health 
outcomes, raising educational attainments specifically in schools and trying to sort 
out the traffic congestion.  Each of these saw resources targeted at urban centres 
(Barber 2007).   
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Rural was hit by a pincer movement in that Defra’s priority moved to reform of the 
CAP, partly out of the necessity of the Mid-Term Review but also at the instigation of 
Beckett, who saw this - alongside the climate change agenda - as being her main 
concerns (interview with Minister 5).  Allied to that, the increasing importance of 
regionalism and the enhanced role for the RDAs reduced the influence of rural.  This 
culminated in a massive reduction in the budget for rural policy which alongside the 
loss of the Countryside Agency and its many programmes and initiatives meant that 
the countryside fared badly against the urban domain for the remaining years of New 
Labour’s period in office. 
In summary, New Labour had between 1999 and 2004 established a distinctive rural 
policy which countered the accusation that it was purely an urban-led party and 
government.  However by the second part of the decade the government had 
regressed and no longer had the same interest in rural matters. It had substantially 
cut the budget meaning that its earlier impact on the countryside had been short-
lived and it had little legacy to fall back upon for what might have been one of the 
more substantial achievements of the Blair administration. 
Research Question Three - In terms of New Labour’s strategic approach in what 
ways did the tension between (a) centralisation and decentralisation and (b) 
externalisation and internalisation of power impact upon policy-making and delivery 
in the countryside? 
New Labour had undertaken little research into how it would conduct itself in the 
countryside and what it planned to do there.   Prior to gaining office in 1997 its only 
real interest centred upon reform of the CAP and disentangling food policy from 
MAFF because of the BSE scandal.  New Labour had used that scandal as one of 
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the brickbats to attack the Major government’s incompetence and was determined to 
make a fresh start through the setting-up of the independent Food Standards Agency 
(Lang 1998 & 2000, Leach 1998, Randall 2009, Wales et al 2006). 
The predilection of New Labour for solutions to crises based on the reports of 
independent bodies was a dominant theme throughout its period in office and 
characterised the rural policy area on more than one occasion (Larsen et al 2006).  
For instance, the aftermath of foot and mouth was investigated by three independent 
commissions (see Chapter Four) and the Haskins’ Review had at least the pretence 
of being autonomous of government.  This was an indication of its belief in evidence-
based policy-making as part of a target-driven culture (Boaz & Nutley 2009, Hood 
2006, Woods 2008e).  This meant that rural was not unusual in that externalised 
policy-making was a crucial element in how New Labour operated in the countryside. 
What made the situation more complicated was that rural policy was diffused across 
many parts of government even after it was given its own home in Defra.  Before 
that, though MAFF had some responsibility for rural, most of the main policies were 
situated across the major spending departments.  MAFF, whilst it tended towards 
command and control decision-making (interview with Academic 8), had abdicated 
much of the responsibility for rural to the EU.  This was a mixed blessing for although 
this energised the development of neo-endogenous schemes in the form of LEADER 
(and later LEADER +) and rural development programmes that were always in 
partnership with the EU, the UK was noticeably reticent in properly funding these 
programmes or giving them the attention they fully deserved.   
The difficulty was that funding streams were based upon historic payments and as 
the UK had been one of the lowest funders of rural within the EU this remained the 
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case even though the amount allocated to rural overall was rising.  This resulted in 
rural being a marginal player even within agricultural financial arrangements that 
exemplified that having a degree of freedom of manoeuvre from the centre was not 
always a good thing (Lowe 2006, Lowe & Ward 1998, Lowe et al 2002, Marsden & 
Sonnino 2008, Ward & Lowe 2004).  Under Pillar Two, monies were made available 
for rural development and regeneration, but England still had a lower percentage of 
funds distributed to rural  than for most other EU countries.  Also most of the money 
was still under the aegis of agricultural support measures, so rural was further 
marginalised. 
The decision to create the Countryside Agency was as dramatic as it was surprising.  
No mention of this idea had been made in the 1997 manifesto and interviewees 
indicated that they were taken aback at the nature and speed of the announcement 
(interview with Minister 6).  Though it remedied the split between the human and 
physical countryside introduced by the post-war Labour government and was 
something that rural campaigners had long fought for, the move was unprecedented 
(interviews with Practitioners 14 & 23).  That it received the support of the MAFF 
ministerial team demonstrated their willingness to countenance a rural affairs 
ministry, of which the Agency’s setting up was in many ways a stepping-stone 
(interview with Minister 6). 
Given that there is little evidence beyond these reflections by interviewees what 
followed was all the more interesting.  Government created a major arms-length 
body which had responsibility for both policy-making and delivery, and for the next 
five years it grew into a powerful countryside advocate with a clear vision, money 
and people to make rurality important and different. 
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Whether New Labour’s period of greatest involvement with the countryside between 
1999 and 2004, corresponding as it did with the life span of the Countryside Agency 
was coincidental or otherwise, the reality was that the role of the Agency did change 
rural areas by creating an effective interface.  It did so largely from a perspective of 
social democratic interventionism, experimentation and novelty which was in the 
image of those appointed to run it.52  This took many forms, but was noticeable for 
an emphasis upon participation, networks and partnerships that was ideally suited 
for many ruralities.  As indicated by two of the practitioner interviewees closely 
associated with it; 
New Labour came in, in 1997 with little idea of what to do in rural areas.  It 
was under no pressure as metropolitan journalists shared that disinterest in 
the countryside.  It soon became apparent that an arms-length body 
(alongside the new Countryside Advocate) would make a bold statement 
about the countryside.  This could combine policy-making with delivery and 
even some regulation.  We were given every encouragement to go out and 
develop policies – New Labour liked the idea of community empowerment and 
we even got Royal approval…..We were really only catching up with what 
already existed in other European countries, but the key was we were 
autonomous from government but accountable to it (interview with Practitioner 
1). 
The Agency did build on what went before, but what was different was less 
the freedom to operate, but the resources to be able to make a real difference 
                                                          
52
 Amongst people appointed was Richard Wakeford as Chief Executive.  He was seen as one of the 
rising starts of the civil service (Riddell 1998).  Also Margaret Clark became a director of the Agency, 
and was a long-time advocate of greater government involvement in rural affairs. 
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in the countryside.  For that I hold the Treasury responsible as a friend to 
rural, and Labour deserves an awful lot of credit for the way in which it 
handled the Countryside Agency in its early days (interview with Practitioner 
27). 
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the Agency, the Haskins’ Review was a 
threat to its existence and pulled policy-making back ‘in-house’.  Haskins’ reiterated 
his view that policy-making was chiefly the responsibility of ministers and that the 
merging of roles with implementation was a fundamental weakness of the Agency’s 
modus operandi, allied to its loss of focus and poor management style (interview with 
Haskins).  However he also stressed that he was a decentraliser, and given that was 
one of the stated principles of New Labour, the outcome from the Review was at 
least contradictory and confusing. This uncertainty replicated what others both within 
government and operating on the ground, expressed to me in interviews, and added 
to the dislocation that was felt after 2004 (interview with Minister 2, Practitioners 4 & 
7).   
Whilst it is easy to point all the blame for the turn away from rural at the door of 
Haskins’ and in particular his disdain for the work of the Agency, there were other 
factors at work.  Haskins’ recommendations did not just justify the need for increased 
regionalism, a more business-friendly approach, and clear executive decision-
making, but was in league with New Labour’s increasing neoliberal tendency (Bevir 
2003, Fuller & Geddes 2008, Newman 2001).  That rural had largely escaped from 
that fate was more by accident than design but from 2004 onwards policy-making 
was much more constrained by that ideological strand (interview with MP 2, and 
Practitioner 36).  This did not happen in one discrete move - it was rather a 
sequence of events - that not only marked New Labour’s cooling towards rural policy 
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but also a move away from the social democratic interventionism that had set it 
apart.  Indubitably the centralising of policy within Defra was a sign of weakness 
rather than strength, (as was pointed out by various respondents), but that again was 
accompanied by reduced resource, a much smaller team to administer it and a 
limited strategy compared to the expansive Rural White Paper.  As one interviewee 
noted ruefully; 
After 2004 rural policy was beset with problems.  Abolishing the Countryside 
Agency had been a question of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  
Though the idea of an integrated agency in the form of Natural England had 
merit it never had the resources necessary.  Also a whole raft of other 
problems arose at the same time – the loss of the post office subsidy, 
increased difficulties in introducing the right to roam, the CAP reforms, and 
overall it was the loss of budget that hurt us.  These were rather more 
important than where or who made policy (interview with Civil Servant 5). 
The loss of confidence of civil servants was mirrored elsewhere.  The churning of 
ministers hardly helped the stability of the policy-making process and, given the 
government’s increasing obsession with delivery overall, especially affecting the 
main departments of state, rural became even more of a bit player (interview with 
Practitioner 5).   
Thus it was this reduction in resource rather than the locus of where policy was 
made which bedevilled New Labour’s rural approach after 2004.  What was 
undoubtedly true however was that the reassignment of policy-making back into the 
parent department did nothing to advance rural and may in due course have 
seriously damaged ongoing initiatives like rural proofing and mainstreaming.  In this 
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sense the loss of the Countryside Agency, the downgrading of pledges from the 
Rural White Paper and the repercussions of Haskins’ all compounded the perception 
that New Labour had lost its way where rural was concerned and had failed to live up 
to its own expectation as a decentralising administration, making and delivering 
policy where it was most appropriate and effective.  The conclusion of one 
practitioner in interview was as follows; 
Defra had no real power to effect change in the countryside, because it relied 
so much on other Departments….Yet New Labour missed opportunities such 
as it could have relied to a greater extent upon the third sector, decentralising 
power, and improving the exercise of that power.  It withdrew from the 
countryside preferring to fall back upon centralised decision-making and the 
government became a caricature of the OECD definition that England was 
just an urban country (interview with Practitioner 5). 
Research Question Four – In what ways did New Labour’s wider strategy of 
modernisation of the state have an impact on rural areas and how important were 
these themes in rural policy and political activity? 
Chapter Seven identified why modernisation was so important to New Labour and 
how it permeated every aspect of the government’s efforts in office.  The corollary 
was that modernisation became code not just for revisionism but for neoliberalism 
and for a further rolling back of the state with surrender to globalisation (Allender 
2001, Bevir 2005, Cerny & Evans 2000 & 2004, Geddes 2006, Hay 1999, Lister 
2003, Panitch & Leys 2001).   
The chapter also highlighted why modernisation, at least for the years between 1999 
and 2004, took a different path in the countryside.  Whereas in urban Britain 
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modernisation became associated with marketisation and managerialism, in rural 
England the drive for change was public and voluntary sector led and was much 
more about enhanced provision rather than the introduction of greater competition 
and choice.  This was partly out of necessity - there were not the same opportunities 
for economies of scale and growing the number of suppliers in rural settings - but 
also because the government adopted a different strategy in the countryside, where 
it was more about protecting and reshaping existing services, as pretending they 
could be dramatically improved by greater competition (Ward 2008c). 
This is not to imagine that the hollowing-out of the state was halted in rural areas 
during the New Labour period.  At best there was a slowing of the rate of hollowing 
out.  However, rather confront local populations over service change, because of 
overarching service priorities, New Labour in the main, avoided head-on disputes, 
preferring alternative strategies to effect reform in the countryside.  This situation did 
alter after 2004 when economic pressures crowded-out social concerns, but for a 
time the aim on the back of the Rural White Paper was to try to raise service 
standards to those already achieved in urban communities (interview with Minister 
6).  Thus in a whole range of fields this became the service norm - child care, 
broadband, policing, not increasing the distance from a post office, access to 
affordable transport are some examples of where these service standards were laid 
down in the White Paper, put into Countryside Agency targets, and monitored by 
local authorities and others.  This did not mean that all closures of services were 
prevented but both in theory and practice there was a form of rural proofing 
undertaken to calculate whether there were alternatives to closure, and if not, 
whether some ameliorating measures could be put in place to sugar the pill 
(interview with MP 1).  As one MP intimated in interview; 
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I had to accept that I couldn’t prevent all closures.  Of the five post offices 
earmarked to shut under Network Change I could only argue for the retention 
of two of them.  Of two village primary schools down for closure because of 
insufficient numbers neither deserved to stay open, but one did because of a 
vigorous campaign by pushy middle-class parents.  Sometimes as an MP you 
had to manage expectations, and do what you believe was right in your heart, 
even if this was not popular (interview with MP 4). 
In this sense modernisation in the countryside was much less about choice and 
diversity – the watchwords of New Labour elsewhere – and more about security and 
improvement, providing services where none previously existed and uplifting existing 
provision to be nearer to what was acceptable elsewhere.  This pursuit of more 
equitable distribution of increased resources was crucial – which is why once the tap 
was tightened, if not turned off completely, rural policy went into decline after 2004. 
There were exceptions to this – some parts of the countryside by dint of location 
were part of action zones or neighbourhood renewal areas, and so faced the same 
competitive pressures as the rest of the place where they were situated (Asthana et 
al 2002, Foley & Martin 2000, Painter & Clarence 2001).  However in the main the 
countryside was rarely at the front end of New Labour experimentation, and so did 
not experience the same tensions that some of these programmes caused.  Instead 
the countryside was usually several phases removed, and so was spared the worst 
excesses of trial and error, though this meant that what was then offered were hand-
me-down policies from urban settings. 
As one practitioner complained to me in interview; 
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As a health professional most health policies were devised in urban settings 
and largely came from the big city hospitals.  There was always so much 
pressure to rationalise clinical services, and pull more resources to the centre 
and this left a huge debate around fairness, equity, effectiveness and 
efficiency.  Reorganisation usually meant that rural would have to accept 
worse service provision and despite national standards, this required closures 
at local level in rural communities.  Trying to go out and justify this on clinical 
grounds was never easy, and was the really unpleasant bit of my job, despite 
the NHS having more money overall to play with (interview with Practitioner 
42).  
Here modernisation had a negative context as reform in urban centres often meant 
that rural areas faced the closure of services, or deteriorating service provision.  This 
wasn’t just bad for rural practitioners but had political consequences as well.  As one 
MP argued in interview; 
In Yorkshire the DoH was looking for a site for a new hospital.  There was a 
large former mental asylum in my constituency, which had a huge amount of 
land associated with it and would have been relatively easy to convert.  For 
some bizarre reason Frank Dobson (Health Secretary) chose an inner city site 
instead.  This had no justification whatsoever, and his successor Alan Milburn 
admitted to me that a mistake had been made but it was too late to rectify it.  I 
just felt that modernisation to ministers and civil servants was synonymous 
with what was good for the cities and the rest of us could go and hang 
(interview with MP2). 
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In this respect modernisation of the state highlighted how small a part rural played in 
the great scheme of things.  Likewise making community assets more available to 
those living in the countryside was promoted by Quirk (2007) as part of the drive 
towards asset-based community development but was never realised as too much 
stress was placed on the physical aspects of this opening rather than the human 
capital benefits that would ensue (interview with MP 1 and Practitioner 20). 
The Report of Stuart Burgess, Chair of the CRC, on the potential of England’s rural 
economy (2008) met a similar fate.  So even where opportunities existed and chimed 
with government priorities of improving economic growth, driving up productivity, and 
sustaining a more business-friendly environment, rural lost out as time and 
resources were invested elsewhere, (as the Defra Select Committee Enquiry 
commented in 2008).  
New Labour was often additionally handicapped by inappropriate use of language to 
help sell the idea of modernisation and reform.  Fairclough (2001 & 2010) has 
emphasised New Labour’s contrived discourse and how this was eventually to 
undermine its case because of the inadequacy of explanation, the blandness of 
phraseology, and the frequent recourse to untested technologism (See also 
Charteris-Black 2014, Jones 1999, McLennan 2004).  Whatever the problems 
elsewhere, these concerns were magnified in rural areas.  Failure to provide a 
rationale for the New Labour drive towards modernisation led to resentment and 
unnecessary opposition to what otherwise might have been consensually agreed.  
Reform of the town and country planning system in rural areas would be a metaphor 
for this with unnecessary conflict over how to implement change (interview with 
Academic 6).  Where attempts were made to engage and include, with a stress upon 
participation by rural communities, building networks and partnerships, there were 
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good examples of what was possible (Clark et al 2007).  Sadly these were just the 
sort of programmes sacrificed after 2004. 
For the rest, rather than push on with reforms to make the lives of the rural 
disadvantaged better, New Labour too often sought accommodation with those in 
charge of traditional elites.  Modernisation could have made a difference and 
government with its huge mandate had the legitimacy to contest the countryside on 
behalf of those unable to so, but here New Labour flunked its responsibility.  It was 
guilty of Bourdieu’s idea (1991) of symbolic violence against those the Party was 
formed to protect, failing in its duty to recognise and bear down on inequality and 
class barriers derived from existing power structures (Atkin 2003, Shucksmith 2012).   
Cruickshank (2009) takes a slightly different line, developing a post-structuralist 
theme in terms of the conflict between modernists seeking to develop the 
countryside and those whose main purpose was to protect it.  In this the conflict 
operated through the Foucaldian concept of governmentality (Foucault 1978), and 
how that affects the governance of rural space and what room there is for local 
autonomy (Hewitt 2011a, Murdoch & Pratt 1993 & 1997).    
Together these symbolic discourses demonstrate that though the countryside gained 
through not having to endure the excesses of marketisation under New Labour, it 
also lost out by a government failure to pursue an ongoing strategy of fairness, 
greater service equality and a re-balancing of power, of which more is said in the 
next section. 
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Research Question Five – To what extent was New Labour’s approach to the 
countryside affected by both temporal events and spatial awareness, and how did 
this affect the manner of policy-making and delivery, and the political context within 
which it was operating. 
Research Question Five has been critically evaluated as a cross-cutting theme 
running throughout the thematic chapters.  From those chapters the importance of 
time and space to the New Labour period in the countryside can be explored and 
assessed starting with the temporal analysis. 
In the thesis New Labour’s countryside has been structured into three main periods 
of time (see page 135).  Within these frames, there were specific events which 
mattered in terms of their timing including the production of the Rural White Paper, 
the presentation of the Haskins’ Review, and the derivation of the Rural Strategy.  
Time also was crucial because New Labour was very often event-driven – the 
hunting debate, the fuel protects, and the foot and mouth outbreak all conspired to 
force it to prioritise the countryside as each took on national importance.   
New Labour’s strength, at least in the early years of administration, was the dexterity 
with which it dealt with negative events, a mixture of review, spin, compensation, and 
reflection (interview with Academic 7).  The reality was that such was the strength of 
its hegemonic position, and the relative weakness of the opposition, that New 
Labour’s powers of recovery were undeniable (see Chapter Four).  Nevertheless the 
manner of New Labour’s response from 1999 until 2004 went well beyond reactivity 
and reflexivity.  Whilst intervention and pumping up spending may have seemed to 
be a clever tactical ruse, the repercussions went much deeper and the 
consequences put New Labour’s countryside operation into a very different light.  
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Simply, New Labour chose a path of social democracy to deal with the exigencies of 
the problems it faced in the countryside, and the repercussions of this approach 
should not be underestimated.  Though led by the Countryside Agency, an arms-
length organisation, the overall result was that the countryside was feted, funded and 
facilitated to at least make it feel for a time that it mattered (Ward 2008c). 
Previous chapters have rehearsed the reasons behind the Haskins’ Review, and its 
outcomes but in terms of temporal context it did fundamentally alter New Labour’s 
relationship with the countryside, and there was no chance that this was ever 
recoverable afterwards. 
In terms of spatial features, the story is starker.  Challenged by crucial developments 
in the countryside of which the main features were counter-urbanisation, 
differentiation, contestation, and stylised fallacies based around the symbolic notion 
of rural, New Labour chose a mixture of accommodation, concession, and 
commission (Burchardt & Conford 2008, Champion 1999, Champion & Shepherd 
2006, Cloke & Little 1997, Headicar 2013, Hodge & Monk 2004, Lowe et al 2005).  
When challenged on countryside issues the response of New Labour was usually to 
avoid confrontation.  The one outstanding exception was hunting – but that was not 
just a countryside issue, it was just that most consequences were felt there and even 
then it was only the collective muscle of the Parliamentary Labour Party that forced 
Blair’s hand (interview with MP 7).   
For the rest, New Labour was either oblivious to the circumstances surrounding how 
the countryside functioned, including the relations of power, or saw the countryside 
as merely a bit player in a much bigger game, whether that be globalisation, Europe 
or regionalism.  As one practitioner pointed out to me; 
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The problem with New Labour was that by 2004 it had lost the plot regarding 
rural.  It had wasted an inordinate amount of time on a marginal issue – 
foxhunting – and turned away from a perfectly good policy – rural proofing – 
and largely replaced it with mainstreaming rural which was ‘like a limestone 
river disappearing down a hole’.  New Labour just couldn’t grasp the key 
issues which is how to best manage and adapt to necessary change at local 
level in rural areas.  Rural was suborned by regional dimensions and anything 
else that could possibly get in the way of just getting the basics right (interview 
with Practitioner 21). 
This is not to say that New Labour did not engage with some issues of import, 
especially during the interventionist years.  For instance the ideas, initiatives and 
programmes it advanced from 1999 onwards fitted neatly with the neo-endogenous 
developments in rural policy favoured by the EU and OECD.  Some of these arose 
through LEADER, but others were home-grown such as the Vital Villages scheme.  
The desire to provide service protection and augment service standards to 
accompany other radical proposals, including rural proofing and mainstreaming, 
showed what was feasible.  Though practically-bounded because of resource 
implications, these developments were ground-breaking and excited both rural 
communities and those executing the policies (Bosworth & Willett 2011, High & 
Nemes 2007, Ray 2006). If it had been able to commit fully to its decentralising 
agenda and capture an element of regionalism for the countryside the achievements 
would have been all the greater (Hewitt 2011a). 
The countryside also benefitted from New Labour’s national policies, especially the 
national minimum wage, national childcare strategy and bus passes for pensioners – 
which drew attention to pockets of deprivation in rural areas and how income and 
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service minimum standards equally benefitted ruralities (Asthana et al 2009, Barnes 
2007, Dolton et al 2008, 2010 & 2012, Gilbert et al 2001, Laverty & Millett 2015, 
Mackett 2013, Smith et al 2012) 
New Labour improved the understanding of what was meant by rural to give a 
stronger handle on how to define place, and measure what was meant by rural.  This 
helped not just politically and economically but geographically, culturally, sectorally 
and socially (See Chapters Four and Seven; Bibby & Shepherd 2004).  It neatly 
matched New Labour’s reliance upon evidence-based policy-making. 
After 2004 in not facing up to the challenges of rural life in anything other than a 
time-bound and superficial manner New Labour missed a wonderful timeliness to 
use its electoral strength and putative support on the ground from activists, 
practitioners, academics and rural communities themselves, to start to move the 
dynamics of power, influence and opportunity in a different direction, to make the 
countryside a fairer, more just and better place.  It had a particular blind spot when it 
came to remote rural, where the greatest economic and social investment was 
needed (Defra Select Committee 2008, Nemes 2005).  As one civil servant noted to 
me: 
From the middle of the decade (2000 – 10) we seemed to spend an inordinate 
amount of time on institutional change, and this came at the cost of good 
policy-making.  So many things seemed to come and go – rural proofing, 
mainstreaming, double devolution – all good in themselves but not sustained 
and then the money was not there.  There is always the danger that 
perceptions outdo the reality of the countryside, but if we had kept going and 
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retained the drive of Alun Michael we could have really started to make a 
difference in rural areas (interview with Civil Servant 6). 
Much of the feeling of drift after 2004 came from the increased questioning of New 
Labour’s ideological commitment (interview with Practitioner 21).  New Labour’s 
pragmatism in relation to the countryside may have seemed to be an immediate 
strength with how it dealt with events for much of its early period in office, but its lack 
of philosophical grip in how it approached difficult concepts like the contested 
countryside resulted in the government making little impression upon how power 
operated in rural communities and little had changed by the end of its thirteen years 
in office. 
An integrated assessment 
The five research questions do point to the complicated nature of New Labour’s rural 
policy with numerous contradictions, the many twists and turns in how it was 
delivered in response to events, the unpredictable influence of the intervention of 
different actors, the impact of institutional and structural change, and the importance 
of how much time and resource the government was prepared to devote to it.  In 
parallel with this there was the churn of politics, with the gradual weakening of 
political hegemony.  Together they accounted for the view that New Labour had 
attempted something dramatic with regard to rural policy, at least for a time, but that 
by the end of its term in office it left a sense of unfulfilled possibility.   
8.2 To what extent has the study met the aims set? 
This study was developed with the purpose of giving New Labour’s rural policy and 
politics closer attention.  By reflecting on the perspectives of actors involved with 
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New Labour’s activity in the countryside, the central conclusion is that there was 
between 1999 and 2004 a social democratic moment, but that this disappeared after 
2004. 
What the research has tested is the extent to which New Labour’s rural policy and 
implicitly the direction of its political discourse, could be described as discernible, 
measurable and consistent.  The notion was that there were distinct periods in how 
New Labour operated in the countryside, and that these were determined by political 
priorities, themselves issue-driven.  This is not to deny that there were other factors 
at work which affected New Labour's relationship with the countryside, especially the 
government's economism, and societal objectives. 
The investigation started from the premise that New Labour's increased 
representation, and specifically its greater number of rural MPs, profoundly affected 
New Labour's relationship with the countryside.  However such was the scale of the 
landslide that this caused a rethink by New Labour of its approach to the 
countryside.  Allied to this were the exigencies of two other factors - the intervention 
of events in the countryside that the government had to respond to, and the 
presence of a phalanx of MPs in the newly-formed Rural Group, who demanded 
attention.  The research has continually highlighted these features. 
What marked 1999-2004 out as a discrete time-period was the reaction of New 
Labour to the challenges it faced them.  Rather than emphasise its accommodation 
with neoliberal instincts, the government chose a distinctly social democratic 
approach as to how it derived rural policy, and met its political objectives in the 
countryside.  What made this all the more surprising was that New Labour was in the 
process of dumping social democracy in many other policy areas, preferring the 
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amorphous combination of the third way, communitarianism and pure pragmatism 
elsewhere (Nuttall 2006).  This research has argued that was indeed New Labour’s 
direction of travel, examined why this was the case and critically reflected upon the 
implications.  That was the narrative from 1999 -2004, and this research adds to the 
understanding of why that was the case, and the implications for the English 
countryside over that period. 
The study investigates the degree to which New Labour was able to develop a 
distinctive approach to rural policy and politics and the extent to which it was able to 
overcome the accusation by some that it was purely an urban construct.  It did this 
by a series of interventions, policy and programme-wise, the creation of new 
institutions, specifically the Countryside Agency, and by the active involvement of 
actors.   
The research emphasises that the method New Labour preferred for the evolution of 
rural policy was to rely upon external agencies for both policy-making and 
delivery.  The chosen vehicle for this was the Countryside Agency, which has been 
studied surprisingly little in its own right.  It also keenly sought support from actors 
outside of government, largely in the voluntary sector, to pursue new forms of 
engagement with rural areas.  Though modernisation was also important, as reforms 
to the countryside became an essential element in improving the lives of countryside 
residents, the research hypothesises was that it was markedly different from the 
market-driven approach taken in urban England. 
The story does not finish with 1999 – 2004 however.  Undoubtedly the primary 
evidence demonstrates that after 2004, New Labour took a radically different 
approach, putting rural policy effectively into reverse, with the restoration of a 
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strongly centripetal direction of travel.  This coincided with the demise of the 
Countryside Agency, the reduction in budgets, and the re-centralising of decision-
making within government itself, as a weak Defra tried to assert itself by taking the 
policy-making reins back from the Agency. 
What this study critically discusses was that from 2004, rural policy and politics was 
again marginalised by New Labour, and the progress made from 1999 until 2004 
was largely forgone.  This did not mean that all rural programmes came to an abrupt 
halt after 2004, but there was much less emphasis upon the rural from that time 
onwards, and importantly, much less resource to call upon.   
The study therefore meets its main aim of exploring this little-known but important 
part of history.  In critically examining the five research questions there is now a 
better understanding of New Labour’s relationship with the countryside.  The 
research posits the view that New Labour’s involvement with the countryside can be 
divided up into definite time periods.  It also seeks to better explain how it tried to 
come to terms with spatial aspects of the countryside, but that this was of limited 
success. 
The research further demonstrates the extent to which the New Labour operation in 
the countryside had distinctive features – to try to disassociate itself from being seen 
as purely an urban party, to seek out new forms of policy-making, and to carefully 
orchestrate aspects of modernisation.  In so doing it has identified not just the 
causes and consequences of New Labour’s actions, but also the contradictions and 
lack of coherence in what was attempted.  This has been achieved by extensive 
recourse to interview material applied using the tools of ethnography.  In this way it is 
hoped that a contemporaneous record will greatly add to understanding of the way in 
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which New Labour performed, albeit in this under-explored area, which may in due 
course stimulate further research. 
8.3 Observations on the role of the researcher in the research 
This research has recorded a highly personalised venture.  It has resulted from my 
conviction, based upon experience, that there was a piece of research that needed 
to be carried out, in an area of study that was both neglected and needed 
attention.  There were alternatives - a book, or collaborating with someone else's 
research, but I chose a PhD because of a sense of personal ambition and self- 
fulfilment, and to give greater status to the study’s findings. 
Being embedded in the research process has characteristics different from other 
forms of research (Adler & Adler 1987, Brannick & Coghlan 2007, Lewis & Russell 
2011).  First you come to the research directly from your own experiences or 
habitus.  I cannot demur from the standpoint that ideas, opinions and discourses 
arose from my own deliberations during the period in question.  Though I was not 
entirely wrapped up with rural issues it was my main area of domestic interest which 
flavoured what I have done subsequently (Labaree 2002).  Second I was fortunate in 
that my address-book and the contacts that I subsequently made were impressive in 
number and quality in that I do not believe that anyone else could have attempted 
quite the same project, or certainly not have pursued it in quite the same way. 
There are downsides to such an approach.  Are the research, the research questions 
and the analysis too personalised and lacking in objectivity?  Having the choice of 
the interviewees led to inherent bias?  Was I swayed in my research by the desire to 
make a series of judgements that devalue the objectivity of the research but also 
undermine the case for future use of the research evidence? 
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My answer to each of these dilemmas is no - in that the rigour of a PhD forces the 
researcher to face up to these challenges and deliberately adopt an approach that 
avoids these pitfalls.  Thus, I undertook interviews in number well beyond what is 
normally necessary in order to gather appropriate levels of evidence.  By 
triangulation I have sought to present, if not vindicate, the analyses of those involved 
and have engaged in extensive secondary source gathering, given the relative 
paucity of the material in the field concerned.  The incipient nativeness of politicians 
who have left or lost office was less of a problem than I had anticipated, but one that 
I was wary of, to circumvent prejudicing the evidence (Schneider 1993, Thompson 
1987).  Again the breadth and depth of the research lessened this as an issue, if not 
eradicated it completely. 
From the outset I decided against any quantitative element to the research.  Though 
I did toy with the notion of contacting other players such as Constituency Labour 
Parties in rural areas by questionnaire, I decided against this, as the likelihood of 
adding to the sum of knowledge was marginal, and it would have altered the 
research aims.   
The other dominant issue was whether this research should have been auto-
ethnographic given the highly personalised nature of it.  Rural studies has made 
increasing use of ethnography and auto-ethnography (Gristy 2014, Heley 2011, 
Hillyard 2007).  Likewise political science has grown to appreciate the value of this 
methodology (Denzin & Lincoln 2011).  
One interesting aside was that on a number of occasions, respondents were keen to 
see me because they wanted to tell their story.  None of the departing civil servants 
or ministers interviewed had received an exit interview at the end of the New Labour 
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period in office.  They therefore felt deprived of being able to have their say on how 
they thought they had performed, what they had learned, and their views on policy, 
performance and process.  The interviews gave this opportunity – to some it was a 
cathartic experience, which is why some sessions ran on longer than expected, and 
much good information was obtained from the discussion after the former interview 
had finished.  I was pleased at how frank interviewees were with me – I respected 
their wish when they told me things in confidence, though interestingly bar a couple 
of occasions what was said was already on the public record, such had been the 
extensive coverage of New Labour in autobiographies, biographies, diaries, and 
academic material.  Whether that level or quantity of material would have been 
forthcoming had I not been treated as an equal will be for others to judge. 
The process of completing a PhD is time-consuming and managing work and 
personal time is never easy.  I faced the additional pressures of standing again 
(unsuccessfully) for Parliament, which meant talking some time off mid-research and 
writing-up.  However I did use this opportunity to keep in touch with the rural political 
scene, and this did harvest contact with some actors who, whilst I did not formally 
interview them, were helpful points of advice and information.  Ensuring that I cut off 
from what occurred after 2010, was a danger, but making the research coterminous 
with New Labour in power, meant that I was able to avoid looking at what befell 
policy-making afterwards, even if this was of personal interest. 
The researcher's role has therefore taught me of the value of pursuing a life-time 
interest, which has given me the enthusiasm to keep going and produce something 
which hopefully is of value.  This is something I am already committed to following up 
with a number of people still active in the Labour Party, including the leadership, so 
hopefully this thesis will just not sit on a shelf at home. 
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8.4 Future Research 
The basis of this research is that there is a dearth of political studies of the 
countryside and hardly anything written on the Labour Party and rural areas referring 
to contemporary history.   Apart from Griffiths (2007), Thorpe's chapter in Worley's 
book (2005), Andrew Flynn’s unpublished PhD (1989), some other historical work by 
Worley (2005a&b), and the article by Johnson (1972), studies on the Labour Party 
do not feature rural matters in any noticeable way.  Contemporary studies which 
discuss the impact of New Labour on the countryside, with the notable exception of 
the book by Woods (2008a), are non-existent.  What specifically is lacking is an 
analytical account of the politics behind the issues that influenced New Labour’s 
performance in the countryside, and how the changed structure and agency affected 
the Party, its views and its organisation.  The limited interest in how New Labour’s 
policies operated at ground-level in rural communities is particularly disappointing.  
What research that exists was left to government itself, operating largely through its 
own agencies.  Other research has either not been commissioned or published 
which leaves a real gap in understanding. 
In some respects it is not surprising that there is little research upon the Labour Party 
and the countryside given the Party's own predilection for its urban prowess, and 
strength in metropolitan politics.  This is to deny the interest among some rural 
constituency parties which have continued to make the case for Labour's 
involvement in policy-making, campaigning and general activism in countryside 
issues.  This is worthy of further investigation, and could include the relationship of 
the Parliamentary Party to internal Party organisations such as Rural Revival and 
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Labour Coast & Country, to investigate how this has impacted upon the Policy 
Commission process through to Annual Conference.   
There has been comment in recent times about the relevance of identity politics.  Yet 
the left and progressive politics is greatly underrepresented in terms of their political 
involvement in the evolving political situation in rural areas.  Given the importance of 
the countryside to the evolution of modern society and political environment, evinced 
through the works of EP Thompson (1963), Hoggart (1957), Howkins (2003) and 
Williams (1973), it is surprising that contemporary studies are so limited, and the role 
of the Labour Party deemed so unimportant.  Interestingly the histories of the 
development of the Labour Party make play of how rural areas played a part in the 
growth of Labour – Pelling  (1983), Pugh M (2010) -  but that interest seems to end 
in the 1960s.  That lacuna surely needs to be rectified. 
This thesis has largely been limited to rural politics within England.  Studying Labour 
in Scotland and Wales, where traditionally Labour has been stronger in rural areas 
and how that has influenced the direction of the Party in and out of devolved 
administration, and then making some comparisons with England would make for 
illuminating future research.   
It would be wrong just to constrain any future interest to only Labour politics.  Some 
further examination of the new institutionalism embraced by Labour, and present in 
initiatives that led to the creation of the Countryside Agency is worthy of future 
research.  A more detailed and reflective study is needed, and an explanation into 
why ministers and civil servants became so antagonistic towards the Agency. 
There are also the opportunities that wider research of progressive politics in the 
countryside would produce.  The intervention of the Green Party into the countryside 
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is not unimportant, yet most studies of the Greens have been centred on other 
issues, and their more urban strongholds (Birch 2009, Spoon 2009).  Likewise the 
importance of developments in the form of the Transition Towns movement and how 
taste has shaped left of centre politics is worthy of proper investigation.  Though 
indirectly linked it is not insignificant that the Transition Towns locations tend to be 
based on areas where Labour and the Greens have some presence - Stroud, 
Calderdale and Totnes are examples of this (Barry & Quilley 2009, Connors 2010, 
Felicetti 2013). 
It would also be appropriate to drill down to research into the implications for Labour, 
and possibly the Greens, of changes in food policy and territorial use of land.  Whilst 
the growth of hobby farming and lifestyle choice re-location to the countryside has 
been pursued, the political implications of this are still relatively little understood 
(Home 2009, Lang et al 2009, Munton 2009).  Future research could also explore 
how the changing employment breakdown in the countryside has impacted upon 
trade union representation there and what affect this has had upon trade union - 
Labour relations in the countryside.  Inevitably the issue of relations of power, class 
and elites would impose upon this, but given the lack of interest expressed by 
Labour, some research into why this remains the case would be invaluable. 
The battles over land-use should not be entirely encapsulated within the debate 
about counter-urbanisation (Halfacree 2012).  There are other themes present which 
are worthy of examination including around bottom-up neighbourhood planning, 
community land trusts and social enterprise empowerment (Gallent & Robinson 
2012, Moore & McKie 2012, Ridley-Duff & Bull 2015).  Each of these has some 
political repercussions and should be studied both in terms of influence through the 
lens of governance, but also outside of the mainstream political process. 
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A final area for future research involves the role of local government during the New 
Labour years in the countryside.  Though most of the politicians interviewed had a 
history as councillors, and a number of local authority officers were cross-examined, 
both directly as part of the research, and also for comments on ideas that I was 
mulling over, there is a paucity of evidence from this source.  This is important for 
New Labour did radically reform local government during its period in office.  Though 
most of the focus for this was in the cities, and urban authorities, an exploration of 
what happened in the rural areas is overdue.  There are a limited number of 
investigations of parish and local councils, and recommendations on their future role 
did feature in the Lyons’ Review (2007), but this field could be researched in more 
detail to great effect. 
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Appendix 1: The Genesis of the Rural Group of Labour MPs - Correspondence 
between Bradley and the House of Commons Library to demonstrate the 
Parliamentary strength of Labour in the countryside 
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY       
Research Services 
1 Derby Gate 
London  SW1A 2DG 
Tel:  0171 219 2454 
Fax: 0171 219 5944 
dewdneyrs@parliament.uk 
Our ref:  1997/6/116SG/RD 
 
18 June, 1997 
 
Dear Mr Bradley 
 
Rural Labour MPs 
 
You asked for a list of rural parliamentary constituencies with a Labour Member. 
 
I have taken population density and agricultural employment as a measure of "rurality".  The enclosed 
two tables (ranked within party and overall) do this for the current parliamentary constituencies in Great 
Britain, using data from the 1991 Census.  The indicators used are: 
 • usual residents per hectare. 
 • the proportion of those in employment (employees and self-employed) in agriculture53.   
 
The tables show both absolute figures and a relative measure expressed as an index where the average 
for Great Britain is 10054.  A composite index is also given (final column) on which the ranking is based; 
                                                          
    53
  old 1980 Standard Industrial Classification Division 0; includes forestry and fisheries. 
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this has been calculated simply by adding the two indices and dividing by two, so that the indicators 
have equal weighting55. 
 
On this composite measure, there are 180 constituencies which are more (or as) rural as Great Britain as 
a whole, and 461 which are less rural.  This distribution is so skewed because the rural constituencies are 
"outliers" which have very low population density and high agricultural employment.  The rural 
constituencies are much more rural than the urban constituencies are urban. 
 
Of the 418 Labour constituencies, only 51 are more rural than Great Britain as a whole.  Labour seats 
are, of course, generally more urban than those of other parties.  The Liberal Democrats have especially 
rural seats, as, not surprisingly, do the SNP. 
 
I hope this is useful.  Please do not hesitate to get in touch if you would like this information presented in 
some other way. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Richard Dewdney 
Social & General Statistics Section 
Peter Bradley MP 
House of Commons 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    54
  The index for population density shows constituencies with fewer residents per hectare than the GB average 
as greater than 100; the index for agricultural employment shows constituencies with more than the average in 
agricultural employment as greater than 100. 
    55
  However, there are more "outliers" for population density than agricultural employment, and this obviously 
affects the composite rankings.  There are 12 constituencies (10 of which are in Scotland) which have a 
population density less than one-tenth of the GB average, while there are no constituencies where agricultural 
employment is ten times as high as the GB average.  There is, however, quite a strong correlation between the 
two indicators, and places with very low population density also tend to have very high agricultural employment. 
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HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY 
Research Services 
1 Derby Gate 
London  SW1A 2DG 
Tel:  0171 219 2454 
Fax: 0171 219 5944 
dewdneyrs@parliament.uk 
 
Our ref: 1997/11/28SG/RD 
10 November 1997 
 
Dear Mr Bradley 
 
Labour MPs in ‘semi-rural’ constituencies 
 
Further to some previous work we have done for you56, you asked for a list of Labour Members in 
constituencies which could be described as ‘semi-rural’ as opposed to rural. 
 
As my colleague, Adrian Crompton, explained when you spoke to him last week, this exercise is 
somewhat arbitrary.  In the first place, the analysis takes only two variables — population density and 
agricultural employment — as a measure of "rurality" and is obviously a simplification of a more 
complicated reality.  Secondly, any cut-off point is a matter of (fairly subjective) judgement. 
 
On this measure, there are 180 constituencies which are more (or as) rural as Great Britain as a whole, 
and 461 which are less rural57; of the 418 Labour constituencies, only 51 are more rural than Great 
                                                          
56
  our ref. 97/6/116SG 
57
  This distribution is so skewed because the rural constituencies are "outliers" which have very low population 
density and high agricultural employment.  The rural constituencies are much more rural than the urban 
constituencies are urban. 
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Britain as a whole.  You have decided to call these seats — which represent 28% of all (Labour and non-
Labour) seats — ‘rural’. 
 
Clearly, the seats at the bottom of the list are urban.  Deciding which are ‘semi-rural’ is far more difficult.  
However, a useful cut-off are those which are half as rural as the GB average — that is, those with an 
index between 50 and 100.  There are 54 such Labour seats. 
 
Another approach would be to follow the analysis conducted by ONS after each of the last three 
decennial Censuses of grouping areas into ‘families’ based on socio-economic conditions.  The latest 
(post-1991) analysis has six families, one of which is ‘rural areas’; within this family there is a group 
called ‘mixed urban and rural’, which covers two clusters (‘towns in country’ and ‘industrial margins’).  Of 
the 457 local authorities in Great Britain58, 137 (30%) are classified as ‘rural areas’ containing 10 million 
people (18% of the population). 
 
The other five families in the post-1991 classification are: 
 prosperous areas 
 maturer areas 
 urban centres 
 mining and industrial areas 
 Inner London 
 
If you would like me to produce a list along these lines by best-fitting parliamentary constituencies falling 
within ‘rural areas’ local authorities, please get in touch.  In the meantime, I enclose a summary table of 
these families and their components and a detailed list allocating each local authority to its family, group 
and cluster59. 
 
I hope this is helpful. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Richard Dewdney Social & General Statistics Section 
                                                          
58
  As at 1994; due to local government reorganisation, this analysis will have to be repeated for the new 
unitary authorities (and areas affected by associated boundary changes). 
59
  Source: ONS The ONS classification of local and health authorities of Great Britain, Table 3.1 and Table F 
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  Population density & agricultural employment by parliamentary constituency party: 1991 Census: GB (by party)      
                 
                 
     Absolute data  Index: GB=100      
                 
     Pop. density: Agricultural Population Agricultural Overall   Area People Density 
 rank by    residents per employment density employment "ruralness"     
 "ruralnes
s" 
Constituency Party Member hectare % of all           
NOMIS (of 641)                
            Labour NOMIS??   
619 4 Inverness East, Nairn & Lochaber Lab Stewart,David 0.1 5.61  2,610 293  1,451                     1  1 230,323 69,869 0.303352 
641 5 Western Isles Lab Macdonald,Calum 0.1 7.01  2,527 366  1,446                     1  2 91,945 86,495 0.940725 
536 16 Carmarthen East and Dinefwr Lab Williams,Alan W 0.4 13.79  589 719  654                     1  3 10,804 83,305 7.71057 
540 27 Preseli Pembrokeshire Lab Lawrence,Jackie 0.6 11.47  391 598  494                     1  4 7,077 79,584 11.24544 
588 28 Dumfries Lab Brown,Russell 0.4 7.57  589 395  492                     1  5 18,590 80,669 4.339376 
636 30 Stirling Lab McGuire,Anne 0.3 3.36  791 175  483                     1  6 2,729 86,302 31.62404 
579 34 Carrick, Cumnock & Doon Valley Lab Foulkes,George 0.4 5.95  547 310  429                     1  7 9,594 84,419 8.799145 
537 35 Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire Lab Ainger,Nick 0.7 10.03  332 523  428                     1  8 2,806 87,531 31.19423 
532 47 Clwyd West Lab Thomas,Gareth 0.8 8.02  299 418  359                     1  9 9,453 90,409 9.564054 
582 53 Clydesdale Lab Hood,Jimmy 0.6 4.48  409 234  321                     1  10 249,812 74,567 0.298492 
531 56 Clwyd South Lab Jones,Martyn 0.8 5.87  298 306  302                     1  11 7,896 86,720 10.98278 
543 63 Monmouth Lab Edwards,Huw 0.9 6.01  264 313  289                     1  12 5,114 82,628 16.15722 
128 65 North West Norfolk Lab Turner,George 1.1 6.42  226 335  281                     1  13 2,811 98,173 34.92458 
499 70 Workington Lab Campbell-Savours,Dale 0.9 4.62  279 241  260                     1  14 2,617 92,042 35.17081 
382 72 Selby Lab Grogan,John 1.2 6.09  194 318  256                     1  15 2,169 79,631 36.71323 
369 76 Brigg and Goole Lab Cawsey,Ian 1.2 5.71  199 298  248                     1  16 2,305 81,401 35.31497 
250 80 Forest of Dean Lab Organ,Diana 1.3 5.56  185 290  238                     1  17 6,746 84,490 12.52446 
506 92 Bishop Auckland Lab Foster,Derek 0.9 3.61  254 188  221                     1  18 10,382 84,107 8.101233 
594 94 East Lothian Lab Home Robertson,John 1.1 3.98  226 207  217                     1  19 4,853 86,267 17.77601 
496 99 Copeland Lab Cunningham,Jack 1.0 3.09  249 161  205                     1  20 69,849 84,752 1.21336 
381 102 Scarborough and Whitby Lab Quinn,Lawrie 1.3 4.24  184 221  203                     1  21 24,537 95,757 3.902555 
585 107 Cunninghame North Lab Wilson,Brian 0.9 2.40  260 125  193                     1  22 38,976 85,624 2.196839 
275 114 Shrewsbury and Atcham Lab Marsden,Paul 1.5 3.89  156 203  180                     1  23 1,948 82,308 42.25257 
470 115 Lancaster and Wyre Lab Dawson,Hilton 2.0 4.59  120 239  180                     1  24 9,714 87,843 9.042928 
362 119 Newark Lab Jones,Fiona 1.5 3.57  156 186  171                     1  25 10,767 86,069 7.993777 
511 121 North West Durham Lab Armstrong,Hilary 1.2 2.68  197 140  168                     1  26 2,279 81,373 35.70557 
284 128 Staffordshire Moorlands Lab Atkins,Charlotte 1.9 3.30  125 172  149                     1  27 2,339 89,167 38.12185 
358 132 Bassetlaw Lab Ashton,Joe 1.8 2.92  134 152  143                     1  28 2,559 86,801 33.91989 
277 135 The Wrekin Lab Bradley,Peter 2.2 3.19  109 167  138                     1  29 2,811 84,592 30.09321 
351 140 Corby Lab Hope,Phil 1.7 2.32  144 121  133                     1  30 13,732 80,674 5.874891 
330 142 High Peak Lab Levitt,Tom 1.5 1.80  162 94  128                     1  31 5,178 90,271 17.43357 
252 143 Stroud Lab Drew,David 2.2 2.81  106 146  126                     1  32 3,065 98,111 32.01011 
477 145 West Lancashire Lab Pickthall,Colin 3.7 3.57  64 186  125                     1  33 17,996 89,530 4.974994 
476 146 South Ribble Lab Borrow,David 5.7 4.00  42 208  125                     1  34 5,117 101,580 19.85148 
138 148 Waveney Lab Blizzard,Robert 3.7 3.37  64 176  120                     1  35 2,874 94,029 32.71712 
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533 152 Delyn Lab Hanson,David 2.4 2.64  98 138  118                     1  36 2,388 99,066 41.48492 
353 154 Kettering Lab Sawford,Philip 1.9 2.10  125 110  117                     1  37 3,601 89,919 24.97056 
620 155 Kilmarnock & Loudoun Lab Browne,Desmond 2.1 2.34  112 122  117                     1  38 3,198 88,283 27.60569 
471 156 Morecambe and Lunesdale Lab Smith,Geraldine 2.4 2.54  100 132  116                     1  39 7,125 80,382 11.28168 
629 160 Ochil Lab O'Neill,Martin 1.6 1.51  148 79  114                     1  40 11,062 91,130 8.238112 
370 162 Cleethorpes Lab McIsaac,Shona 2.7 2.63  89 137  113                     1  41 5,549 91,044 16.40728 
587 164 Dumbarton Lab McFall,John 1.5 1.08  162 56  109                     1  42 4,351 86,243 19.82142 
224 166 Falmouth and Camborne Lab Atherton,Candy 3.8 2.90  62 151  107                     1  43 16,651 76,549 4.597261 
367 167 Sherwood Lab Tipping,Paddy 2.8 2.44  86 127  107                     1  44 3,739 87,901 23.50923 
512 169 Sedgefield Lab Blair,Tony 2.2 1.97  109 103  106                     1  45 20,190 96,504 4.779792 
534 172 Vale of Clwyd Lab Ruane,Chris 3.4 2.63  71 137  104                     1  46 15,135 88,599 5.853915 
624 173 Midlothian Lab Clarke,Eric 2.3 2.00  103 104  103                     1  47 21,026 84,525 4.020023 
32 174 Braintree Lab Hurst,Alan 2.8 2.32  85 121  103                     1  48 74,356 71,296 0.958847 
548 175 Conwy Lab Williams,Betty 2.2 1.85  110 96  103                     1  49 14,512 88,226 6.07952 
278 176 Burton Lab Dean,Janet 3.1 2.43  78 127  102                     1  50 2,652 90,618 34.16968 
566 179 Gower Lab Caton,Martin 2.4 1.93  99 100  100                     1  51 4,750 92,271 19.42547 
332 186 South Derbyshire Lab Todd,Mark 2.8 1.99  86 104  95                     1  52 70,129 81,345 1.159934 
221 188 Wansdyke Lab Norris,Dan 3.0 2.07  79 108  93                     1  53 11,314 86,995 7.689146 
564 189 Vale of Glamorgan Lab Smith,John 3.2 2.10  75 110  92                     1  54 23,587 88,154 3.737398 
90 191 South Thanet Lab Ladyman,Stephen 5.5 2.66  43 139  91                     1  55 4,109 86,395 21.0258 
80 192 Dover Lab Prosser,Gwyn 4.2 2.38  57 124  91                     1  56 5,841 82,674 14.15408 
388 193 Barnsley West and Penistone Lab Clapham,Michael 3.6 2.01  66 105  85                     1  57 6,969 97,857 14.04176 
283 194 Stafford Lab Kidney,David 5.4 2.32  44 121  82                     1  58 8,852 88,107 9.953344 
342 195 North West Leicestershire Lab Taylor,David 2.9 1.55  82 81  82                     1  59 45,408 90,402 1.990883 
539 196 Llanelli Lab Davies,Denzil 3.1 1.63  76 85  80                     1  60 5,612 91,066 16.22701 
89 199 Sittingbourne and Sheppey Lab Wyatt,Derek 4.3 1.97  55 103  79                     1  61 29,138 91,284 3.132816 
640 201 West Renfrewshire Lab Graham,Thomas 2.4 1.07  99 56  77                     1  62 5,763 89,303 15.49592 
290 202 North Warwickshire Lab O'Brien,Mike 3.1 1.44  77 75  76                     1  63 2,536 87,904 34.66246 
125 203 Great Yarmouth Lab Wright,Tony 2 4.8 1.94  49 101  75                     1  64 2,700 88,086 32.62444 
325 205 Bolsover Lab Skinner,Dennis 3.9 1.69  61 88  75                     1  65 1,564 76,372 48.8312 
38 206 Harwich Lab Henderson,Ivan 7.0 2.20  34 115  74                     1  66 1,907 78,917 41.3828 
622 209 Linlithgow Lab Dalyell,Tam 3.4 1.48  70 77  74                     1  67 35,765 85,269 2.384147 
391 210 Doncaster North Lab Hughes,Kevin 4.1 1.69  59 88  73                     1  68 12,145 98,975 8.149444 
331 212 North East Derbyshire Lab Barnes,Harry 3.8 1.54  62 80  71                     1  69 3,074 97,799 31.8149 
591 213 Dunfermline East Lab Brown,Gordon 3.2 1.31  74 68  71                     1  70 16,847 85,111 5.051997 
294 214 Warwick and Leamington Lab Plaskitt,James 3.6 1.42  66 74  70                     1  71 330,112 81,078 0.245608 
576 216 Ayr Lab Osborne,Sandra 4.6 1.65  52 86  69                     1  72 3,648 95,364 26.14145 
530 217 Alyn and Deeside Lab Jones,Barry 4.7 1.67  51 87  69                     1  73 68,908 91,170 1.323068 
467 218 Chorley Lab Hoyle,Lindsay 4.8 1.68  50 87  69                     1  74 6,876 93,003 13.52574 
20 219 North East Milton Keynes Lab White,Brian 3.5 1.32  68 69  68                     1  75 20,696 90,996 4.396792 
495 222 Carlisle Lab Martlew,Eric 4.6 1.57  52 82  67                     1  76 2,110 80,210 38.01422 
424 223 City of Chester Lab Russell,Christine 5.9 1.79  41 93  67                     1  77 16,144 92,709 5.742629 
593 224 East Kilbride Lab Ingram,Adam 2.9 0.97  84 50  67                     1  78 6,198 88,097 14.21378 
272 226 Wyre Forest Lab Lock,David 6.1 1.77  39 92  66                     1  79 2,253 86,623 38.44785 
567 227 Neath Lab Hain,Peter 2.7 0.85  87 44  66                     1  80 4,531 94,866 20.9371 
434 228 Weaver Vale Lab Hall,Mike 5.7 1.68  42 87  65                     1  81 33,873 80,138 2.365837 
623 229 Livingston Lab Cook,Robin 3.3 1.05  72 55  63                     1  82 8,867 94,645 10.67385 
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389 230 Don Valley Lab Flint,Caroline 3.5 1.11  69 58  63                     1  83 8,838 88,040 9.96153 
292 233 Rugby and Kenilworth Lab King,Andrew 3.6 1.11  67 58  63                     1  84 15,250 86,424 5.667148 
405 234 Calder Valley Lab McCafferty,Christine 3.1 0.94  76 49  63                     1  85 25,326 94,555 3.733515 
426 235 Crewe and Nantwich Lab Dunwoody,Gwyneth 6.1 1.61  39 84  62                     1  86 148,429 80,492 0.542293 
289 237 Tamworth Lab Jenkins,Brian 4.9 1.29  49 67  58                     1  87 5,288 83,444 15.77988 
472 238 Pendle Lab Prentice,Gordon 5.1 1.32  47 69  58                     1  88 98,445 84,218 0.855483 
602 240 Falkirk East Lab Connarty,Michael 3.8 0.96  62 50  56                     1  89 5,937 90,235 15.19875 
412 241 Keighley Lab Cryer,Ann 5.3 1.28  45 67  56                     1  90 3,687 98,512 26.71874 
291 242 Nuneaton Lab Olner,Bill 4.8 1.13  50 59  54                     1  91 2,225 85,672 38.50427 
26 243 Hastings and Rye Lab Foster,Michael 7.0 1.43  34 74  54                     1  92 2,001 82,087 41.02299 
410 244 Hemsworth Lab Trickett,Jon 6.0 1.32  39 69  54                     1  93 4,355 74,726 17.15867 
423 246 Wakefield Lab Hinchcliffe,David 6.1 1.32  39 69  54                     1  94 9,198 98,843 10.74614 
555 247 Ogmore Lab Powell,Ray 3.8 0.85  63 45  54                     1  95 4,986 96,553 19.36482 
580 248 Central Fife Lab McLeish,Henry 7.2 1.41  33 74  53                     1  96 3,345 89,889 26.87265 
565 249 Aberavon Lab Morris,John 3.7 0.81  64 42  53                     1  97 2,511 86,864 34.59339 
356 253 Wellingborough Lab Stinchcombe,Paul 4.9 1.04  49 54  51                     1  98 1,603 91,791 57.26201 
508 254 City of Durham Lab Steinberg,Gerry 4.3 0.92  55 48  51                     1  99 1,675 92,948 55.49134 
408 255 Elmet Lab Burgon,Colin 4.5 0.95  53 50  51                     1  100 2,076 90,958 43.81407 
377 256 Scunthorpe Lab Morley,Elliot 5.4 1.11  44 58  51                     1  101 7,587 91,761 12.0945 
544 257 Newport East Lab Howarth,Alan 5.8 1.15  41 60  50                     1  102 5,726 87,458 15.27384 
573 258 Airdrie & Shotts Lab Liddell,Helen 3.5 0.61  69 32  50                     1  103 4,380 89,276 20.38265 
494 260 Barrow and Furness Lab Hutton,John 5.0 0.99  48 52  50                     1  104 2,296 86,774 37.79355 
324 261 Amber Valley Lab Mallaber,Judy 5.7 1.10  42 57  50                     1  105 6,505 78,404 12.05288 
535 264 Wrexham Lab Marek,John 6.3 1.13  38 59  48                     1  106 4,795 79,945 16.67258 
399 265 Sheffield, Hillsborough Lab Jackson,Helen 4.9 0.92  48 48  48                     1  107 4,174 81,718 19.57786 
86 267 Medway Lab Marshall-Andrews,Robert 5.7 1.03  42 54  48                     1  108 14,489 88,581 6.113672 
516 268 Wansbeck Lab Murphy,Dennis 5.9 1.04  41 54  48                     1  109 22,007 80,074 3.63857 
586 271 Cunninghame South Lab Donohoe,Brian 5.8 1.01  41 53  47                     1  110 4,555 84,317 18.51087 
551 273 Bridgend Lab Griffiths,Win 5.4 0.93  44 48  46                     1  111 76,560 87,521 1.143169 
406 274 Colne Valley Lab Mountford,Kali 5.2 0.88  46 46  46                     1  112 3,051 91,352 29.94166 
553 276 Cynon Valley Lab Clwyd,Ann 3.7 0.48  64 25  45                     1  113 4,158 93,160 22.405 
387 277 Barnsley East and Mexborough Lab Ennis,Jeff 6.1 0.93  39 49  44                     1  114 3,590 97,079 27.0415 
592 280 Dunfermline West Lab Squire,Rachel 4.6 0.65  52 34  43                     1  115 66,545 79,674 1.197295 
475 281 Rossendale and Darwen Lab Anderson,Janet 4.4 0.61  54 32  43                     1  116 30,476 95,509 3.133909 
84 283 Gravesham Lab Pond,Chris 9.4 1.15  26 60  43                     1  117 2,931 98,745 33.68987 
481 285 Knowsley North and Sefton East Lab Howarth,George 10.7 1.17  22 61  42                     1  118 32,927 87,980 2.671971 
72 287 Stevenage Lab Follett,Barbara 10.0 1.11  24 58  41                     1  119 17,904 92,383 5.159908 
428 288 Ellesmere Port and Neston Lab Miller,Andrew 7.7 0.95  31 50  40                     1  120 4,913 80,387 16.3621 
355 289 Northampton South Lab Clark,Tony 5.2 0.66  46 35  40                     1  121 4,709 90,068 19.12678 
392 290 Rother Valley Lab Barron,Kevin 5.5 0.70  44 36  40                     1  122 20,572 83,834 4.075151 
260 291 North Swindon Lab Wills,Michael 6.1 0.79  39 41  40                     1  123 24,758 86,199 3.481662 
554 292 Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney Lab Rowlands,Ted 4.8 0.57  50 30  40                     1  124 103,948 84,072 0.808789 
503 294 Redcar Lab Mowlam,Marjorie 3.9 0.35  61 18  40                     1  125 19,894 89,891 4.518498 
595 295 Eastwood Lab Murphy,Jim 4.9 0.58  49 30  39                     1  126 2,795 90,517 32.38533 
542 298 Islwyn Lab Touhig,Don 6.6 0.79  36 41  39                     1  127 5,763 96,076 16.67118 
263 300 South Swindon Lab Drown,Julia 7.0 0.82  34 43  38                     1  128 45,557 78,559 1.724411 
79 301 Dartford Lab Stoate,Howard 9.0 0.96  27 50  38                     1  129 4,915 81,302 16.54161 
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584 302 Cumbernauld & Kilsyth Lab McKenna,Rosemary 6.0 0.68  40 36  38                     1  130 14,522 87,851 6.049511 
341 304 Loughborough Lab Reed,Andrew 6.3 0.70  38 36  37                     1  131 4,384 84,107 19.18499 
269 305 Redditch Lab Smith,Jacqui 9.9 0.96  24 50  37                     1  132 16,403 86,748 5.288545 
556 307 Pontypridd Lab Howells,Kim 6.4 0.70  37 36  37                     1  133 2,642 90,737 34.34406 
599 308 Edinburgh Pentlands Lab Clark,Lynda 8.4 0.84  28 44  36                     1  134 2,684 94,287 35.12928 
500 309 Hartlepool Lab Mandelson,Peter 9.6 0.90  25 47  36                     1  135 2,369 82,911 34.99831 
74 312 Welwyn Hatfield Lab Johnson,Melanie 6.9 0.68  35 35  35                     1  136 3,569 90,232 25.28215 
505 313 Stockton South Lab Taylor,Dari 8.0 0.76  30 40  35                     1  137 3,072 80,518 26.21029 
37 314 Harlow Lab Rammell,Bill 13.0 0.98  18 51  35                     1  138 7,001 84,449 12.06242 
376 317 Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle Lab Johnson,Alan 35.0 1.17  7 61  34                     1  139 6,373 76,960 12.07595 
65 318 Hemel Hempstead Lab McWalter,Tony 8.5 0.74  28 39  33                     1  140 2,908 84,043 28.90062 
30 319 Basildon Lab Smith,Angela 9.6 0.80  25 42  33                     1  141 7,607 85,310 11.21467 
432 320 Warrington North Lab Jones,Helen 10.7 0.84  22 44  33                     1  142 6,178 78,765 12.74927 
502 321 Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland Lab Kumar,Ashok 35.2 1.14  7 59  33                     1  143 6,516 83,848 12.86802 
416 324 Leeds North West Lab Best,Harold 12.1 0.88  20 46  33                     1  144 5,532 89,915 16.25362 
545 326 Newport West Lab Flynn,Paul 7.8 0.67  31 35  33                     1  145 190,754 85,021 0.44571 
621 327 Kirkcaldy Lab Moonie,Lewis 6.6 0.53  36 28  32                     1  146 16,153 88,102 5.454219 
489 328 St. Helens North Lab Watts,Dave 12.1 0.84  20 44  32                     1  147 3,714 80,701 21.72886 
603 329 Falkirk West Lab Canavan,Dennis 6.4 0.49  38 26  32                     1  148 163,399 77,353 0.473399 
347 331 Lincoln Lab Merron,Gillian 18.1 0.95  13 49  31                     1  149 73,643 95,324 1.294407 
517 332 Blaydon Lab McWilliam,John 7.7 0.60  31 31  31                     1  150 15,122 81,782 5.408147 
469 334 Hyndburn Lab Pope,Greg 10.0 0.72  24 38  31                     1  151 72,537 89,428 1.23286 
572 335 Aberdeen South Lab Begg,Anne 9.3 0.68  26 35  31                     1  152 4,049 85,936 21.22401 
329 336 Erewash Lab Blackman,Elizabeth 11.8 0.78  20 41  30                     1  153 2,061 81,565 39.57545 
637 337 Strathkelvin & Bearsden Lab Galbraith,Sam 6.2 0.42  39 22  30                     1  154 2,569 83,173 32.37563 
552 338 Caerphilly Lab Davies,Ron 6.9 0.50  35 26  30                     1  155 6,497 69,148 10.64307 
510 339 North Durham Lab Radice,Giles 8.1 0.59  29 31  30                     1  156 2,284 86,208 37.74431 
433 340 Warrington South Lab Southworth,Helen 10.0 0.68  24 35  30                     1  157 19,169 94,642 4.937242 
422 342 Shipley Lab Leslie,Christopher 9.5 0.64  25 33  29                     1  158 9,348 88,592 9.477107 
420 343 Pontefract and Castleford Lab Cooper,Yvette 12.9 0.77  19 40  29                     1  159 204,462 89,410 0.437294 
509 345 Easington Lab Cummings,John 8.8 0.60  27 31  29                     1  160 116,183 85,313 0.734298 
446 346 Heywood and Middleton Lab Dobbin,Jim 14.0 0.79  17 41  29                     1  161 15,030 91,783 6.106653 
546 347 Torfaen Lab Murphy,Paul 6.9 0.45  35 23  29                     1  162 8,290 83,364 10.05597 
439 348 Bolton West Lab Kelly,Ruth 11.3 0.71  21 37  29                     1  163 15,970 91,415 5.72417 
453 350 Oldham East and Saddleworth Lab Woolas,Phil 8.1 0.53  29 28  28                     1  164 10,199 93,337 9.151583 
372 351 Great Grimsby Lab Mitchell,Austin 32.4 0.94  7 49  28                     1  165 49,572 88,612 1.787541 
466 352 Burnley Lab Pike,Peter 8.2 0.53  29 28  28                     1  166 30,401 87,101 2.86507 
571 353 Aberdeen North Lab Savidge,Malcolm 7.5 0.47  32 25  28                     1  167 21,655 85,046 3.927315 
276 357 Telford Lab Grocott,Bruce 16.4 0.78  15 41  28                     1  168 61,498 82,135 1.335572 
71 359 St. Albans Lab Pollard,Kerry 12.9 0.69  19 36  27                     1  169 27,938 85,279 3.052438 
514 361 Blyth Valley Lab Campbell,Ronnie 11.2 0.62  21 32  27                     1  170 7,196 93,004 12.9244 
357 362 Ashfield Lab Hoon,Geoff 9.2 0.51  26 27  26                     1  171 18,227 91,109 4.998574 
375 363 Kingston upon Hull North Lab McNamara,Kevin 35.1 0.88  7 46  26                     1  172 4,877 91,797 18.82243 
618 364 Hamilton South Lab Robertson,George 9.9 0.54  24 28  26                     1  173 55,209 91,189 1.651705 
493 365 Wirral West Lab Hesford,Stephen 16.7 0.72  14 38  26                     1  174 90,188 101,461 1.124994 
45 366 Thurrock Lab MacKinlay,Andrew 10.9 0.57  22 30  26                     1  175 3,144 93,175 29.63581 
461 367 Worsley Lab Lewis,Terry 15.2 0.68  16 36  26                     1  176 3,824 101,845 26.63311 
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464 368 Blackpool North and Fleetwood Lab Humble,Joan 32.7 0.84  7 44  26                     1  177 8,505 100,174 11.77825 
415 369 Leeds North East Lab Hamilton,Fabian 12.1 0.59  20 31  25                     1  178 129,301 79,935 0.618209 
281 370 Newcastle-under-Lyme Lab Golding,Llin 10.5 0.53  23 27  25                     1  179 4,171 88,159 21.13618 
460 371 Wigan Lab Stott,Roger 15.8 0.67  15 35  25                     1  180 69,986 86,810 1.240391 
271 372 Worcester Lab Foster,Michael 24.6 0.76  10 39  25                     1  181 20,762 85,240 4.105577 
541 373 Blaenau Gwent Lab Smith,Llew 6.7 0.25  36 13  24                     1  182 62,392 91,993 1.474436 
418 374 Morley and Rothwell Lab Gunnell,John 11.2 0.51  21 27  24                     1  183 49,061 93,776 1.911416 
19 375 Milton Keynes South West Lab Starkey,Phyllis 14.0 0.58  17 30  24                     1  184 2,383 85,410 35.84138 
492 376 Wirral South Lab Chapman,Ben 12.1 0.51  20 27  23                     1  185 2,088 95,507 45.7409 
279 377 Cannock Chase Lab Wright,Tony 11.7 0.49  20 26  23                     1  186 2,852 89,576 31.40813 
444 378 Eccles Lab Stewart,Ian 19.4 0.65  12 34  23                     1  187 4,713 85,081 18.05241 
385 379 City of York Lab Bayley,Hugh 33.7 0.74  7 38  23                     1  188 12,790 80,394 6.285692 
401 380 Batley and Spen Lab Wood,Mike 18.5 0.62  13 32  23                     1  189 136,182 84,331 0.619252 
419 381 Normanton Lab O'Brien,William 12.7 0.50  19 26  22                     1  190 4,782 87,349 18.26621 
583 382 Coatbridge & Chryston Lab Clarke,Tom 9.1 0.35  26 18  22                     1  191 57,190 87,721 1.533852 
561 383 Cardiff North Lab Morgan,Julie 16.7 0.57  14 30  22                     1  192 23,576 90,567 3.841491 
480 384 Crosby Lab Curtis-Thomas,Clare 17.2 0.57  14 30  22                     1  193 27,798 80,566 2.898266 
447 385 Leigh Lab Cunliffe,Lawrence 16.2 0.55  15 29  22                     1  194 2,861 97,808 34.18665 
113 387 Crawley Lab Moffatt,Laura 19.8 0.59  12 31  21                     1  195 18,764 97,243 5.182424 
122 390 Peterborough Lab Brinton,Helen 24.7 0.63  10 33  21                     1  196 1,998 87,014 43.55055 
407 391 Dewsbury Lab Taylor,Ann 16.4 0.52  15 27  21                     1  197 2,276 91,758 40.31547 
421 392 Pudsey Lab Truswell,Paul 16.3 0.52  15 27  21                     1  198 3,155 84,750 26.86212 
462 393 Wythenshawe and Sale East Lab Goggins,Paul 26.7 0.62  9 32  21                     1  199 40,779 97,567 2.39258 
230 394 Exeter Lab Bradshaw,Ben 20.5 0.57  12 30  21                     1  200 108,938 87,339 0.801731 
504 396 Stockton North Lab Cook,Frank 9.0 0.28  26 15  21                     1  201 34,179 94,601 2.767811 
557 397 Rhondda Lab Rogers,Allan 7.9 0.20  30 10  20                     1  202 109,362 85,300 0.779978 
440 398 Bury North Lab Chaytor,David 16.4 0.49  15 26  20                     1  203 34,517 95,554 2.768317 
3 399 Luton South Lab Moran,Margaret 16.2 0.49  15 25  20                     1  204 79,510 80,944 1.018035 
361 400 Mansfield Lab Meale,Alan 18.3 0.52  13 27  20                     1  205 19,852 97,330 4.902781 
490 401 St. Helens South Lab Bermingham,Gerry 15.3 0.46  16 24  20                     1  206 83,634 87,070 1.041084 
600 402 Edinburgh South Lab Griffiths,Nigel 29.5 0.61  8 32  20                     1  207 4,954 79,605 16.06883 
519 403 Houghton and Washington East Lab Kemp,Fraser 11.0 0.34  22 18  20                     1  208 2,654 84,616 31.88244 
463 406 Blackburn Lab Straw,Jack 19.9 0.52  12 27  20                     1  209 2,152 95,680 44.46097 
458 407 Stockport Lab Coffey,Ann 38.4 0.62  6 33  19                     1  210 1,723 78,301 45.44457 
400 408 Wentworth Lab Healey,John 10.1 0.28  24 15  19                     1  211 1,665 77,020 46.25826 
524 409 North Tyneside Lab Byers,Stephen 17.8 0.48  13 25  19                     1  212 2,744 102,469 37.34293 
417 410 Leeds West Lab Battle,John 28.9 0.57  8 30  19                     1  213 1,681 69,312 41.2326 
286 412 Stoke-on-Trent North Lab Walley,Joan 14.2 0.40  17 21  19                     1  214 2,373 95,800 40.37084 
374 413 Kingston upon Hull East Lab Prescott,John 34.3 0.59  7 31  19                     1  215 2,379 90,351 37.97856 
616 414 Greenock & Inverclyde Lab Godman,Norman 10.0 0.26  24 13  19                     1  216 1,737 107,119 61.66897 
23 415 Brighton, Kemptown Lab Turner,Desmond 20.8 0.49  11 26  19                     1  217 1,677 70,049 41.77042 
436 418 Ashton under Lyne Lab Sheldon,Robert 32.0 0.54  7 28  18                     1  218 21,885 91,544 4.182956 
166 419 Enfield North Lab Ryan,Joan 24.1 0.49  10 26  18                     1  219 30,100 92,558 3.075017 
208 420 Upminster Lab Darvill,Keith 13.6 0.35  17 18  18                     1  220 7,833 91,725 11.71007 
326 421 Chesterfield Lab Benn,Tony 18.8 0.44  13 23  18                     1  221 2,500 103,882 41.5528 
522 422 Newcastle upon Tyne North Lab Henderson,Doug 12.5 0.31  19 16  18                     1  222 4,067 100,005 24.58938 
520 423 Jarrow Lab Hepburn,Stephen 16.2 0.39  15 20  18                     1  223 3,057 90,031 29.45077 
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411 424 Huddersfield Lab Sheerman,Barry 19.2 0.42  12 22  17                     1  224 2,592 88,266 34.05324 
457 425 Stalybridge and Hyde Lab Pendry,Tom 14.2 0.34  17 18  17                     1  225 2,730 84,344 30.89524 
507 426 Darlington Lab Milburn,Alan 31.6 0.51  8 27  17                     1  226 3,009 85,618 28.45397 
130 427 Norwich South Lab Clarke,Charles 24.5 0.47  10 24  17                     1  227 92,216 88,600 0.960788 
455 428 Rochdale Lab Fitzsimons,Lorna 13.5 0.32  18 17  17                     1  228 142,726 80,170 0.561706 
217 429 Bristol South Lab Primarolo,Dawn 42.7 0.55  6 29  17                     1  229 26,763 80,324 3.001308 
465 432 Blackpool South Lab Marsden,Gordon 41.5 0.52  6 27  16                     1  230 154,953 74,778 0.482585 
359 433 Broxtowe Lab Palmer,Nick 12.9 0.27  18 14  16                     1  231 14,231 102,806 7.224088 
129 434 Norwich North Lab Gibson,Ian 18.2 0.37  13 20  16                     1  232 49,560 81,652 1.647538 
429 436 Halton Lab Twigg,Derek 21.0 0.40  11 21  16                     1  233 8,097 84,643 10.45362 
78 437 Chatham and Aylesford Lab Shaw,Jonathon 59.2 0.53  4 28  16                     1  234 93,250 86,381 0.926338 
581 439 Clydebank & Milngavie Lab Worthington,Tony 10.2 0.16  23 8  16                     1  235 30,134 93,280 3.095507 
34 440 Castle Point Lab Butler,Christine 18.4 0.36  13 19  16                     1  236 19,404 93,381 4.812461 
12 441 Slough Lab Mactaggart,Fiona 36.9 0.48  6 25  16                     1  237 8,205 81,122 9.886898 
27 442 Hove Lab Caplin,Ivor 36.0 0.47  7 25  16                     1  238 28,100 100,133 3.563452 
529 443 Tynemouth Lab Campbell,Alan 30.1 0.44  8 23  15                     1  239 59,961 91,749 1.530145 
1 444 Bedford Lab Hall,Patrick 30.5 0.44  8 23  15                     1  240 3,594 97,063 27.00696 
213 445 Wimbledon Lab Casale,Roger 40.3 0.48  6 25  15                     1  241 40,715 86,346 2.120742 
598 446 Edinburgh North & Leith Lab Chisholm,Malcolm 45.7 0.48  5 25  15                     1  242 15,724 85,448 5.434241 
632 448 Paisley South Lab McMaster,Gordon 17.3 0.29  14 15  15                     1  243 44,916 85,708 1.908184 
11 449 Reading West Lab Salter,Martin 18.3 0.31  13 16  15                     1  244 2,812 81,020 28.81223 
216 450 Bristol North West Lab Naysmith,Douglas 19.0 0.31  13 16  14                     1  245 5,481 77,670 14.17077 
360 451 Gedling Lab Coaker,Vernon 21.1 0.34  11 18  14                     1  246 3,446 92,716 26.9054 
73 454 Watford Lab Ward,Claire 25.7 0.37  9 19  14                     1  247 66,919 84,159 1.257625 
482 455 Knowsley South Lab O'Hara,Eddie 19.4 0.31  12 16  14                     1  248 2,533 83,653 33.02527 
327 456 Derby North Lab Laxton,Robert 29.6 0.39  8 20  14                     1  249 92,355 98,856 1.070391 
232 457 Plymouth, Devonport Lab Jamieson,David 29.9 0.39  8 20  14                     1  250 5,697 90,324 15.85466 
596 458 Edinburgh Central Lab Darling,Alistair 38.8 0.42  6 22  14                     1  251 17,889 86,967 4.861479 
563 459 Cardiff West Lab Morgan,Rhodri 24.2 0.35  10 18  14                     1  252 4,718 77,272 16.37813 
365 460 Nottingham South Lab Simpson,Alan 26.9 0.37  9 19  14                     1  253 34,780 76,207 2.191116 
473 461 Preston Lab Wise,Audrey 26.1 0.36  9 19  14                     1  254 2,567 92,303 35.95754 
404 462 Bradford West Lab Singh,Marsha 27.0 0.36  9 19  14                     1  255 3,033 87,580 28.8757 
459 463 Stretford and Urmston Lab Hughes,Beverley 20.9 0.31  11 16  14                     1  256 1,813 80,951 44.6503 
570 464 Aberdeen Central Lab Doran,Frank 39.9 0.41  6 22  14                     1  257 27,318 99,056 3.626034 
338 465 Leicester East Lab Vaz,Keith 35.8 0.40  7 21  14                     1  258 2,677 85,067 31.77699 
441 466 Bury South Lab Lewis,Ivan 19.8 0.29  12 15  14                     1  259 2,945 87,264 29.63124 
364 468 Nottingham North Lab Allen,Graham 40.3 0.39  6 21  13                     1  260 58,078 79,520 1.369193 
314 470 Stourbridge Lab Shipley,Debra 33.0 0.36  7 19  13                     1  261 2,288 83,568 36.52448 
607 471 Glasgow Cathcart Lab Maxton,John 37.3 0.37  6 19  13                     1  262 2,079 73,407 35.3088 
178 473 Hayes and Harlington Lab McDonnell,John 21.0 0.28  11 14  13                     1  263 2,500 86,609 34.6436 
386 474 Barnsley Central Lab Illsley,Eric 19.6 0.26  12 13  13                     1  264 3,323 81,755 24.60277 
562 475 Cardiff South and Penarth Lab Michael,Alun 21.3 0.27  11 14  13                     1  265 15,248 92,384 6.058762 
626 476 Motherwell & Wishaw Lab Roy,Frank 16.1 0.20  15 11  13                     1  266 10,339 99,753 9.648225 
403 477 Bradford South Lab Sutcliffe,Gerry 22.4 0.28  11 15  13                     1  267 2,945 89,868 30.51545 
589 478 Dundee East Lab McAllion,John 34.4 0.35  7 18  13                     1  268 8,437 96,989 11.49567 
118 479 Cambridge Lab Campbell,Anne 27.2 0.31  9 16  13                     1  269 32,634 91,694 2.809769 
414 480 Leeds East Lab Mudie,George 26.2 0.30  9 16  13                     1  270 31,741 85,044 2.679311 
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251 481 Gloucester Lab Kingham,Tess 24.9 0.30  10 15  12                     1  271 5,187 86,756 16.72566 
409 482 Halifax Lab Mahon,Alice 16.7 0.20  14 10  12                     1  272 49,680 90,632 1.824316 
219 483 Kingswood Lab Berry,Roger 28.1 0.31  8 16  12                     1  273 2,864 77,860 27.18575 
307 484 Coventry North West Lab Robinson,Geoffrey 24.6 0.28  10 15  12                     1  274 4,695 86,560 18.43663 
597 485 Edinburgh East & Musselburgh Lab Strang,Gavin 25.9 0.29  9 15  12                     1  275 79,883 85,244 1.067111 
233 486 Plymouth, Sutton Lab Gilroy,Linda 42.5 0.36  6 19  12                     1  276 5,726 93,848 16.3898 
181 487 Hornchurch Lab Cryer,John 20.9 0.25  11 13  12                     1  277 13,499 91,632 6.788058 
317 488 Walsall South Lab George,Bruce 28.9 0.31  8 16  12                     1  278 18,106 87,724 4.845024 
568 489 Swansea East Lab Anderson,Donald 16.3 0.18  15 9  12                     1  279 6,516 84,577 12.9799 
10 490 Reading East Lab Griffiths,Jane 34.6 0.32  7 17  12                     1  280 13,061 91,179 6.981012 
448 491 Makerfield Lab McCartney,Ian 15.5 0.16  15 8  12                     1  281 10,858 92,484 8.517591 
390 492 Doncaster Central Lab Winterton,Rosie 19.1 0.22  12 11  12                     1  282 17,044 89,060 5.225299 
610 494 Glasgow Maryhill Lab Fyfe,Maria 33.0 0.31  7 16  12                     1  283 9,764 88,741 9.088591 
167 495 Enfield, Southgate Lab Twigg,Stephen 30.5 0.29  8 15  12                     1  284 24,938 86,227 3.457655 
308 496 Coventry South Lab Cunningham,Jim 29.5 0.29  8 15  12                     1  285 46,647 101,349 2.17268 
328 497 Derby South Lab Beckett,Margaret 26.6 0.27  9 14  11                     1  286 3,125 88,530 28.3296 
394 498 Sheffield, Attercliffe Lab Betts,Clive 21.2 0.22  11 12  11                     1  287 1,864 87,550 46.96888 
521 499 Newcastle upon Tyne Central Lab Cousins,Jim 36.7 0.31  7 16  11                     1  288 5,557 90,148 16.22242 
165 500 Eltham Lab Efford,Clive 39.7 0.32  6 17  11                     1  289 42,311 83,235 1.967219 
396 501 Sheffield Central Lab Caborn,Richard 32.4 0.29  7 15  11                     1  290 42,943 81,647 1.901288 
438 502 Bolton South East Lab Iddon,Brian 27.6 0.27  9 14  11                     1  291 94,859 91,540 0.965011 
301 504 Birmingham, Northfield Lab Burden,Richard 41.2 0.32  6 17  11                     1  292 57,204 81,093 1.417611 
62 505 Southampton, Test Lab Whitehead,Alan 41.2 0.32  6 16  11                     1  293 85,592 94,298 1.101715 
617 506 Hamilton North & Bellshill Lab Reid,John 14.6 0.11  16 6  11                     1  294 46,938 85,077 1.81254 
303 507 Birmingham, Selly Oak Lab Jones,Lynne 38.0 0.31  6 16  11                     1  295 48,130 83,306 1.730854 
135 508 Ipswich Lab Cann,Jamie 28.3 0.26  8 14  11                     1  296 96,518 90,461 0.937245 
170 511 Finchley and Golders Green Lab Vis,Rudolph 46.2 0.31  5 16  11                     1  297 61,349 92,325 1.504915 
83 512 Gillingham Lab Clark,Paul 29.6 0.26  8 13  11                     1  298 91,179 96,078 1.053729 
61 514 Southampton, Itchen Lab Denham,John 31.6 0.26  8 13  10                     1  299 4,966 90,498 18.22352 
316 516 Walsall North Lab Winnick,David 36.0 0.27  7 14  10                     1  300 3,637 89,008 24.47292 
164 517 Edmonton Lab Love,Andy 51.5 0.31  5 16  10                     1  301 3,918 96,720 24.68606 
437 518 Bolton North East Lab Crausby,David 25.0 0.22  10 11  10                     1  302 16,852 87,961 5.219618 
323 519 Wolverhampton South West Lab Jones,Jenny 34.6 0.26  7 14  10                     1  303 9,637 90,002 9.339213 
451 520 Manchester, Gorton Lab Kaufman,Gerald 48.8 0.30  5 16  10                     1  304 92,223 92,092 0.99858 
141 521 Battersea Lab Linton,Martin 78.4 0.33  3 17  10                     1  305 6,632 85,272 12.85766 
218 522 Bristol West Lab Davey,Valerie 40.5 0.28  6 14  10                     1  306 57,224 88,461 1.545872 
322 523 Wolverhampton South East Lab Turner,Dennis 35.3 0.26  7 13  10                     1  307 81,466 94,112 1.15523 
201 524 Romford Lab Gordon,Eileen 27.5 0.22  9 11  10                     1  308 89,654 95,966 1.070404 
310 525 Dudley South Lab Pearson,Ian 30.9 0.23  8 12  10                     1  309 66,092 83,236 1.259396 
168 526 Erith and Thamesmead Lab Austin,John 33.9 0.24  7 13  10                     1  310 12,620 93,799 7.432567 
393 527 Rotherham Lab MacShane,Denis 21.7 0.17  11 9  10                     1  311 16,880 93,768 5.554976 
612 528 Glasgow Rutherglen Lab McAvoy,Thomas 24.9 0.19  10 10  10                     1  312 138,686 104,338 0.752333 
285 529 Stoke-on-Trent Central Lab Fisher,Mark 28.8 0.21  8 11  10                     1  313 1,868 82,673 44.25749 
413 530 Leeds Central Lab Fatchett,Derek 25.3 0.19  9 10  10                     1  314 8,755 87,161 9.955568 
523 531 Newcastle upon Tyne East and Wallsend Lab Brown,Nicholas 35.3 0.23  7 12  9                     1  315 77,052 94,914 1.231817 
58 532 Portsmouth North Lab Rapson,Syd 33.3 0.22  7 12  9                     1  316 8,495 92,201 10.85356 
24 533 Brighton, Pavilion Lab Lepper,David 28.5 0.20  8 10  9                     1  317 3,733 95,904 25.69087 
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205 534 Tooting Lab Cox,Tom 82.3 0.30  3 16  9                     1  318 25,239 94,210 3.732715 
479 536 Bootle Lab Benton,Joe 41.0 0.24  6 13  9                     1  319 12,686 87,059 6.862604 
298 537 Birmingham, Hall Green Lab McCabe,Stephen 45.4 0.25  5 13  9                     1  320 20,987 95,302 4.541002 
169 538 Feltham and Heston Lab Keen,Alan 32.1 0.21  7 11  9                     1  321 81,626 99,500 1.218974 
215 539 Bristol East Lab Corston,Jean 38.4 0.23  6 12  9                     1  322 1,724 73,558 42.66705 
491 540 Wallasey Lab Eagle,Angela 37.8 0.22  6 12  9                     1  323 1,107 86,758 78.37218 
155 541 Croydon Central Lab Davies,Geraint 38.7 0.22  6 12  9                     1  324 2,764 95,326 34.48842 
452 542 Manchester, Withington Lab Bradley,Keith 41.4 0.23  6 12  9                     1  325 1,065 98,619 92.6 
148 543 Brentford and Isleworth Lab Keen,Ann 36.6 0.21  7 11  9                     1  326 2,225 81,908 36.81258 
483 544 Liverpool, Garston Lab Eagle,Maria 26.9 0.16  9 8  9                     1  327 1,182 81,293 68.7758 
297 546 Birmingham, Erdington Lab Corbett,Robin 44.5 0.23  5 12  9                     1  328 1,688 73,732 43.68009 
454 547 Oldham West and Royton Lab Meacher,Michael 31.8 0.18  8 10  9                     1  329 1,527 81,542 53.40013 
339 548 Leicester South Lab Marshall,James 45.7 0.22  5 12  8                     1  330 2,851 104,278 36.57594 
631 549 Paisley North Lab Adams,Irene 16.1 0.04  15 2  8                     1  331 3,946 91,257 23.12646 
398 550 Sheffield, Heeley Lab Michie,Bill 37.7 0.20  6 10  8                     1  332 770 79,828 103.6727 
287 551 Stoke-on-Trent South Lab Stevenson,George 26.9 0.15  9 8  8                     1  333 2,580 88,810 34.42248 
518 552 Gateshead East and Washington West Lab Quin,Joyce 31.2 0.17  8 9  8                     1  334 2,035 78,537 38.59312 
311 553 Halesowen and Rowley Regis Lab Heal,Sylvia 28.5 0.16  8 8  8                     1  335 3,424 90,728 26.49766 
321 554 Wolverhampton North East Lab Purchase,Ken 36.5 0.19  7 10  8                     1  336 1,778 100,050 56.27109 
614 555 Glasgow Springburn Lab Martin,Michael 34.9 0.19  7 10  8                     1  337 2,796 108,303 38.73498 
319 556 West Bromwich East Lab Snape,Peter 31.8 0.17  8 9  8                     1  338 1,712 107,977 63.07068 
526 557 Sunderland North Lab Etherington,Bill 35.7 0.18  7 10  8                     1  339 4,127 97,401 23.60092 
443 558 Denton and Reddish Lab Bennett,Andrew 34.2 0.17  7 9  8                     1  340 1,854 79,563 42.91424 
182 560 Hornsey and Wood Green Lab Roche,Barbara 62.0 0.23  4 12  8                     1  341 1,604 95,900 59.78803 
2 561 Luton North Lab Hopkins,Kelvin 47.0 0.20  5 11  8                     1  342 1,846 103,689 56.16956 
605 562 Glasgow Anniesland Lab Dewar,Donald 41.9 0.19  6 10  8                     1  343 2,397 107,301 44.76471 
158 563 Dagenham Lab Church,Judith 42.9 0.19  6 10  8                     1  344 1,908 109,865 57.58124 
177 564 Harrow West Lab Thomas,Gareth 41.0 0.18  6 9  8                     1  345 1,802 96,509 53.5566 
183 565 Ilford North Lab Perham,Linda 44.0 0.19  5 10  8                     1  346 1,648 84,927 51.53337 
296 566 Birmingham, Edgbaston Lab Stuart,Gisela 31.9 0.14  7 7  7                     1  347 1,930 76,560 39.66839 
144 568 Bexleyheath and Crayford Lab Beard,Nigel 36.8 0.16  6 8  7                     1  348 3,670 88,573 24.13433 
305 569 Birmingham, Yardley Lab Morris,Estelle 41.8 0.18  6 9  7                     1  349 2,747 83,917 30.5486 
300 570 Birmingham, Ladywood Lab Short,Clare 37.3 0.16  6 8  7                     1  350 2,628 89,155 33.92504 
304 571 Birmingham, Sparkbrook and Small Heath Lab Godsiff,Roger 61.7 0.21  4 11  7                     1  351 3,046 97,660 32.06172 
193 572 Mitcham and Morden Lab McDonagh,Siobhain 49.8 0.18  5 10  7                     1  352 2,184 100,826 46.16575 
402 573 Bradford North Lab Rooney,Terry 29.9 0.12  8 6  7                     1  353 2,064 87,554 42.41957 
173 574 Hackney South and Shoreditch Lab Sedgemore,Brian 81.9 0.21  3 11  7                     1  354 844 91,775 108.7382 
309 575 Dudley North Lab Cranston,Ross 34.1 0.14  7 7  7                     1  355 1,098 89,879 81.85701 
354 576 Northampton North Lab Keeble,Sally 34.2 0.14  7 7  7                     1  356 1,065 106,649 100.1399 
160 577 Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush Lab Soley,Clive 56.2 0.19  4 10  7                     1  357 1,256 91,039 72.48328 
306 578 Coventry North East Lab Ainsworth,Bob 41.6 0.16  6 8  7                     1  358 2,734 105,567 38.61266 
179 579 Hendon Lab Dismore,Andrew 30.9 0.12  8 6  7                     1  359 2,325 95,342 41.00731 
318 580 Warley Lab Spellar,John 44.7 0.16  5 8  7                     1  360 3,677 77,055 20.95594 
171 581 Greenwich and Woolwich Lab Raynsford,Nick 42.4 0.16  6 8  7                     1  361 3,315 102,397 30.88899 
203 582 Streatham Lab Hill,Keith 87.0 0.21  3 11  7                     1  362 909 79,405 87.35424 
527 583 Sunderland South Lab Mullin,Chris 38.1 0.14  6 7  7                     1  363 3,736 78,050 20.89133 
198 584 Putney Lab Colman,Anthony 56.0 0.17  4 9  7                     1  364 1,656 102,732 62.03623 
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180 585 Holborn and St. Pancras Lab Dobson,Frank 87.4 0.20  3 10  7                     1  365 1,968 86,541 43.97409 
140 586 Barking Lab Hodge,Margaret 42.7 0.14  6 7  6                     1  366 1,651 93,122 56.40339 
569 587 Swansea West Lab Williams,Alan 22.0 0.04  11 2  6                     1  367 727 86,352 118.7785 
590 588 Dundee West Lab Ross,Ernie 32.1 0.10  7 5  6                     1  368 745 77,332 103.8013 
611 589 Glasgow Pollok Lab Davidson,Ian 30.3 0.09  8 5  6                     1  369 942 103,316 109.6773 
613 590 Glasgow Shettleston Lab Marshall,David 40.8 0.12  6 6  6                     1  370 2,761 98,341 35.61789 
340 591 Leicester West Lab Hewitt,Patricia 31.4 0.09  8 5  6                     1  371 1,084 79,128 72.99631 
95 592 Oxford East Lab Smith,Andrew 30.2 0.08  8 4  6                     1  372 1,232 74,936 60.82468 
302 593 Birmingham, Perry Barr Lab Rooker,Jeff 40.4 0.11  6 6  6                     1  373 1,150 78,094 67.90783 
161 594 Ealing North Lab Pound,Stephen 44.8 0.12  5 6  6                     1  374 1,460 85,764 58.74247 
211 595 Walthamstow Lab Gerrard,Neil 55.8 0.14  4 7  6                     1  375 1,706 84,954 49.79719 
176 596 Harrow East Lab McNulty,Tony 38.6 0.10  6 5  6                     1  376 1,201 86,358 71.90508 
484 597 Liverpool, Riverside Lab Ellman,Louise 34.6 0.09  7 5  6                     1  377 2,607 86,991 33.36824 
175 598 Hampstead and Highgate Lab Jackson,Glenda 72.5 0.16  3 8  6                     1  378 8,455 104,283 12.33389 
210 599 Vauxhall Lab Hoey,Kate 100.2 0.17  2 9  6                     1  379 1,989 92,616 46.5641 
206 600 Tottenham Lab Grant,Bernie 72.5 0.15  3 8  6                     1  380 1,403 78,625 56.04063 
174 601 Hammersmith and Fulham Lab Coleman,Iain 100.1 0.17  2 9  6                     1  381 999 115,822 115.9379 
150 602 Camberwell and Peckham Lab Harman,Harriet 103.7 0.16  2 9  5                     1  382 3,772 100,683 26.69221 
197 603 Poplar and Canning Town Lab Fitzpatrick,Jim 46.6 0.11  5 6  5                     1  383 2,827 77,882 27.54935 
363 604 Nottingham East Lab Heppell,John 43.6 0.10  5 5  5                     1  384 4,548 78,445 17.24824 
606 605 Glasgow Baillieston Lab Wray,James 23.2 0.00  10 0  5                     1  385 1,150 100,060 87.0087 
146 606 Brent North Lab Gardiner,Barry 43.7 0.09  5 5  5                     1  386 1,753 80,070 45.67598 
143 607 Bethnal Green and Bow Lab King,Oona 92.6 0.14  3 7  5                     1  387 1,063 87,445 82.26246 
478 608 Birkenhead Lab Field,Frank 38.5 0.07  6 4  5                     1  388 1,366 99,066 72.52269 
395 609 Sheffield, Brightside Lab Blunkett,David 39.6 0.07  6 4  5                     1  389 2,859 97,163 33.98496 
450 611 Manchester, Central Lab Lloyd,Tony 32.6 0.04  7 2  5                     1  390 5,392 73,560 13.64243 
163 612 East Ham Lab Timms,Stephen 53.6 0.10  4 5  5                     1  391 2,754 76,102 27.63326 
525 613 South Shields Lab Clark,David 42.3 0.07  6 4  5                     1  392 1,006 100,826 100.2247 
190 614 Lewisham East Lab Prentice,Bridget 60.8 0.10  4 5  5                     1  393 1,536 85,710 55.80078 
528 616 Tyne Bridge Lab Clelland,David 33.9 0.04  7 2  4                     1  394 1,146 84,157 73.43543 
449 617 Manchester, Blackley Lab Stringer,Graham 34.7 0.04  7 2  4                     1  395 2,070 83,516 40.34589 
189 619 Lewisham, Deptford Lab Ruddock,Joan 73.0 0.10  3 5  4                     1  396 6,565 109,498 16.67906 
501 620 Middlesbrough Lab Bell,Stuart 34.9 0.03  7 2  4                     1  397 54,337 82,165 1.512137 
191 621 Lewisham West Lab Dowd,Jim 67.9 0.09  4 5  4                     1  398 57,816 92,331 1.59698 
184 622 Ilford South Lab Gapes,Mike 56.4 0.08  4 4  4                     1  399 21,505 103,240 4.800744 
159 623 Dulwich and West Norwood Lab Jowell,Tessa 59.8 0.08  4 4  4                     1  400 55,343 99,118 1.790976 
172 624 Hackney North and Stoke Newington Lab Abbott,Diane 108.7 0.11  2 6  4                     1  401 63,272 99,916 1.57915 
147 625 Brent South Lab Boateng,Paul 53.4 0.06  4 3  4                     1  402 17,955 88,555 4.932052 
485 626 Liverpool, Walton Lab Kilfoyle,Peter 57.3 0.07  4 4  4                     1  403 52,327 80,639 1.541059 
560 627 Cardiff Central Lab Owen Jones,Jon 41.0 0.03  6 2  4                     1  404 4,973 80,766 16.2409 
486 628 Liverpool, Wavertree Lab Kennedy,Jane 55.5 0.06  4 3  4                     1  405 9,875 100,465 10.17367 
162 629 Ealing, Southall Lab Khabra,Piara 57.6 0.06  4 3  4                     1  406 3,999 83,134 20.7887 
609 630 Glasgow Kelvin Lab Galloway,George 47.2 0.04  5 2  4                     1  407 2,811 80,248 28.54785 
487 631 Liverpool, West Derby Lab Wareing,Robert 43.8 0.04  5 2  4                     1  408 84,611 78,218 0.924442 
192 632 Leyton and Wanstead Lab Cohen,Harry 58.7 0.06  4 3  4                     1  409 27,688 91,174 3.292907 
299 633 Birmingham, Hodge Hill Lab Davis,Terry 46.3 0.04  5 2  4                     1  410 1,593 94,378 59.24545 
185 634 Islington North Lab Corbyn,Jeremy 118.8 0.09  2 5  3                     1  411 17,736 88,906 5.012742 
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145 635 Brent East Lab Livingstone,Ken 68.8 0.06  3 3  3                     1  412 66,388 93,353 1.406173 
608 636 Glasgow Govan Lab Sarwar,Mohammad 36.2 0.00  7 0  3                     1  413 4,418 87,644 19.83794 
456 637 Salford Lab Blears,Hazel 38.0 0.00  6 0  3                     1  414 9,886 88,622 8.964394 
156 638 Croydon North Lab Wicks,Malcolm 63.1 0.04  4 2  3                     1  415 21,637 90,151 4.16652 
199 639 Regent's Park and Kensington North Lab Buck,Karen 115.9 0.07  2 4  3                     1  416 34,927 96,749 2.770035 
212 640 West Ham Lab Banks,Tony 73.4 0.03  3 2  3                     1  417 25,988 93,626 3.602663 
186 641 Islington South and Finsbury Lab Smith,Chris 103.8 0.03  2 2  2                     1  418 5,598 90,233 16.11879 
497 13 Penrith and The Border Con Maclean,David 0.2 12.74  972 664  818    419 7,228 88,966 12.30852 
515 19 Hexham Con Atkinson,Peter 0.3 7.11  800 371  585    420 7,512 88,549 11.78767 
267 22 Leominster Con Temple-Morris,Peter 0.6 12.80  425 667  546    421 5,160 96,663 18.73314 
273 23 Ludlow Con Gill,Christopher 0.5 11.18  495 583  539    422 8,065 96,084 11.9137 
379 25 Richmond Yorks Con Hague,William 26.7 0.47  9 24  17    423 6,350 84,714 13.34079 
383 26 Skipton and Ripon Con Curry,David 0.4 8.54  546 445  495    424 40,315 87,245 2.164083 
380 31 Ryedale Con Greenway,John 0.5 8.85  504 461  483    425 35,546 91,486 2.573735 
348 32 Louth and Horncastle Con Tapsell,Peter 0.6 10.46  385 545  465    426 3,224 95,358 29.57754 
350 33 South Holland and The Deepings Con Hayes,John 1.0 12.40  234 647  441    427 3,668 89,609 24.42993 
236 36 Tiverton and Honiton Con Browning,Angela 0.8 10.40  286 542  414    428 9,885 92,454 9.352959 
345 37 Gainsborough Con Leigh,Edward 0.6 8.00  386 417  402    429 19,218 95,943 4.992351 
498 39 Westmorland and Lonsdale Con Collins,Tim 0.5 6.64  440 346  393    430 13,269 93,399 7.038888 
371 40 East Yorkshire Con Townend,John 0.8 9.17  295 478  387    431 4,769 90,924 19.06563 
384 41 Vale of York Con McIntosh,Anne 0.7 8.51  325 444  384    432 58,506 87,080 1.488394 
132 42 South West Norfolk Con Shephard,Gillian 0.8 8.53  317 445  381    433 45,613 92,703 2.032381 
247 44 West Dorset Con Letwin,Oliver 0.8 8.43  300 440  370    434 2,372 85,364 35.9882 
249 48 Cotswold Con Clifton-Brown,Geoffrey 0.7 6.77  354 353  353    435 38,234 124,577 3.258278 
274 49 North Shropshire Con Paterson,Owen 0.9 8.38  258 437  347    436 39,080 78,841 2.017426 
127 50 North Norfolk Con Prior,David 0.9 8.41  255 439  347    437 15,788 86,499 5.478781 
344 51 Boston and Skegness Con Body,Richard 1.3 9.30  179 485  332    438 28,708 92,701 3.2291 
244 52 North Dorset Con Walter,Robert 0.9 7.39  260 385  323    439 14,627 83,920 5.737335 
349 54 Sleaford and North Hykeham Con Hogg,Douglas 0.8 6.40  306 334  320    440 15,238 90,879 5.963972 
427 58 Eddisbury Con Goodlad,Alastair 1.2 7.56  206 394  300    441 6,478 90,497 13.9699 
120 59 North East Cambridgeshire Con Moss,Malcolm 1.1 7.34  217 383  300    442 36,881 88,242 2.392614 
134 61 Central Suffolk and North Ipswich Con Lord,Michael 1.1 6.93  224 361  293    443 39,532 82,784 2.094101 
131 62 South Norfolk Con MacGregor,John 1.1 6.91  223 360  292    444 36,804 77,268 2.099446 
126 64 Mid Norfolk Con Simpson,Keith 1.0 6.13  247 320  284    445 61,199 93,071 1.520793 
368 66 Beverley and Holderness Con Cran,James 1.1 6.32  209 330  269    446 36,003 89,619 2.489209 
343 67 Rutland and Melton Con Duncan,Alan 0.8 4.45  298 232  265    447 24,309 85,833 3.530914 
259 68 Devizes Con Ancram,Michael 1.0 5.31  243 277  260    448 8,811 89,747 10.18579 
17 73 Buckingham Con Bercow,John 0.9 4.84  258 252  255    449 22,373 91,692 4.098333 
43 74 Saffron Walden Con Haselhurst,Alan 1.0 5.17  239 270  254    450 2,813 84,883 30.17526 
239 75 Totnes Con Steen,Anthony 1.3 6.25  178 326  252    451 11,448 93,092 8.131726 
333 77 West Derbyshire Con McLoughlin,Patrick 1.0 5.11  229 267  248    452 2,501 83,406 33.34906 
293 78 Stratford-on-Avon Con Maples,John 1.1 4.95  223 258  241    453 1,498 91,291 60.94192 
268 79 Mid Worcestershire Con Luff,Peter 1.6 6.42  145 335  240    454 2,603 89,975 34.56589 
254 81 Bridgwater Con King,Tom 1.2 5.31  197 277  237    455 5,043 92,239 18.2905 
110 82 Arundel and South Downs Con Flight,Howard 1.5 6.03  158 314  236    456 11,070 82,217 7.42701 
124 84 South East Cambridgeshire Con Paice,James 1.2 4.93  207 257  232    457 42,233 83,515 1.977482 
22 85 Bexhill and Battle Con Wardle,Charles 1.5 5.90  155 308  231    458 9,342 90,184 9.653607 
362 
 
288 88 Stone Con Cash,Bill 1.3 5.04  190 263  226    459 23,716 86,095 3.63025 
112 90 Chichester Con Tyrie,Andrew 1.4 5.25  170 274  222    460 19,995 86,003 4.301225 
474 91 Ribble Valley Con Evans,Nigel 1.3 5.02  180 262  221    461 2,554 94,253 36.90407 
270 93 West Worcestershire Con Spicer,Michael 1.4 5.08  174 265  220    462 14,374 79,756 5.548629 
139 95 West Suffolk Con Spring,Richard 1.2 4.53  196 237  216    463 25,149 92,869 3.692751 
257 96 Wells Con Heathcoat-Amory,David 1.5 5.21  160 272  216    464 2,949 93,183 31.59817 
137 97 Suffolk Coastal Con Gummer,John 1.2 4.51  194 235  214    465 2,195 90,383 41.17677 
262 98 Salisbury Con Key,Robert 1.1 3.85  210 201  205    466 5,647 89,987 15.93536 
40 100 North Essex Con Jenkin,Bernard 1.7 5.21  138 272  205    467 10,809 96,665 8.94301 
352 101 Daventry Con Boswell,Tim 1.1 3.75  212 196  204    468 34,736 81,885 2.357353 
373 103 Haltemprice and Howden Con Davis,David 1.7 5.08  138 265  202    469 20,358 85,567 4.203114 
76 104 Ashford Con Green,Damian 1.6 4.83  149 252  201    470 58,849 89,602 1.522575 
136 105 South Suffolk Con Yeo,Tim 1.3 4.05  190 211  200    471 58,133 99,856 1.717716 
346 108 Grantham and Stamford Con Davies,Quentin 1.2 3.58  192 187  190    472 65,870 96,386 1.463276 
261 109 North Wiltshire Con Gray,James 1.4 3.88  172 202  187    473 14,451 89,805 6.214449 
29 110 Wealden Con Johnson Smith,Geoffrey 1.7 4.44  139 231  185    474 72,855 93,809 1.287612 
5 111 North East Bedfordshire Con Lyell,Nicholas 1.4 3.77  168 196  182    475 9,880 93,566 9.470243 
229 113 East Devon Con Emery,Peter 1.8 4.40  130 229  180    476 13,843 87,939 6.352597 
235 116 Teignbridge Con Nicholls,Patrick 1.6 3.93  148 205  176    477 3,020 85,812 28.41457 
98 117 Witney Con Woodward,Shaun 1.3 3.20  185 167  176    478 14,545 97,238 6.685321 
121 118 North West Cambridgeshire Con Mawhinney,Brian 1.5 3.58  159 187  173    479 8,320 87,091 10.46767 
264 120 Westbury Con Faber,David 1.6 3.57  152 186  169    480 2,400 77,201 32.16708 
133 122 Bury St. Edmunds Con Ruffley,David 1.8 3.92  131 204  168    481 2,281 74,101 32.48619 
97 123 Wantage Con Jackson,Robert 1.5 3.08  157 161  159    482 73,394 88,925 1.211611 
81 124 Faversham and Mid Kent Con Rowe,Andrew 2.2 3.97  110 207  159    483 2,403 92,232 38.38202 
94 125 Henley Con Heseltine,Michael 1.5 2.87  160 150  155    484 5,050 95,986 19.00713 
123 127 South Cambridgeshire Con Lansley,Andrew 1.5 2.77  154 144  149    485 2,406 102,665 42.67041 
60 130 Romsey Con Colvin,Michael 2.0 3.20  121 167  144    486 2,377 96,237 40.48675 
115 133 Horsham Con Maude,Francis 2.0 3.07  117 160  139    487 3,489 86,996 24.93437 
39 134 Maldon and East Chelmsford Con Whittingdale,John 2.0 2.96  121 154  138    488 11,387 80,938 7.10793 
93 136 Banbury Con Baldry,Tony 1.8 2.70  133 141  137    489 120,643 81,422 0.6749 
55 137 New Forest West Con Swayne,Desmond 2.1 3.01  114 157  135    490 103,792 101,803 0.980837 
4 138 Mid Bedfordshire Con Sayeed,Jonathan 1.9 2.73  126 142  134    491 44,837 82,041 1.829761 
69 139 North East Hertfordshire Con Heald,Oliver 1.8 2.57  132 134  133    492 4,777 98,125 20.54113 
91 144 Tonbridge and Malling Con Stanley,John 2.4 2.89  101 150  126    493 23,428 89,739 3.830417 
253 147 Tewkesbury Con Robertson,Lawrence 2.2 2.62  106 137  121    494 61,930 79,694 1.28684 
103 149 Mole Valley Con Beresford,Paul 2.4 2.69  100 140  120    495 4,074 101,608 24.9406 
82 150 Folkestone and Hythe Con Howard,Michael 2.6 2.81  93 146  120    496 3,455 97,234 28.14298 
85 151 Maidstone and The Weald Con Widdecombe,Ann 3.2 3.13  74 163  118    497 17,052 83,704 4.90875 
234 153 South West Devon Con Streeter,Gary 2.1 2.36  111 123  117    498 129,583 98,981 0.763842 
56 157 North East Hampshire Con Arbuthnot,James 2.5 2.55  96 133  115    499 124,250 89,537 0.72062 
54 158 New Forest East Con Lewis,Julian 2.1 2.19  114 114  114    500 88,644 81,335 0.917547 
425 159 Congleton Con Winterton,Ann 4.0 3.22  59 168  114    501 13,641 83,866 6.148083 
49 161 East Hampshire Con Mates,Michael 2.8 2.69  86 140  113    502 67,210 93,400 1.389674 
77 163 Canterbury Con Brazier,Julian 3.3 2.90  72 151  112    503 43,002 97,347 2.263778 
366 165 Rushcliffe Con Clarke,Kenneth 2.4 2.22  100 116  108    504 3,466 103,642 29.90248 
119 168 Huntingdon Con Major,John 2.2 1.96  110 102  106    505 2,062 87,719 42.54074 
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246 170 South Dorset Con Bruce,Ian 2.3 2.01  104 105  104    506 3,202 79,840 24.93442 
48 171 Basingstoke Con Hunter,Andrew 1.6 1.09  151 57  104    507 60,559 89,711 1.481382 
282 178 South Staffordshire Con Cormack,Patrick 2.1 1.67  113 87  100    508 88,166 100,246 1.137014 
33 180 Brentwood and Ongar Con Pickles,Eric 2.7 2.11  89 110  100    509 35,313 93,013 2.633959 
57 181 North West Hampshire Con Young,George 4.1 2.68  58 140  99    510 37,449 86,053 2.297872 
280 182 Lichfield Con Fabricant,Michael 3.0 2.15  80 112  96    511 81,193 94,423 1.162945 
334 183 Blaby Con Robathan,Andrew 2.9 2.06  83 107  95    512 13,127 91,664 6.98286 
430 184 Macclesfield Con Winterton,Nicholas 3.1 2.19  76 114  95    513 40,118 86,085 2.145795 
106 185 South West Surrey Con Bottomley,Virginia 3.7 2.40  65 125  95    514 42,846 96,165 2.244434 
468 187 Fylde Con Jack,Michael 3.7 2.38  64 124  94    515 80,827 98,075 1.213394 
265 190 Bromsgrove Con Kirkbride,Julie 4.2 2.40  57 125  91    516 60,637 97,915 1.614773 
223 197 Woodspring Con Fox,Liam 3.9 1.89  61 99  80    517 36,733 82,485 2.245529 
335 198 Bosworth Con Tredinnick,David 3.1 1.55  78 81  79    518 111,808 93,353 0.83494 
111 200 Bognor Regis and Littlehampton Con Gibb,Nicolas 16.2 2.73  15 142  78    519 3,720 91,047 24.475 
88 207 Sevenoaks Con Fallon,Michael 3.6 1.59  66 83  74    520 211,718 94,473 0.446221 
41 208 Rayleigh Con Clark,Michael 5.2 1.96  46 102  74    521 64,323 86,013 1.337204 
99 211 East Surrey Con Ainsworth,Peter 3.6 1.47  66 77  71    522 61,865 95,571 1.544831 
337 215 Harborough Con Garnier,Edward 4.1 1.54  58 81  69    523 28,545 86,410 3.02715 
68 220 Hitchin and Harpenden Con Lilley,Peter 3.5 1.28  69 67  68    524 59,343 88,792 1.496251 
92 221 Tunbridge Wells Con Norman,Archie 4.2 1.51  57 79  68    525 103,509 82,398 0.796047 
102 225 Guildford Con St Aubyn,Nick 5.0 1.62  48 84  66    526 60,658 95,335 1.571681 
87 231 North Thanet Con Gale,Roger 10.2 1.97  23 103  63    527 15,110 89,969 5.954269 
243 232 Mid Dorset and North Poole Con Fraser,Christopher 4.9 1.49  49 78  63    528 22,318 87,503 3.920737 
8 236 Maidenhead Con May,Theresa 5.5 1.40  44 73  58    529 95,605 91,563 0.957722 
46 239 West Chelmsford Con Burns,Simon 4.5 1.15  53 60  56    530 17,692 65,781 3.718121 
116 245 Mid Sussex Con Soames,Nicholas 6.0 1.30  40 68  54    531 15,606 73,494 4.709343 
36 250 Epping Forest Con Laing,Eleanor 6.8 1.36  35 71  53    532 10,855 72,254 6.656287 
66 251 Hertford and Stortford Con Wells,Bowen 5.2 1.14  46 59  52    533 300,474 64,775 0.215576 
16 252 Beaconsfield Con Grieve,Dominic 4.9 1.08  48 56  52    534 13,923 75,527 5.424621 
242 259 Christchurch Con Chope,Christopher 7.1 1.27  34 66  50    535 89,277 59,105 0.662041 
117 262 Worthing West Con Bottomley,Peter 28.4 1.73  8 90  49    536 12,506 85,822 6.862466 
14 263 Wokingham Con Redwood,John 6.4 1.15  38 60  49    537 1,682 68,931 40.98157 
336 266 Charnwood Con Dorrell,Stephen 5.0 0.92  48 48  48    538 4,251 71,067 16.71771 
21 269 Wycombe Con Whitney,Ray 6.7 1.13  36 59  47    539 3,938 83,705 21.25571 
18 270 Chesham and Amersham Con Gillan,Cheryl 5.0 0.89  48 46  47    540 3,211 77,667 24.18779 
15 272 Aylesbury Con Lidington,David 4.8 0.85  50 44  47    541 163,759 66,375 0.405321 
108 275 Surrey Heath Con Hawkins,Nick 8.9 1.23  27 64  45    542 96,317 69,183 0.718284 
70 279 South West Hertfordshire Con Page,Richard 5.6 0.84  43 44  43    543 179,005 63,094 0.352471 
312 284 Meriden Con Spelman,Caroline 7.2 1.00  33 52  43    544 85,093 68,216 0.801664 
104 286 Reigate Con Blunt,Crispin 7.4 0.96  32 50  41    545 83,376 66,449 0.79698 
6 293 South West Bedfordshire Con Madel,David 7.4 0.91  32 48  40    546 30,120 65,532 2.175697 
13 296 Windsor Con Trend,Michael 6.2 0.76  38 40  39    547 17,556 65,171 3.712178 
42 299 Rochford and Southend East Con Taylor,Teddy 9.3 0.99  26 51  38    548 27,979 67,850 2.425033 
109 303 Woking Con Malins,Humfrey 9.5 0.96  25 50  38    549 29,856 72,150 2.4166 
51 310 Fareham Con Lloyd,Peter 13.3 1.03  18 54  36    550 10,058 66,177 6.579539 
105 311 Runnymede and Weybridge Con Hammond,Philip 9.7 0.87  25 45  35    551 23,743 74,698 3.146106 
67 322 Hertsmere Con Clappison,James 9.1 0.76  26 40  33    552 196,011 41,666 0.21257 
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101 323 Esher and Walton Con Taylor,Ian 11.9 0.88  20 46  33    553 16,140 76,895 4.76425 
7 325 Bracknell Con Mackay,Andrew 10.2 0.81  23 42  33    554 82,902 74,989 0.90455 
435 341 Altrincham and Sale West Con Brady,Graham 17.4 0.87  14 46  30    555 205,121 52,692 0.256883 
64 344 Broxbourne Con Roe,Marion 16.7 0.85  14 44  29    556 26,473 72,455 2.73694 
114 349 East Worthing and Shoreham Con Loughton,Tim 16.1 0.81  15 42  29    557 12,317 71,932 5.840058 
196 354 Orpington Con Horam,John 12.3 0.71  19 37  28    558 9,788 76,348 7.800163 
31 355 Billericay Con Gorman,Teresa 11.5 0.68  21 36  28    559 18,262 69,154 3.78677 
25 358 Eastbourne Con Waterson,Nigel 12.3 0.68  19 36  28    560 12,914 83,188 6.441691 
53 360 Havant Con Willetts,David 19.1 0.79  13 41  27    561 114,968 70,193 0.610544 
107 386 Spelthorne Con Wilshire,David 15.9 0.54  15 28  21    562 9,958 78,344 7.867443 
100 388 Epsom and Ewell Con Hamilton,Archie 18.7 0.57  13 30  21    563 4,866 79,231 16.28257 
52 404 Gosport Con Viggers,Peter 24.4 0.57  10 30  20    564 3,258 71,811 22.04144 
202 405 Ruislip-Northwood Con Wilkinson,John 17.2 0.49  14 26  20    565 11,732 80,512 6.862598 
47 411 Aldershot Con Howarth,Gerald 16.7 0.45  14 24  19    566 19,848 66,815 3.366334 
245 416 Poole Con Syms,Robert 24.9 0.51  10 26  18    567 28,728 91,410 3.181913 
442 417 Cheadle Con Day,Stephen 23.5 0.49  10 26  18    568 10,297 65,266 6.338351 
153 431 Chipping Barnet Con Chapman,Sydney 26.5 0.46  9 24  17    569 71,804 69,149 0.963024 
241 435 Bournemouth West Con Butterfill,John 32.5 0.48  7 25  16    570 1,574 62,782 39.87678 
313 452 Solihull Con Taylor,John M 27.0 0.38  9 20  14    571 9,003 67,529 7.500947 
149 453 Bromley and Chislehurst Con Forth,Eric 23.1 0.35  10 18  14    572 8,050 74,574 9.264116 
240 467 Bournemouth East Con Atkinson,David 32.2 0.37  7 20  13    573 22,556 78,438 3.477528 
315 469 Sutton Coldfield Con Fowler,Norman 15.9 0.22  15 11  13    574 72,356 76,015 1.050574 
157 472 Croydon South Con Ottaway,Richard 23.6 0.30  10 16  13    575 664,328 65,140 0.098054 
295 493 Aldridge-Brownhills Con Shepherd,Richard 16.1 0.16  15 8  12    576 15,094 69,378 4.59642 
142 509 Beckenham Con Merchant,Piers 34.5 0.29  7 15  11    577 119,804 75,811 0.632792 
44 510 Southend West Con Amess,David 44.3 0.32  5 16  11    578 824,205 53,472 0.064877 
152 515 Chingford and Woodford Green Con Duncan-Smith,Iain 38.6 0.28  6 15  10    579 196,763 85,874 0.436433 
187 559 Kensington and Chelsea Con Clark,Alan 109.7 0.26  2 14  8    580 10,416 75,075 7.20771 
195 567 Old Bexley and Sidcup Con Heath,Edward 33.4 0.15  7 8  7    581 6,509 66,541 10.22245 
154 615 Cities of London and Westminster Con Brooke,Peter 56.3 0.10  4 5  5    582 138,752 81,054 0.584166 
431 126 Tatton Ind Bell,Martin 2.4 4.00  101 209  155    583 7,731 70,305 9.094378 
578 1 Caithness, Sutherland & Easter Ross LDem Maclennan,Robert 0.1 8.97  3,679 468  2,073    584 10,472 62,412 5.959722 
634 2 Ross, Skye & Inverness West LDem Kennedy,Charles 0.1 7.58  3,099 395  1,747    585 76,884 70,552 0.917645 
575 3 Argyll & Bute LDem Michie,Ray 0.1 12.49  2,434 651  1,543    586 11,369 66,323 5.833552 
630 8 Orkney & Shetland LDem Wallace,James 0.2 13.74  1,407 717  1,062    587 52,444 77,173 1.471541 
558 9 Brecon and Radnorshire LDem Livsey,Richard 0.2 13.13  1,107 685  896    588 199,784 80,895 0.404911 
559 10 Montgomeryshire LDem Opik,Lembit 0.3 15.96  929 832  881    589 2,181 75,027 34.4069 
635 12 Roxburgh & Berwickshire LDem Kirkwood,Archy 0.2 11.94  1,058 623  840    590 2,302 73,946 32.11873 
639 14 West Aberdeenshire & Kincardine LDem Smith,Robert 0.2 6.41  1,097 334  715    591 20,441 66,225 3.239863 
513 17 Berwick-upon-Tweed LDem Beith,Alan 0.3 9.48  787 494  641    592 14,992 68,265 4.553507 
238 18 Torridge and West Devon LDem Burnett,John 0.4 12.25  535 639  587    593 28,406 81,160 2.857171 
615 20 Gordon LDem Bruce,Malcolm 0.4 9.67  662 504  583    594 66,908 70,652 1.055962 
638 21 Tweeddale, Ettrick & Lauderdale LDem Moore,Michael 0.3 5.29  847 276  561    595 17,448 85,344 4.891399 
225 38 North Cornwall LDem Tyler,Paul 0.8 9.19  312 480  396    596 1,670 64,883 38.84675 
231 43 North Devon LDem Harvey,Nick 0.7 8.10  331 423  377    597 2,799 72,583 25.93185 
227 55 St. Ives LDem George,Andrew 1.5 8.51  161 444  302    598 1,556 71,021 45.65711 
627 57 North East Fife LDem Campbell,Menzies 0.9 6.24  275 326  300    599 9,154 76,762 8.385294 
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226 69 South East Cornwall LDem Breed,Colin 1.2 6.04  205 315  260    600 2,357 69,476 29.48246 
266 71 Hereford LDem Keetch,Paul 1.0 5.18  248 270  259    601 9,687 77,485 7.998592 
255 83 Somerton and Frome LDem Heath,David 2.6 7.23  91 377  234    602 18,919 72,352 3.824279 
256 87 Taunton LDem Ballard,Jackie 1.2 5.03  197 262  229    603 10,813 68,793 6.3623 
258 89 Yeovil LDem Ashdown,Paddy 1.0 3.85  249 201  225    604 443,584 66,910 0.150839 
63 106 Winchester LDem Oaten,Mark 1.5 4.34  163 226  195    605 1,598 66,967 41.90387 
228 112 Truro and St. Austell LDem Taylor,Matthew 1.5 4.03  154 210  182    606 3,103 71,829 23.15056 
28 129 Lewes LDem Baker,Norman 2.0 3.32  118 173  146    607 1,824 67,950 37.2539 
9 131 Newbury LDem Rendel,David 1.5 2.49  157 130  143    608 1,784 64,648 36.23279 
220 141 Northavon LDem Webb,Steven 2.3 2.90  105 151  128    609 1,244 58,716 47.2005 
75 177 Isle of Wight LDem Brand,Peter 3.3 2.43  73 127  100    610 2,008 66,275 33.00104 
222 204 Weston-Super-Mare LDem Cotter,Brian 6.0 2.10  40 110  75    611 2,269 68,684 30.26994 
488 278 Southport LDem Fearn,Ronnie 20.4 1.45  12 75  44    612 2,691 67,106 24.93618 
601 282 Edinburgh West LDem Gorrie,Donald 8.0 1.07  30 56  43    613 1,490 60,768 40.78964 
50 297 Eastleigh LDem Chidgey,David 11.8 1.11  20 58  39    614 2,000 69,910 34.94819 
378 306 Harrogate and Knaresborough LDem Willis,Phil 16.5 1.14  14 59  37    615 203,602 73,402 0.360518 
445 315 Hazel Grove LDem Stunell,Andrew 14.2 0.98  17 51  34    616 6,525 64,967 9.957056 
214 316 Bath LDem Foster,Don 10.5 0.87  23 45  34    617 4,787 70,112 14.64566 
96 330 Oxford West and Abingdon LDem Harris,Evan 8.1 0.65  29 34  32    618 6,241 61,797 9.902477 
237 333 Torbay LDem Sanders,Adrian 24.5 1.00  10 52  31    619 872,835 79,809 0.091437 
35 356 Colchester LDem Russell,Robert 16.4 0.79  15 41  28    620 37,493 79,861 2.130034 
248 389 Cheltenham LDem Jones,Nigel 24.9 0.63  10 33  21    621 9,759 64,746 6.634369 
397 395 Sheffield, Hallam LDem Allan,Richard 10.6 0.36  22 19  21    622 19,687 67,177 3.412229 
200 430 Richmond Park LDem Tonge,Jenny 0.4 8.87  535 463  499    623 23,144 76,795 3.31807 
188 438 Kingston and Surbiton LDem Davey,Edward 35.6 0.48  7 25  16    624 26,287 61,185 2.327589 
151 447 Carshalton and Wallington LDem Brake,Thomas 34.4 0.45  7 23  15    625 192,647 75,776 0.39334 
204 503 Sutton and Cheam LDem Burstow,Paul 45.7 0.33  5 17  11    626 4,225 68,076 16.1132 
207 513 Twickenham LDem Cable,Vincent 34.0 0.28  7 14  11    627 77,015 66,888 0.868509 
59 545 Portsmouth South LDem Hancock,Mike 60.9 0.26  4 13  9    628 525,735 75,527 0.14366 
194 618 North Southwark and Bermondsey LDem Hughes,Simon 71.9 0.10  3 5  4    629 43,618 70,178 1.608916 
549 11 Meirionnydd Nant Conwy PC Llwyd,Elfyn 0.2 11.25  1,123 587  855    630 248,337 42,134 0.169664 
538 15 Ceredigion PC Dafis,Cynog 0.4 14.18  677 740  708    631 3,953 63,654 16.10466 
547 46 Caernarfon PC Wigley,Dafydd 0.7 6.87  360 358  359    632 3,889 67,284 17.30182 
550 60 Ynys Mon PC Jones,Ieuan Wyn 1.0 6.53  248 341  294    633 140,459 74,006 0.526887 
604 6 Galloway & Upper Nithsdale SNP Morgan,Alasdair 0.2 17.14  1,582 894  1,238    634 918,319 70,723 0.077014 
628 7 North Tayside SNP Swinney,John 0.1 9.23  1,661 481  1,071    635 258,826 58,393 0.225607 
625 24 Moray SNP Ewing,Margaret 0.4 7.67  607 400  503    636 217,611 65,661 0.301735 
577 29 Banff & Buchan SNP Salmond,Alex 0.6 11.53  377 601  489    637 13,484 82,998 6.15535 
633 45 Perth SNP Cunningham,Roseanna 0.5 5.47  453 285  369    638 224,597 63,314 0.2819 
574 86 Angus SNP Welsh,Andrew 1.1 4.45  227 232  230    639 340,079 74,014 0.217638 
320 610 West Bromwich West SPK Boothroyd,Betty 29.6 0.03  8 2  5    640 27,867 67,410 2.419014 
209 535 Uxbridge  Vacant 27.6 0.19  9 10  9    641 313,362 29,600 0.09446 
                 
                            418      
  Scotland (a)   0.63 2.92  377 153  265   7,885,703 4,998,567 0.633877 
  Great Britain   2.39 1.92  100 100  100   22,998,553 54,888,844 2.386622 
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  England   3.61 1.78  66 93  80   13,037,186 47,055,204 3.609307 
  Wales   1.37 3.48  175 181  178   2,075,664 2,835,073 1.365863 
              -162,966   
                 
                 
                 
 Note: (a) figures for Scottish constituencies include inland water (lochs, etc.).            
                 
 Sources: ONS New Parliamentary Constituencies - Monitors (November 1996)            
  House of Commons Library Election Database             
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Appendix 2  
Non-traditional English rural seats won by New Labour in 1997 and 
subsequent results in 2001, 2005 & 2010 (* indicates seats already held in 
1997) 
1997 constituency     2001  2005  2010 
Amber Valley     W  W  L 
Batley & Spen     W  W  W 
Braintree      L  L  L 
Brigg & Goole     W  W  L 
Broxtowe      W  W  L 
Burton      W  W  L 
Calder Valley     W  W  L 
Castle Point      L  L  L 
Chatham & Aylesford    W  W  L 
Chorley      W  W  W 
Cleethorpes      W  W  L 
Colne Valley      W  W  L 
Corby       W  W  L 
Dartford      W  W   L 
Elmet       W  W  L 
Erewash      W  W  L 
Falmouth & Camborne    W  L  L 
Forest of Dean     W  L  L 
Gedling      W  W  W 
Halesowen and Rowley Regis *   W  W  L 
Harwich      W  L  L 
Hastings & Rye     W  W  L 
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High Peak      W  W  L 
Keighley      W  W  L 
Kettering      W  L  L 
Lancaster & Wyre     W  W  L 
Medway      W  W  L 
Newark      L  L  L 
North Warwickshire *    W  W  L 
N W Leicestershire     W  W  L 
N W Norfolk      L  L  L 
Pendle *      W  W  L 
Redditch      W  W  L 
Rossendale & Darwen *    W  W  L 
Rugby & Kenilworth     W  L  L 
St. Alban’s      W  L  L 
Scarborough & Whitby    W  L  L 
Selby       W  W  L 
Sherwood *      W  W  L 
Shipley      W  L  L 
Shrewsbury & Atcham    W  L  L 
Sittingbourne & Sheppey    W  W  L 
South Derbyshire     W  W  L 
South Ribble      W  W  L 
South Thanet     W  W  L 
Stafford      W  W  L 
Stourbridge      W  W  L 
Stroud      W  W  L 
Tamworth *      W  W  L 
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The Wrekin      W  L  L 
Wansdyke      W  W  L 
Warwick & Leamington     W  W  L 
Wirral South *     W  W  W 
Wirral West      W  W  L 
Worcester      W  W  L 
Wyre Forest      L  L  L 
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Appendix 3 – The Labour Party manifestos and the sections on the 
countryside: 1997, 2001, 2005 & 2010 
1. Section on the countryside from the 1997 Labour manifesto ‘New 
Labour, new life for Britain’ 
Life in our countryside 
Labour recognises the special needs of people who live and work in rural areas. The 
Conservatives do not. Public services and transport services in rural areas must not 
be allowed to deteriorate. The Conservatives have tried to privatise the Post Office. 
We opposed that, in favour of a public Post Office providing a comprehensive 
service. Conservative plans would mean higher charges for letters and put rural post 
offices under threat. 
We favour a moratorium on large-scale sales of Forestry Commission land. We 
recognise that the countryside is a great natural asset, a part of our heritage which 
calls for careful stewardship. This must be balanced, however, with the needs of 
people who live and work in rural areas. 
The total failure of the Conservatives to manage the BSE crisis effectively and to 
secure any raising of the ban on British beef has wreaked havoc on the beef and 
dairy industries. The cost to the taxpayer so far is £3.5 billion. 
Labour aims to reform the Common Agricultural Policy to save money, to support the 
rural economy and enhance the environment. 
Our initiatives to link all schools to the information superhighway will ensure that 
children in rural areas have access to the best educational resources. 
Our policies include greater freedom for people to explore our open countryside. We 
will not, however, permit any abuse of a right to greater access. 
We will ensure greater protection for wildlife. We have advocated new measures to 
promote animal welfare, including a free vote in Parliament on whether hunting with 
hounds should be banned by legislation. 
Angling is Britain's most popular sport. Labour's anglers' charter affirms our long-
standing commitment to angling and to the objective of protecting the aquatic 
environment. 
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2. The 2001 Labour manifesto extracts on the countryside ‘Ambitions for 
Britain’ 
Rural Britain 
The recent outbreak of foot and mouth disease has caused strain and distress in 
rural areas. Labour’s priorities have been clear: to eradicate the disease as quickly 
and effectively as possible, to compensate those directly affected, and to protect the 
wider economy. As the number of new cases falls significantly, and the clean-up of 
infected areas gathers pace, we are committed to help the most affected regions 
with a recovery plan including advice on sustainable restocking, organic conversion, 
and early retirement and outgoer schemes. We will conduct a scientific review of 
how to prevent animal disease outbreaks from occurring in the future, and will 
introduce tough rules to back this up. But we must also learn some of the wider 
lessons. 
Agriculture and fishing  
Since the Second World War the economy of rural areas has undergone massive 
change. About two per cent of the national workforce are now employed in 
agriculture. But the industry is particularly important because of the links with food 
production, our landscape and our environment. Labour’s aim is to promote 
economic renewal with a sustainable future for farming, strengthened communities 
and sustainable land use. Short-term pressures need to be met. Since the early 
1990s, sectors of farming have been hard hit by BSE, the weakness of the Euro and 
falling world commodity prices. Labour has provided £1.35 billion in short-term relief 
for farmers, including aid for diversification, farm business advice, better marketing, 
small slaughterhouses and restructuring of the industry. We have minimised many 
regulatory burdens and improved the way food safety, environmental and animal 
health regulations are implemented. But British agriculture will only thrive in the 
longer term through a further, radical reorientation of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), away from distorting Europe-wide production subsidies towards more 
national responsibility for domestic farming, environmental and rural development 
priorities. CAP reform is now more possible; Labour’s engagement with the EU gives 
us the best chance of making it happen. We have begun the process of change with 
our farming strategy and our seven-year, £3 billion Rural Development Plans for 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Labour will expand this programme 
so farming can become more diverse and responsive to consumers, and produce in 
a way that sustains and improves the environment. We have already increased 
payments for organic conversion from £0.5 million to £18 million, and will increase 
them further. We have set up an independent, open and consumer-focused Food 
Standards Agency to ensure that all food meets the highest standards. We will argue 
for the extension of food labelling, to give consumers more choice. Genetically 
modified (GM) foods and crops have caused concern despite stringent safety 
checks. There should be high standards of safety – regulation must be strict, to 
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protect the environment and promote public health and consumer choice – but we 
must use science to establish the facts, the opportunities and the risks before taking 
final decisions in an open way. It is also important to reform the Common Fisheries 
Policy to preserve fish stocks for the future. In the short term, Labour is providing 
more than £60 million in structural funds over the next three years to help the 
industry, including a new decommissioning scheme while also tackling the problem 
of ‘quota-hoppers’.  
Economic renewal  
The economic hub of a rural area is often a thriving market town. That is why Labour 
is committing an extra £100 million of public and private funding over the next three 
years for the renewal of market towns. RDAs will be charged with renewal of rural as 
well as urban areas. We will support village life with rate relief for pubs, garages and 
shops, as well as farmers who diversify part of their activity into other enterprises. 
Tourism is a vital, growing industry for Britain, with 1.8 million employees, and links 
to the museums, arts and heritage that people want to enjoy. Quality is our platform 
– which is why we now have a unified grading scheme for hotels and guest houses 
in England, and new training and New Deal opportunities. We will support well-
targeted promotion, regional programmes linked to RDAs, and high-quality 
information via the internet. Traditional tourist resorts face special problems, so we 
have extended the assisted area map to include many seaside resorts and have 
negotiated an extension to the European Union regeneration funding so that seaside 
towns throughout the country can start rebuilding their economy.  
Rural life  
Labour is pledged to a rural services standard to set out specifically what rural 
people can expect from 21 public service providers – with annual auditing and 
commitments to service improvement. The rural school closure programme has been 
ended; 3,000 new, affordable homes a year are on the way; a £30 million police 
programme will help cut rural crime; £239 million over three years has been set 
aside for rural transport services; and the Post Office is now obliged to prevent 
closure of rural post offices except in unavoidable circumstances, with £270 million 
to help achieve this and recruit sub-postmasters. Labour is determined to protect 
Britain’s landscapes and wildlife. Planning, transport and energy policy all make a 
difference. We have also designated the first new national parks since 1948 and 
brought consensus to a large increase in access to open countryside. We will press 
ahead with an £8 billion programme for water companies to clean up rivers and 
minimise damage from waste. The dangers of coastal and inland flooding are now 
widely appreciated, and we are committed to investment in preventative solutions, 
including more sensitive use of agricultural land. We have increased the number of 
protected nature sites. We have also initiated important steps to improve animal 
welfare in Britain, and argued successfully for higher welfare standards for battery 
hens and pigs across the EU.  
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Leadership for the future  
Labour is committed to support our countryside and the people who live and work in 
it. We are committed to create a new department to lead renewal in rural areas – a 
Department for Rural Affairs. Independent and wide-ranging views are essential to 
the development of strategic and long-term policy. We will set up an independent 
commission to advise on how we create a sustainable, competitive and diverse 
farming and food sector within a thriving rural economy which advances 
environmental, health and animal welfare goals. 
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3. The 2005 Labour manifesto extracts on the countryside – ‘Britain – 
forward not back’ 
Thriving rural areas  
Since 1997, Labour has made it more difficult to close rural schools, put in £750 
million to support rural post offices and introduced a 50 per cent rate relief on village 
shops. Through our £51 million Rural Bus Subsidy Grant we have delivered over 
2,200 new bus services in rural areas this year.  
We set targets for the creation of affordable homes in rural areas,which we have now 
exceeded. We will explore how to ensure a proportion of all new housing 
development is made available and affordable to local residents and their families.  
Because of our success in achieving extensive reforms in the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), 2005 will be the first year for decades when farmers will be free to 
produce for the market and not simply for subsidy. We will continue to push for 
further reform of the CAP in the next Parliament, starting with the sugar regime.  
We will continue to promote the competitiveness of the whole food sector, and 
assure the safety and quality of its products. We will introduce an explicit policy for 
schools, hospitals and government offices to consider local sourcing of fresh 
produce. We will continue to improve the environmental performance of agriculture, 
rewarding every farmer in England for environmental protection and enhancement 
work through our new Stewardship schemes. We will also promote biomass, bio-
fuels and non-food crops. We will work to tackle diffuse water pollution through 
addressing impacts across water catchments without the costs falling on water 
customers.  
Under difficult circumstances, Labour is working with the fishing industry to create a 
sustainable long-term future for the fishing communities of the United Kingdom.  We 
have reformed the Common Fisheries Policy and will continue to protect the marine 
environment and ensure fish stocks and their exploitation are set at sustainable 
levels.  
We will introduce the Animal Welfare Bill as soon as possible in the new Parliament. 
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4. The 2010 Labour Manifesto extracts on the countryside ‘A future fair for 
all’ 
Valuing nature for everyone  
For millions of people the British countryside, and the parks and commons of our 
towns and cities, provide solace from the pressures of modern life. The riches of 
Britain’s biodiversity – our native species, both rare and commonplace – depend on 
them.  
We are committed not only to protecting but also to enhancing our natural 
environment, and enabling it to be enjoyed by all. The area of Green Belt has 
increased over the last decade – and we intend to sustain it. We will maintain the 
target that 60 per cent of new development should be on brownfield land. 
We have created two National Parks in the New Forest and South Downs, and given 
the public a Right to Roam our mountains, moors and heaths. We will now extend 
this to the whole English coastline.  
Competing pressures – from greater food production to housing and natural flood 
defences – are making the management of land resources ever more challenging. 
We will introduce a new framework for managing our land that can more effectively 
reconcile these pressures. We will put forward new areas for protected landscape 
and habitat status, focusing on green corridors and wildlife networks to link up 
existing sites. And we will commit to increasing the area covered by forest and 
woodland.  
Our air, rivers and beaches are now the cleanest they have been since the height of 
the industrial revolution. We will continue to ensure progress. Having doubled 
spending on flood defence over the last decade we will bring forward legislation to 
improve floods and water management.  
We have banned foxhunting and animal testing for cosmetics and tobacco, and we 
will bring forward further animal welfare measures. We will campaign internationally 
to end illegal trading in ivory and to protect species such as polar bears, seals and 
bluefin tuna, as well as for an EU-wide ban on illegally logged timber, banning it 
domestically if this does not succeed. 
Sustainable farming, healthy food  
We want British farming to be profitable and competitive. We need our farmers to 
produce more food, nurturing our countryside and biodiversity. We will continue to 
seek reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to facilitate the creation of 
fairer and better functioning agricultural markets, enabling farmers to return a 
reasonable profit from food production at lower cost to the consumer.  
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In order to protect farmers and food suppliers from unfair and uncompetitive 
practices by major retailers, we will create a Supermarket Ombudsman. Consumers 
have the right to know where food comes from. We are working with the food 
industry and retailers to ensure proper food labelling, including tougher and clearer 
‘country of origin’ information. This will also help to level the playing field for British 
farmers.  
An economically viable and environmentally sustainable fishing industry is vital for 
our coastal communities. We will push for fundamental reform of the EU Common 
Fisheries Policy 
Thriving rural communities  
Those who live in rural areas are entitled to excellent amenities and services, as are 
those who live in towns and cities. Rural communities face unique challenges. We 
are committed to continued investment in frontline services in rural areas.  
Already £3.9 billion is being spent on support for the rural economy and we will 
continue to provide specific support to rural businesses. We are building 10,000 
homes in rural areas up to 2011. We are protecting rural bus services and making it 
more difficult for rural schools to be closed.  
Rural businesses and communities must have the broadband connections they 
need. We are committed to universal broadband access, irrespective of location. The 
levy on fixed phone lines will pay for expansion of fast broadband connections to 
rural areas. 
Rural villages should never be left without essential services. Councils now have to 
ensure that the importance of local services to the community is taken into account 
before granting planning permission to change their use, and we will strengthen this 
to protect viable shops, pubs and community facilities. We will continue to encourage 
and support imaginative solutions in rural communities to the provision of locally 
owned services. 
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Appendix 4 - Description of Research Participants 
During the course of 2010, 2011 and 2012 some 139 interviews took place.  Some 
re-interviews occurred and also respondents provided supplementary material.  
Where more than one participant took place in the interviews I have only referred to 
that as one interview, likewise where I met someone or talked to them over the 
phone, or emailed them I have referred to that as one contact, and so there were 
actually more interviews that occurred than the number given. 
Ministers and Special Advisers 
8 ministers and 2 special advisers were interviewed.  All bar one of the ministers had 
direct responsibility for rural in government, and the individual who didn’t was a key 
member of the Backbench Group both before and after his period in office, and was 
in a position to be able to influence rural policy.  Ministers came from both the 
Commons and the Lords 
None of the Secretary of States or equivalent were interviewed as their involvement 
with rural was less direct.  However I have talked to them about rural issues when I 
was in Parliament, and have recalled some of the issues discussed. 
The 2 special advisers both had key responsibilities for rural, and were able to point 
me towards other sources of information which meant that I was able to draw upon 
some specific exemplars of the role and importance of SPADs. 
MPs, Lords, Councillors and Party Activists 
11 MPs and 4 members of the Lords were interviewed.  3 Councillors and 5 Party 
activists were also questioned, and some of these had also been Parliamentary 
Candidates. 
All the MPs bar one, were a member of the Rural Group, and were deliberately 
targeted for their particular knowledge of the activities of the Group.  This number 
included Bradley, who agreed to be directly quoted in the text, such was his 
importance to the exercise.  I also include reminisces from my time as a Select 
Committee member, because of the relevance of that to the enquiry, but these are 
not directly quoted, and the individuals concerned are not identified in any way. 
Besides the 3 councillors who were interviewed at length I have talked to many other 
councillors about their views and though not referred to directly their ideas and 
comments do provide a backcloth to the research.  Likewise the Party activists 
represent a much larger cross-section of opinion from which I have drawn evidence.  
This has included conversations with individuals from both Rural Revival and Labour 
Coast and Country to two representative bodies that lobby on behalf of rural issues 
within the Labour and Cooperative Parties.  Some activists wore more than one hat 
being both councillors and parliamentary candidates in rural areas, though they were 
principally interviewed because of their activist involvement. 
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Civil Servants 
8 civil servants were interviewed and one clerk to the Defra Select Committee.  The 
latter was chosen because he was involved in the enquiries into rural issues 
undertaken by the Committee.  The civil servants identified all had specific 
responsibility for rural and overall were the main players in the evolution of rural 
policy during New Labour’s period in office.   
Academics 
10 academics were interviewed.  All have or had a direct interest in rural affairs and 
were chosen because of their knowledge of the field.  Most of those interviewed also 
had a specific knowledge of the political aspects of countryside policy and the 
evolution of rural policy. 
Practitioners 
Respondents were divided into two groupings.  First there were those responsible for 
running national organisations, both within and outside of government, and second, 
those who were involved at a more local level, principally within Gloucestershire, and 
so well-known to me. 
47 interviews were undertaken of national figures and 40 of local elite individuals.  
Some people overlapped in that they may have had a national role and 
responsibilities but lived locally, and some who I have defined as local, had links with 
national organisations. 
Included within the national category were those who had been important in running 
countryside organisations or who had had a specific rural brief.  Amongst those 
located locally were representatives of planning, housing, education, health, 
transport, policing and the voluntary sector. 
A specific line of the enquiry became the requirement to better define what a rural 
constituency is.  With this in mind I met up on three occasions with Peter Bibby from 
Sheffield University who was tasked by government with providing a more adequate 
definition of rural.  He is quoted personally as he agreed to be referred to as such.  
Though he is an academic he has been working for government for the last fifteen 
years, and such is the importance of his work (along with John Shepherd) that he is 
named in the research and treated as a practitioner. 
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Appendix 5 - Traditional and modern definitions of the different types of 
constituency (see Chapter Four) 
Geographical or functional representation of the type of seat 
The most straightforward method, the information gathered from statistics that are 
readily available and easy to interrogate.  The source material is provided in the 
Office of National Statistics NOMIS database, which covers labour market and other 
related statistics collected from the census and other more up to date, data sets.60   
From the perspective of finding a rural constituency NOMIS permits a statistical 
search that ranks constituencies according to the level of sparseness of the 
population, or if seeking a functional analysis, how many people are employed in 
agriculture, as a percentage of the total employment.  Using this method does 
involve making assumptions about the validity or relevance of agricultural 
employment as a measure of rurality but it is at least a starting point for determining 
spatial and functional representation (Flynn 1989, Self & Storing 1962).   
The relevance of this approach was reinforced by the fact that when Bradley 
commissioned research from the House of Commons Library (Dewdney 1997a&b)61 
on the number of Labour MPs in rural and semi-rural constituencies as part of the 
launch of the Rural Group, the methodology used by the researcher drew directly on 
this method.  This gave the figure of 180 rural constituencies, although this refers to 
the total, rather than the number represented by Labour MPs, which was 51 and a 
further 54 in semi-rural seats.   
                                                          
60
 NOMIS database, ONS www.nomisweb.co.uk 
61
 The actual correspondence including the statistical evidence is in Appendix 1 
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Johnston et al (1997) have produced their own classifications of parliamentary 
constituencies, referring to clustering of features or variables, including defining rural 
seats by social class, functionality (such as a coal-mining area), number of retirees, 
and type of housing.  This formed the basis of research to explain New Labour’s 
landslide. 
Parliamentary division of seats into borough or county constituencies 
British Parliamentary seats are divided into either borough or county constituencies.  
Such designations predate the Great Reform Act of 1832 and have much to do with 
the way that Borough Status was achieved through the acquisition of a Royal 
Charter.  While this may seem an historical anachronism this description is still used 
today.  The Boundary Commission in its Fifth Review defined County Constituencies 
as places ‘with largely rural populations’ (2007), though in reality any constituency 
with a rural hinterland becomes a county constituency.  Therefore, the balance of 
county to borough constituencies has altered in favour of the former.  Again, such a 
designation remains rule of thumb rather than scientific.   
As Johnston states:  
There are no absolute rules derived from first principles and applicable in all 
circumstances.  The method of defining constituencies is very much a political 
decision…. the nature of the decision can have very significant electoral and 
political consequences (2001, p20). 
It remains unclear how the designation of a particular seat may affect its relative 
winnability by a particular party, but perceptions can still play a part in helping 
determine electoral outcomes. 
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Geodemographic segmentation of the electorate 
From the 1980s onwards, a new dynamic entered UK politics as British political 
parties employed the ideas and techniques of marketing, long the preserve of the US 
(Harris & Lock 2010, Lees-Marchment 2008, Newman 1999, Scammell 1999, Wring 
1996).  Though this did not alter the nature of constituencies, it resulted in political 
parties possessing a greater insight into the social make-up, views and prejudices of 
voters in rural seats, to assist in targeting support.   
Geodemographic segmentation is described as a multivariate statistical classification 
for discovering whether the individuals of a given population can be categorised into 
various groupings, usually based around income brackets, housing types, 
consumption patterns, or locations they inhabit.  The operation involving the 
allocation of people into specific taxonomies is then fine-tuned by making 
quantitative comparisons of the multiple characteristics that make up each of these, 
tested against other representative groupings.  The assumption is that intra-group 
differences will be much less salient than inter-group differences, so that a definite 
pattern of typologies arises.   
The Marketing Industry has made extensive use of this information over many 
decades, especially the application of algorithms to drill down to find the most 
appropriate fit for individuals within each category (Phillips et al 2010).  Political 
marketing merely adopted and adapted those techniques so that its own fields of 
study could be encapsulated within this new science. 
There is still some dispute about the effectiveness of these techniques (Bashford 
2015, Lees-Marchment 2004).  Used carefully they have the potential to change 
perceived relationships between leaders, parties and voters (Scammell 1999).  After 
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some initial hesitancy New Labour, enthusiastically embraced political marketing and 
used it extensively for its campaigning (Harris & Lock 2005, Webber 2006, Wring 
1996).   
Two major developments crystallised the advantages of these new techniques in the 
political world.  First, the creation of Geographic Information Systems, which allowed 
the tracking of individuals and groups, which after interpretation of the data became 
the basis for standardised classifications of people (Harris et al 2005, Pickles 1995).  
Second, the increasing sophistication of database management software allowed 
political parties to capture information about people on a mass scale, which can then 
be distilled and categorised to make assumptions about their future voting intentions, 
based on past political valences (Baines & Egan 2001, Jones 1997, Mancini 1999). 
Political marketing and market segmentation can take many different forms.  Here, 
the emphasis was how these techniques were employed in the battleground of 
marginal constituencies including in rural areas.  This has resonance with the 
rational choice theory of politics and especially resource-advantage theory whereby 
parties try to maximise the efficient allocation of resources to gain the best possible 
vote in those locations, gaining the greatest electoral benefit (Baines et al 2002, 
2003 & 2005, Webber 2006).   
The best-known geo-demographic systems operated in the UK are the ACORN 
system (A Classification of Residential Neighbourhoods), (Yorke & Meehan 1986) 
and the Experian MOSAIC UK system (Baines et al 2002, Butler & Harris 2009, 
Harris & Lock 2005, Lilleker et al 2006, Savigny 2005, Savigny & Temple 2010).  
MOSAIC was exclusively available to the Labour Party for political purposes and 
became a major tool in its campaigning activity.  In MOSAIC, populations are divided 
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into 15 main socio-economic groups and within these 67 different identikit types or 
sub-groups are established.   
Two of these socio-economic categorisations specifically refer to rural Britain; Group 
C Rural Solitude, and Group D Small Town Diversity.  Under these headings come a 
variety of sub-groups such as ‘squires amongst locals’, ‘country loving elders’ 
(previously called countryside guardians), ‘upland struggle’, and ‘jack of all trades’.62  
Whilst these labels may seem somewhat pejorative, their real purpose is to provide 
descriptors to help parties identify potential voters by segmentation of the electorate. 
Given the relative sparseness of population, more diverse neighbourhoods, and the 
greater difficulty in accessing and capturing sufficient quantitative data in rural areas, 
there remains a much less obvious read-over from standard definitions of identity-
type in rural areas than in urban centres.  Nevertheless Labour increasingly relied 
upon MOSAIC in seeking to add to its voter knowledge, even in rural constituencies.  
There was some tension between how the party centrally, and individual 
constituencies locally wanted to engage with aspects of direct marketing and market 
segmentation (Savigny 2005).  Pressure was placed upon candidates and campaign 
teams to draw upon and exploit this information source (interview with MP 7).   
Output Area Classification/Local Authority Districts 
New Labour’s determination to make evidence-based policy-making central to its 
operation is a consistent theme in this thesis. Therefore it was always searching for 
new ways of capturing and interpreting data, and was willing to commission work 
that would permit a better understanding of what was happening on the ground, and 
                                                          
62
 MOSAIC is subject to regular updating and enhancement by Experian as it grows and improves the 
level of sophistication of the data sets it uses.  Increasingly MOSAIC is employed with other software 
packages to speed up its application as a campaigning tool. 
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as a result how it could better target resources.  New Labour was willing to challenge 
preconceived ideas - for example that either it did not matter if there was little 
discrimination between types of area, as England was fundamentally an urban 
country (OECD 2011), or that the process was too difficult (Scott et al 2007).  Output 
Area (OA) based upon spatial analysis of different places was the result, divided up 
into individual Local Authority Districts (LAD).   
Work on OA classification started early in the second Blair administration and the 
research continues to the present day.  The review team established to pursue this 
work consisted of civil servants, representatives from government agencies and 
academics, and was led by the academics Shepherd and Bibby, and Allan of the 
Countryside Agency (interview with Bibby).  The purpose was to devise a much 
tighter definition of what a rural (and urban) area is.  The results of the research, 
whilst not being available in time for the Rural White Paper, did provide evidence that 
helped with the delivery of subsequent countryside policies, demonstrated in the 
Rural Strategy and elsewhere (Bibby & Shepherd 2004, Countryside Agency 2004, 
Defra 2004a&c and 2009a&b).  
The derivation of OA came from a spatial analysis that looked at settlement 
distribution or morphology, literally measuring the spaces between dwellings at 
different chosen distances, cross-checking this against census information, postcode 
access files and ordnance survey maps (Allen 2008, Bibby & Brindley 2013a&b, 
Pateman 2010/11, Rabe 2011).  From this, it was possible to devise relative sparsity 
of population in a specific area, referred to as output areas.  If more than 26 per cent 
of the population of an area was defined as rural because of the spatial distribution 
of the population in that geographical area then the area as a whole was designated 
as rural (CLG 2006).  There is also Super Output Areas (SOA). 
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OA classification  was very much a bottom-up approach to settlement designation, 
and in its raw form was applicable only to specific locations, and so of limited value 
to wider policy development (ONS 2008).  Consequently, the review team was 
encouraged to look at an alternative method, which aggregated their earlier findings 
to form a more definitive understanding of rural settlements.  Account was taken of 
additional features, specifically the context of a settlement, or closeness to other 
settlements, functionality, including employment and perceptions of residents, and 
attitude to rurality (Defra 2009a&b). 
This investigation focussed upon creating a better differentiation between urban and 
rural local government, though for parliamentary purposes, the process was more 
complex, and it was later applied only to constituencies (Defra 2005a, Department of 
Constitutional Affairs 2007, Shepherd 2006).   
Six types within the typology of District/Unitary Authority or Constituency were 
acknowledged.  These were later changed to better reflect that urban areas could be 
surrounded by significant rural hinterland, and to emphasise the role of hub towns on 
their rural populations (Bibby & Brindley 2014a&b).  The original definitions, with the 
re-designations in brackets were:   
 Major urban (Urban with major conurbation) 
 Large urban (Urban with minor conurbation) 
 Other urban (Urban with city and town) 
 Significantly rural – whereby at least 26 per cent of the population lived 
in rural areas (Urban with significant rural) 
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 Rural 50 – whereby at least 50 per cent of the population lived in rural 
areas (Mainly rural) 
 Rural 80 – whereby at least 80 per cent of the population lived in rural 
areas (Largely rural) 
The Countryside Agency initially, and Defra subsequently, became increasingly 
interested in drawing a distinction between urban and rural England and became 
adept at collecting and interpreting statistics (Defra 2002).  As one civil servant noted 
in the interviews; 
After 1997 there was a new interest in rural but very little knowledge or 
understanding of service delivery and how well policies were working.  To 
overcome possible conflict over policy and delivery there was a move for 
accurate statistics which is what Defra specialised in and became known for 
(interview with civil servant 8). 
OA/LAD classification played an important part in helping enhance that process, and 
Defra saw the value of applying data that would give a better understanding of rural 
areas.  
The relevance to this study of this development was the willingness of New Labour 
to bolster a greater comprehension of what constituted rural and then to use this 
knowledge to boost both policy-making and political engagement in the countryside.   
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Appendix 6 - Defra’s Aim and Objectives 2001 
Defra’s aim is: 
Sustainable development, which means a better quality of life for everyone, now and 
for generations to come, including: 
 A better environment at home and internationally, and sustainable use of 
natural resources; 
 Economic prosperity through sustainable farming, fishing, food, water and 
other industries that meet consumers’ requirements; 
 Thriving economies and communities in rural areas and a countryside for all 
to enjoy. 
Objective 1 
To protect and improve the rural, urban, marine and global environment and 
conserve and enhance biodiversity, and lead integration of these with other policies 
across Government and internationally. 
Objective 2 
To enhance opportunity and tackle social exclusion through promoting sustainable 
rural areas with a dynamic and inclusive economy, strong rural communities and fair 
access to services. 
Objective 3 
To promote a sustainable, competitive and safe food supply chain which meets 
consumers’ requirements. 
Objective 4 
To improve enjoyment of an attractive and well-managed countryside for all. 
Objective 5 
To promote sustainable, diverse, modern and adaptable farming through domestic 
and international actions and further ambitious CAP reform. 
Objective 6 
To promote sustainable management and prudent use of natural resources 
domestically and internationally. 
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Objective 7 
To protect the public’s interest in relation to environmental impacts and health, 
including in relation to diseases which can be transmitted through food, water and 
animals and to ensure high standards of animal health and welfare. 
